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PREFACE
This dissertation is a study of the German Catholic Center Party trom the
November Revolution 1918 to the adoption of the Weimar Constitution, August

1919. It attempts to determine the effectiveness of political Catholici8Dl in
helping to solve the problems of the chaotic conditions after the German
Revolution ot 1918 which witnessed the overthrow of the empire, thrones, aray,
and dynasties.

Besides examining the socio-econoaic composition ot the Party,

this study endeavors to delineate the Party's ideology and program in adjusting
to the new revolutionar.y conditions as an active member in the Weillar Coalition
government.

The focal point ot consideratiOD in this study is the role of the

Center in formula tin, the three major tasks lUldertaken 'bT the National Assembly':
na_ly, the creation of a legal government, the conclusion of the peace negotiations, and the framiDg ot a democratic constitution tor the German Republic.
Necessar117 involved in this triple action of the Party are the internal conflicts within it, which are given as much con.ideration as available source.
warrant.
Since mo.t of the intoraation i. drawn frca German sources , it wa. nece••ary tor the writer of thi. dissertation to make her own translations.
Throughout the dissertation, theretore, unless otherwise indicated, all translations are the author's own.
Very special thanks are due to Dr. Raymond H. Schmandt for his kindness
and invaluable assistance in helping make this project a reality.
iv

p

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

LIFE • • • • • •
ffiEFACE

II:

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

••

• • • • • • •. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • • •

oj

LIST OF TABLES • • • • • • • • • • • • ••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
INTRODUCTION •• •

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

i11
iv

vii
1

Origins ot the Center Party--Formatlon, 8tructure, and
growth ot the Party--Ideology and program ot the Party-Zentrumastrei\--Tensions ~th1n Party due to growth ot
democratic and progre88ive element8.
Chapter
I. PARTY ACTIVITY BETWEEN REVOLUTION AND F..LECTION DAY • • • •• •

•

24

ELF.cTION TO THE NATIWL AS5»tBLY: ANALYSIS OF CENTRIST RETURNS
AND ATTITUDES • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • •
• • • •

82

Party'. attitude toward monarchy prior to Revolution-Reaction ot Center to the November Revolution--Reorganisation ot Center Party'. national 8tructure--Plans tor
Center's prograa--Father Braun8' plan--Cologne Plan-Berlin Plan--Hotfmann'e new Kulturkampt--Separatl8t movement in the Rhineland--Final acceptance ot Par~ platlora-Election rally and campaign.
II.

e"

."

•

•

Prepara Uon for election to the National A88emblyElection to the National Assembly--Analysis ot Party
8trength in electoral districta--AnalyBis of political
and 8ocio-econam.ic views of delegate8--View8 ot Center
on revolution and republ1c--Formation of Center' 8 board
ot directol'8--View8 on entering a coal1 tion government.
III.

THE CENTF..R PARTY IN THE WEIMAR COALITION: PROBLEMS OF THE PEACE
NEOOTIA TIONS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Convening ot the National Assembly--Centr1st partiCipation in the work ot the National Assembly--Centri8t view8
on dOll1e8tic program-Centri8t view8 on foreign policy-v

114

•
Centrist role in the peace negotLations--Attack on
Erzberger's armistice terms--Reaction to peace treaty-Crisis in government aver acceptance ot peace terms-';'
Centrist acceptance ot Versailles Treaty.
IV.

ON THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTION: CENTRIST VIEWS ON
POLITICAL ASPECTS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••

Dfa~BERATIONS

1$7

Formation ot cansti tutional dratt--Ccaposi tion and work or
consti tutional cammi ttee--centrist views on Section II
Political aspects ot constitution-Deliberations on
Articles 1-18--Republic versus a monarchy--Contl1ct aver
change ot national tlag--Contlict over tederal venus
unitary gcwermnent--New arrangement ot Llnder-..centrist
views on parU tion ot Prussia--Survey of separa tist movements in the ?russian provinces--Evaluation ot Centrist
role on the political aspects ot the constitution.

v.

DELIBERATIONS ON THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTloth CENTRIST VIEWS (II
CIVIC, RELIGIOUS, AND CULTURAL ASPECTS • • • • • • • • • ••

188

Sohema on the Grundrechte--Work ot the aubcOl'lllllittee-Section I, "The Iiicllv1.dual"--5ection n, "Community Lite"-Section III, "Religion and Religious Societies"-.Controversy
over Church-State relations--8ection IV, "Education and
Schools"--Centrist struggle tor retention ot contessional
schools--Weimar achool compromises.
VI.

CENTRIST VIEWS ON
••••••••••••••••••••••

DELIBEfiATIONS ON THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTIOlh

ECON()1IC ASPJ!X::TS

231

Centrist socio-economic goals in election campaign--Pesch's
views on Christian Solidar1sm--Centrist delegates' views on
social and economic reforms in constitutional committee and
National Assembly--Centrists on socialization laws and
nationalization--Centrist influence on the economic section-Final vote and acceptance ot constitution--Evaluation of
Center's role in the National Assembly.
VII. CONCWSION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Summary and appraisal ot the role ot the Center Party trom
the November Revolution to the adoption ot the Weimar
Constitution--Appraisal ot the Weimar Constitution-Criticism ot the work ot the Centrist delegates.
BIBLIOORAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

vi

269

p

LIST OF TABLES

Table

Page

I.

Election Returna tor the National Assembly, 1919 • • • • • • • ••

88

II.

Election Results tor National Assembly, January, 1919, Acoording
to Distric tEl • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

93

Occupational Breakdown of Centrist Delegates • • • • • • • • • • •

9,

Centrists Elected to the National Assembly, 1919 • • • • • • • •

97

III.
IV.
V.
VI.

Vote on the Hew nag, July 3, 1919 • • • • • •

• • • ••• • • • • 169

Center Vote on the Constitution, July 31, 1919 •

vii

•

•

•

•

c

• • •

c

•

2,1

p

-------------------------------------.
INTRODUCTION
Germany in the fall of 1918 presented a woeful picture of frustration and
unsuccessful offensives on the front and hunger, hardship, and general dissatisfaction at home.

Four long years of fighting had left the people weary and

discontentedJ defeatism and radical agitation were evident everywhere.

Hence,

it was not surprising that the November Revolution with its abdication of the
Kaiser, the toppling of thrones allover Germany, and the establishment of the
Republic, was effected with relative ease.

Democracy had been prescribed as

the solvent for all Germany's problelllS--better days beckoned just beyond the
democratic horizon.

But the new governaent was socialistic, workers' and sol-

diers' councils held the reign.

The political situation was precarious.

To

bring order out of chaos, a lational Constituent Assembly was demanded to guar-

antee a truly democratic government for the German people.

Under such cireUII-

stances, old political parties revamped their programs and new parties were
fomed in order to adjust to the JIlOre recent political, 8ocial, and economic
conditions.

Along with all the others, the Catholic Center Party sought to

..rshal its members behind its revised political directives and prepared to
play its role in the formation of the new democratic government.
The energetic part played by the Center in the establishment of the
Weimar Republic cannot be understood without some knowledge of its past history
Bnd basic ideology.

I1.cal sphere.

The Center Party of 1918 was no apprentice in the polit-

It had been educated and tested by almost fitty years ot struggle.

1

2

rounded in 1870 by a group ot Catholic 11leJlbers

ot

the ?russian Landt8g who were

concerned about the consequences tor Catholici8lll and political and cultural
pollcies, the Party sought to defend the constitutional rights of German
Catholics.

The following year it expanded its aims to include representatives

to the first Reichetag of the newly organised German Reich. l

CODling as a response to cert.ain specific and uniQ.ue teatures ot German
deYelopment, the Center Party retlected a political Catbollcism which had been
active in Germany since the time ot Joseph G3rres in the l820-s.

Called to

lFor a comprehensive and detailed history ot the Center Party, see Karl
Bachem, Vor schichte Geschichte und Politik der deutschen Zentruma artei,
9 yols.
K I
•
•
chem, 92 - 32.
e most recent history ot the
Party is the excellent work by Rudolf Morsey, Die Deutsche Zentrum!p!rtei 19171923 (Dllsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1966). (Work on this dissertation was well
on its way betore the publication ot Morseyls book.) A briet study ot the political structure ot the ~rty is given in Friederich Dessauer, Das Zentrum
(Berlin: Pan-Verlagagesellschatt, 1931), Joset Joos, Die tilitiacbe Ideenwelt
des Zentrums (Karlsruhe: G. Braum, 1928), and Johannes Sc utt, Die dedschen
latholiken und die zentruJl8~rtei (Kolna J. P. Bachem, 1928). OEIier a1llpaihetIc hIstories are karlbbeIm, Geschichte der cbristlichen Parteien in
Deutschland (Mllnchen. Kasel-Verlag, 1953) J LUdWIg Bergstrlsser, GesciiIchte der
iCntlschen Parteien in Deutschland (5th ed., Manchen: G. Olsog, 1955) KarlA.
hUlte, ed. NatIonale lr'biit: Dis Zentrum und sein Wirken in der Deutschen
R;:lik (Berlliit Wilhelm Andermann, 1929), Martin Spahn, Das deutsche Zentrum
(
hen: Kirchhe1ll'sche, Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1906), HanlS Broermann and Karl
Grobbel, Unterm Zentrumsbannerl Dokulllente sur Zei eschichte (Berlinl Weckruf'
Verlag, 192 ,Woltgang Treue, Deutsche Partei ro raDIU
9 1-19$6 (03ttingen.
Munsterscbmidt-Verlag, 19$6).
ced
ev s
ven y gar Alexander,
"Church and Society in Germany," Church and Societ I Catholic Social and Political Tho ht and Movement 178 , ed. Jose
• oody ew York, Arts,
.,
3 and R 0
Morsel", "D e Deutsche ZentrUJUparte1, It Das End. der
Parteien, ed. Erich Matthias and Rudoll Morsey- (Dliaseldorla Droste VerIig,
1960). Also usetul is Edward J. Dunne, "The German Center Party in &Dpire and
Republic, A Study in the Crisis ot Deaocracy,1I (unpublished Ph.D. dissertat.1.tm,
Dept. ot History, Georgetown University, 1950). The toll owing guides are helpful. Georg Schreiber, "Eine Dbersicht sur Literatur der Zentrumspartei t{h. die
Jahre 1914-1923" Die Politik des Deutachen Reiches,Politisch8s Jabrbuch I
M.-Gladbach, Volksvere1nner18g, 1925) J Bruno Gebhardt, Handbuch der Deutschen
Geschichte (III, IV, 8th ed.) Stuttgart: Union Verlag, 1959) and bah1mann¥;ll!l~:¥.enkunde der deutschen Geschichte (9th
Leipsigl K. F. koehler,

ed.,

""

3
Munioh in 1827 a8 profes80r of history, J08eph oarres
had became the inspira"
tion for a group ot Catholio intellectuals and politioians whioh developed organiBed Catholic political action ill Germany.

" •• ' puphlet, "Athana'iUIJ,"
Gorr

written in protest against the 1mpri80lllllent of the Archbi8hop ot Cologne, vas
the great clarion call for political equalit7 of Catholic. and tor the freedom

ot the Catholic Church. The idea8 expre8sed in thia publica tion provided. a
!IOdel for the adjustment of traditional Catholiciam. to modem political and
social conditions.
These same policies were further developed by a group ot southern Qel"llUlD
Catholic democrats active in the Frankfurt Assembly ot 1848.

Theee men organ-

ized a union called the Piusverein which advocated along with its Easedeutech
policy the protection of the autonoay of the German states against an7 strong
centralization movement which might threaten the position ot the Catholic
Church in Germany.

The group chose as its slogan, "Freiheit del' Kirche im

Staatel .. 2
Ot special importance tor the later development

ot the Center Party was

the work of a loosely organized group ot Ca tholic parliamentarians in the
PrUIJsian Landtag.

In 18$2, HeJ'll8lUl von Mallinckrodt3 and the Reich.n.berger

2,A survey of the ll-ckground and formation of the Center Party can be
in Ludwig Bergstra88er, Studien zur Vorgeschichte del' Zentrum8partei
(TUbingenr J. C. B. Mohr, 1910).

to~d

-llermann von Mallinckrodt (1821-1874) attended the univer8ities of Berlin
and Bonn. After practicing law tr<* 1842-1848, he entered the Prussian Landtag
in 18$2 and served there until 1863. He was elected to the Diet of the North
German Conrederation in 1866, but returned to the Pruasian LRndtag in 1868. He
beoa_ the head ot the Center Part7 in the PrWJsian Landtag and the Raich.tsg
in 1870. As a brilliant parliamentarian he bitterly opposed anti-clerioal legi~tion untU his untime17 death in the midst ot the Kulturkampt. See otto
Plout, Hermann von Mallinclcrodt. Die Geachichte aeinea Leben. (Freiburg-iaBreisgaul Herder, 1901).

brothers" August and Peter,,4 who were to become the co-founders ot the Center

Part,., fOl'lll8d a Catholic faction (Katholischen Frakt1on) to tight tor the protection of the Catholic Church against the interterence ot state sovereignty.
Such aotivation tended to characteri.e the party as being predCJllinantly a cont ••• ional group.

live

This, however, was not the wish of the leaders who strewe to

their taction a purely political rather than a cantessional character.

Accordingly, they stres.ed political goals for the psrt7 and changed ita name
111 18,9, to the "Faction of the Center" (Fraktion des Zent.rume) which signified

the place they occupied in the cha.ber.

Despite their efforts" the transtorma-

tion troa a confessional to a political faction was not entirely successful.
Moreover" the less.ning ot Church-5tate tensions as well .s the political disunity of the representatives brought this precursor ot the Center Party to an
inauspicious end.
After the election ot 1866" the Catholic faction as such ceased to exist.
Thus, the interlude between 1867-1870, allowed time for serious retlection and
concentration of effort on the part ot Catholic parliamentarians. Already the
dark, threatening clouds on the political horizon warned ot a coming great confiict tor the Catholics in Germany.

In 1866, the outcome

ot the Austro-Prussian

war, the exclusion of Catholic Austria from the Germanic Contederation, lett
the Catholics ot South Ge1"Jl8ny at the mercy of the predominantly Protestant
Horth German Contederation.

The avowed anti-clericalism ot both the National

4August Reichensberger (1808-189,) studied at Bonn, Heidelberg, and
Berlin. From 1848-188, he was an active parliamentarian in the Frankfurt
Assembly! Prussian Landtag, Prussian Herrenhaus (18.$1-1863)" and the Reichstag
(1871-18t:t4). His brother Peter (181$-1892) studied at Bonn and Heidelberg.
L1ke August he was an author and parliamentarian in the Reichstag from 1871
untU his death. 5ee Ludwig Pastor" August Reichensberger, 2 vols. (Freiburg1a-Breisgau; Herder, 1899).

Liberals and the ProgressiYe parties alarmed the Catholics regarding' their position in the new Reich and _de thea eepeciall7 teartul of state control of
education.

The need for a "Catholic tront" or at least tor an organised stand

against these encroachments vas evident.

Leaders ot the old Center taction re-

sponded to the emergene,.. by issuing a call tor the tonaation ot a new Catholic
party".

In October, 1870, atter seyeral months

ot discussion, the group pub-

lished the so-called Soest Program which they later adopted as the plattorm tor
the new party.
Beginning wi tb the slogan, "For Truth, Justice, and Liberty, It the progru
listed nine basic prinCiples.
1.

Presenation ot the independence and the rights of the Church

2.

Pari ty of all recognised religious denOllinations

).

Opposition to civil marriages

4. Confessional schools
S. Creation ot a Bundesstaat, with autonam)" ot the separate
states

6. Decentralization ot ada1nistration
7. Reduction of expenditures and equal distribution of the
tax burden
8.

Haraon1zing ot the interests ot capital with those ot the
landowners and ot both ot these with the interests ot
labor b7 aeans ot the support ot a stlll'd7 II1ddle class

9.

Freedam tor all attempts to solve the social problelU that
do not deYiate fram the law, and legislatiye elimination
of those evils which threatenr:<to bring about the lIOnl and
ph;ysical ruin ot the workers.~

This program indicated the part)"'s desire ot not .erel;y defending the rights oj

SWdwi~ Bergstrl.ser, Dar poli tische JCa thollsi_us I Dokuaente seiner
F'.r1tw1cklung (M&chen: Drei Hasken Verag, 1§2j) 11, 27-28.

p
6
the German Catholics, but of Heting also the political, social, and' economic
needs of its

constituenta~

The basic principles of the Soest Program remained

in torce as the Catholic plattora.

The new Center Party was not to contine ita activities to Prussia alone.
Ita _bers were detendned to gain representation in the Imperial Reichatag
which was to haft ita first session in the spring of 18n. ,An appeal was ..de
to the general electorate.

The votes ot the southem states were easily gained

because of their tear tor the tate of the Church in the newly-established
Protestant eap1re.

In areas where the religious issue bad no appeal, the

Center advocates were able to win votes by stressing the tear of oyercentralisation in Berlin and the cOlllpl.ete sinking of the nationality ot the
nr101l8 states into that ot a united Qel"lll8DY.

As a result, the Catholic and

particularist poliCies were united, an<! so "ultruontanes,· Poles, Guelphs, and
later the French ot A1Ace-Lorraine, in tact, flYery opponent ot nationali_ .
helped the Center on to victory at the polls in the election ot March, 1871.
It was not, however, until the end ot March that the party was formally organi.ed at a Meting in Berlin called tor that purpose.
The tirst election under the Soest Progr811l was a great auecess tor the
Center or Constitutional Party (Vertassqspartei), as it was also named.
Sixty-three delegates representing 18.6% ot the entire vote entered the
Reichstag carrying the Center's banner.

Under the able leadership of the

Hanoverian Ludwig Windthoret, the Center was to beccae a tormidable political
iutruaent in the bands ot i te clear-sighted, detera1ned Mabere. 6

6Ludwig Windthorst (1812-1891) studied at G8ttingen and Heidelberg.
nectecl president of the .econd chamber ot the Hanoverian legislature in 18,1,
he lett this position two years later when he was appointed Minister ot Justice
111 the cabinet ot George V. He held this new position until 1866 when he wa.

~--------------------------~
7

No sooner had the new Center Party taken ita place in the Reiohsteg, when
B1PS rck launched his oftens1:ve.

In his opinion, the part.icularin of the

catholic Church and ita identification with separatist currents within the
Reioh jeopardized the newly' won German un1 ty and exposed the empire to the
danger of COII.plete disintegration. Bi8ll8rck's lulturltaapt or his war against
the catholic ad"f'8rsaries began with the removal of the special division tor
Catholios in the Pruas1an Ministr,y of aeligioUB Atfairs. 7 Then csae penal laws
a,aiJ18t priests preaching the inviolability ot the rights of the Church.
suppression of the Jesuits was the next calam t:r.

The

The climax ot th1a escalating

penteoution was reaohed with the prcaulgation of the anti-Catholic ·Ma,. aws,·
introduced by the Pruasian Minister ot Religious AffairS, Adalbert 'alk.

These

laws virtuall,. crippled Catholic education in Germany and wiped out all reuin-

iDe guarantees ot the Pruasian Constitution ot 18;0 which bad sateguarded the
Catholic Church aocording to the principle ot fta tree Church in a tree Ste te ••
Through the decade ot the 1870' s the Center played the role ot a strong
opposition part,. in the Re1ohetag.

Fighting diligentl,. to keep the Church

elected to the Pruasian andtag and to the Reichetag ot the North Gerun
Contederation. Atter the death ot Mallinckrodt in 1674 he became the leader
ot the .Center in the Reichstag and reuined head ot the party untU his death.
l ..ster political strategist, he vas one ot the tiercest opponents ot B1smarok
in the Reichstag. Windthorst vas adept in the management ot .en, an excellent
~lIdge ot.character and one ot the b!st parl1aaentar;r debaters or his t1ae. See
~rd Husgen, Ludwig Windthorst (181111 J. P. Bache., 1911).

7..s yet there is no reall;y thorough and fully satiafacto17 work on the

lKulturkulpt. A hand,. SUlllll8r;y ot the latest publications can be found in the
!critical review by Rudolf LUl, "Dar ltulturk_pt in Deutschland. Bemerkungen
!au eiDer neuen Darstellung," in . .en UDd. ,orschR!en aus 1tal1en1schen
~rchlven unci Bibl1otheken, ~I (Hb1iiienl
li.eyer terLg, 1963),
~_. 571.-)Yl..
Th1s renew is severely critical ot the lateat work: by Erich
~ba1dt-'olkmar, Dar Kulturkaapt in Deutschland, 1871-1890. (G8ttingeDI
~uater.Chm1dt-Verla" 1963'.

IIJI_---------------:l
8

tree from state dOlllination, the Centri.ts systeaatically attacked every piece
ot anti-clerical legislation discussed in the Reichstag.

Government successes

vere purchased at the price of a bitter parliamentary struggl..

Neverthele.s,

tile Kulturkampf enabled the Center to eaerg. trem the conflict the best-disoiplined, the MOst powerfully organized, and the strongest single party in
Oel'lUUlY.

Moreover, the conflict served to make Catholics in Oel'll8ny realise

eTen .ore the need for such a party, for it was evident that the Center's
W.ltanschauung cut across class barrien, making it literally a party for the
..s.... Since 18n the Center had deYeloped a Catholic pres. with Oeraania,
pUbli.hed in Berlin, a. ita otticial organ, and other similar publicati0D8 for
the Rhineland and the South. 8

Eaerging trCII the struggle of the lCulturlauapt

and aided by the new freedOil of assembly, press, and suttrage, the Center be-

e... a regular popular party even employing popular .logau. Such a d.....lopaent was understandable since political Catholicism, as .xemplified by the
C.ntrists, was basically in cont01'llity with the fundamental idea. ot a
delllOCratic-liberal treedc:a in political and cultural life.
Because ot the party structure and i tat principl.s the Center soon attained, and alwayB kept, the position ot strategic center between the parties
ot the Right and Lett.

Un11lce JJlO8t other partie. ot the German Reich.tag, the

cOlllposition of the Center Party followed ideological rather than .ocial or
class lines.

It _braced people tre. all walks of lite.

Included in ita

"8other iIlportant Catholic newspapers were the ICSlnische VOlks.eit~1

~esttal1scher MerJcur in Mllnater, Sehles18che Volks.eng in lr.al8u, Maler

~ournall Asr:er Postzeitungl Der BBdlseher Beobachter in Karlsruhe, Das
uteche Vo b tt iii Stuttgart. In 1871 there wa. a total ot 126 C.nt:rI'it
newspapers W1.th a total circulation ot 322,000, by 1912 this had increased to
446 papers and 2,624,900 circulation. See Bach.., ZentrUIIspartei, III,lSS.

~----------------------------~9
..,mership were great landowners and lowly peaaants, industrial magnates and
tactory workers, bankers, shopkeepers, protessional men, and arti8an8.

Under

the un1f'71DI yet loose bond ot religious attachment, it cCRb1ned se""ng17 divergent streaDlS ot ccmservatism, llberalism, and radical social retorm.

Span-

ning the cross-currents of ideas and social forces, it purposely shunned any
extreae and doctrinaire positions.

To meet the needa of such a diversified

representation, neoeaaity d8llAnded a tlexible socio-econoaic policy. COIlsequently, the Party freely applied the baaic principles ot the Soast ProgrUl,
adjusted them to changing ideaa of the t1Dlea, and thus realistically and oontinuously redetined its own position.

Because of auch a course ot action, the

Center at taes was denounced b1 ita opponents as an 'WUIcrupulous, unpr1Do1pled
opportunistic power group.
As the deeade ot the 1870's drew to an end, it bee... apparent that the
lulturkampf was deereaaing in strength and 1 t se_ed as it the strained relationship between Biaarck and the Center Party might be 1mproved.

The gov-

e1'DMnt's change tr<ma tree trade to proteotion in 1879 had oost Biaarck the
support ot the Naticmal Liberala. Such a tranaition was greeted favorably by
the Centrists who represented,

-one

others, large agrarian interests eager to

have their tara products protected by tarift legislation.

other tactors also

tended to eaae the tension between the Centrists and Bismarck.

The German

alliance with Catholic Austria on the one hand, and the strong anti-olerioal
pollcies of republioan rrance on the other compelled the Center Party to

SlJR)Ort

Bi8lllarck's toreign policy. WhUe ai_ret had at first feared the sooial demands ot the Center, he now began to see their usefulness in sucoesstull.7 wean-

iDe away many

of the working claases trOll the acre hated socialist aovement.

Furthel'llore, sinoe Bi8ll8l"Ok planned no further extension of cent.ralised

..,--+-,.

10
.inCe the Church que.tion va. no longer a matter ot strong controYers,., and
.ince it was po.sible to grant reasonable concessions to Catholic worker., the
Iron Chancellor was now w11l1ng to cooperate wi tb the Center Party in the
.icbatag.
The Centrists capitalized on this change ot attitudes and labored unceasingly in the 1880'. to raoye the obnoxioWl lulturkalllpt legi.lation.

Bit

b7 bit, they were able to obtain the rtrris10n at manY' at the anti-clerical
lavs. Although the German govemaent kept the anti-Jesuit laws and retained
the right to .upem•• Catholic education and to approve clerical appointaentll,

oonditions had generally iaproved by 1887.

From this t1lle onward the Center

uuall7 tollowed a cons.native course, becOJDing staunch supporters ot the
Reich!s program except in polici•• which contlicted with the 8oe.t Program.
Ilotvitb.tanding, Bismarck retained. his JJd..tru8t ot the Centrists and took care
Il.....r to be in the po.i tion ot being depend.nt upon their eupport.
58"f'ertheles., during the Wilhel.m1an epoch and al.o later, the Center c _

w achieve

precisely th. position vhi.ch li8ll8rek teareel.

The greater the in-

cr.... in the r.presentation ot the Social Democrats, the grea ter bee_ the
iaportanoe ot the Center Party as the holder ot the balance ot power in the
Reichatag.

Betw.en l89S and 1906, the Center was the chiet support of the ill-

penal government, and £rca 1907 onward there was never a pernment _jori t7
1d.thout the Center.

With ita fairly stable repres.nta tion ot about one hundred

depuUe. and its veU-disciplined party organbaUon, the Center bee... the
poll tical arbiter ot OermaD7.
It was only' 10glc8l that the Center should tollow a middle oourse, haYing
.e it did .uoh a close mutual interaction ot political and .ocial Ca'thol1oin.

~-.------------------------~
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!be equalising of social interests between the property owners and the prop8l'1i71ess , and the equalisation of political interests between the strong and
the ..ak, (protecting ainority- groups), helped to give the Center a certain

elaaticity- and adaptability.
a positive contribution.

In the field of social legislation the Party- made

Throughout its h1stor,y the Centrists worked indefati-

pb17 toward the atta1mn.ent of social ideals.

They- were a vi tal factor keeping

betore the 878s of QeruD7 the Catholic idea ot social justice and social charity. Social retoN was an important plank in the Party program 1'roJIl 18n
omrard.

In 1876 • social plank in the Party's prograa included provisions tor

a Sunday- holiday, regulation of the yearB and tel'll8 ot an apprenticeship, protection of factory workers, l.iJIl1tation ot hours of work for 'W01Il8n, l.1aiting and
protection of ohild labor and the establishment of an arbitral tribunal to
settle disputes between labor and capital.

Later, part:Qr due to ita s0010-

econOJllic progrUl ot 1894, the Center was able to achieve protective legislation
tor the workers and social insurance sch...s, protective trade leg1.lat.ion and
fiscal polleiea which attempted to regulate an equitable balance between the
interesta ot induatr,y and agriculture. 9 While advocating more labor legislation, the Center alwa;ya rauined bitterly hoatile to sociali_.
In tult111ing ita responsibilities and duties towards all cla.ses ot

people, the Center turthered legislation that protected such minority groupe
a. the Poles and the oitisens of Aleace-Lorraine.

In mUter,y .nd colonial

policie. the Party- took a crt tical poSition, positive on principle but alwa78
S70r SOll18 of the party's socio-econcm1c programs, see Wolf'gang Treue,
Deutsche parteiPrniramme, 1861-1956. A helpful survey of the histar,y of the
~enteri s aoclal a
econcale poliCIes is given in Lorellll Zach,
Jahre ZentJ.wi
¥trtaChafts-und Sosialpolitik 1m Reichatag. 1871-1921 (Berlinreraanla,

2g

§21).

....
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trJ'iDI

to llmit a1litari_ and imperialism.

Thi. position .t Umes o.used the

center to sutter the los. ot its parl.1am.ntary 1ntluenc., as in 1884, 1893, and

1907 but u.ually not to any grea t degree .10 Pur.uing polici.. ot the middle
otten c.used violent tensions within the Center Party.

On the whole the larg.r

PrUB81an taction was usually more conservative in 1 ts outlook than th. 81IUlU.r
nuab.r ot democraticall)" inclined nan-Prusi.n. of H•••• , Baden, .nd wlrttembe1g.
Despite the Party's well-disoiplined organi•• tion, the.e int.rnal contllcts were otten reflected in the C.ntri.ts' .ttitudes. Id.oloaio.ll)" its
aabership was united and r.ady to taoe any •••• ult upon the treedc. ot the
Church.

This v.s the source ot ita .trength during th. Kulturkaapt.

polit1cal _tters th.r. w.re sharp divergenc.s witb1n the Party.

But on

rus beoame

.pparent .specially in the period between th. turn ot the century .nd the outbre.k ot the war.

At times there were strained relations between the Centr1ats

111 the Raichetag .nd those in the Catholic Workers Associations and the
Chrietian Trade UniOl18.
During the reign ot WUlia II the leadership ot the party vas e ••enUall)" cODServative.

The Party was in the hand. ot a group ot Catholic civil

serYant. who adopted a .taUllOh attitude in support ot the e:rlsting political
.ituation in Geruny.

!viDe partie. was

The Center'. alignaent with the goverment and the righ'-

traoeable to its tear ot the rapidly grovilll populari t)" ot the

Social Democratic Part)" in Germany.

Bureaucrats, landowner., clergymen, and

prote.sional men .upplied the political id.a. and leadership ot the Catholio
oOlllllmity. Suspioious ot the restle•• prol.tarian element 1n the Party, the
lo,or an excellent cov.rage ot this period, see John K. Zeender, "The
German Center Part.y and the Growth ot Gerun .. tional Power, 1890-1906" (unpublished Ph.D, dissertation, Dept. ot H1story, Yale University, 19S2).

13
leadere along with the Oerman hierarchy believed tha t the Ca tholic minority and
the Church would sutfer if the semi-absoll1te monarchy' would ever be replaced bJ
a deaocratic state similar to England or France.

Unwilling, therefore, to work

with the left-wing parties for the democratbation of Germany, the Center con-

tinued to support the aonarchy and its older parliamentary allies.
It

wa. not surprising that a progressive and democraticallT inclined

liberal faction should . .rge within the Party.

The complaoent attitude of

the oonservative "old guard" irked this newer faotion.

The leadership of the

liberal faotion was ass.ed by a younc energetio politician trCD Wtlrttemberg,
Matthias Erl!lberger. ll B7 1907 he had becCllA8 one of the most coneplouoUB .....
bers of his Party. .As head of the left-wing faction he wanted to draw the
Center closer to the more progressive politioal groups.
This ag1 tation coinoided also with an increased tendency to convert the

Party into more than a confes.ional organiBation and to open its doors to _.ber. of other religious groups.

The Oerman Christian Trade Union had been able

to establish an interconfe.sional basi. tor its organiution by 1899.

In at-

tempting to do the .ue, the Center hoped to oTercOlU prevalent anti-Catholic
passions and make i tselt IIOre aoceptable in the aeiobatag.

The contrcwers,.

came to a head as a result ot the publication ot an important article by a
Centrist member, Julius Bach_, which appeared in March 1906 entitled,

"We

llttatthias Enberger (1875-1921) entered the Reichstag as its youngest
member in 1903 atter a dist1Dgu1shed oareer as a journalist, pamphleteer and
organiler of Catholic lay institutions. He was also one ot the founders ot
the German Christian Trade Union DlOV'eaent in the 1890'.. He served as Genaan
Peaoe Commissioner in 1918, 8S a delegate to the National Assembly (1919-1920),
and as Minister ot Finance (1919-1921). He was assassinated at Oriesbach,
Germany, in 1921. See Klaus Epstein, Matthias Irsberger and the DU. . . ot
Oerman Democracl (Princetone Princeton UillTer.ity Pre.s, 19$9).
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MlIIt Get OI1t of the Tovar.· 12 Bacha, publisher of the ,alnische Volka.eitg
and a leading repre8entative of the progressive social views, argued that al-

though the Center Party had 1ta origin in religious issues, it was really not
.-ant to be a reUgioua party.

Be quoted one of the founders of the part,.,

!Iall1DCkrodt, as eapbasising this s _ point in the Reich8tag in 1872.

Bacha

waated the Party to return to the tounders' original intentions of hanne an
iIltercontessional part;y.
Protestant groups.

ae proposed that the Center collaborate with

He further suggested that the Center along with the

Christian Trade Unions throw i te support vherever teaslble to non-Ca'tbol1cs
running tor ottioe.

A heated dlscuas10n on th18 question developed within Catholic circles,
beooaing 110re intense as it became 1nvolved in a s1allar controver87 a.ong in-

teUectuals concerning Modern1a and Integrall_.

The Modernlsts tavored

closer cooperation between Catholic and non-Catholic torces ot lIOdern culture.
The Integral1ats, on the other hand, rejected all non-Catholic culture and
took special pride in asserting the existence ot speclf1call;r Catholic princlples to govern aU areas of aotivlt,.. Although Modemi.. was espoused b,. a
very limited group of GeZ'II8D intellectuals, the German Integral1ata

ot Berlin

chose to consider all Catholics who favored close cooperation with non-Cathol.1ca
in political or econaa1c questions as Modemlsts at heart.
J"ect17 at the Center's at'tepte

1;0

This struck di-

rid 1tself of its contessional character.

tenaiona broke forth in a veh...nt RiChtUlllsstrelt (athe 'Where aN we
going" controversY") between the conte.sional sector wi th its centers in
11wlr mLsen aus da Turm henns.

The coaplete text 1. reprinted in
Dokulllente seiner Entvicklum
Drei Masken Verlag, 192.3) II, 332-341.

~g Bergs trls ser , ber 'PontIsche la tholl.l_us:

(MuncheJu
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Trier-Berlin-Breslau, and the non-contessional sector which drew its strength

rrc- the Party's toUowing

"

in Cologne-Munchen-Qladbaoh.

'1'he Kolner
Richtg
"

led by the two Bachems, Karl and Julius, and Hermann Carda una , and the K"ol.n1scbl
volka.eitugg, as well .a the Chrutian Trade Uniona in M.-OJ.adbach under the
leadel'llh1p ot Frans Bitlle, August Pieper, and Heinrich Brauns vere attacked by
the Berliner Richtg headed by Count Hana von Opperadortt, Frana Bitter, and
BeJ"lUDll Roeren and baoked b7 the Catholio Workers' Asaociation operating under
the innuence ot the aristocratic and clerical direction ot Karl von SaviP7,
HeiDrich FourneU, and Paul neiacher.

The Berliner Riohtg aocused the

,Sln1aohe R1chtung ot advocating the supplanting ot Catholic organisations by
-super-oonfeaaional" and general Chriatian institutions. 13 The bulk at German
Catholici8D1 a8 well as almost all the Centriat leaders were on the side of
Colople from the beginning, but tor a whUe Berlin appeared to posseas the
better Vatican connections besides the support of the German hierarch7.
The unity ot the Party waa undoubtedly strained by the bitter internal
oontro"ray.

The Zentrumastreit, aa it waa also called, caused the Centrists

to take inventory ot their Party' 8 accc.apliahllents and to re-evaluate the purpoee ot its existence.

The Berlin group, hostile to aU non-Catholic oulture,

luiated that the Center ahould be a purely Catholic party, not -re17 an inte,..
oontessional Christian one.

The interoontes8ional trade unions advocated by

the progressive wing vere also opposed by this strictly conservative wing because such unions would be liable to corrupt the faith ot the Catholio . .bel'll.
fbe Berliners desired the close cler10al sup8rv'iaion ot all Catholio lay
lL
.
-For an interesting but alao one-aided account ot the 0 ontroversy, see
Bach., Zentruupart.ei, VII, chapters iii-iv. Alao helpful 18 John I. Zeender,
"Qe:naan Catholios and the Concept ot an Intercontessional Part7, 1900-1922, n
Journal ot Central European Attairs. XXIII (196)-1964), 424-439.
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organizat10ns and denounced 8!l7 type at cooperation between Catholics aDd
Protestants.

-

This view was vlgoroU8ly' oppoeed by the secreta17-general at the

folksYere1n, August Pieper, and the Centrist leaders, Franz Hitze and Karl
friaborn.

Erzberger, in his critici_ at the Berliners, asserted theT were

st.raiDing Catholic principles beyond the breaking point bT deanding a spao1tioa117 Catholic answer to everr probla.14 • cCllbined Reich and P1'l18sian
CCJIIII1ttee tor the Center Party tinall7 resolyed the dispute on JloYember 28,

1909, by tormally declaring that the Center Party was political, not 01er.l.cal.1S
Both Roaren and Count yon Oppersdortt were expelled trca the Party in 1912 wheJ:I
they retuaed to accept the Party's verdict. 16
Although the Party did not actually split as a result ot 1ts intenua1
struggle, it nevertheles8 8uttered in the election ot 1912.

Dusatistaction

UlODI the Berliners over the resultra at the R1chtg88treit on the one band,
and the unpopularity aaong urban Catholic workers

ot the Party's conservatiye

~zbergar at tir8t espoused the Berlin cauae but later, because ot 1ts
doctrinaire poe1tion, he renounced it and ca.. out in support at the Cologne
group. He 1I8S 1rritated by' the whole controver8yand deplored the bickering
within the party's ranks ae a danger to ite unity.
1"rh1s did not really end the Zentrwu8treit. it beCUle acute again in
1914. '!'heodor Wacker, the Baden Centrist leader, was censored in Rome tor hia
article, "Zentrua und kircblichen Autoritlt" which upheld the independence ot
the part,. in political utters. Although the censorship was later withdrawn
and Wacker's pos1tion accepted by Rolle, the incident tended to reopen the conVOTers,. over the conless10nal character.
~
..
1 survey ot the Zentruaastre1t oan be tound in Ludwig Bergstnsser,
"Del" I1ss ia ZentruutlU'lll," Itadalso'e allttar, nV(lov_ber, 1910), 241-246.
eee also Ernst Deuerlein, "Verliiit una &,ebnis des Zentruuetre1tee {19061909)," Stimac del" Ze1t, CUI (Ha7, 19S5h 10)-126. For Enberger'l role in
the Itruji18, see naus Epetein, "Enberger's Poaition in the ZentruJR.streit
Betore World War I," Catholic Historical Review, XLIV (April, 19$8), 1-16.
Enberger's own views on the coiif'ueloiiil lieue oan be tound in the Engllah
translation, Enberger, The German centre-part!_ Studies in P011tioe~ EcO!Di!!
and Apologetics (I... tard.. , International Carollc Publishing
1

co., n).
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course on the other, cost the Canter a serious loss ot Totes. 17 The Socialist
dctOl'7 at the polla in 1912, which saw the Social Democrats replaoe the
center as the strongest party in the Reichstag, WAS undoubtedly due in
. .sure to the Catholic workers' votes.

SOJU

Not that the center was re.iss in its

oonoern tor social retorJlJ the faot was, the Reiohstag and Pruasian Center
delegations oontained only a tew labor ...bers, whereas the rural areas were
aore strongly represented than their Catholic populations warranted.

Due

to

bard competition with the Social Democratic trade unions, Catholic labor lead-

era began to question plutocratiC suffrage in PrU8Sia, indirect taxation, and
other oonservative polioiea.
At the SUle time the naren..s of these proble.. intensified
existing criais in leadership in the Party.

an

alread,.

The election ot Baron Georg

HertJ.ing as parl1aaenta17 leader ot the Center had teaporaril,. resolved the
orisis in 1908.18 His tame a8 a noted soholar and sk1lltul concUiator and
lCllla-tille ...ber ot the Part,. bad plaoated the discontented.

Atter his resig-

nation in 1912 to becOlie Minister President ot BaTaria, the prob1n again
became acute.

The new parliuenta17 leader, Peter Spahn, though of Rhenish

origin, had an e.sentially 81'Jlpathetio Tiew ot Pruasian institutions because
17The retuma of the election ot 1912 gave the Center 91 seata in the
Re10hstag in cc:.parison to the lOS seata held in 1907. The Social Democrats
gained 110 aeats in 1912 as ccapared to the 43 .eats held in 1907.
18Qeorg von Hertling (1843-1919) studied at Minster, Munich, and Berlin,
and taught philoeophy at Bonn and Munich. He served a. a _.ber ot the
Reichatag from 187S-189O and in 1896. He was leader of the part)" from 1909

untU he became president ot the Bavarian llin1atry in 1912. During World War!,
a8 chancellor ot the Reich, resigning in late 1918. See
Bans liaele, "Hertling,· Hochland, X (September, 1913), 7$O-75S and Karl
Bach8ll, "Hertling,. Deutsche. Biographisches Jahrbuch, 1917-1920, II (1925),
416-42S.
he replaced Michaelia
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of his lang service in the Pruasian judic1ar,y.19 He tavored the Right and de.u-ed to bring cooaervative Catholici.m and conaervative Protestantiea closer
together. WhUe Spabn rerued to sponsor polioie. which would weaken the exist,1DI monarchical, aristocratic and tederal !nati tutiOJlB, he waa by no ..ana a

statio oonltervative.

Yet, neither could he f01'llulate a policy which would reo-

CllCile the social and political upirationa ot the . .ssea with the existing
cClRStitution ot the German atate••
Ditterence. in polioie. and per.onality separated Spabn trom the youthful
Ersberpr.

Tbe latter, aooustomed to the aore democratio institutions ot

.outhern Germany, telt that the uniyersal tide ot democracy would eyentuall7
neap awa7 the resistance ot the _anarchies and ar1stocracT, but he reali.ed

.ut h1a Party and the nation vere not read7 tor deaocratic gOV'erllMnt.

He

directed hia eftorta, therefore, toward the formation ot a ooalition with the
liberal parties to achieye liberal political and constitutional retorms.

For

a time just prior to the tint World War he succeeded so well in winning the
.upport of enough .aderate conservative. that he
\nditional opposition to direct

taxe.,

parties in a progrd ot tax rat01'll.

8W\Ulg

his Party aWlT froa ita

and associated it with the liberal

Although the majority ot the Centrists

tavored the ...sure there vas deep resenaent dong the .old guard, It such as
SUon Yon Hertling, Peter Spahn, Count von Galen, and Adolt Gr8'ber.

lionethe-

le•• , they bad to concede that detinite prOlre••ive and d_ocratic el81llent.

wra gradually assUlll1.ng greater importance in the ParV.
19Peter Spabn (1846-192,) a. a Doctor ot Law combined hi. judicial dutie.
He .erved a. a._bel' ot the Prusaian Landtag trCll
1882-1909 and the Reichatag (1884-]917). He waa the Pruaaian Miniater ot Justice
tre. 1917-1918. From 1912-1917 he va. the official party leader. He was
elected aa a delegate to the National Aa.amb1y, 1919-1920, and to the Reiohatag
ot the Weimar RepubliC, 1920-192,. See Bach_, Zentruapartei, VI, 146-147.

wi tb. parliaaentary work.
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The outbreak of the war in 1914 found the Center forcing its divergent
:S.nteresta into the background in order to present a comaon front an val" issues.
'Dle slow, hesi tent progress the Part,. had made in veering to the Lett in the
two ,..ars prior to the war was delayed b,. the Burctrieden which imposed a check

aa dOlUlstic reforaa. Parliaaentar1ani8ll, the Prus8ian electoral system and
social retorm.s were not seriousl,. discussed . again untU 1917.

Tb.e Centrist

leaders, eager to daOllsvate the patriotism of German Catholicism, agreed with
the Reich government a. to the cause of the war, the Han. to win it, and the
policies to follow upon victor;y. 20
As the war was prolonged with no imaedia te end in view, priva tions which
bad been keenly felt on the home front were

ag~V8ted

b,. the British blockade.

Political tension. became apparent deep! te the ottioial Burg!rieden, for war
weariness was definitelT exacting its toll b,. 1916. A oonvoveny over the

war aims caused auch Mction in the Reichltag.

Annexationiat war as. were

espoused b,. all the political parties except the Social Democrats.

In the

first two years ot the "aI", the Center satisfied itself with general stateaente
about the necessity of anne.xatiOll8 c0Jllll.8ll8urab1e to Gel'll8llT'. sacritice and
future security needs.
a. 8117.

Even Ersberger at first was a. arelent an anneDtion1st

Later, however, as he gained a truer perspective ot the international

Situation, he beca.e politically more mature and more critical in judgunt.
Graduall,. he retreated from hi. extrue annexation1st views ta1d.ng with hill the
liberal Centrists.

The _jori t,. of the Party, nevertheless, supported Spahn

and his demands tor annexations.

2Oror an account ot the Center Part,.'s internal strife pl"lor to and d~
World War I, see John lc. Zeender, "The Genaan Center Party' during World War I.
An Internal study," Catholic Historical Review, XLII (Janua17, 19S7)1 4h1-468.
A180 helpful is Bruce tr;;, "Eri68rger and oerman Politics, 1914-192 ," (unpubli8hed Ph.D. dis8ertation, Dept.. of Hist.ory, Stantord University, 19)4).
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But by 1916 dissatisfaction with the cODaenative type of Centrists'
leadership again began exerting itself.

lot only Enberger's daocratic wing,

bUt also the Volkaverein, a Catholic lay' organisation under Centrist direotion,

s. ".11 ss the Christian Trade Un101U1 voiced ori tioi8118 about the exoes.ive
a,"rian infiuences in the Party and began agitating tor social and politioal
reforms.

This gravitating toward the Left by the liberal wing was Viewed with

lanl by the Centriat conservative leadership.

The atheia, the anti ..

].ericali", the lUterialistie .ooiali_ of the Social Deocrats bad alva,.
en strongly oppoeed by the Center. Oollaboration with the unreliable Soc1al
IDe!lIOOrau was tantamount to denial of Catholic principles.

But under the

.in of high prices and taul ty pro'Yi.ioniDg of the var 1Wars, the Cathollo
bor representatives no longer accepted the the.is that the Social Daoorata

re unreliable.

'l'h18 daooratic element wanted the Center to collaborate with

e Social De_ocrats in its demands for suftrage reforms in Prussia. Viewed in
light of the "treaendoua sacritice all Oermane were 1Ulk1n& tor the ratherlaD:\
e Prua.1an three-cla.8 s)'8tea of votinc va. tound vantine. 21 Oerman .oldiers
workers wanted a _ore equitable taxation and voting Il7lltem.

Ersberpr's

ral wiDg succeeded in auater1nc enough Centrists to concert with the Left
demanding suffrage reforma and in foraula ting a peace polioy.

Enberger and

21.&.ceording to the three-class system the political voting power of an
iv1dual was detel'Jllined by his taxes, that 1s, acoording to his inCOll8 and
roperty. Josef Joos, the Centrist liberal writer, later reported, nThe averge man, who was everywhere undervalued, disdained, and slighted and yet called
to render the same services in the field and at hOlle, suddenly ceased to
ccept this and regarded electoral retol'll in Pruasia s111P17 as the expression
t the appreciation of the plain aan • • • a Joos also referred to the 0PP061ion of the Catholic hierarchy to electoral reforms. Cited in Ralph aaswell
ts, Fall ot the aenun lapire, 1914-1918 (California: Stanford University
8.S, 1932), II, 275-276.
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h18 asaociatea on the Lett intended to identi17 the Re1chatag and the naUon

with "a peace ot understanding and compromiae." Then too, in order to create
a better impreaaion on the democra tic AUies, Enberger and the lett-1finc
parti ea planned that the govermaent should buIled1ately introduce equal suftrage
in Prussia.

The ottshoot of thi8 whole IlOV8Jllent vas the tuous "July Peaoe Resolutiaa."
propoaad by Ersberger to the Reichetag in 1917.

.87 thi8 tt.lR. he had become the

IIOst influential JleJIlber in his part7 and was recognised, albeit reluctantl7, by
the "old guard" as the lUldiaputed leader ot the Part7. Spahn had reBiped !rca
the Part7 to become the Pruasian Minister ot Juettce, but he had ad'rleed the
other conservative. to go along with the Parv'e new Polle7.

True to ita opera-

tional pattern, the Center .. a body took a realistic view ot the political
.i\uation and, theretore, 101811;r supported the peace resolution.
'!'he events ot July precipitated a cri818 in the gOV'el'lllent wh1ch re8ulted

lin •

change ot chancellor.

'!'he July Resolution itself was stillborn, a ncta

Dt the new Chancellor Michaelis' qualified acceptanoe.

Opportune viotories

Iloag the tront boosted sagging OeNan moral.J the pressure
~

oonservati.. were at work.

~CIIl

~

Jdlitar;y BUCoess

The high-sounding phrases ot the peace Nsolu-

vere tor gotten a8 the Right claored tor a victorious peace.

~ucce8ses

~. toro.s
~taelt

The early

ot the ottensives in the West in the first Ilontha of 1918 8peeded up
ot erosion in the Center Party. Th. oODServati,.. wing apin ....ted

tor a nctorious peaoe. Moderate canservatives bepn Joining toroes

jr1th extreme conservatives at the expense ot ErBberger's democrats.
Events in the last tew months ot the val' brought about a sudden reversal
~

th1a con8ervative trend. As tailures along the trent mounted and popular
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di••ati.taction at home beeame more radical, the pa rUes ot the Lett becUl8
bOlder in their democratic demands.

Th1a mov_ent .trengthened ErBberger"

liberal wing which was in a,apath;y with the political demands ot the utt.
Fopitioua IlOJUnt had

00Jll8

The

to broaden the base o:t the Party in order to turn it

lIO%'e in the direction 01' a liberal and democratic policY' and to cooperate
. .rei the.e ends with other democratic groups.

Thus the ba.ia waa laid tor

the Centrist ooali tion with the Socialiats and other republican groupe during

the Weiur period.
Aa one

SU1"Ye18

the alllo.t halt-centur;y hieto17 01' the Center PartY' eme

oannot help concluding that ba.icallT it r . .ined cODservative.

In crucial

decisionl bet.en conaervative and liberal elements the Center tended to tip
the lealel in tavor ot the tONer.

!hie vaa

10

e. lone

8.

the landed. arlltoc-

ra01' and large industrialists provided the leadership tor the Part;y.

Once the

urban population, espeoiall;y the workerl, began to exert theallelve. through
their labor organiutiona and labor leader., the conaervative leadership vas
ohallenged. and a Jlovaaent toward the Lett began slOlfly to appear.

Its ascend-

ancy wal long and laborioWlJ conservatism was reluctant to give wa1'.

Though

Enberger had gained a position 01' leader.hip in the Party by the 8UJIUIler ot
1918, bi. position was tenuOWIJ be .bad still to cope with strong opposition.
True, Catholici.. was a

COllllllCXl

denOllinator tor the Center Party, but

apart fr01ll that, there waa no unifying ele.ent in the Party's heterogenous
locio-eeonClllic .tructure. Divi.ions .ere within the social clas.e., not 'between th8lll.

In Baden, wlrtteJlberg, and sOlle part. 01' Bavaria, the local clergy;

peasants, and lower middle ola.. were strong supporters at the peace mov_ent
and democratic retorm, _Ue in other parts ot !avaria the leader. were lapicioWi of Ersberger'l

centralising tendenciel.

In Rhineland and Weltphalia

~---------------------------------------------2=3~
the peasants were organized under aristocratic leadership and supported con-

servatives policies.
total program.

The Catholic Workers Association favored Erllberger's

Some of his defenders like Wilhelm Marx, later WeiJl8r chan-

cellor, and Johann Mesberta, the labor leader and deputy, were closely attached
to the volksverein.

But Adam Stegerwald,22 the leader of the Christian trade-

1IDiona, whUe acquieSCing in the liberal social policies, was a aupporter of a
s'tl'ODl monarchy and critical of parliaaentary retol'll..
Such was the c0lllp1ex structure of the Center Party aa Germany stood on
the briDle of aili tary collapse at the end of the 8UJIIIIler of' 1918.

banta alaost

bqoad control were propelling the Center Party along with the rest of 0eJ'11&D.7

t . .rd major political changes which would nec.ssi tate realigDlllenta and reTaping ot the Center's progra.

Tensions within the ParV were to be further

iIIOre.sed by the iJaportBnt decisions to be faced in the c c.aing JIODtbs.

22Adam Stegerwald (1874-1945) was a champion ot Sooial Catholicia and a
leader in labor IIOV8Jl8llta. He vas one or the founders of the Christian Trade
11Di0lUl and was elected the national chairman in 1921. In 1699 he also rounded
the Central Union of Christian Carpenters. Later he was chosen international
. secretary of the Christian Workers .ssooiation. He serred as a delegate in the
Pruasian Herrenhaua (1917-1918,) the National A8Semb17 (1919-1920), and the
Reichetag (1920). He was Minister of COIIIlerce for the Reich (1928-1930) and
Minister of Labor (1932). He was elected chairman of the Center in 1929. See
J(<>ter Deutll, Adall StageNalda Oewerkschafter. Politiker. Minister. 1874-1945
loIn I Bond-Verlag, 1952).

,-'--------------------~
CHAPTER I
PARTY ACTIVITY BE1.WEFJl REVOLUTICB AND E.I..ECTION DAY
During the JIOnths of OCt.ober and Noveaber 1918, Gel"lll8n)" experienced
acaentoua changea in the struct.ure of her govermaent.. Alread7 at the end of
\he summer Ililltary diaaster, deteaUsa, 800ial unrest, famine and general
cUaeontent had precipitated the popular rejecUon of the old.. Biaarckian auWo"e7 and 11111tarisa.

!he Allied threats to retuae to deal with the Reich so

10Dg 8a it retained a .ea1aut.ocraUc reg1M were effective.
CCIIltinUing

The ma8ae8 were

to agitate for a .ore deaocratic govel"Dlll8nt, and political leadera,

reflecting the will of the people, were iaportuning the Eaperor tor action.

a.

iaJl II had responded to the.e preaaures

b7 appointing Prince Max of Baden

Chancellor, entrusting to bill the difficult task of introducing d8JlOCratic

retol'!l8 into Geraany and opening peace negotiations with the Allies.
In an address toIthe Relohetag on October 22, 1918, Prince Max outlined
h1a proposal for a cOIl8titutional change. l

According17,

CI'l

October 28, 1918,

• law vas passed _anding the old BiaIIlarckian Constitution and -tins the
chancellor fully re8ponsible to the Reichatag. 2 By the end of October 1918

er & Co., 1

-

2Law ot October 28, 1918, as cited ibid., p. )67.

24

,
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t;be German

empire bad bee converted into a const.i tut.ional monarch7.

For the

t.1r1t t.1me in German histor7 a goveraaent had been made responsible to the
people's representat.ive..

fbis assumpt.ion ot power by the I18jorit7 1n the

Reicbet.ag, though it. tailed to arrest the social and economic ills at German7,
brought. about. the tall of the old arist.ocrat.ic regime and ushered in a parlia.

aentary system.
The Center Part.7' a role in the promot.ion at the constit.utional retorms
".s reluctant. fro. the outset.

Having auccuabed t.o pressure and haying grudg-

ingl7 supported the .. jontx in the Reichstag for these reloru, it bad neyertheless ceaaeles817 protested and warned that these torme ot liberal parlia~nta17

goyernaent. were alien to German tradition and to German na tional

character.

Proud at ita tradit1.onaliaa and its coneernt.i_ and conri.nced ot

the soundness ot the federal struct.ure ot the Reich, the Party detended the
HOUle at Hohen.ollem with

8

seal coraparable to that at the Pruasian Conaerva-

tiye part7.3
As late as June 30, 1918, the Center's Reich caa1tt.ee had published a
IPrograJll to meet. the "new tillea" wh10h _r had created.

It bad pledged anew ita

10181t7 to the tederal character ot the oonstitution, a strong JIlonarch7, and
Meiner kratt.vollen Volksvertret.ung. n4 The sent.iaental idealizat.ion ot the
~arch7

which the Center asaociated with German national character and tradi-

jt1ca played a _jor role in i t.a poll tical theory. All branches ot the Party
It.vored the retention ot t.he monarchy' and believed t.hat ita tall would represent.
3tIax1Jl11ian Pteitter, Zentrua und neue Zeit. (Flugschritt.en dar Deutschen
~ent.rmupart.ei, /Il, Berlinl neceilher 5, 1918), p. 9.
4·Prograa ot the Center Part.7, June 30, 1918," 8. cited in Sachem,

~ent.ruupart.ei. VIII, 363-)66.
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the destruction ot Genu.n social cohesiveness.

EYen Enberger prior to the

reYOlution had been no exception to thia posi tion.

s

As one ot the Reich's

JI1,nisters he consistently rejected propoeals by the Rational Liberals that the
raperor be urged to abdicate.

Krzberger SUlll1Urized his objections to such pro-

poeals 111 a letter to the Papal N\UlCio. Archbishop Pacelli, on October 31, 1918:
The considerations spealdng againet an abdication at this aoaent
are that the present governing _jorit7 would be serious17 shaken,
that there would be ditt1culties about a new oath ot loyalty tor
the al'll)"J and tha t the throne would presumably pass to the oldest
son ot the Crown Prince. • • • the abdication would weaken Germany
b7 leading to deep internal triction. 'or these reasons I share
the view ot all the meJlbers ot the goyeroment that. an abdicatioD
would at this moment hal'lll, not help, Germany.6
A more explicit declaratiCll ot 10yalt7 va8 printed in a leading editorial
ot a Centrist newspaper, M{lnatersche Anzeicer, on Nov_ber 1, 1918, "hich
stated:
The loyal praiaes Cot the Hen-enhausJ tor the aonarchT and d7nast7 tind a V8r7 lively echo throughout the land, especially
vi th our Center Party whose monarchical tr&di tion even in thiB
time ot deJlOCraC7 undergoes no change. 'or us, the .anarch,. i.
the embodiment ot Gerun l1I1it7, and the difficult daTI through
which we pus cannot _ke us waver in our position toward the
dynasty. The question whether the ..peror and king will abdicate concerns the whole population in a high defl1"8e, not so auch
that they wish such a step, but rather because they tear it. It
the Social Democrats a. the principle opponents ot monarchy
should deaand its el1m.ination, then they stand alone in their
requests. 7
Spoor indications ot Ersberger's 10yalt7 to the monarchy, see Matthias
Enberger, Erlebn1.sse 1m Weltkrie, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1920),
pp. )8, 50,

207, 226, 2fij:2LL, 25 , 337.

~berger to .Archbiahop Pacelli, October 31, 1918, as cited
er, pp. 267-268.

Matthias Fzsbe

in Epstein,
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,_.

jnother group favorable to the Center which also evidenced this loyalty to the
Kaiser was the Catholic

WCIIl8n'S

League ot Germany.

Ita chairladY', Hedwig

nranateld,8 sent a petition dated NoveJibar 2, to the Chancellor in the nue

ot 120,000 .8JIlbera ot her organization begging that all attacks upon the Kaiser
and hiS dynasty "be etreetively and unflinchingly repulsed. n9
During the historic tirst week ot Nov_ber, while the reYolut10D817 Jloveaent was gathering J101lentUlll and the Social n.tocrata were pressuring tor the
eaperor's abdication, the Center Party still continued stolidly to back the
aonarchy.

In Cologne on November 2, the Centrists were told by Fa ther Bertra.

Kestert, one ot their leading spokesmen, that the Center should be Icnown as a
"convinced supporter ot a Jlonarchical systea" and should prove i taelt "a strong
IChristian, national, and social party with God, tor the _peror and the R8i1.tl.nlO
CD Nove.ber "

three days later, Ad.. Stegerwa1d addressed a large assembly ot

Centrists at Hamm. and extolled the glories ot the Geraan _peror:
001' political naivete can assert that it the emperor goes, we
will receive a better peace. The king is an eamest, aature
aan I something we certainly cannot say about the Crawn Prince.
Or does one thiDk he is able to replace the emperor with the
eleven-year-old son of the Crown Prince? 1'hat would invol...e
an 1lIparial regencY'. • • • In that hour wherein we erect a republic in the Reich and place a president at ita head, then
will the union ot the Reich vanish. • • • For centuries our
ancestors have tought tor the Kaiseridee. We aut certainlY'
be a sorry people it we are to give up with one blow all these
8aedw1g Dranete1d (1871-192,) was a school teacher and writer. In 1912
becaJll8 active in teminine move..nta for 80cial betterment and took ewer the
~eadersh1p of the Catholic WOllen's League. In 19~9 she was elected as a Cmtnst
~.legate to the National Asseably. She contributed articles to YIlrious joU1"nlli5
~ wrote Die Chr1stJ.1che Frau.
~he

9Cited in Schulte, Mtlnstersche Chron1k, p. 2.
lOc1ted ibid, p.

4.

II'
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tradi tions ot the past. The emperor forms the rallying point, the
focal unit for the German people.ll
UntU the day betore the revolution the consemtiTe Centrists adhering

to the advice ot their Catholic hierarchy had maintained "an unshakable loyalty
to the emperor and the princes, our monarchs by the grace ot God. ,,12 Yet, even
while they were attelllpting to preserve the old monarchical system in the tace

ot 1nBurrection, a lett-wing Centrist paper, the Schlesische Volkszeitun,s, was
announcing:

"The Center now supports the opinion that the abdication ot the

nperor is the only possible reliet
By Bovember

trOll

the difficult circlllstances. Hl)

8, it had become apparent even to staunch supporters of the

IlO1l8rcby that the aaperor's poSition was precarious.

In a Centrist Reicbatag

cOllll1ttee ..eting beld that day in Berlin, a proposal tor the abdication of
Willi.. II was discussed.

Chairman Adolf Or8berlh and nca1nal part7 leader

larl Tr1mbornlS both voted against the proposal, asserting that there waa no

-

llcited ibid., pp. 11-12.
l2'or the episcopal letter ot Bowaber 8 1918, signed by all the archbishopa andbishopa ot German7, aee Schulte, M&n;teracbe Chronik, p. )1.
l.3xO'VeJIlber 8, 1918. as ci ted ~.

lhAdolf Gr8be!' (16Sh-1919) was edueated at the universities of !!bingen,

~ipzig,
~ourta

and Strasaburg. After serrlDg in a judicial capaci t7 in the prorincial

ot Bereshei1l and Saulgard, he beeame director ot the provincial courts

~t Hall, Regansburg

and HeUbrorm.

Appointed chairman of the WL-ttellberg

~enter taction in 1694, he retained this position throughout bia lite, aaaUlld.ng

las well the national chairmanship of the party in 1917. He also aerved as a
_ber ot the Reichstag (1887-1918) and ot the second chamber of the wlrttellberg
iLandtag (1889-1919). He was appointed minister in Prince Max's cabinet (1918)
land in the Weimar cabinet (1919). As chairman of the Center taction in the
lI.tiona1 Assembly (1919) b. was a zealous advocate ot Christian education and
".presented the party in the constitutional cama1ttee on the section ot "Church
~ School."
lSlarl Tr1mbom (18$4-1921) was a Cologne lawyer who received hi8 &dueaot Leipsig, Mnnchen, and Stras8burg. Se was a member

~ion at the universitie8

P'
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-political necessity tor such an action. n16 But the Reichstsg's pre~ident,
Centrist Konstantin Fehrenbach,17 taking
the committee:

8

more realistic view, announced to

"I am under theimpres8ion that we debate something which per-

haps around four o'clock [today] will no longer be important. a18 In Fehrenbach's
opinion, there was no alternative, the emperor would abdicate.

Yet i t he did

not, "totally difterent question. [would] come under discussion. u19 On the
following day, not only CentriBts but all Germans were compelled to tace those
"totally different questions."
Weeks earlier, Prince Max alal'll8d by the deterioration of political condit.1.ons, had requested the emperor to abdicate that Oenumy might be saved troll

ot the Pruss1an Landtag and the Reichstag tr«a 1896-1918. ae was appointed to
the Ministry ot the Interior 1n Prince Max's cabinet in 1918. From. 1914-1921
he served as cbairlll8n of the Volksverein and as chairman ot the Rhenish Center
Party trOll 1919 untU hiB death in 1921. In 1919 he was elected to the National
Assembly and diatinguished himselt as an expert parliuentarian in the discussion on conatitutiOlUll _tters. See Hermann CardaUD8, .Karl Triaborn (M.-Gladbach,
Volksvereins.Ver1ag, 1922); also Karl Bach_, "Trimborn," Deutsches Biographiaches Jahrbuch 1921, III (Stuttgart, 1927), pp. 263-26$.
16cited in Rudolf Horsey, 1IDie deutache ZentrUl1spartei Zw1achen 1000eaberRnolution unci We1aar liationa1vers.-l.ung,· in Dona WesValiea, ad. by Johannes
Bauermann (Hnnater, . Aschendorttache Ver1agsbuchhand1ung, 1963) I p. 2bo. Moreey
gives a detailed account ot the act,irlt,ies durina the aont,ha ot Jov_bar and
December, 1918, drawiDg upon auch unpublished _terial frca the state archives
at, Cologne. (Most reterence. frca Morser in thia chapter are trOll thi8 article,
although Morsey's Die Deutsche Zentrwupartei 1917-1923, Sec. II, Chap. I, contains sia1l.ar intol!'ll8t1on.)
17Konstantln Fehrenbach (18$2-1926) attended the University ot Freiburg.
ae beeam. a _bar of the Reichstag in 1903 and ita president in 1918. Later
he vas also elected president ot the National Aas_bly. FrOlll 1920-1921 he • •
appointed chancellor ot the Weimar Republic and participated in the conterence8
With the A111e8 at Spa (1920) and London (1921). Later he served as chairman
ot the Centrist. lett-ving in the Raichetag (1924-1926).

l~orsey, uZentruupartei," p. 241.

-

19Ibid.

)0

anarchy. Wear:y ot war and hungr:y tor peace, the populaoe vas aenai U ve to the
iJlplication ot the Allies that the presence ot Will.iaa II vas iJapeding peace
negotiations.

Ho definite plana tor a popular insurrectJ.on had been toJ'llUlated;

nevertheless a revolutJ.onar:y apin t had been toaented a. a reault ot a wideapread mood ot deapair brought on by the IIdlita17 collapae. 20 Only an incident
waa needed and thia waa provided
l1el.

GIl

October 28 when the sailors mutinied at

FrOlll ICiel the inaurrection spread rapidly along the coast

to B_burg,

sr_en, and Lllbeck. Within a week alaost e'9'817 oity in the Geraan .-pin had
vi tnessed socialist rioting and the establishment ot soldiera t and workers'

OOUDeils aa new toru ot local gOV'enaent.
reached Brumndck and then Munich.

By November

7 the revolution bad

In Bavaria a republio was proclaimed vi th

the lett-wing Socialist lurt Eisner a. preaident.

Berlin vas next to suceumb

to atrikea and insurrectJ.ona. 21
Prince Max repeated his wam1nga ot 1apending danger in an ettort to saYe
the Hohen.oUem dynasty, but William II retuaed

to be aoved. On Rov_ber 9,

1918, theretore, to preaerve Berlin and Germany trom turther cbaoa, Prince Max
ec.peUed by necesaity announced the abdication ot the emperor and banded the
re1M

ot government weI' to the Social »-oerat Friedrich Eben. 22 tet, neith

"·-~----------------------------------------------=)l'
Prince Max nor Ebert vas thinking in tel'lllS of ending the monarchy.

2)'

It was

Philipp Scheidemann, another leader of the Social Democrats, who decided t.be
issue on his own 1n1t.iative.

In the afternoon

ot lIovember 9, he greeted an

ass ..bl)" of insurrectionists outside the Ministry headquarters vi tb the proclaUtion ot a Oerun Republic. 24
Germans everywhere were surprised and stunned.

The 18l.n18che Zei tunC. a

leading newspaper tor the right-wing of the lIational Liberals soon to become tb
German People's Party, referred to the incident a. a "BlitBschlag" which had
-jolted" the people and lett them "paral;ymed.- 25 A Centrist paper in the
Rbineland, ,SlniscM Volk••eitS, described the happening. a. being "ot monstrous and incalculable sip1t1cance. 1t26 Another national Centrist newspaper
printed in Berlin expressed regret but said it was an event which had become
-inevitable" as the revolutionary agitation increased in intensit)".27

The

aperor' 8 hesi tanc)" had cost hi. both throne and dyna.t)".
2~en the Social Democrats tavored a constitutionalllonarch)" similar to
IDgland. Bach., Zentrum!J!rtei, VIII, 2$0.

24seheidemann's proclamation vas: "The old and rot ten--the lIOnarchy--has
been broken down. Long live the newl Long live the German Republicl- Philipp
Scheid8llUlnn, MellOirs ot a Social DellOCrat, trans. by J. E. Michell (l.ondonc
Hodder and Stroughton, 1929), II, 582. This is a variant ot the original a.
published in the VoesiSCM Zeitung, November 9, 1918, cited in Ernst Rudolf
Huber, Dokuaente Bur Deutsche Verf..sungsgeachichte, III (Berlin, W. Kchl"--r
Verlag, 1960), pp. 1-2.
,
25.wo'VUlber 9, 1918, 11049, evening ed! tion. Sinee each edition is identified by a new nuaber, further reterence. will carry only the date and edition
lhaber. All article. are trOll tront page unle•• otherwi.e deSignated.
24iovelllber 9, 1918, #886.
27Germania I

Zei tung

-

Hereafter cited as KV.

f'llr das deutsche Volk, 1I0vember 9, 1918, '529.
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With a revolution perpetrated, the Iaiser overthrown, and a republic procla1laed, the Center, 11ke aU of Germany's political partie8, now faced the
que8tion of ita own statue.

Long identified a. a champion of the .onarchy, it

..a altogether alien to republican tenets.

The traditions of its Christian

we1 tanscbauung were repugnant to a 80cialist republic.

But Germany was in a

chaotic condition} _ediats steps had to be taken to preserve order.

Centrist

leaders could not afford the lUltUZ')" of be".UiDg their ow uncertain position.
!bey bad not favored the insurrection; they had not perpetrated the courae of
.wents. 28

They deplored and would continue to deplore a state

ot atrairs which

111 their opinion wa. ccapletely unnecessary.29 MeaDllhUe, however, they decided temporarily to accept the tait accompli, to cooperate with the new

regille,lO and to work energetically "to preaerve peace and order.,,3l
28"licht das Zentl"Ull hat dan Thron verassen, 80ndern del' laiaer hat aein
Volk varlassen." Joset Schofer, Politi.che Briele 4ber das alte und das neue
Zantrum (Frieburg-iJIl-Brelsgaul Heraer' Co., 1922), p. 22. It the naflonal
'Pirtil tag" of the Center Party on January 19, 1920, the Baden Minister of
Finance, Joseph Wirth, noted. "The thrones were not overthrown becausa ,.. were
UIlf'aithtul} they were ruined on accomt of the policy which the supporter. of
the thronea exercised." atticial Report, a. cited in Morsey, Zentruaapartei
1917-1923, p. 81.
29An editorial queriedc "War das DotweDdig?" and responded in the negativ. by taking each ot the October retorma and showing how these ret01'll8 had already proYided tor a d.ocratio g«emmant. See !!I NOYeaber lO, 1918, 1944. A condensed lona ot thia article appeared in the MLstersohe Anseiger on December 1,
19181 "War die Revolution notwend1g, ua den kU1tan81&U8 zu beaeit1.geD?, lein!
~ das Volk hatte die Regierung bereita in Hlnden. 'War die Revolution notwend.1g, _ die kaiserliche Gewalt d_ Volk81d.Uen zu unterstellen? leinl Dann
die kaiserl1ehe Gewalt war dem Vollc8w11len bereita unteratellt. War die Revolution nowendig, UIIl di. Aunt\chae de. Iapital1_u au bekimpten? '.1Id Denn
•• war gl.lte Ausieht vorhanden, dieaen lCalllpt aut gesets11ehea Wege ertolgreich
durchsu!lhren." ,Cited in Schulte, MlU1ster.che Chronik, p. 19$.
30tt1'be Centrist leader. diligently and courageously strove to prevent
worse occurrences and to prelerve the sorely tried Fatherland troa anarchy. It
Karl Schulte, "Werden und Wirken in del' deutschen Republlk," in Nationale
Arbeit, p. 29.

31Pfeirfer, Zentrum, p. 17.

(kle ot the first re8pOllsibili ties of the new

gOY

whet Germany would do about. the difficult al'lliat.ice con

tions.

following the abdicat.ion ot the emperor a aeet.ing ot the

":a.XWtN:;&,;UUIIID~

£../

retarie. ot state under the direction ot the new chancellor, Friedrich Ebert.,
resolved to accept the amatice teraa in order to avoid a capitula tion ot the
a ray.

Centriats GrBber and Trimborn both participated in the aeasion and then,

atter baving accepted the .ajorit,.. view, resigned as state secretar1e•• 32
Fehrenbach, who aa president

or

the Reichstag vas alao presant, lett 1maedia

atter in deep distress and returned to hiB home in Baden.

Here he addressed a

etinC ot his Centrist colleagues and de.1ectedl7 cQllcluded his speech with the
remark I

"1inia Germaniae. a33

The overthrow ot the old regime also caused the dissolution of the
1chstag elected in 1912 ending at the same time the tenure for the Reicbatag
taction ot the Center Party as well as that of the individual Landtag tactions.
This lett the Part,.. leaderless and without direction.

Technically, the Centr1at

tional caudttee wbich had . .t several tilles during the war could not be reonvenad in order to elect a governing group tor the Part.,...
anter Party in a precarious poei tion.

This put the

lor the next few da78 'the tn meJlbers

t the Centrist Reich' a committee who were still

in Berlin raained quiet and

eetaingly impervious to 'the calls ot the press tor action • .3h State coa.1tteea,

3~oraq, "Zentruupartei," pp. 244-245, IV, November 12, 1918, #894,
oted that Tr1mborn "atter one month as Ministerot the Interior" had resigned
nd retumed to the Rhineland.
33Joset Schoter, Mit der alten Fahne in der neue Zeit (Freiburg-ilIlisgau: Herder &: Co., 1926), p. 103; Sachem, Zentrumsertei, VIII, 439 •

918,

.3hSer1iner TaSlatt, lovember 12, 1918, #580, ae1"ll'lania, November 12,
er 13, 1918, 1897.

1529, tv, 10
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tor their part, iIIlpatient at receiving no diracti vea froll the Center' a national
c~ittee,

acted on their own initiative, sOlle holding back in sUence, others

participating vigorously in their local proviaional governaents.

Thus in Upper

Sileaia where the Center, under the new title ot ·Catholic People'a Party,"
teared for its territorial integrity because ot t.he unfavorable armiatice
1;81"118,

a certain pol1tical reserYe was lIIlintained. 35 But in ¥dIrttaberg as

well as in Hesse, a Centriat was included in each ot the new provisional gOTermaents. 36 Sillilarly, in Karlsruhe as early' as HOYember lO, two leading representatives at the Baden Center, Joseph Wirth and Gustav Trunk, joined the
prOYisional government in order to help check the Revolutionastura.

Their

action was endorsed on the tollowing day by a large majority ot the Center's
central collDlitwe ot Baden, and Archbishop ThOll8s Harber ot Freiburg also gave
h1a apprOV'al. 37

By joining with the majority parties, the Centrists in Baden,

Besse, and wtlrttemberg de facto continued the kind ot coalition government. set
up on a national plane within Prussia in 1917.

Preparations to enter the local gCJl'ernment at Cologne were also being
arranged. At an assembly' ot Centrists, the local chairman ot the Party, 'ather
Bertrall lastert, told his hurers they must be willJ.ng to enter into cooperation with the new govenuaent in order to insure -peace and order. nJ8 Kastert
daaanded the right tor the Center Party to eJlPress its principles and poei tion
)SMorsey, nZentrumsparte1," p. 246.
39Hesse's representative was Otto von Bretano di TramessoJ Wdrttambergts
representative was Johann von K1ene. Ibid., p. 24SJ Bachell, ZentruJllsparte1,
VIII,419.
-

37Schoter, ,22•

38!!"

.2.!1.,

pp. 104-106; Bachell, Zentrwup!rtei, VIII, 421.

NOV'eaber ll, 1918, #889.

p
I"""
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"clearly and distinctly," insisting that all "popular groups" should cooperate
"1mDlediatelyt' in forming workers' and soldiers' councils and committees ot
publio safety.

The Rhenish Centrists at thie t1lle gave no indication ot accept-

ing a republlc J theT s till had hopes ot obtaining "democracy" wi thin the
.tructure ot a lIonarchical goverDlllent. At all eventa, they demanded that this
decision should be left to a National Conetituent AssellblT. 39
On

to

the local scene, the Center's cCDllittees tor the lIloSt part retrained

trOll ..king any major readjustments to the Party's structure or prograll, hoping

that detinite directives would eventually come trom. the national cOlllUll1ttee.
!heir news organs, nonetheless, continued to pressure tor bI1Ilediate action.
The tcBln1sche Volks.eitg demanded the convocation ot a "Parteitag" and urged

the Center "to get on board now • • • to publish its goals and no longer lag
behind the develo}.'a8nu • • • to declare in explic1 t teru what our task 111

and to detera1ne what the party 1s to do.,,40

Dortm.und's TremoDia wrote that

they ava1 ted a progr8JI trClll competent leaders "not the day atter tcaorrow, but
today. aU
In South Gel'll8n)" the Bavarian Centrists struck out on their own.

In the

8u.mer ot 1916 indications ot a cleavage between the Bavarian Centrists and the

PrwlI.ian Centrists had already been evident.

Bavarian suspic10ns ot the lett-

lwing

lIov_ant 1d.thin the Party were strengthened by such r8lUrks ot Enberger

1a8a

"Links 1st das Leben und rechts 1st der Tod •• 42 The conflict between the

-

39rbid., November 11, 1918,

1887.

4Orrom the editOrial, "Zentrua an Bardl", 1I000elllber lS, 1918, #901.
4lcited in Mors87, "Zentrumspartei," p. 246.

42Karl Schwend, Barern Zwischen Monarchie unci Diktatur (M'lInchens
Pflaum, 1954), p. S9.

Richard

Berlin Centrists and the Bavarian Centrists bee... aore pronolJllCed atter the
october parliamentary" retorma.

Consel"V'ative CatholiciSDl looked askance at the

center's consorting with the traditional eneaies ot Catholicism.

Also a long

tradi tion ot suspicion ot the Horth tended to stir up separatist currents which
were never too tar trOll the surtace.

The revolution in Bavaria and ita sepa-

ratist movement had indeed receiftd the 8anction ot the Bavarian Centrists.
!'1fo

ot the party _bera, in tact, vere innted to partiCipate in the new pro-

T1Bional gOV8l'D1Bent:

Dr. Georg Heim, director ot the Bavarian Pea8anta Union

and Dr. Sebastian Sehlittenbau.er. 43 But the Bavarian Centrists distrusted the

revolutionists.

'fo preserve Itsecurit)" ot persons, propert)", and democratic

solidarity," Dr. Schlittenbauer recommended "the tormation ot a new Christian
puty based on deaocratic principles. It41&. He and Dr. Heila, the leader ot the
Bavarian Center Party, called a Centri8t aeeting at Regenaburg on November 12,

1918, to form the "Bayer1Bche Volkspartei.,,4S He1a pointed out to his "old
friends ot the Center" that the BaYarian People's Party was not _rely a change
ill the nute

ot the Party but a completely new independent organi.ation open to

all countrymen, "catholics and Protestant Christians" alike.

"All who support

phriatian culture as opposed to the all-devastating and corrosive uterialislt

~t unite with us," he said. 46 A cClllUllittee camprising tormer Bavarian
43see Buchheim, aeschichte der Christlichen Parteien, p.
44cited in Schwand, ~.

S:!.,

341.

p. S9.

4Sauchhe1ll, Chriatlichen Partei8ll, p.

348.

46Quoted in Buchbe1m, Chriatlichen Parteien, p. 349.

Hia appeals did not

.0 unheeded. Two t8JllOU8 Protestant leaders, Protessor Otto trOll the UniveraitT
lOt Munich and Baron von Pechaann, the well-known apokeaan tor P'rench Lutherans,
jlDawered the

8U11man••

~-.--------------~
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Centrists drafted

a new program at Munich on November IS and published it

officiallT three days later. 47
The program of the Bavarian People'" Party recognized the revolutiOl'l as
an "accepted fact. a But the Party did not agree in principle with the manner
in vhich the republic had been created.

They aspired to bring about changes

onlY by legal .eans. Therefore, they demanded the calling of a Constituent
..tional AsseMbly elected by universal BUttrese to provide for a parliamentary

'JBte.,

end desired 1.JIlportant que,tions to be decided by direct referendum.

Other provisions, aore tradi Uonal to the Center, requested the Maintaining of
a Christian Wel tanechauung, the sateguarding of marria ge and the foUy, and
the guaranteeing of Chri,tian education and contessional schools.

In the

800-

nClllic area it recCllDJ88nded pronnons tound in previous Centrist programs:

ad-

justaent ot interest 1J"0UpS, protection of property, the curtailment of the
"abusea" of capitalism, and as an appeal to the peasants, "healthy agrarian
reforma."

In the seventh and last provision, indicative of Bavarian aniaosity

against Pruasian hege.ony, 48 theT d. .nded "a union of German states on a
federal basis with no single state predGtllinating • • • • The present far-reach1n@
federal, economic, and fiscal political dependence of Bavaria on the overpowering North aust under all circUllStances end."49
lewa of the Bavarian cleavage was conspicuously slow in reaching both
West Germany and Berlin and vas accepted by the Center Party "north of the

-

47Ibid., p. 3S0.
48c:me sentence in \hi, section states. "Wir haben es satt, f{1r die
Zukuntt von Berlin aus bi' ins kleinate regiert au werden." Uraachen und
Polgen, Ill, 202.

-

49The complete program is printed in ibid., Ill, 200-202.

~--------------~
Main" with "sincere regret."SO

Tbe Centrist there suspected Bavarian

"sonderb~derlei"Sl and "strong particularist tendencies," and perhaps an
attellpt on the part of the Bavarians to win over to their cause the German
Auatrillns in order to erect a Itstrong opponent to North Germany" (-Sdlwergew1cht
pgen Norddeutscbland"). S2 However, due to the turbu1eDC)" of the da)", the
Centrists in Berlin and Cologne sa" no po8sibilit)" or tntluencing the decision
of the Bavarian8.

Unable to check the movement, the Centri8t leadership acqui-

e8ced to the forution ot the Bavarian People's Part)".S) But Berlin headquarters allowed the Bavarian8 no UluaiOlUl a8 to the fUture role they would
play within the Center Party.Sb
The revolutioDal"1' situatiCll1 in Berlin hindered the Centrist Reicbatag
.-bers 1n their etforts to tol"llUlate any t:.ed1ate plans. SS 001)" six _ber.
r_1ned in Berlin: Martin Fa8sbender, Johann G1eaberts, Bartholoaiua Ko••ann,
)laxi.ilian Pfeift'er, Albrecht Frhr. von Rechenberg, and EDgen Schifter. 56
The.e ..n felt the ab.ence of a dc:ainant figure.

SO!!"

The leaders ot the Part)" who

lovember 19, 1918, 1912.

Slaermania, 10'fU'lber 19, 1918,

1541.

S2secker-Arnsberg to A. Stegerwa1d, lovellber 19, 1918, cited in Morse)",
Zentrumspartei 1911-192J, p. 88.
S)!!, lovelll'ber 19, 1918, 1912J Bachem, Zentrumspartei, VIII, 261.

S40n Dec_ber 18, 1918, the Secretary-general Max1Jdlian Pfeitfer wrote
to brother Anton, Secretary-general of the Bavarian People's Part)", that the

BVP "ould be allowed "absolutely no influence" in the National Assembly.
in Horsey, Zent~rtei 1911-l92J, p. 88.

Cited

SSnu. to strike8, insurrection, and 8treet .t1ght1ng the session of the
Re1cbatag was suspended on November 8, 1918, and many members returned home.
56pfeiffer, Zentrua, p. 18.
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bad serTed as Reich officials in Prince Max's government were not available.
With GrBber exhausted and ill and Trimborn and Fehrenbach disgusted with events

1n the capital, all had returned to their hae states. S7 Enberger, the one
centrist who could have provided the necessarT leadership, was at COI8piegne
acUnc ae the German Al'Iliet1ce COIRIIlis8ioner, but due to arrive back at Berlin
.bonly.

The six Centrist Reichetag _lIbere awaited Ersberger's arrival.

How-

ever, in order to placate the local c..uttees that wera pressuring the Center's
headquarters at Berlin for direction and Qenlightenaent

or

the electorate,·SB

the six cCllDllittee _Babers forDlulated a publio declaration on NO'f'amber 12, 1918.

In it the7 insisted that the old Re1chstag was the "only unal tared rauin1.ng

representation of the German people" whose authorit7 ·ought not be dmdi:d:lIbed:.'9
P\lbllshed the following da7, the proclamation, addreesed to the "electors in
city and country," atter noting that most of the Centrist _embers had left
Berlin, ContinUedl
Those members still present in Berlin tum to the people and declarel We solemnl7 demand respect and equall t7 of rights tor our
principles. We a.sume the right ot treedOil of speeoh and the
right of assemb17. In the decisive "OIIent of balloting, the
Center Party will call on all who acknowledge ita prinCiples.
But today it 18 nec....ry' to work for peace, security, and order
in the land • • • • We beg our Party friends everywhere. Deliberate on the circUJUtancest Prepare for the electionl Prepare
and instruct the womenL
Help preserve order and public aecurt t7 that we may all have
bread and sustenance'
S7Morse7, "Zentrumspartei," p. 242.

S8!!.

Ioyember 13, 1918, /)897J Germania, November

S9Fteiffer. Zentrum, p. 18.

14,

1918,

#S:33.

-
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W.tch tor the directions ot the
[Dated a]

Pa~·.

instructionsl

Berlin, Ioyaber 13, 1918.

[Signed: ] Members of the Center taction ot the German Reichetag.
Dr. Fassbender, Olesberte, lCos8JUDn, Dr. Pteifter, Dr. freiheIT
von Rechenberg, Schitter.OO

'l'his constituted the prelude to the first steps toward Party reorganization.
Party friend. fra. various econam1c and 80ci.l organizations and ...bers ot
the Catholic pre.. hastened to the assistance ot the six-membered Centrist

cClDJllittee. 6l
Prussian Centrists on the sa.. day aade a eiDlUar appeal to "all other
PruSaian triends" atatin, that the cri.is of the hour demanded that eye170M
-'Should do all in hi. power to keep peace and order, to prevent the shedding

ot Ilore blood and to end taaine.-62 Party . .bers were asked to cooperate in
strengthening the partT to Het the new crisi•• 63
A second general maniteato exhorted all people---laborers, farmers,
office workers, city dwellers, civil servanta, teachers"--to concentrate their
ettorts tor a united tront against the disorder ot the day.
class rule and the turn of events in the capital.
The ideas esabodied in the Center's slogan,
not dle in tortT-eight hours.
anyone.

!!.,

I

The party d4D)uncei

-Berlin is not Germany••••

Truth, Justice, and Freeda.L I will

The German people are not

to be dictated to by

TheT should voice their own opinions and declare themselves.

The

6Olbid., pp. 20-21J printed also in Germania, Bovember 13, 1918, #532J
Novemb8r 14, 1918, 1898.

-

6l1CV, Joveaber 15, 1918, 1901, Pfeitter, Zentrua, p. 17.
62oermania, November 13, 1918, 1532,

-

631bid.

!!,

lh:wnber 14, 1916, 1898.

p-~--------------------------~u~
a.rtD8Il people want. peace. Diaun1 ty will bring disorder, tamine, and dis1ntegrat1on.,,64 Germans were warned that. to accept Dolshed_ meant abrogating
tbeir rights.

All cit.isena were urged to unite and demand the convocation ot

a .ational Assembly.

Until such a group existed, the party declared, it. would

recognise only the Reichstag .s the sovereign power in Ge1'lUl17. 6S
This was the state of attairs to which Enberger returned in the late
afternoon of Wednesday, November 13, 1918.66 He was stunned by the transtormstiOl1 which had overta~en his country and alal'll8d at the lack of law and order

in the capital. 67 After report1ng to the provi.ional govermaent concerning the

a1'll1st1ce tel'll8, Enberger attended . . .eting on Hovember ll& of all the Centrist

~ers in the area. 68 Tbia Party caucus decided to 8et
~ttee

up a steering cc:a-

selected tZ'OJl the group to help in Norientin, the Center Party.

'!'he

~ClIIDittee consisted of three _IIbersl MaxiJdlian pteifter69 !rom. the aeichatag
taction, Rudolf Wildermann froa the Prus.ian Landtag taction, and the director
64aerman1a, November

~zberg8r,

6SKV , November

lS,

lS,

1918,

IS26,

p. 2J

!!,

November

lS,

1918, #901.

1918, 1901J pteUtar, Zentrum, p. 18.

Erlebn1ss8, p. 340. PteUfer, Zentrua, p. 17, has Enberger
larriving on Friday, Rovember lS. Thi. i. obY1ouali incorrect Since Enberger
.... present in Berlin for a Centrist caucus on Hoveaber 14, see Erlebn1sse,
p. )40.

67Ibid• While at COIlpiegne Enberger heard ruaors ot a revolution in
Germany and wondered which government he represented--the l)Ip1re or the
Republic. Ibid., p. 33S.

-

6~ax1a11iall Pteitfer (1875-1926) studied at the qniveraities of Berlin~
68lbid., p. 340.

and Mt!richei1l In 190) he bec... secreta17 or the - Ltbra17 of BUi.berg
in 1910. He was appointed archivist at the State Archives at
~unlch in 1912. Fro. 1907..1918 he was a member ot the Relchatag. He served
~~1 general secretary of the Center trOll 1918-1920 when he va. appointed German
~b.8sador to Vionna.
~idelber

!ana cU8~!.n

, _____-------------::---1
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ot the Zentrums-Parlaments-lorrespondenz, Franz Fortmann. 10 On the following
daY as the caucus continued ita discussion, Ersberger proposed a reorganization
of the national

struct~

ot the Party. To achieve greater cohenveness with1l1

the Center, he suggested establishing a general secretariat with headquarters
at Berlin.

The proposal was well received and the ofticers were selected.

HaXimUian Pfeiffer, an old friend and fellow worker of Erzberger,

the Party's national treasurer.

val

8A'>Q1nted

Other _bers ot the central Party bureauc-

racy included the ...bers of the newly-created steering cCllDll1ttee. 1l
The establiehllent ot a general-secretariat fulfilled an oft-repeated
desire of the Center Party and was welcoud by all the a_bars ot the Part,.
who now looked to it a8 the "anillated focal POint of Centrist pol1cies. n12
The secretariat did not disappoint ita Party members.

IDaediate1y, it set.

about its task of "enlightening the electorate n b,. organizing a speakers'
bureau, preparing courses in political education and issuing paapbleta and
Henceforth all ca.paip material and general maniteatoes were
to be issued through this department. 7)
short articles.

The Center Party, now ·ccae on board," saw for itselt what other partie.
were already doing to reTamp their progr8lU to adjust to the new situation.

With great rapidity the old aonarchical ele.ents were abandoning tormer plat-

torms, reorganizing thease1Tes (in some cases adopting a new name), and advocating d_ocratic measures for preserrlng the state fro. anarchy.
10!!., lovember 16, 1918,

1904.

-

11Ibid •
72aermania, November 20, 1916,
7)BacheJll, Zentruupartei, VIII,

154).
25)-254.

The old
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conserVlltive Party ot Prussia and GermaIlY' was in the process of joining with
Free Conservatives, Pan-Germans, and a majority of the Junker class to form
the German National People'. Party.

Right-wing member. of the f'01"IIler National

Liberal party, long known a8 the champion ot liberalism, nov bee... the German
People'. Party, while their left-wing opponents were uniting with the Progntssi1a
People's Party to tom the German Democratic Party. Only the Majority Social
t)eJIOCrat8 and the Independents retained their old party nalles and plattonu. 74
The reorganization ot the national Party structure accomplished at the
Center caucus of Nov8llber

14..15 in Berlin created an impreSSion of' party ac-

ti'rity which was gratefully acknowledged a. a s)'lIptcm ot a "new awakened
. energr.,,75 Nonetheless, thi. activity created an illusion of major policy
readjustments which ·at that time were not torthcoming.

An indication ot this

is seen in the six manitestoes published by the General secretariat between
November 15 and Decellber 2, 1918.

to various social groupsJ

Five ot these declarations were addressed

"to the workers, soldiers, and saUon of the

Center"; 76 "to the like-minded people ot Austria" J 77 "to the atticials, teachers, and emploPes"178 "to the citilens and tarmers ot the German Fatherland"J79
74,After the Independents lett the coati tion governm.ent ot the Council of
Peoplee- COIDJlieeare on December 27, 1918, the Majority Socialists preterred to
be called Social Democrats (SPD).
75!!, November 15, 1918, 190).
76Gemania , November 15, 1918,

11537, !!., NOYember 16, 1918, 1904.

77Germania, November 16, 1918, #538.
78Ibid., November 20, 1918,

1543.

79Ibid., Noyember 26, 1918, #551.

JJPi
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and "to the German academic youth. ,,80 A sixth statement was ent.i tled "Peace
and Breadl,,81 Yet, each proposition WAS a stereotyped appeal, an expression ot
d181l87 at the ditficulties ot the tiDl8s, an assurance tha .. the Par,Y' would help.
There were vague promises ot "new things to come," ot rejecting "the reaction

ot the Right and the terror ot the Lett," ot "driving out anarchy," ot litting
"the hunger blockade,· ot demanding "the return ot war prisoners," but. there
was no definite program, no conatructive political reform, no down-to-earth
plan tor the future.

Only 1n the last statement addressed to the academic

youth was there an indication of something positive, and that merely in connection with changing the name "Zentrum" to toster 1ntercontessional participation. 82
Nevertheless , agitation for reform was evident.

At a Centrist assembly

in Trier on November 17 the director ot the local Centrist organization,

Christian Stock,
" repeated queries he had been hearing c onceming the Center.
-where is the Center?

.

Doe. it sleep? Is it already dead or buried?,,6)

Stock had but t.o look around to find hie answer.

Humerous well... attended

Centrist Metings were held throughout the nation.

Karlsruhe witnessed a

large Centrist assembly on November 16. Bb At another held in Cologne the

-

6Orbid., December 2, 1918, #$62.
81Ibid., November 24, 1918, 15b9.
given in-pfiitter, Zentrua, pp. 26-40.

'l'b.e c c:aplete set of proclamations is

82rus one was signed: "Dar Genera1sekretlr der Deutschen Zentruupartei
(Christlich. Volkspartei), Dr. Pteiffer, M. d. R." ~., p. 40. Germania,
December 2, 1918, 6592.
8lrrierische Landeszeitung, November 18, 1918,
"Zentrumapartei," p. 2G8.
8u.chem,

Zen~rtei, VIII, 442.

127), as Cited in Morsey,

~-.------------------------------45~
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.
tollowing day over 3000 persons attended,
while a similar gathering met
H
86
simultaneously in Munster.
There were several distinguishing teatures which
..de these meetings ditterent frOIl previous Centrist gatherings. For the tirst
tiIle wOllen speakera came to the tore. 87 Then too, with the exception ot Otto

yon Bretano di TI'8JIl8ZZ0 in Wi8sbaden and Frhr. von R8chenberg in Berlin, there
was a noticeable absence ot repre'sent8tives ot the nobility and ot the . .bere

ot the agrarian-conservative wing within the Center Party.88 Th18 absence had
a positive etfect on the growth ot dClllinance of the left-oriented taction of
the Center Party begun in 1917.
The purpose ot the Centrist assemblies and caucuses was to determine the
future polleies for the Part;y. A sense ot urgenc;y engendered b;y the pending
elections goaded fI'18ry political party on as it formulated t.he kind ot plat.tol"1l
it hoped would attract the voter.

Of the several progralllB proposed by.arious

local Centrist tactions and Catholic organizations, none vas so crucial in
-awakening the Center" as the program drafted in the middle ot November b;y
'ather Heinrich Brauns, the spiritual director ot the Volkavere1n. 89 Convinced
85!,!, Nov_ber 18, 1918, 11909, Geraania, Nov_ber 19, 1918, 1542.
86Germania, November 19, 1918,
pp. 119-120.

#542. Schulte, MHnstersche Chronlk,

87In Karlsruhe, Clara Siebert. in Cologne, Christine Teutsch and Minna
Bachea-Sieger, as cited in Horsey, Zentrum8partel 1917-1923, p. 93.

_.

88 Ibid

89He1nr1eh Brauns (1868-1939) studied theology at the University ot Bonn
and at Cologne and econades at Bonn and Freiburg. In 1890 he was appointed
chaplain in Rrete1d and later vicar in Borbeck. He was director ot the Central

Oftice ot the "Volksverein" frOll 1900-1920 and general director frOll 1920-193).
He was elected as a delegate to the National Assembly (1919) and to the Reichst4t
(1920). From 1920-1928 he served in the Reich's cabinet as Minister ot t.bor.
See Joseph Sehllitt, "Brauns," in Staatslexilcon, 6 &d. II, (February, 1958),
~. 161-166.

,
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the future success ot the Center Party lay in its ability to emerge as

quickly as possible trCD its "tower," Brauns su"taitted to the leaders ot the
Party a plan tor the reorganization of partY' structure and platform.
graJll

W8S

His pro-

so constructed a8 to appeal to liberal and de.ocratic eleMntll a8 well

.s to the 1Il0re coneenative aristocratic groups.
d_ocratic and 1Dtercontessional party.

The plan called for a widelY'

It suggested that the name "Zentrum"

be dropped 80 that Prote8tants would not hesitate to seek membership.

It ot-

tered social reforms to keep the usses trOll siding wi tb. the Sociali8ts J yet
at the same time it held tast to the Christian principles
the clergy.

80 8S

not to alienate

It proposed the restoration of the monarchY', but conceded that

IUCh a measure rested with the decision ot the National Assembly.

FinallY',

the plan called for a ftGrossdeutschland" which would include Austria.9°
Brauns' plan was the first to offer a definite proposal for the future
part)" structure.

The Berlin caucus of NO't'ember 14-1.5 avoided taking anY' deti-

nite stand and merely confined itself to discussing the daily political and
econClllie problema without oftering posi tive solutiollll.

Brauns' prop08a18 did

Dot come under di8cussion bY' the Berlin group.
Braun8' prOP08ed draft, however, did find a receptive audience among his
left-wing colleague8 ot the Rhineland.

There the Centrists, dependent upon

the vote8 of the indu8trial area8,were eager for an 1Jamediate constructive
IProgram to retain their hold on the Catholic laborers who were being wooed by
80cialist propaganda.
~

Progressive labor leaders took the initiative to call

Centri8t meeting to discuss plans tor a prelimi.n.ary program.

aathered at

iDu18berg on November 16, thi8 energetiC group, with an almost unanimous vote
9°Braun8 to Wilhelm Marx, November 13, 1918, State Archive8 ot Cologne,
as cited in Morsey, "Zentrumspartei," pp. 248-249.

~--------------------------------h~7
accepted Braun8' program.

91

The proposal tor the restoration ot the monarchy,

lUJWever, was rejected de.pite strong opposition to the contraI7J this question
vas to be lett to the lational Assembl,. to decide. 92

em November 16, a coaaitte. ot twelve Centr18ts 9.3 appointed

by the

DuiSberg aS8emblT outlined a twent,.-one point program to serve as the basis

tor discW!lsiOll at a general meeting ot the Center Part.,.. 94 'J.'wo days later the
~ln1sche

Vollisait.unl publi8hed th1e program. under the heading,

"The Cente1'-

the Free German People's Part.,.lu--indicat.ing s proposed new name tor the
Party.9S The article emphasised the Center's fundamental opposition to the
Socialists and impressed upon its readers that this dratt represented a changed
platform adapted to the anew tae8. It The program set torth a plan ot Christian
social policY' ("Sos1alpolit1k"), oftered "safet,. and securitT' to all who prates8ed a positive faith in Clod, demanded the "pre.er'f'ationottheBundesstaaten,·
and prop08ed t.be introductiOD of "proportional and women's .utfrage rights. ,,96
91:o,id., p. 250. Morsel" derives JIlUCh ot his material concerning this moveMnt .from the unpublished M_o1rs of Wilhelm Marx found in the state archives
ot Cologne.
92lbid. Mor8e,. cited. letter ot the Rhenish labor secreta17, Johannes
Beckerlu--;;rt. bas been vel7 d1f'.f1cult for .e to convince our trade unionist8
• • • the t the JIOD8"h,. belongs to the pa st ...
9.3Ibid. Among the members were r. 1. Bacheil, I. Hoeber, J. Kuckho.ft,
A. Rings, B. Kastert, P. Schlack, and J. Becker.
94!!, Bovember 21, 1918, 11917, indicates that the group wanted to be able
A gener.l meeting
_s held in Berlin on the same day that this dratt program was printed. It. is
doubt.tul it this program was used a8 a ba8is tor discus8ion at the Part.y' 8
Berlin 8es8ion. See Ibid., November 25, 1918, 1928.
to present. the electorate with "something completel,. nev. a

-

9.5vov8lllber 20, 1918, #915. J. Becker here proposed the new t1tle "Freie
deutsche Volliparte1" t.o ind1cate the Party's conversion to a "progre8sive and
intercontesaional party.a

-

96Ibid •

48
Vraf'ted as they were by Centrists who were attuned to the sent1aente ot the
working classes, the twenty-one pointe carried a definite appeal to the labor
Such policies as assistance in the building of homes, the legal con-

classes.

!iscation ot large estates, "with remuneration," and the dissolving ot entails,
rstlected the Party's concem with socio-economio attairs.

In the cultural

area, there were promises ot resistance to any illegal or forceful change ot
Lburch-State relations. 91 But nothing was said about the Grossdeutschland
proposal, Dor about a positive program tor the mitigation of the war debts or
the political reorganisation ot the country-.
A further explanation of the Rhinelandera' KalDer pJJne was published

the next day (November 21).

Rerlewing the Party's history and traditiOns, and

emphasizing the Center's integrity, declaring that it bad always acted in the
public interest and would continue to do so, the article pointed out thatsocial
retorms could not be adequately provided by' Catholics who were not sooiall11nded.

In conclwsian, it extended an appeal to the Bavarian Centrists to

unite with the Rhineland group:
We beg our Bavarian friends not to retuee their consent to
the Rhineland proposals, to accept the proposed dratt of the Party's
1l8JIle, "Free German People's Party, It as their own, and to examine
the well-intentioned provisional program. All this will be simple
as soon as the printed matter, etc., ot the Party i8 cirCulated in
Bavaria and has done ita work.98

The Rbineland Centrists had not acted without a certain stratag...

It

was their hope that the hasty coapUation and publicatiCX1 ot the provisional

progr8ll would catch the Center otf-guard and dissolve with one revolutionary
etroke the former conserva ti va direction ot the Party.

97Ibid •

-

98 lbid •• Novellber 21, 1918, 1917.

The leaders also hoped
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to prevent the workera from drilling into the camp of the SPD.

To this end it

.-pla.yed the practice nov popular in bourgeoia political campaigna ot incorporating "deutsche" or "Volkaparteitl in the part;y title. 99
But the impetuolUl and unprecedented act of the left-oriented Rllinelanderl
tailed ita .rk.

Far trClll disSipating the power ot the cOllsenatives, the

program mobilised a strong reaction within the Parv.

For seae, the "strong

.,ve1ISent to the lett" was the cause ot downright resentment. lOO The left-wing
".a wamed that auch precipitate Botint7 could lead to the dissolution ot individual state organizations and jeopardize the unit;y ot the entire Center. 10l
til the sa.e da;y that the "Cologne Plan" waa published, siJIilar ideas came

under acrutill7 in another quarter, tor an otficial Part7 caucus under the

cba~

IW18hip ot Enberger had been arranged in Berlin to diacus the Centr1sta' new
party program.

Present at this gathering were varioue Retchstag Centriata,

Part;y _bers trom the Pruaian Landtag, directora ot the Rhineland and Wea""':'
phalian tactiona, repreaentativea of the Center'. neve organs, delegatea trom
the Chriatian Workers' ASSOCiation, the Volkeverein,th.e Farmere' Union, and
even fraa the Central Council of the Catholic WOllen's League. l02

The asaembled

...bere discussed what the7 called the "two big probleu ot the dar':

The in-

evi. tabili t7 ot another ICulturk_pt should the govemaent succUlllb to a proletarian dlctatorehip, and the threat ot anarch7 in the disturbances inatigated
99"Deutsche Volkapartei, h "Deutschnationale Volkapartei," "Deutsche
Demokratische Partei," and "Bayrische Volkspartei."

1944.

looIn a communication "aus Mittelatandskreiaen," ICV, November

-

-

2S, 1918,

l°lxarl Hoeber, ibid., November 21, 1918, #917.
102, report ot the .eeting of November 20 was printed in Gel'lllania, IIS44 on
the aaBle da7.

~-.------------~
so
'b1 the Bolshevist groups.

The Centrists agreed that. unleas the new Party were

adapted and made rele'Y8nt to present situations, it would remain yain and inetfectual.

"
Like the Kolner
GruW!t the Berlin assemblage considered propos.ls

to bre.k asunder once and for all t.he traditional confessional framework

ot the

Center Party and to rearrange it into an interconfessional Christian _jori t)"
party.

Unwittingly, they aet their approval on a ujor portion of Cologne's

provisional draft by' 81Ibod)"ing mall)" ot the same ideas in their prellminerT
program. 10)
Dr. Pfelffel' published the results of the meeting in the form ot a proclaJRation on the same da)" (November 20).

In the proclamation which told of the

Party' 21 adjustment to the r8volutionar)" ai tuation, he set torth the ideals ot
the new temporary' platforml
The World War and the Revolution have ru1ned the old Germany,
In storm and stre8s will a new one be born. It shall be a free
social republic in whioh all Germans, all olasses and ranks, aU

citizens without distinction of reliefs and membership of party
can be contented. To create this new Germany is the taak of the
whole nation, not of one part)" dictatorship. All parties want.
and lIlU8t. join in it. But. to do ao all old parties require an
internal and external renewal.
A new Center tRust. and will endure the change ot t.hese days.
Public beliet in a deJllocratic republic, opposition to the rule
ot the upper classes" order in freedom, open renunciat.ion of
__oni. and uterialin of our day, fostering of ideal values,
making the people and the nation financially .ound: the.e are
the tundauntal principles ot i t.& renewal 8S a Christiandeaocratic People's Party.

103xv. ''Die Reform des Zentrums," November 2), 1918, 6924, indicated that.
a compariiOn between the two progra1ll8 (Berlin and Cologne) would lead one to
believe that tbey had used "identical models." Money, Zentrumspartei 1917~~ pp. 104-10$, notes that neither group was aware of what. the other was
I~o.a.ug. He citea a letter of Brauns' which said that after he had returned home
trom the Duiaburg conference on November 19, he had received a notice to hurr,y
to Berlin. Brauns reached the capital on N01Vember 2$ and stayed over the next
few days to confer with the Center's leaders. Cited. ibid., p. 10$.

-
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All social claases, IIl8n and women, who protess these principles and would join up vi th these slogans in the eleCtion tor
the National Assembly should accept the new Center. The Center
dare not go under. It must continue on with new gOllls and a
wider foundation. It 1I1U8t lead to newer heights. 104
The statement was followed by certain "guiding principles" tormed by the
assembly pertinent to the two major areas ot toreign and domestic policies.
'aong the important provisions were demands tor a ·switt conclusion ot a world
peace," "regulat.tonot intemational relations on lasting justice instead ot
torce, n "creation ot a league ot natiens with equal rights tor small and large
nations," "international regulations and protection ot the rights ot workers,"
"substitution ot private capitalistic monopoly" by local cooperatives, "maintenance ot contessional "Volksschulen," "retention ot parental rights" in education, and "treedaa ot religious orders and congregations. 1I10'

The cultural

.ection ot the guiding pr1nciplu gave evidence ot the Party's new concern tor
all Christian grOl1.pa.

Clly in two ot theae cultural and religious proposals

did it Jl8ke specific reterence to Catholics. l06

It l.tt no doubt ot ita earnest

wish to open ita doors to aU Christian d8nmnationa.
<&l the whole the Berlin proposals were more moderate than the Cologne

dratt.

While the latter called tor a cOliplete Party reorganization, the

lObsee the P'l.;Hchritten by Pteitter, Zentrua, pp. 41-46 tor the cOllplete
proclamation alongth the " Leitsltse, • Also printed in Oermania, November 20,
1918, 1544; !!, November 22, 1918, 1919. The latter paper indicated that it
subscribed to the pointe and anticipated the accomplishment ot a cOlllbined program ot all Centrist tactions in the near future. This was just two dav. atter
""
~i t had printed the Kolner
Plane.

-

l°'xbid.
1065ec • I, point 6 (foreign policies): "Vol1kOlllllene, durch vSlkerrecht1iche B{kgschattern g8sicherte Unabhangigkeit des HeUigen Stuhles." Sec. II,
C, point 6 (cultural pollcies), "Freiheit • • • der katholischen Orden und
Kongregationen." Ibid., pp. 42, 4,.

-

,.--
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tormer's "Leitsa"tse " proposed a renewal of the old Center--"Chr1stlichd_olaatiscbe Volkspart.ei."

They would change tbe name but retain much ot the

Center's program ot June, 1918.

The two drafts were similar in that neither

made reference to an otticial Party plan tar the future poll tical structure ot
Qermany.

The lIOOial economic suggestions were also s1JDilar with the exception

that the Berlin plan contained no mention ot dissolving entails, nor ot legal
contiscation ot large properties.
ment of war profitsl

There was some variance alao in the treat-

the Cologne plan d_aming their confiscation, the Berlin

proposals aildl;y requesting the "strongea' tiacal assea8ll8nts.· 107
Tbe publication of the aore "lett-oriented" Cologne plan and the aright~riented"

Berlin proposals created wideapread discussion in Centrist circl.a.

Catholic public opinion, reflecting the diversified viewa ot tbe heterogenous
Centrist g:toups, varied trom total agre8Jl8nt on the need of renovation, to
partial or complete di8agreement on the manner and extent ot retormation.

In

small local Centrist .eetings in Rhineland, Berlin, and Wfirttemberg, st.olid

conservatives who lIDtU now had maintained an oainoua silence began to prOlllOte
their ideas despite the fact that their positioo had been greatly undermined b;y
the events ot November 9 and the power balance within the Party upset.

This

cODservative w1n& resented the attempts to break the ZentrUll8tUnl, and wamed
against abandoning the old Party name,loB and the sudden desertion ot tidelity

to the old monarchical structure. 109

..

107 lIBerliner Lei tal tse ": " • • • sch:rtste steuerllche Erfassung der
hoben Einkoalen und Veraagens, besonders der lriegagew1nne • • • It Ibid., p.4S;
IIVA
If
---Aolner EDtwurt H : "Schirfate
Errassung der hohen EinlcCDllleD, der grossen
Verm~gen und des unYerdienten Vera8genazuwachaea. Einziebung sller Kriegsgew1nne." ltV. November 20, 1918, 191$.

-

l06See Karl Hoeber in !,!, November 2$, 1918, 11927.

l09~t Salm-Reifferscheidt to Wilhela Marx, November 18 J 1918 J cited

iF
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Apparently no two Centrist groupa supported identical platforms.

Lack of

Party cooperation was bewailed while each group waited for the other to conform

on November 26, for example, a provincial meeting of the Westphalian Centrist
c(lll1lllittee aet at HaBlll to discuss a provisional prograa.

The call1littee issued

• aaniteato to the local cORIunity in which it called upon ita constituents "to
work together for the maintenance of order by rejecting eve17 type ot narrowminded Party rule. 1I

It demanded the "ereotion ot local cOlllll1tteea of satety"

which would accurately present the picture of the econc:JBic, protessional, and
political conditions in city and community. "We have the obligation to cooperate [it stated]. We a180 have the right to be heard • • • • We frankly declare
ourselves tor a democratic republic. nllO In the Berlin directives this group
recognized a ba.is for a "clear and final program."

They did, however, object

to dropping the name "Zentrua, II but they were willing to add the naae lIQrJst1.ichd8llOlcratische Volkspartei, " in order to encourage other Christians to join the
party.lll
'ar different was the outlook of the 11 ttle group which met in Cologne

on the toll owing day, Nov_ber 27. Representing the c O1l8ervative middle class
interests within the Part,.. (HOrtaausschus.

,Sln der Vereinigung sur Wahrung

der Intereseen des Mittelstandes innerbalb der Zentrumspartei"), this smaller
group edUci.ad what they termed a "privately drafted" program which had origi-

nated in a cOlllllittee that had tailed to include the representatives of middle
ela8s interests.

-

In a special program repre8enting its awn Tested interests,

in Morsey, Zentrumepartei 1917-1923, p. 107.
110clted in Schulte, Mtlnstersche Chronik, p. 166.

-

lllIbid., p. 167.

,

------------------------------------------~~
it demanded that the "treatment" ot economic lite be based on "Christian aoral
principle.," and it declared that Ha fundamental beliet in the monarchy" vas
"a conscientious duty."

In thiS 18 tter propo.i tion, it enjoyed the support

ot

the Rhineland aristocratic wing ot the Center Party which also criticized the
"abandonment" ot the IlOnarchy .112
In direct contrast to this conservative approach vas the policy espoused
by the traditionally democratic Wurttemberg
Center taction termed "adapting
"

oneselt to the changed circwutances." Meeting likewise on November 27, this
group considered the reestablishment ot the monarchy as impossible, and spoke
out clearly tor a"democratic-republican 8tate structure.,,113 Similarly, the
Baden Centrists gave their approval tQ the precedent set by Berlin in rejecting a monarchical form

ot govem.ent. Meeting in Karlsruhe the Baden Centrists

rejected the otter ot • cOlibined list (8Ustenverb1ndungll) with the conservative. and retained the "name and banner" of the center. l14
Q1e

ot the most contrOYeraial questions discussed b7 various local com-

II1.ttee8 was the change of Party name.

Despite repeated efforts

011

the part of

the Center's democratic wing to broaden the membership to include non-Cathol1cs,
the Party tenaciously clung to its contessional characteristics and to the

name which identitied it

8S •

Catholic Party.

Yet not Catholio concerns alone,

Ibut the religious, social, and educational interests ot the entire German
phriatian population vere threatened by the Socialist regime.

It was the time

itor Protestanta and Catholics both. to unite in a common tront against the
112Cited in Horsey, "Zentrumspartei," p. 2$4.

llbschoter, Mit dar alten Fab.ne, pp. 113, 11$, 119-120.

113KV , Hovember 28, 1918, 11937.

,
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dangers ot atheistic materiali8Jl1 and anarchy.

It the confessional connotation

ot "Zentrum" hindered Christian unity, it was to be expected that Centrists
would change the name to something more acceptable.
Among the various suggestions tor name-changing oftered by Centrists,
shades of conservatism or liberali8Jl1 could be detected.

Berlin's national

e()lllldttee, for instance, preferred dropping the old name and assuming the title
"Cbristliche Volkspartei." According to the Cologne plan "Freie deutsehe
Volkspartei" could be added to the old name--but temporarily.

Once the con-

stituents had become adequately instructed, ttZentrua" could be dropped vithout
opposition. US Westphalian Centrists adYocated the retention of the old name
with the added title, "Christlich-demokra\1sche Vol1cspartei," whUe some

ot

the more liberally inclined Baden Centrists tavored "Christlieh-sosiale
Volkspartei. nU6 The minority conservative element still clung to the name

ot Center. ll7 And sOllle,like the Karlsruhe Centr1ats, thought

the name

"Christlieh-somialen Volkspartei" would perhaps bring "momentary" success,
but in the long run lIight pose a danger to ideological rigidi ty

~ehaul1che

Geschlossenheit").ll8
ll5Op1ni0l'l8 varied in the Cologne conterence ot November 18. Wilhelm
Marx thought it important that the old name be retained. J. Becker was ot the
op101on that "Zentrum" should be dropped as soon as the electorate became
familiar with the new nallle. He wrote to Stegerwald, Erzberger, Brauns, Joos,
Gronowski, lAnsing, and Bell to win their support for this proposal. See
Morsey, "Zentruaspartei," p. 2S1.

-

ll6Ibid., p.

25S.

ll7Dr. Martin Fassbender severely criticized this attitude in his aoving
detense for the name "Christlieh. Volkspartei." See Germania, November 28,
1918, IS56, p. 2.
118Schofer,

OPe

cit., p. 120.

p------------------------------~56~
Besides emphasizing the interconfessional character of the Party,
Centrist leaders were also stressing "democratic party life" which was to dominate "more strongly" in the future.

At a Centrist rally in Cologne in the

first week of December, Karl Trimborn pointed this out to an assembly ot over

S,OOO people. He referred to the revolution as a "national misfortune" which
"aggravated the arrangement ot the armistice" and caused "much internal disorder. ,,119 The Centrist leader favored the idea ot a "greater Germany" with
the inclusion of Austria and the maintenance of the Reich's unity.

He admitted

that the Center had traditionally been a staunch supporter of the monarchy
which served as a strong bond of unity for the Reich.

But under the present

circumstances the erection of a republic was perhaps the "most correct, most
expedient, and most imperative necessity• • • • Loyalty to the monarchy is no
longer an obligatory principle in our program • • • [he stated.]

It the

National Assembly decides for a republic, then we have to recognize the will ot
121
the people. 1I128 Wilhelm Marx
addressing the overflow crowd in an adjoining
room expressed similar sentiments and prophesied a "great tuture" for the
"Chrlstlieh-demokratischen Volkspartei" based on the Berlin "Leitsltze."122
119xv , December

5, 1918, #957.
120Ibid •
l2lwilhelm Marx (1863-1946) studied jurisprudence at the University ot
Bonn and became a lawyer in 1684. He was appointed economic councillor in
1904 and judge ot the <';ourt of Appeals in Cologne (1906) and in DUsseldort
(1907). He served as a meMber of the Prussian Landtag (1899), the Raichetag
(1910-1918), and the National Assembly (1919-l920). He was chosen president
of the Center Party (1921-1923) and two years later succeeded Gustav Stresemann
as chancellor of the Reich (1923-1924J 1926J 1927-1928). He retired trom
political leadership when the Center was weakened in the election of May, 1928.
l22!!, December 5, 1918, #957.
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This reversal of one of the major tenets of the Party's program of June 1918,
waS

indicati VB of a significant change in Rhineland sentiments and showed the

growing strength of republican acceptance.
As the month of Wovember drew to a close the Center leaders faced the
still unsolved problem of party solidarity.

How were they to combine the

various proposals of local committees to formulate a national program acceptable to all members? Moreover, how were the various interest groups to be
reconciled to a democratic interconfessional party? Another problem contronting the leaders was that of finding a sui table program dealing with ChurchState relations and Christian cultural principles which would meet the approval
of the Ge~n Catholic hierarchy.123
The problem ot how to hold the Center Party together or at least how to
prevent their members fram drifting into other political caaps became more
acute as various parties made their bid for public support.

Ole such party

attempting to lure the discontent.d aristocratic conservative Centrists into
124
its camp was the newly created German National People's Party (DNVP).
This
party, founded on November 22, 1918, combined elements from the old Conservative Party, Free Conservatives, Pan-Germans, and a majority of the Junker
class.

Organized to protect the interests of the conservative aristocracy

123In 8 letter written by Bishop Karl J. Schulte of Paderborn to Dr.
Pfeiffer on November 23, 1918, the bishop agreed "on the whole to the Berlin
principles" but wished that "the requirement of freedom ot instruction be
more strongly protected." Cited in Horsey, "Zentruaspartei," p. 2gS.
124For an excellent study of this party, .ee lArwis Hertzmann, DNVP:
Ri..Kht-Wing Opposition in the Weimar Republic 1918-1924 (Uncol.n: UniversIty
of Nebraska Press, 1963).
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against the attacks of the bourgeois liberals, the DNVP posed

8S

a respectable

Jdddle class party,12$ and hoped to unite naU good citizens" in defense
ageinet the "dangers of locia11sm" and the "indignit1'" of the Republic. 126
Broad appeals aimed at the anti-revolutionists in the German People's Parv
and the Center Party were made during the election campaign,127 but at the
t1Jle were not too successful.

Most Centrists, regardless of their reelings

towards the revolution, preferred to await the decisions of the National

~ssembly.128
The solution to Party solidarity was prO'lided, surprisingly enough, not
from within the Pany, but rather from a force outside.

On Nov8lllber 13, the

revolutionary govemment appointed the Independent Socialist Adolf Hoffmann
("Zehn-Gebot-Hofflllann") a8 Minister of Culture.1 29 His appointment portended
trouble for future Church-5tate relations and for the 8y8telll of contessional
12$In one of the Party' 8 appeals published in East Prus8ia it stated:
"Such persons may all the more easily oCllle to the DNVP without damaging the
honor of their old partybeoause the Nationalist organi;ation is not, like the
I1IP, an old party with a new name, but it is a ccapletely new Partir • • • • The
DNV'P i8 not the old Conservative Parv. It does not wish to be that, nor can
it be." Edward Beckmann, "St&Uung nehmen'" in Ostpreussische Zeitung,
December 10, 1918, as cited ~.,' p. 44.
l26PRiChtl1nien der Deutschnationalen Volk.partei vam 27. Dezember 1918,"
al cited in Ursaohen und 'olgen, III, 205-206.

l27Hertsmann,

E!!!,

p. 43.

128The DNVP continued to woo the discontented Right wing of the Center
Party after the January election. In midsummer of 1919 Germania complained
about the efforts being exerted br the DNVP to win Catholic 8Upport for their
political program, and to join their Party. See Germania, July 4, 1919, 1298.
129aoftmann t s appointment was criticized as a "tasteless afterthought of
history" (ltgeschmackloser Treppen1d. ttl der Weltgeschichte"), KV, November 14,
1918, 1/899.
-
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SChools in Germany.130
A fanatical atheist, Hoffmann immediately promulgated a Socialist anticlerical program.

Two of his decrees, published on November 27 and 29, re-

spectively, abolished clerical

supe~ision

in the "Volksschule," forbade the

teaching of religion, and nullified such practices as prayer before and after
claeses, pupil attendance at religious services, and observance of religious
holidays--cherished concessions which had been granted to confessional schools
1Jl The Catholic reaction was immediate; protests broke out
by the old regille.
everywhere. 132 Bishops resented the "de-Ghristianizing ot schools."13) But
there was lIore to come.

Government subsidies to the Church, it was learned,

were to be suspended after April 1, 1919. Secularl,at1on of Church and convent

property would obvtously tollow.

All were appalled at the "irreligious

achievement" of the revolution and feared the establishment of a proletarian
dictatorship.

The specter of a "new Kulturkampf" 10Cll'led darkly.134

l)O"Heute stehen vir von der brennenden Sorge, welChes die Lage der
katholischen Kirche im neuen Deutschland sein vird." Germania, November 1"
191B, #,3,.
l3l.rhe two decrees are cited in Max1Jdlian Pfeiffer, K!JIPf UIl die
heillssten GiterL (nugschr1tten der Deutschen ZentrUD18partei a '15, Berlin:
January 9, 1919), pp. 12-11.
132Germania , November 2B, 1918, 1,56; November 29, 1918, 15,8; November 1):
1918, 1559.
133Cardinal von Hartmann, Archbishop ot Cologne, in
December 16, 1918, as cited in Pfeiffer, Kampf, p. 21.

8

protest written on

134In a "flaming protest published December 20, 1918, Cardinal Hartmann
and the Prussian bishops lashed out against the dangers of the socialistic
materia11sm of the day: "Jetst kOl1llllt ein Kul turlcaapf von noch viel schl.1mmerer
Art." ~., pp. 23-33.
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Catholics and Protestants alike resented Socialist attempts to secularize
education. 135 Together they staged interdenaainational demonstrations against
the obnoxious decrees. l36 In Berlin a special interdenominat.ional cODlJlittee was
eatablished to tight a common cause against the "1Il8terialiam" ot the day.131
Aaong outspoken cri tics ot Hot.f1lann t s lepsls ti<m, the Center Party

.toad out as t.he stalwart detender ot Christian culture and education.
ning in

Begin-

the middle ot November and continuing beyond the January election

campaign, the Party waged a tireless and, at times, vitriolic battle against
the Socialist anti-clerical program. A undate published by the PrU8sian
Center £actiOl1l 38 was only the tirst ot many such bitter protests to be permed
by Centrists against the "rape ot Catholics and Protestants" through the
"Jakobinermassregeln" ot Adolt Hotfaann. 139 The Socialist Minister ot Culture
tt

vas abused and insulted cneve17 side. He was cond.ned a. a "Kultursch8dlin,,,"
as an "illiterate person • • • bristllDa with anitch tor dictatorialpower.,,140
l3S,or a report ot the discussioo held by the Protestant High COIl8istory,
see ibid., pp. 44-45.

-

136Joseph Selbst, Vicar-general ot Mainz wrote: "Catholic and Protestant
brethren rose up as one un • • • • Prell nUileroue _s.ive assemblies one could
hear a cry ot protest and a stol'll ot oppoei tion which swept oyer the land like
a natural catastrophe and in the chaos ot revolution Berlin itselt could not
be lett unheard." Cited in Morsw,r, "Zentrumapartei," p. 257.
137Pteitter, KalfPt, p. 55; Geraania, NOVeMber lS, 1918,
a "mobUization of a
religious strength."

1535,

spoke of

138!!. November 19, 1918, 1912.

-

139Ibid., November

25,

1918, #928.

140"Mann obne Bildung • • • gestachelt von diktatoriscbem Macbtikitzel."
Ibid. Tbe Munster protessor Johann P1enge protested "a. a scholarly Socialist"
toE'bert against the "sudden frenzy of power exhibited by Hotr_nn" whose
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~n

the K8lnische Volkszeitung he was depicted as • big-aouthed, illiterate

atheist of Berlin,

8

cyniC, an evil scum tram Berlin's quagmire, a gushing

water-spout before an imposing bu1ld1ng, an intellectual Ther8ites. nl41
An uninterrupted wave of protest stemming fro. individuals, frca Catholic
organizations, and trail Protestants added ita weight to the cultural and religious demands of the eenter. 142 Capitalising upon the religious issue, the
Centrist leadere combined the various socio-econaa1c groups within the Party
into a cOJlllon front with the de tense ot (;hriltian education a. a unitying
cc:anon den01llinator.

The publication ot the anU-clerical decrees, furthermore,

gave the Party a suitable slogan tor the colling election campaign for the
National Asseably--one that could be used to attract both Catholics and
Protestants alike. 143
The incessant protests against Hottann gained their end.

ay the

a1ddle

or December, his co-worker in the Ministry ot Culture, Konrad Haenisch, was
appointment had been "a continuous historic disgrace tor the Socialists. tJ
Cited in Schulte, MGnsterache Chronik, p. 132.
ft
l4l"Gro.s8Chnautzig~r, ungebildeter Berliner Gottesleugner, widerwartiger Zyniker, Ible Blu\e aUB Berliner Grossltadtstrumpt, grinsender Wasserapeiher vor einem Monuaentalgeblude, geistiger tneraites," December 11, 1918,
#988, also cited in Schulte, JlLlswrache Chronik, p. 289.

14200 November 27 Protessor Georg Schreiber spoke to a Centrist assembly
about the "Catholic c:;:1:8is" and the dangers of separation ot Cburcb and State.
A protest signed by one thousand un and women ot Cologne concerning the religious question vas sent to Ebert by the Center Party on Dec_her 4. lAtter

the reading of Ebert's reply at another large gathering of Centrists at
MUnster tended to increase the antagoniSJll againat government policies. C1 ted
~., pp. lBO, 206, 262-26$.

143A few 1I01'1ths later bas spoke ot the "revolutionary flirtation"
which expo.ed the "cultural aiu" ot the SPI) and shook t.he "cbri8t.licbe Volles8eele" and rai8ed the caapa1gn to a "battle of ideale." Cited in Mor8ey,
ftZentruaBpart.1," p. 2$B.
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forced to confesa that Hot.t'lllann t a policies had been "shipwrecked."

"A hasty

separation ot State and Church by a .ere decree • • • [he stated] would lead,
in lilY opinion, to disastroue political consequences," theretare, the govern-

lIlent would have "to tolerate" the interest. of Christianity in PrUSS1a. 1h4
Under pressure ot public opinion Haeniach cancelled de tacto HoffMann's edict:
of November 29 concerning the abolition of religious instructions, declaring it

tilegal siDce it had not been published in the "prescribed fDa ••145 Cb
January

4, 1919, Hottaann d1sguetedly reaigned his otfice. The united ettorts

ot German Catholics and Protestants _rehalled b,. the atreng foroe ot the
Center had scored a ncto1'7. 146
But it waa not the voice of religion sole17 1IIhich called a halt to
political tyranny.

Nor for that IRatter were the pending elections the decisive

factor in the withdrawal of the recent administrative decre...

The warning

note that had aet the SocialUt aovermaent quaking waa a _11 c17 out of the
West.

Identitied by German Nationalists as Centrist-inspired, "Loa von Berlin"

became a rallying s10pn that echoed throuah the land. 147 Rhineland citisens

-

144Ibid •
14'Publ1c decree ot December 26, 1918, aee Pfeifter, Kaapf, pp. 59-60.
~rman1a published an edi tor1al, flEln Ert'olg der chriatlichen1irotest, "
IDecember 2B, 1918, 1604, aee alao Berliner Tasebla~l, January 5, 1919, 118.
146Pteilter warned that the atruule had just begtm. The Socialist antilelerlcal proaraJll indicated the trend of ita aeculari8IB and IUterlali81llJ worae
thinga would happen if the Socialists should win • majority in the ccaing
!election. See Pteiller, K!!p:!, p. 60.
147Alread7 on Dec_ber 17 Profeaaor Plenge warned Haenisch I "You are not
Iware ot the unner by which the • Los von Berlin, t f aelbatlndiges RheinlandNestta1en' have received an echo here. PrecticalIT the whole responaibility
tor it talla on the Pr'ue.ian Miniatry ot Culture... Cited in Schulte,
~Un.tersche Chronik, p. 235.

~--------------~
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were dete1"ll1ned to create a new republic of Prussia's westem provinces. 148
Too long had they been irked by Pru.aia's unsympathetic dOlllination over the.
They had watched the unsettled events of November and the chaotic situation
brought about by strikes and Spartacist notings.

They had endured the preseno

ot allied occupation troops. They had li'V8d in tear of partial annexation ot
Rhenish terri t01"7 by France.
ICulturka1llpf.

.ow they were cringing under the laah of a new

:

No 1IOIlder that even hitherto 10,..1 Rhenish people began to favor

separation from Prussia.

R8henish law for Rhenish land" ("Rheinisches Recht

f{ho Rheinisches Land" )149 bee... the motto of a reactiClll8r;y Jloveaent against
the undemocratic and "irresponsible" government of Berl1n.150 With Red dictatorship ot "the worthless 'r.ssetreaden' intruder, Kurt Eianer of Bavaria,"
threatening on the one ,hand and the "rule ot Berlin d... gocuea n on the other,
Rhenish Centrists desired a new Beich fOl'll8tion with a separate republic for
tbe Rhineland area (Pfalll, Heasen-Naasau, Rhineland and Westphalia) based on
a "nev free Gemany."

"fraue ,_ Reich, los von BerlinL "151

Press reaction to the movement was naturally divided.

A tew Centrist

publlcatiOl1IJ aupported the idea,152 other larger daillie8 were highly akep153
tical.
The "Centrist" label had been tagged on the Movement by newsaen

148,!!,

Dec_bel'

149Ibid.,

-

150

5, 1918, 11957.

December

4,

1918, #953.

"We will not dance to the tune ot Berlin," Tremonia, December 6, 1918,

# 337, a8 cited in Horsey, "Zentrumapartei," p. 259.

151IV,
Gerun

Deceaber 4, 1918, 1953. This separati8t 1l0000ent wa. not antibuts1mply anti-Pruasian.

152For
235.

SOll8

..

"
of these ca.nents, see Schulte, Munster.cbe
Chronik, pp. 233-

153
The ICHlniache Zeit.unsr. December 6. 1918.

1ll2~.

criticiF.AtI t.h.

II"

-----------------------------------------------------------------,
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who might JIlore correctly have identitied it vith two fellov-editors.

EaplO)'ing

the slogan, "Weg mit Berlin,1t Karl Hoeber and Father Joset Froberger, editors

ot the KGlnische Volksseitung, had lashed out in their papers against the
dictatorship of ainority groups and the utooilshness of the Spartacists ...l54
It was their paper which bad originated the idea of dividing Germany into tour
republics arranged in such a pattern as to break the doainant position ot
l55
Prussia and recon8truct the Beich on a "tederal d_ocratic ba&18 ...
At 8
meeting in Cologne on December

4,

called tor thepurpoee ot acquainting

Cologne's citizens with the proposed "Berliner Leitsltze" and other proposed
reforms ot the Center Party, Karl Roeber read the resolution demanding a new
division of the Reich to a large assembly ot Centrists.

The response vas over-

whela1ng. 1S6 At the same .eeting, Father Kastert eagerq endorsed the resolution, declaring that it carried the sanction ot the Archbishop ot Cologne, and
underscoring the tact that ita d8ll18nds were not the Centrists! alone but the
157
desire ot all people in the Rhineland.
ft

arrangement as "imprac tical" and "unacceptable." The Tagl1che Rundachau called
it "clerical partioularism". Vordrte accused the Centrists or creatiiig a "private dcaain ot clerical backwardne8s ft J 0.,..ni8 warned ot the "danger to the
unity ot the Reich in these chaotic times". the Telegraphen Union doubted
whether the movement represented the "general vill ot the Rhenish-Westphalian
people." All articles as cited in illS,., pp. 215-217.
154
December 6, 1918, #959.
l55Ibid., December 12, 1918, /I 976, Schulte, MUnstersehe Chron1k, p. 264
baa a aap-orthe proposed reconatruction ot the Reich.
..
lS6"Stnrmischer~ s1ch starker und starker wiederholender Beitall, Hat und
1'Ueherschvenken. Die Auveaenden erbeben aich von lhren Platzen. Kin velt" iBaer 1m Gedichtnis hatten wird." IV,
ge8chichtlicher Augenblick, der tur
December 5, 1918, 11957.

.

Or

157An otticial of M.:htster cOlllllenting on this remark, said that he doubted

jP

6,
But the spark enkindled by Hoeber and Froberger and fanned to a blaze by
Rhineland separatists was not destined to tlare up

80

brightly again.

Tbough

Rhenish Centrists fought and expounded, other political parties refused to
become involved.

Grossly exaggerated was the K8lnische Yolks.eitune's asser-

tion that the movement had been accepted wi th "enthusiastic agreement by all
parties • nl,8 Even within the Center there had bean little encouragement. l ,9
When the inhabitants of Westphalia agitated for an independent Ku-Bepublic,
and siDdlar mOV'ements ot separatist minorities tollowed, support for the
Rhenish-Westphalian mO'l'eJIlent grew even weaker.

Serious-minded Centrists began

to question the adnsabili ty of the whole separatist program.

The Mlnsterschs

Anseiger on December 8, warned against a flhasty decision, ,,160 and two days
later Adolt Schlledding, a Mt1nster Centrist, reintorced this admonition by
lpeaking out vigorously against any iJlmediate Los von Berlin mov..ent. 161 Like
lentiments were expressed at Haa on Dec_bel" 11 by Karl Herold, the chairman
whether the Bilhop of M6.nster would be ot the same opinion. Cited in Schulte,
MGnstersche Chronik, p. 222. Later the IV, Dec_bel" 12, 1918, 1976, explained
that the resolution represented the wishe. ot individual Centrists and was not
• movement ot the Center Party. For this reason, neither Trimborn nor JII.arx as
leaders ot the Party had c011lllented on the resolution. At a Rhenish Centrist
Partei l an Septeaber 16, 1919, Father Brauns re.phasized thia when he
j)OIiite out,"in the name ot the Party directors," that the Rhineland movement
hac! not 'been staged by the Psrty but expressed the wishes ot individuals.
Reports aa cited in Monsey, Zentrumsp!rtei 1917-122~, p. 122.

r

l~orsey, "Zentrumapartei,. p. 262.
"l59No reterencea were made to such proposals in the various discussion
aeetings 'formulating programs tor the Center's new platrom. The future state
structure was to be decided by the National A.sembly.
160Cited in Schulte, ......--...M«nstersche
-.

-

161Ibid ., pp. 2,4-2,8.

~hronik,
. p. 246 •

I""""
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at the Westphalian Centrist cOllllll1ttee. He cOUllselled his com.panions to remain
alo ot , declaring that such a decision ought to be made by the National Alsembl¥
not by one party.162 Stegerwald and F..rsberger were also Itrong in their opposition

to~,the

leparatist movement. grzberger in particular lavored a strong

centralization at power and had little sympathy with any particularist sentiments--a view that was in contradistinction to that ot !lOst ot his tellow
Centrists. S1.m1lar teelings were entertained b7 Hans Bell, a Centrist Reichetag member trom D{1sseldort who, on necember 1), withdrew his support troa the
movement and joined the opposition.163
That

8 . .e

ileaellber 1) vas made noteworth7 by the conYocation ot a general

.eeting at Elbeteld, under the auspices at the Prussian govemaent, tor the
purposes at investigating and settling separatists' contentions.

Important

otticials at the Rhenish province. were present, as well as the repreeentative.

ot local coaumties, political partie.,

and the press.

Tr 1lllborn as Centri.t

representative in explaining his position repudiAted the KBln1sche Volks-

,.eitung'l whole idea ot leparation, and said that Berlin'. m18l1l8nageaent had
164
alienated the Welt.
He noted, turthermore, that with France striving to w1n
Rhenish Catholic slllpathy tor an Anschluss, the formation of a separate
Rhenish-We.tphalian republic was simply an alternative to foreign annexation.
The mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer, called the s eparatiet proposal "the

162.!2!i., pp. 266-267.
163Ibid ., p. 273.

164Tr1.mborn

remarked tha t in Trier, people were saying, "We would ra ther
be French, than bow to Hottmann. II Ibid.

F
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greateat atupiditya ever heard ot, and pointed out that the proposal bad neTer
been wholeheartedly accepted by the Center Party.16S
The Elberteld conterence sounded the death knell to the Rhenish republic
DlO'lement tor the mCllent, although the K&lnische Volkszeituns continued to
publiC i.e it.

Enberger, Gr6ber, and a Centrist leader trCII MUnster, Karl

Herold, repeated their condemnations ot the Los von Berlin plans at the
national Centrist convention held in Frankfurt on December 30.

166

But TriJlborn

and Wilhelm Marx as leaders ot the Rhenish Centrists had already buried the
usue when on signing the Party's general election manitesto on December 28,
they conti1"ll8d publicly:

"The Reich's unity IlUSt under all circwutances be

maint.iined. n167
The Berlin Centrist leadership had neither sanctioned the separatist
movement nor become inyolved in the controversy.. Its e,tforts had been concan'trated rather on the business ot constructing a new Party plattOl"l'l and on
joining with the Church in ita bitter campaign against the Prussian reYolutionary Kulturpolitik. l68

In these intereats, Berlin Centrists had joined

wi th Rhenish-We.tphalians in a series

-!!"

ot coaaittee meetings during the Ilonth

16SIbid ., pp. 271-274.

166

January 2, 1919, #3, Germani!, January 2, 1919, #2.

167The Loa yon Berlin issue was to be resurrected again atter the
Rational Assembly cOllV'ened: In Westphalia the idea ot a separate Ems-Republic
never really died and WIlS a cause ot _barras_ent to the Centrist leadership
during the election campaign. See Schulte, Mtinstersche Chrontk, pp. 293, 303,
308-314, 319-322.
168On November 23 Bishop Karl Joseph Schulte of Paderborn tearing tuture
Conflicts tor the Church over cultural-political attaire, requested secrep17general Pteitter to see that the Center enter boltlly into the tra,. with "ruck~1~~8 katholischar Flrbung," as cited in Morse,., Zentruupartei in 19l7-192l,

68
of December att.empting to reeolve' the dirterences between the two groups. AffA'
169
four weeks of "difficult transactions"
a 8et of new policie8 bad gradually
evolved combining the main pOints of both programe .110 The.e were then sub111
lIitted on December 20 to the national c<DRittae tor tinal approval.
The
committee held a conference at Frankfurt on December 30 under the direction
of the Party leader, Adolf Graber. Among the thirtY-8ix leading members of
the Party present were I

Enberger, Karl Herold, Richard MGller-Fulda, Fflrst

lAwenstain, Graf Pra8chaa, K.

o. von Bretano, and

Vorl

F. X. Bach_.

Savigny, M. Pfeifter, L. Gerstenberger,
Representatives of the Catholic Women's

League of Germany, Hedwig Dransfeld and Mra. Hesaberger, a180 atteD.decl. 112
After a careful 8tudy of the preliminary prograa, the coadttee sanctioned it
a. the new Party plattorm for the coming election CaMpaign.113
The prOVisional character of the new Party directives and it. emphasis

on "new principle8" hinted at basiC changes in the Party's policies which
actually were not presented.

True, acceptance of the republic,114 the Party's

169BaCh., Zentruup!rte1a, VIII, 263.
110'01" a coverage of sOlle of the topiCS diBCuased, aee Maximilian
Pfeiffer, Zentrla und politische Neuordnung (Flyachriften del" Deutachen
Zen'trulupartei. 12, Berlin: December, 19l1:J).
11lgv, December 2G, 1919, 1991.

-

112Bachea, ZentrumBpartei
_
a' VIII , 263.
113The new progr8ll, authorised by Graber, was publi.hed in KV, January 2,
1919, 14, Germania, January 2, 1919, 12.
c~uded

11~e "torturous question" of the re8toration of the monarchy was ex-

trOll the di8cua81ona at Frankturt and frca the Party program. The
Wurtteaberg CentriSts, however, had definitely declared that a restoration of
the monarchy ftS "apo.sible." See Bach.., ZentruJuE!rte!, VIII, 264.

"
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.trong empha.is on democracy, and its demands tor a more centra11,ed Reich

evidenced a reversal ot 80.e of the tenets of the previous July program. 17S
aut beside this, there was 11 ttle changed in the basic Center Party's principle..176 The "new" Party platform contained provisions culled trom various
tormer progralU nas well as some new proposals, resulting £rea the last veeks

ot discussion ...177 The platform was divided into three parts.

There were

various provisions concerning the tormation of a .new political constitution,
a section on foreign policies, and a long caulogue of domestic procedures
covering cultural, social, eccmoaic, and tinancia4, policiea. An introduction
in the tont

ot a manifesto (signed

by Gr&ber) .t.ated that the goal

vall to atrive in a true Christian spirit to attain lIocial justice

ot the PartT

tor all. The

revised plattorm recognised the new deaocracy, but attacked class rule, mater178
iali_, ma1Dlloni8Jll, and anarchy.
Concerning the poll tical reorganisation ot Germany, it advocated three

..aeura..

Firat, acknowledging that the new republic vas to be d_ocrat1c and

17SThe new program called tor ''Wahrung der Reichs.inheit, Stirkung
"
des
Reich.gedankes" while at the .... tiM it a.ked tor the "Erhaltung des bundesstaatlichen Charakters des Reichs sum Schutz der Eigenart der deutechen
Stlllllll8. If See "Lei taltae der Deutechen Zutl!UDl8partei vea nezember 1916," in
Urs.chen und Fo1~, III, 197.

Uii'

176At the ,800M Paneita at Berlin on January 16, 1922, EmU Ritter
\old the assembled Can ta, t
the directives ot July 1918 and the program
~OPol!l8d by the WGst. German and Berlin groups were combined into an otticia1
election prograa. Report aa oited in Morae,.., Zentrumsparte1 1917-1923, p. 129.
177Same ideas ot the Jesuit Heinrich Pe.ch's doctrine ot Chriatian
. SoliCSar1811l vere proposed a. an alternative to the evils ot capitaliSJll and
sociali8ll. See He1nr1ch PeSCh, licht kCIIJI\IDist18Cher, 8Ond-ern ehri.tJ.1cher
§..osiali8lBusl (ngschrltten .dar Zentrumsp!rtei IIi, Berlin: DeceJllber 23, 1~8).
178"Le1tsltze der Deut.schan Zentrullspartei (Christliehe Volkspartei)
van 30. Dezamber 1918," in Ura.chen und Fotlan, III, 196.

,..
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Dot socialist, it required that a new constitution tor the Reich and the

-

~esstaat;en

be iJIIaediately framed.

Furthermore, it called tor the iDnediate

J'8Iftoyal ot the National Ass-blT to a naater place than Berlin," and the stationing of a volunteer guard to insure the safety ot the new Assembly's pro-

ceedings. Second, it insisted that the unity and federal character ot the
Reich be Dlaint&ined.
be reserved

"The .ettle.ent ot defensive and toreign poliCies is to

to the Reich whUe the settlement of Church and school 18 resened

to the Bundesstaaten. Third, it asked tor universal euttra.. with proportional
representation; popularly elected gcwermaents in states and the nation; aTailabili ty ot all oltices in the federal government and in municipalities to
people ot all classes J and the adoption ot a bill of rights guaranteeing to
all citizens, "regardless ot political and religious atfiliations," treed(Jll of
speech, press, and aasembly.179
In regard to foreign policies, the platform deliberately incorporated

lany ot the idea8 of WUson'. Fourteen Points.

The Center wanted the "1.mIae-

date conclusion ot a prel.illl1nary peace and the agre.ent and reconciliation
~t

all people."

A8 a deterrent to future war, it called for nthe e8tablish-

Ilent and execution ot an international law tounded on Christian principles
and the reali.ation that permanent peace cOllld be achieved U ba8ed on mutual
recognition of states rather than on the foree ot power."

It desired nthe

creation ot a league ot nations with equal recognition ot both large and ...11
ltate.," with obligatory arbitration, disa:rmament, and abolition of secret
treaties.

Other provisiOll8 m.rely reiterated traditional Centrists demands:

179Cited in Ursachen und FOlgen, III, 197.

, -------------------------------------------------n

"the protection of national and rellgious Ilinorities" in all nations, economic
treed om ot development and treed01ll ot the aeas, international regulation

or

labor legislation and insurance lawa, popular education for the understanding

ot toreign questiona,

and tinaU,., the .. intenance of a German colonial

empire. 180 The third section of the Center's plattora covenad internal or
domestic pollcies.

Here, again, the program proposed policies si.lllUar to ita

previous demandsl "the maintenance and strengtbR&ng of cultural and

or

reli-

giOUS exereiaes with cooperation between Church and State, and "the protection
and strengthening ot the religious character ot marriage and of the tuU,.."
Besides thiS, it advocated a campaign tor the suppression ot iaaoral art and
literature, adequate rel.1gious instruction tor all SChools a. well a. the maintenance of the "confessional publ10 school," Ita tree career for the advance.
Mnt of the talenta" of people trom all walks of lite, and equalit7 ot oppor, tuni t,. tor aU women. 181
In economic and social aftairs, the Part,. insisted upon the _tnt8nance
of the right ot private property, but at the

.8118

tille it championed the

development of national economy in the service ot social juatice.182

It

180Ibid., pp. 197-198. COlIDIlenting on the Party's desire to maintain a
colonial empire, Leo Schwering in an article, "Zentrua und Aussenpolitik,"
published in Germania, 'ebru&r7 7, 1919, (J61, noted that the Party thereby
.howed itself not only "sensitive" to "national" interest. but was also "farSighted" and "opt1m1stic."
'
181
Ibid., pp. 198-199.

-

182Th18 was based on one ot Pesch'. ideas which was incorporated in
article 241 nGeordneter Autbau Vollt8V1rtachaft ill Dienat del' sos1&len
Gerechtigkeit und des a.ae1nwohla aut Orundlage del' produktiven Arbsit.
Grunds't,l1che Erhaltung del' aut pera8nl1ch_ Eigentua beruhenden, nach d_
SolidaritKtsprinsip dea Oesa.twohl del' a.sellschatt untergeordneten Privatwirtllchaft. n ill!!., p. 199.

'~-------------------.
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d.-nded the effect!ve care of all the wounded as well as the support of vet-

.rans

of the 1mr.

Regarding financial affaira, the Party sought to win the

.upport of the bourgeois group by circlmlVenting the flight of capital abroad,
by preYenting depreciation in the value of war loans, and by adVocating that

taxes be apportioned according to each citizen' a abUity to p8y.183
Armed with the new Party plattorm, the "Christliehe Volkspartei" a. the
Center was now called184 entered the election cupaign tor the National .A.ss..b17.

A flood of CaJllpa1gn . .terial--posters, circulars, manifestoes, news

articles, pamphlets-issued tro. the general .ecretariat in Berlin to rouse
the interest of the new claas of votere created by the revolutionary govern-

..nt. 18S For the tiret t1ae inLtbe hi.tory of Germany,

WOMn

would exercise

183 lbid •

-

l84Atter ll\1Ch di8Cusaion concerning a cnange of name. tor the Party the
Frankfurt conterence on Dec_er 30 adopted the name ·Cbri.tl1che Volkspartei"
a8 the official name in order to indicate the interconte.slonal character ot
the Part,.. Bach.., zentruufirtei, VIII, 264. A tew days betore, Peter Spahn
at a Party conference at lier. Iii had protested changing the old Dame, but agreed
to acquiesce i t "wider circlea It wi thin the Party would demand it. Oermania,
Dec_bar 20, 1918, IS94.. The DaIle "Zentrua" was never really relinquiahed.
aince it 1I8S al..,.. prin'ted in parentheses behind "Christliche Volkspartei."
Shortl,. atter the January election, "Cbr18Uiehe Volkapartel" 1188 abandoned and
the Party reverted to the old t1 Ue of nZentrwa. It
l85The general-secretariat iasued a aeriea of nugachr1tten to explain
the Center" vi81ll on the caapaign issues. The first two hi kaxtmuian Pfeifter, ZentruDl unci neue Zeit and Zentrusa lIIld politische Neuordnunl, gave the P
Party's opinion ol the revolution and ita stand on the present political situation. The third by Alexander von Brandt, Staat und K1rche, reviewed the
Center' a traditional stand on Church-State reliUona and showed that the Part,.
Iti11 did not favor a separation of Church and State. The fourth b7 Heinrich
Peach, Nicht kClllllunistischv, soodern chriatJ..1cher Sosialismual developed a
aOCio-econODdc theory Which recOiii1.ed the dignIty of man, harmonized freedom
~th authority, and a1_d at a maxUtUlll distribution ot private property. It
favored the id.a of collective farming and cooperatives. The last three publications, K~t um die h.~sten Ontet by Maximilian Pfeiffer, Revolution und
Kultur b7 rtIli Fsaabe er, and tier Kampf um die Schul. by AdoU Oottwald,
Idealt with the rel1gioua cantlict in the schoolS and c18r1tied the issues.

-

13

the right ot sutfrage, tor in the can1ng election of the National Asl8JUbly to
be held on January 19, not only men, but all women twenty years

would be entitled to cat their ballota.

allT againat

VCIIIn

ot age or older

The Center Party, though tradition-

auttrage, lost no t1ae in sol1citing feminine votes. 186

Poeters were geared to awaken v01IIInly sentiment, particularly the maternal insttnct. 187 Oermania frequently referred to the responsiblli~ of women to be
wen-informed on political questions and urged them to take part in patriotic
and political actirlty.

It was hoped that the 1ntluence of women would en188
noble and enrich the political lite ot the nation.Ever;y woman interested
"in the ve1ghty questions of the hOM and tamily, the school and tiducation, law

and

char1~, work

and protes.ional activity" vas urged to vote. 189 Mi.s

Bblert, a speaker tor the Catholic

WOMB'S

Union, in an ardent appeal to the

WOMn at the Party's big election raUl" on January 1, 1919, told the wcaen lito
give back to the world Chriat1an t81 th, Christian standards, and Christian
Cbarity."19O
186.Alread7 on NOV8Dlber 16 Felis Porsch, the Prwssian Centriat leader,
proposed the Domination of WOllen Jielegatea at a Brealau meeting. See Germania,
November 20, 1918, 1S43. Two days later at a Cologne assembly, the Centrist
executive ccaa1ttee made a prori,aion tor the "organization ot women 'Voters,·
lV, November 18, 1918, 1/909. At. Centrist gathering on December 1, the .m~era were told "to exert untiring recruiting etforts" in winning the women's
votes. Cited in Schulte, Mtinatersche Chronik, p. 16.
187"Starke FraueDberzan werden tlber schwachen Mhnenrillen" J "Die Uen_
~l die U3bel" for reproductions ot sDdlar posters, Bee Helltron, ope cit., I,
r"YQ-168.

186Decellber 13, 1918, 1481. '1'h1s Bee idea VIS expreBsed by the Jesuit
lPeter Lippert, "Der Zua del' frauen, n Stilllaen del' Zeit, XCVI (December, 1918} ,
~P. 394-402.
189
Germania, November 1" 1918, #436.

190

Ibid., January 2, 1919, #2, p.

h.
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The tremendous crowd which at.tended the Center's rally at the Zirkwt
BuSch in Berlin on January 1 was a good. indication ot the support. the Party

was receiYing. 191 Dr. Pteitter, who welcomed the large gathering, stressed

192

the seriousneS8 ot the U.8 and the neces8i t.y tor upholding Party solidaritJ'
'!'be keynote address was giyen by Dr. Anton

Hane,

the direct.or of the Techni-

cians' Union, who emphaaized the need tor 80Cial and econOll1c retorm. While
encouraging .ploye88 and employers to unite their interests and JlUtually respect. each other' a righta, he noted that the Party

1I8S

concerned that provi-

aions be _de tor adequate wages and decent. standards ot living.

The Party,

he aaid, retained lts policy ot recognition ot personal ownel'8hip ot propert.y,
but whUe private initiative was to be encouraged, priYate monopolies were to
be replaced by co_unal adDd.nistrst.ion.

The ideal

ot a socialist. state, he

pointed out, "is the equitable d1atrlbution of goods. 1I ae stressed, theretore, the Party' 8 need to gi'V'e more cOD8iderat.ic.m to social and econOlldc ratOl'lll8

in order to ottset. the talse proa1ses

ot the SociaUst.e. To win in

the coming election, he concluded, the Party must "enter into a new modem
ISoz1alpolit1k. , ,,193
The whole tone

ot the rally centered

on an open attack

ot Socialism.

Both Catholic and Protestant speakers told the interdenOlldnational aS88mbly

to unite torces in an at.tack againat t.he enemy of Christianity. Dr. Carl
Sonnenschein urged all to demand the hlstoric rights ot the Church, Jed

19~e rally was the greatest. the Center had ever experienced. Over
20,000 people attended indoors and another 40,000 heard the speeches broedcast
in the Luaterten. ~. J !!., January 2, 1919, 113.
192Ibid •
193Ibid •

-
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religious organizations,

tor,

i f the Social D81IIocrata were to win the election,

the degeneration ot Germany would tollow.

Religion and Christian ideala, he

told his audience, would be 8uppre88ed by the radioal Soc iali St8 •

"The new

Center wants freedom ot religion, the right to regulate culture, the guarantee

ot rreedOlft ot oonscience, freedom ot education, and religious instruction in
all schoo18--elementRr,y and secondar,y.,,194
In the seyeral short addres8es given by clergyaen, God-tearing men ot
all denOlll1nationa were adviaed ot the necessity ot providing a united front
against a co_on toe.

Dr. Carl Sonnenschein's tears ot a tuture sociali8t

state were echoed by Dr. Karl Dunkmann, a Protestant theologian and university
protes8or.

He reterred to the November Revolution a8 a "scourge ot God," and

encouraged Cathollca and ProteStant8 to atand un1\ed in thi8 tiM of crisi.
againat the SocialiBt threat to the religious interests ot all Chriatian••
rather Bernhard Lichtenberg, speaking tor the Catholics, voiced the same ideas.
He underscored the iJlportance ot the1'8lig1ous iS8ue in the forthcolling election
In a rather florid 8peech, interrupted by frequent applause, Dr. Theodor

Haecker, a Lutheran pastor, eaphasized the importance of joining torces in the
attack on religion and culture.

"We do not intend to change our ideas. we

have charity tor all our brethren. We would reach over high fences to shake
hands with our brethren • • • • We need to be united on our battletront against
bold, endless, insane paganilml. ,,19$ Other speakers had siaUar Mssagea to
give.

Each 8IIlpha8izad the fact that Party solidarity and unity of all faith8
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were necessary concomitants tor sateguarding Christian ideals and br.ald.n& the
.trength ot the Social Deaocra ts.
At the conclusion ot the rally, the entire ga thering--approxiJu tely
.1Xty thousand persons-poured out into the street and, amid the waving ot
banDers and singing ot religious and patriotic songs, marched toward the
196
Ministry or Culture to protest against Hotf'unn's policies.
Although the
demonstrators did not succeed in obtaining a personal confrontation with
Hottmann, the impact
their opponents.

or

their cruaading sp'...rit oould not bave been lost upon

The Socialists were torced to reoogni•• that the new Center

("Christliehe Volkapartei") was s cmething to be reckoned wit11e
SilIlilar rallies and daonetrations were held on a amall.r acale in local
At Braslau the Party solgans railed agai.nat the "Reds· and the "cbaoe"

areas.

ot the times. 197 Several rallies held at Cologne protested the "atheistic
policies nl98 ot the Berlin governnaent and called. tor both "active and passive
resistance. "199 Reviewing the policies ot the Socialists, the Cologne Centrists lashed out against the and in contrast lauded the policies ot the
"Christlich. Volkspartei. n2OO The archdiocesan union ot Catholic Workers'
and Apprentices' Associations pledged the support ot all its lUIlbers to the
"Christlieh. Volkapartei. n20l
196neacriptive accounts ot this d _onstration are tound in Berliner
Tageblatt, January 2, 1919, #3, KV, January 4, 1919, 119, January 5, 1919, #l2J
'freJllonla, January 4, 1919.. 14, r81erred to the d8llonstration as a "true
crusade."
197Gel"Jll8nia, Noveaber 21, 1918, IS$4.
196!!, December 27, 1918, ,1013.
199Ibid ., December 28, 1918, #101S.
200
Ibid., January 4, 1919, Ill.
ft,
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FrClll aU side. the Party received tremendous support.

Hottmann's radical

KulturpolitiJc brought out the Catholic hierarchy' in .full support ot the CenteJII

-

In an otticial declaration, trOll1 the Archbishop

ot Cologne, Cardinal Felix

Hartmann, the Catholic. were told to support the "Christliche Volkspartei"
in its struggle against the "godle.s eftorts"

ot tne Socialists. 202 Other

bishops tr<lll Trier, Paderbom, MGnster, Osnabrtlc~ and HUdeshe1m joined with
Cardinal Har_nn in issuing a pastoral letter in January to allthe umbers

ot their fiocks condemning the "enemy ot Christendca--SOCial1sa" which was
"attempting to bring the di.orders at the day into Catholic districts.,,203
Bishop Adolt Bertr.. ot Breslau warned against a new Kul turlcampt led by the
Socialists and torbade any "Anechluss" with the Socialist parties. 204
The election c_pa1gn was the same one-sided attair as the New Year'.
nay rally and s1Jrllar rallies had been.

Instead ot taking a wide view ot the

Situation, the C@IJlter narrowly lft'elled ita oppoa1tion against the Social n.o.
crats whether they were Majority 80cialists or Independents. 20, Practically
ignoring other poll tical partie., the Center singled out the SPD a. the "only

~ ot the German people," and the perpet.rators ot the revolution. 206 The
202 Ibid., JanUAry 1, 1919, fl.

-

2°lxbid., JlIluary 21, 1919, 113l. Genaania, January 13, 1919, 1120. cited
also in SChUIte, Mbterache Chron1k, pp. 69, 100.
204ae nn.ania, January 23, 1916, 1126.
20Swtule the lett-wing ot the Center JIlight have tavored .ome ot the
social retOl'lll ideas ot the Majority SOCialists, Centrists on the whole were
suspicious ot socialistic philosophy.

20~, January 16, 1919, 148.
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cr.Y was "gegen Klassenverhetzung und Anarchie.,,207 Germanials Januar,r issues
carried a number of articles highly cn tical or the Social Democrats· prograa.
One editorial called the Socialists the Center's "arch-en8D17" because theT
wanted a strong socialiat state, abolition or religion, and state ownership of
property and the means ot production.

The Center, Qermania pointed out, de-

.ired equality tor all states and recognition or states rights, the ..intenance and strengthening or Christian oulture and education, as well a8 treedcm
or conscienoe and religious t.oleration.
208
protect the laborer.

It wanted also to help the tarmer and

To bolster its arguaenta about the irreligious and anti-Christian at.titudes or the Socialists, GefUBia printed a special article entitled, "What
the Social Deaoora ts SaT about Themselve.... 209 Pointing to

S01l8

irreligious

activities and attitudes or the Minister or Culture, the article noted that
these were typical or the inherent polioies ot atheistic sooiali...

It

quoted such sta tements or their leaders as, "To be a Sooialist is to be antiChristian," and K&utsky's clai., "Above all else I have represented the opin~on that everT religion should be opposed."

"ChristianitT and Sociali.. are

8S

Babel was quoted a. saying,
~
210
opposed as fire and water."
A later

0

2 7'or other anti-socialist slogans, see Schulte, Mflnatersche Chronik,
PP. 15), 16), 167, 170; Heilrron, Ope cit., I, 154-168.
208January 7, 1919, 110, p. 2.
209January 9, 1919,
210
Ibid.

-

114,

p. 2.
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editorial asked, "Can a Catholic Be a Social n.oorat?"
211
tive, it used Bebel'a statement as its proot.
In the week prior to the election a whole series

Replying in the n8la"",

ot short articles wa8

publi8hed in Germania explaining clearly and concisely the major planke in
the Center's plattorm and contrasting them wit.h t.hose ot t.he Social Demoorats. 212

The tinal article in the series appearing on the eve ot elect.ion

sUllJl118rl.zed in bold print what. the C81ter con.idered the most important questions to be decided on the morrow's election.

They were listed under three

headings, state politics, culture, and economics.

The tirst cboice was

Germany as a democratic republic or a classle8s society under a proletariat
dictatorship.

The alt.ernative tor the second ohoice was a Christ.ian German,.

or a Germany mastered b;y a modem pagan authorl ty which would suppress
Christian belieta.

Finall7, the voter was to decide whether he would "uphold

the highest principle. in mainuining the right ot pri va te property, fl or
choose 'ired socialiSJll which would lead quickly' to the elimination ot personal
propert.y and t.o CODIIluni8ll.,, 21 3
It was a hard.tought campaign--a battle between Christianity and atheistic Soeiali8lll.Isaues rather than personalitie. had been stre.sed.

A.

the copaign oame to an end there could be no doubt as to what. the Center
("Christliche Volkspartei") stood tor.

Having aS8Ull8d leadership in the

2llo.rmania, Januar;y 13, 1919, 1120, p. 2.
212Ibid., Januar,y 12, 1919, #17, p. 2, January 13, 1919, 1120, p. 2.
January J.li';l919, 121, supplement; January 15, 1919, 123, supplement,
January 16, 1919, 125, supplement; January 18, 1919, 130.

-

213Ibid., January 18, 1919, 130.
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crusade against 5ociali8ll, the Center had merited tor itseU the backing ot
tbree important religious groups.

First ot all, it had won the wholehearted

support ot the Oerman Catholic hierarchy and the heade ot the various Catholic
.ssociations. Secondly,by converting to an intereontessional body, the Center
Party had gained the tavor ot several Protestant grOUps.214 ene suoh group,
the

~Bund

christlicher Deaokraten-Evangelisoher Zweigverein des Zentruma,"

tounded in Berlin under the leadership ot the Protestant pastor Johannes
aaeoker21$ worked with the Center because it alone ftunder the chaotic conditions" ottered fta political abode."216 The Jews were the third religious group
bound in friendship to the Center Party.

en January $, 1919, at a large al-

semb1y in Cologne, Rabbi Schettelowi tz .poke public17 in tavor of the Center'l
Fogram and encouraged all Jews to vote tor it because the Party guaranteed
fta democratic and locial prograDl based on equal rights and justice tor all
peop1 e.

"217

In the course of the two months since the November 9 upheaval, the

Center Party,

whil~

retaining the basic principle. of the old Soest program,

had revolutionized it. political theories.
ciples remained the

Pille.

But its social and economic prin-

Hence, it renected the Revolution ot November

214A manitesto ot

January 7, 1919, signed by "evangelical supporters"
hailed the cooperation betw.en the two great Christian conte••ions in the "'war"
against Soc1a11_ and pledged support to the Center Party in its political
work. See Johannes Linneborn, "Die K1rschenpol1t1k des tantrums," in Nationale
Arhe1t, p. 198.
21$
Haecker founded this organization with the cooperation ot Professor
.rl D1mlau.nn, !mo von Rehbinder, and the banker, Albert R. Weidner.
216r:;, January 18, 1919, 1150.

-

2l7schulte, M4nstersche Chronit, p. 210.
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only in the single area ot politics.

It had abandoned the monarchy and entered

the campaign a. a supporter of a democratic republic. 1.8 a defender ot
Christian ideals, it had fought ~ith the old banner in the new times."2l8
By capitalizing upon the religious issue the Party had managed to submerge

local difterences and to present a united tront.
Party unanimity did not actually exist.

But the image was deceiving.

The conservative wing, content tor

the time being to raain in the background, awaited p08t-election developments.

The Center had been forced out of its "tower"; time would tell whether

it was equipped to meet the challenge ot a new era.

2l.B

Schofer, Mit der alten Fahne in die neue Zeit.

~----------------~
CHAPrF.R II
ELECTION TO THE NATI<JIAL ASSEUBLY
ANALYSIS OF CENTRIST RETURNS AND AT'l'.ITUDES
In the minds of most Germans, it was the National A8sembq alone which

oould achieve the political stability for which the nation yearned.
therefore, all

or

To it,

Gel'DlarlY looked for the restoration of the religious, eco-

nomic, social, and politioal equilibrium so woef'ulq upset by' the recent
upheaval.

BUt hope for the future was not without misgiving, for there

still remained the orucial decision of the German electorate which would
determine whether the National Assably would be democratic or socialistic J
whether, therefore, the revolution would be restrioted to the politioal
area only, or be extended to the social and economic areas ... well.
Germany waited anxiously for the election of this National AS8_bll'.

l'he promise to convene suoh an assembly had been made on the tirst dq

or

the Revolution. When, however, no turther steps were takBn in the matter,
the Genter Party united its demands with other cOD8e1"V'ative and bourgeois
liberal parties, rem1.nding the revolutionary government ot its promiaes.

In

a reply to a letter ot Cardinal Hartmann of Cologne expressing conoem over
the revolutionary government. a anti-clerical program, Enberger wrote on
November 21, 1918, pledging the Center'a support to tight Hoftmann'a schemes.
Erzberger pointed out, though, that this oould be done only atter a Constitumt.
Assembly had restored

801118

kind ot order to political lite I

82

"The deoisive

,
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task ot the moment is to secure a bourgeoill majority for the National Assembly.
jtbis goal can be at ta1ned i f the bourgeois strata ot the population pull them-

,elves together. n1 Erzberger Wormed the Cardinal that he 'Was: pressing the
goVernment to call for early elections.

In fact, Ebert'8 promise to do 80

had been the prerequisite of Erxberger's willingnes8 to continue as Armistice
COmmissioner under the Socialist government. 2

on

Novaber 30, 1918, the

councU of .People' 8 Commissars issued an edict providing tor the election

ot a constitutional National Assembq, but it, too, failed to spec1fy' 'When
~he

election should take place.

TIro more lIBeks of 'Waiting followed.

At

!last on December 16, the announcanent was made that the election would be
!beld in the first month of the nenr year; nanely, on January 19, 1919.3
voting procedure, though pro'V'ided in the Novanber 30 edict, was tracelable to an earlier law enacted on August 2, 1918.4 According to this procedure, Oel"lll8llY wa divided into thirty"-eeven electoral districts.

Each

lParty in the district 'Wa to present a general ticket with its list ot dele.ates. Electors voted tor the general party ticket, not tor individuals.

lIn

other 'Words, a ticket could not be split.

.,tituenC)" was small, parties of' s1ml1

In area where a party's con-

ar political background or parties who

lErzberger to Cardinal Hartmann~ November 21, 1918, replying to a

~etter dated November 18 as cited in Epstein, Matthias ErJSberger, p. 286.

2Ersberger, Erlebnisse, p. 304.
3HeUtron, Die deutsche Nationalvers8Jl'llllung, I, 105. The election 'Was
thi Iiidipeiid4iit Socialists who did not favor
Ian early ela ction.
.
~el.ayed due to the reluc'tiiiCe or

4rhe edict of November JO, 1918, as cited ibid., I, 105-109; also in
Y'rsachen unci Folgc, III, 239-242.
-
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supported similar platforms were allOlf'ed to unite and present a common list.'
A total of

4.33 deputies wae ,to

be elected-one deputy for every

lSo,ooo

per-

sons,6 Distribution of seats was based on proportional representation, whose
basic purpose was to allow each political party a percentage of votes. 7
The important process of drawing up the list of candidates in each
electoral district was entrusted b.1 the respective parties to their local
party canmittees.

All trades, professions, and classes were represented.

The center Party, moreover, demanded that nominees on its ticket be active
registered lIBDlbers capable of carrying through the election campaign in
their districts.

Much of the

C8Dlpaign

material-manifestoes, slogans, post-

ers, pamphlets-cama from the general secretariat in Berlin.

(Prior to the

war this had been transacted by the Centrist local board of col8issioners.)
It was up to the local nominees to disseminate campaign literature and to
speak at Party rallies in their vicinity. 8
Under the proportional representation system in QerJDanY', loyalty was to
the Party, not to the candidate.

Rarely did the voter knOW' the candidates

'])1 the Hanovel'ian electoral district the Center ("christliche VOlkaparteitl) and the Qermm Hanoverian Party ("])eutsoh-hamoverschen Partein)
combined their candidates on a common ticket. Bach_, Zentrumspartei, VIII,
267.
6])1 the end only 421 deputies were elected since the twelve deputies provided for Alsace-Lorraine were not allOlf'8d to participate. Heilfron, Die
cieutsche NationalversUBlung, I, 110.
7For an explanation of the havoc wrought by proportional representation
on the Weimar RepJ.blic, see Ferdinand A. Hemens, Europe Between Democ~
and Anarchy (Notre DamB, Indiana: University of Notlrs D8iie press, 19S1~

ChaPter IV:

8Palll Prange, "Die organisation der Zentrumspartei," in National.
Arbeit, pp. 44S-4.S8.
.
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liSted on the ticket.
~..ked,

"Fortunate

Indeed, as one German citiHn referring to this election
W88

the vater who knew the f'ace of' the leader of' the

ticket to which he gave his vote. n9 Usually, the DlOSt inf'luent1al party
. .bers were placed at the top of' the 118t to assure their election.

'!'hue

Jlatth1a8 Ersberger, who because of' his duties _ German Peace COIIIJIl1ssioner
..... not able to participate actively in the National ABsav.bly' campaign, was
88sured ot his election b.Y being placed second on the ilrttemberg ticket~lO
As election

~

drew near, f'inal ef'f'orts were exerted by all parties to

gain supporters f'or their political progrue. Fear ot an .. t1-chr1stian
socialist regime had impelled Catholics and other bourgeois Christian groupe:
to work untiringly' to curb the growing power ot the Socialists and prevent
thea f'ram. ga1n1ng a

maJ ority of' seats in the National Ass_bly. 11

A f'a1rl,y reliable barometric reading ot the political strength of' the
Qerman electora.te "as 1nd1cated in the NSults of' the various elections tor
local constituent assemblies held in the _eka just prev10UB to the national.
election.

The January

5 election held

omen f'or the center Party.

In that area the Centrists gained the largest.

number of' seata-39 out of' 107.
Democrats with 36 seats.

in Badm, f'or example, of'f'ered a good.

Close behind were the Majority Social

lext were the Danocrats with 25 aeats, and

t1nal.lT

9&rich Eyck, A H1sto~ of' the Weimar Republic, trans. by Harlan P. Hanson
and Robert G. L. waite. (camridgel Harvard unIversIty Press, 1962), I, 70.
lOEpetein, ~nberger, p. 287.
llUl Socialists were looked upon as "einsigen Feind" ot the German
people arid the cause of' the chaotic revolution.ary times. lV, Janua17 18,
1919, #48.
--

~
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the Qerman Nationals with merely 7 seats.

The Independent Socialists alone

taUed to score a single gain. 12 Similarly,

~he

January 12 election for the"

Bavarian Landtag proved a victoX"1 for the Bavarian People'. Part:y, the CentriB
counterpart in Bavaria.

At this election, the Centrists were able to obtain

66 of the 180 seats. 13 Likniee in Trih-ttemberg's election held on the s_e

d&.r, the results were encouraging, tor the Centrists emerged as the third
strongest party, winning 31 of the 150 mandates-an increase of tive more
_.bars over the last election held in 1912.14
Although the prospects for prevent.tna a Socialist majorit:y in the National Assembly seead bright, no one could predict the outcome of the natio
election with any accuracy.

The extension of suffrage to wanen and the lower-

1ng of the voting age to tnnt:y had increased the electorate to such an enent

that results ore utterly unpredictable. Jleverthe1eas, with the passing of
the grave uncertainties of the immediate post-revolution weeks, Centrist
leaders recovered some of their self-confidence as they found themaelves
12Schoter, Mit der alten Fahne in die neue Zeit, pp. 124-125. The
author, one of the energetic B&diii Centi'1St 18id8rs, referred to the election
campaign as "the mOBt fatiguing task" of his lite.
13I1ors8)", "Zentrumspartei," p. 269. There is a discrepancy between
Morsey·s figures and thOBe given in Bachem, ZentruJll8parte1, vm, 405. Morse)"
lists 66 BVP deputies elected in the Bavarian election iii contrast to the 58
listed b7 Bach_. Morse:y's figures correspond to those listed in Zeitschritt
des :hrnriaChen Statistiachen Landesamts, II (1919), 247, as cited 111
Ursac en una toigen, III, 120.
14KorBe:y, "Zentrumspartei," p. 269) Bacha, VIII, 422. The Prusaian
electoral. retume of JanuaI7 26 ore equally rewarding with the Centrist
gaining the seoond higheat returns-85 out of 401 seats, MOrBe:y, p. 270.
Here again Bache.'s figures are slightly di.fferentJ he lists 88 seats for
the Centrists. See Bachem, VIII, 384. Ureachen und Folgen, III, 92, lists
86 Centrists ale cted in Prussia.

..
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receiving considerable backing from the local elections.
The cJ.r)", clear day ot January 19, 1919, enabled over 30,.500,000 German
JD8n and wanen to go to the polls and vote in the national elections.

LaIr

and order were generally lII1intained, though a tew minor diBturbances in the
form of street-tighting and demonstrations occurred at Berlin, HlJIIlburg, the

RUhr, and Cassel. The Spartacists, contra17 to expectations, made no concerted etforts to impede the election. lS Against the advice of Rosa Luxemburg
and Karl Liebknecht, the radicals had threatened to ba.ycott the elections,
but later abandoned their project.

Thus the day passed 111. thout serious in-

cident in an;y sector of the countr,y .16
Notwithstanding, teverish activity exerted b7 campaign coDlD1ttee . .bers
was evidenced everywhere.

On

the way to the polls 'VOters were either 1I'B¥la1d

and harangued by poUtical ..alots or burdened nth campaign literature.

One

e,ye-witness left this desoription:
The voters were overwhelmed with handbills. Every fence, every
empty shop 1I'1ndow, evel)" street corner was plaster6d with c&Dlpaign
posters. One party excited.l¥ ripped down the notices ot another,
or pasted ewer them in such a t88hion 88 to distort the original
message. .All political passions were exerted, using group gatherings, as their special. meana of rendezvous. In the street, on the
comers, wherever groups clustered, passionate speeches were delivered, especial. 11' b,r the Spartacists who used this occasion to
bring their ideas to the people. 17
lSRalph Haswell lJ1ts, The German Revolution 1918-1919; Stanford
UniversrMi Series: H1etPil' Econom.{ca, iihd POlliicil scienoe, I (stantord.,
'O'8111'o
: unIversity
ss, !922), p. lOb
16ri1lhelm Ziegler, Die dautsche Nationalversammlung 1919/1920 und 1hr
Verfassungswerk (Berlin: zen'tra~verJ.ag, ~~J2), p. 2D.
17Perdinand Runkel, Die deutsche Revolution (Leipsig, 1919), p. 231,
cited ibid., 29-30.
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Not since the election ot the French National Assembly in 1811 had Europeans
wi tnessed such an exciting election.

With the exception of the religioua issue there was Uttle basic d1tterence in the avowed political plattorms; all denounced anarchy and championed
democracy.

Nevertheless, the oontroversy over Christianity and "atheistic"

socialism led by the Centrists was strong enough to turn the tide aa:y trom
a socialist victo17.

With 82.7% ot the eligible Germans voting, the election

returns were as indicated in Table I.18
TABLE I
ELECTION RETURNS FOR '!'HE NATIO!{AL ASSElIBL'I, 1919

Number

ot votes
Party
Majority Socialists
Centrists a
Democratic Party (DDP)
National ists (mwp)
Independent Socialists
People's Party (DVP)
1I:1acellaneoUB

(approx.)

Kandatea

Fer cent
VotiPg

1l,509,loo
5,980,200
5,64].,800
3,121,500
2,)17,)00

163
91
75

31.9%
19.7%

1,345,600
484,800

44
22

19
7

18.~

10• .3%
7.6'/.
4.4%
1.5%

Arh1B group inoluded the eighteen members ot the Bavarian People'S
Party, the eight members ot the Catholic People's Party in Upper SUesi.,
and the two I8Dlbers ot the Hanoverian People's Party elected on the
Centrist ticlmt.
l&rbe tigures n listed in Table I are taken .from Wilhelm Mollllll8en, Deutsche
(UUnchen: Isar Verlag, 1960) I, 194.. They are the aarna _
those
a 1D Ursachen und Fol&m, III, Appendix I. Not all authors give
the same figures tor the center and SPD. Horsey, zentrumspartei 1917-192.3,
p. 147, lists 89 Centrists and 165 BPO (p. 147). Treue, DSUtiche Pii"tilprograJIIIIIB 1861-1956, p. )89, gives 91 Centrists and 165 SPD} Koppel 8. PIh8on,
iiOdem Germany. Its Historr and Civilization (New... York: Macmillan Co., 19(4)
Partei~amJIIB
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The eleotion figures provided an interesting oomment&l7 on the politioal
picture of the German nation.

BasicalJ,y, it seemed, the people were in agree-

ment with the political developments that had. taken place since November.
centrists were seen to have achieved their :1mmediate goal:

The

prevention of a

Socialist majOrity.19 The Majority- Socialists were still making the best
showing; yet thaT laoked a sufficient number of seats to control the National
AssembJ,y.

(Even with the 22 seats held by the Independents, the Socialist

parties together had. won onlT 185 seatsl)
d.iminishing part

It w.. obvious, too, that only' a

ot the electorate favored the idea of a dictatorship

proletariat and a system of soviets.

of the

Just as clearly was it evident that the

people were reluctant to retum to monarchy.

onJ,y

44 seats had been won

b,y

the Nationatists-the outright advooates of royalty, and to the People's
Party, whioh proposed keeping the royalty question open, only 19 seats had
gone.

As it stood, the National. Assembly represented neither the old ruling

class, nor big business, nor the extreme revolutionaries; its major emphasis
rather was on middle olass interests, with a leaning in the direction of d_ocratio socialism.

nIts oenter of gravity was just lett of oenter. n20

Appendix B, gives the same figures as Treue. Those listing 91 delegates for
the Centrist returns are including two members of the German Hanoverian Party
that were eleoted on a combined list with the Centrists. Those charts which
list 165 SPO are including two sm deputies elected by soldiers on the
eastem front who were not included in electoral districts.
19Baohem, Zentrumspartei, VIII, 212-213, placed great emphasis on the
role the Center PBrty played in hindering a Socialist majority-_

!2

2OLou1s L. Synder, The Weimar Republic I A History of Germ~ tran Ebert
Hitler (Princeton, New JersOTI b. van Nostrand Co., mo., ~), p. 35.

, -----------------------------------------.
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It was awarent that the Center Party

WBe

to retain its traditional

pivotal position in German politics} hence, the Centrists had grounds torrejoicing over their election retums.

Furthermore, considering the tact

that the inhabitants ot the territories ot !lsace-Lorra1ne, Eupen,

~meqy,

st. Vith, the Saar area, as well as the other recently lost German eastem
areas ot Upper S11esia, Posen, and West Prussia were not allolred to vote and
that some ot these areas contained strong Centrist back1ng, the Center Party
had done exoeptionall.y well. 21 It had emerged trom the tirst national elec-

toral ordeal ot the new democratic state as an important political tactor.
Its 91 seats in the National Assembly made it second only to the llajor1tr
social Democrats.

In reviewing the Centrists' gains both in the local.
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well as the national elections, German1.a telt just1tied in reterring to the

Party as "a strengthened victor" <"gestlrkter Sieger"). 22 Once betore, it
is true, in the 1912 Reichstag election, the Center also held 91 seats) how-

ever, it must be remembered that the electorate then included people trom
densely Catholic rural areas which were los t to Germany in 1919. 23 N8V'8rthe-

less, as the Centrist news organ cOllUll8nted, the election showed that the .Partir
had. the support ot "the truest and JIlOst reliable electoraten 1Ih1ch had managed
to procure for it "a favorable representation. n24
21Bachem, Zentl"Wll8partei, IX, $04.
22Januar,r 28, 1919,

143.

23,or a comparison of the voting strength of the 1912 and 1919 election,
see )(omJIIaen, Deutsche Parteiprogramma, p. 794J 'l'reue, Parteiprogruute, p. )89.
2laoerman1a, January 2), 1919, #3$.

,
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Whether Centrist attempts to break trom the party's confessional
character had st1"9ngly aftected the election is quite doubtful. While credit
for the enlargement ot the electorate could be ascribed to the newrpolicy,
non-catholic gains were not truly noticeable in any marked degree except
perhaps in Berlin. 25 The catholic8 in Germany represented only 29.5% ot the
whole Qerman population.

or

these, 62.8% had voted for the center. 26 Thus,

regardless ot its brave endeavors to co_ out ot its "tower," the center
still remained largely a party ot catholics. 27 Even among its representatives in the National AssemblY, all but three delegates were C&tholics. 28
25Bache., Zentrumsp!lrtei, VIII, 279. Bachem drew his statistics trom
HUlger's Handbuch dir veH'usunggebenden Deutachen NationalTers8DlllU!i' 1919.
26Johannes Schauft, Die deutschen ICatholiken und die Zentrumspartei
(K8ln: J. P. Bachem, 1928), p. 10. ThiS author iii<Hcated iii liiS studi that
in the subsequent Reichstag elections ot 1920 and. 1924 there was a decided
decline in the Oatholic vota tor the Oenter. In 1920, the center had carried
60 •.3%1 in 1924 it polled only 56.4%. A breakdown ot the 1919 C&Jtholic Tote
in some ot the _jor states is as tollon:
Prussia;

Bavaria

58.1% tor center
17.8% tor the Right
24.1% tor the Lett

44% tor BVP (Centrists)
16.6% tor the Right
.39.4% tor the )'Jitt

~teJllberg
71.9% tor Center
13.9% for the Right
14.2% for the Lett

Baden

60.5% tor

center

15.6% tor the Right
23.9% tor the Lett,

~.,

112-11.3.

27He1nrich strietler, Deutsche Wahlen in BUdern unci Zahlens Eine
soziogratische Studie Gber die RelcbStagwih1en dir We1iirer Repubi1k
(Dtl8seldortl Wende-Verlag, 1946), p. 49, iiidicates that 85% of the Cathol.ic
vote came from Aachen, Trier, Scmraben, Oberbayem, Niederbayem, Oberptals,
Konstans, and. Ob8rschlesien. In Trier, Konstanz, Donaukreis and Freiburg
the centrist backing W88 proportionately stronser than in the predominantly
industrial area ot Dftsseldort, Stidwestfalen, ~l.n, and Wiesbaden. .
2&rbe non-Qatholics were Heinrich Lang.-ost, Hanoverian, Johann Richter
trom Ptals, and Alexander Schneider trom Untertranlcen. See Table IV tor the
religion ot each 1I8lb8r.
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On

the other hand, the center Party did benefit from woman suffrage. At

least 10% of the Party's gains was: due to women voters. 29

70%

of the Centrist votes had come fromwomen. 30

In certain areas,

It is a fact that women,

eager to use their newly gained suffrage privilege, were a vital force in the
January eleotions.

One

study indicated that of the number of eligible voters

who actually voted, 83% were women while 82.4% were men.

Of the twenty-year-

old males only 59.6% voted, whereas ot the young women 80.5% ot the same age
cast their votes.

Among electors between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-

five years, 70% of the men and 80.9% ot the women voted.

Among those put

twenty-tive years, the percentage was more evenly matohed with 84.8% men and
82.6% women voting)l The teminine impact was also seen in the number ot
women entered on the various party tickets.

'fhirty-nine women were elected

delegates; ot these, six belonged to the Center Party.32
In surveying the relative strength

ot the Centrists in the electoral

districts as tound in 'fable II, one finds that in nine ot the thirty-seven
districts the Center Party carried the highest number ot votes.33 Centrist
(

29Schauft, OPe Cit., p. 102. This study shows that the percentage of
WOJllen voters was hiiher in proportion to the stress placed on religious or
patriotic ideas.
30sa0hem, ZentruJllBpartei, VIII, 271.
separately.

In some areas wOllen and m.en voted

31Rene Brunet, La Constitution Allemande du 11 Aout 1919 (Paris: Pa;yot,
1921), pp. 140-141.
32'l'be Cen triBt women elected were: Hedwig Dransfeld, directress ot the
Catholic Women's League; Agnes Neuhaus, widow of a goverrant ofticial and
social worker for w~ard girls; J.laria Schmitz, high school teacher; Christine
Teusch, teacher and chairlady of the women workers' seoretariat ot the
Christian Workers' Association; Helene Weber, high school teacher; and Uarie
Zettler, county secretary of the Bavarian State Assooiation tor the catholic
Women's League.
33stat1stics on Table II are compiled from. charts given in Heilfron,
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strongholds were located in the west, south, and southwestern parts ot
Ge~s

n

•

MUnster (District 17), Koln (District 20), Trier (District 21), the

two districts (22-23) cClllprising Dusseldorf, Baden (District 33), Oberbayern
(District 24), and Niederbayem (District 25).

There as well as in Oppeln

(District 10) in Upper Sfiesia the Party had made "astonishing progress. n34
But, on the whole, the east and northeastem Protestant sections with their
small Catholic population lacked Centrist representation.

In contrast, "red

Berlin" tor the first time in the party's h1stor;y had elected a Centrist delegate:

Maximilian Pfeiffer.

Karl Sonnenschien reporting on this happy inciden

in the K6ln1sche Volkazeitung enUll18rated three reasons which accounted

victor;y:

tor this

first, the change in attitude toward the Center in "Protestant

circles"; second, the "emotional evolvement" (ttget!h1smBssige Herausarbeitung")
of its anti-capitalistio and Christian demooratio motives"; and lastly, "the
awakening of the youthful, academic Catholio intelligenoe_,,35
Another important faotor in Centrist gains, and one which would vitally
affect Centrist trends in the future, was the abolition of the Prussian threeclass system of voting.

This innovation allowing for a stronger industrial

electorate bore fruit particularly in the Catholic industrial areas of
n8.aseldort, uIlnster, Cologne, and Trier.

The new type of representation

brc:ught about by the increase ot delegat.es from this class of oonstituents
is more readily seen when one compares the socio-economic representation of

the Center Party for the 1912 Reichstag election with that of the 1919
NationalversaJllDl'5, I, 169-194.
34saohem, Zentrumsplrtei, VIII, p. 271.
35 January 24, 1919, #69.

,.
election for the National Assembly as given in Table 111. 36
TABLE III
OCCUPATIONAL BRF..AKDO'lN OF CENTRISTS DELEGATFS

Occupations

1912

1919

Landed proprietors
Small farmers
Government employees
Clergy
Artisans
Writers and journalists
Professional men and women
Labor representatives
Businessmen
Jliaoellaneous

16

2

4

20
13
1
3
15

5

20
10

5
4

8

11
25

10
1

6

J

To obtain a definite classification of the entire socio-economio representation of the Center Party is difficult due to
such a

stu~.

mwriad

factors involved in

Table III does attempt, however, to give an occupational break-

down of the delegates, but it is important to note that there is considerable

overlapping since only the principal occupation of the delegates is the criteria for this delineation.

(Most clergymen were also newspaper editors or

leaders of various Catholic societies; labor leaders were also journalists, or
vice versa.)

on

the ohart, moreover, government offioials ....re frequently

engaged in the lJIgal and juridical departments of the Reioh and state govemmenta. School employees are listed as professional men or woll8n, artisans
36rhe statistics for the 1912 election are taken from Bruce Brad1'ord Frye,
"Matthias Erzberger and German Politics, 1914-1921" unpublished Ph. D. dissertation (Stanford University, 1953), p. 46. Those for 1919 are f01'll8d from the
biographioal sketches given in Heilfron, Die deutsohe NationalversammJung, II,
APPendix, 1-52.
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denote self-employed skilled craftsmen; small farmers are those who actively
farmed their own property.37
For a turther breakdown or overlapping of occupations, see Table IV,
Which also indicates the age and religious affiliation of each Centrist.
As the tables indicate, the

gradual growth of the liberal le/t-wing fac-

tion and the steady democratization of the Center Party which had slowly developed during the war years bore fru.1 t in the change-over of the Centrist representation in the 1919 election • . Many of the local Centrist colIllittees in
arranging the PartY's electoral ticket, seemed to have reshurned some of the
former Reich&tag members and substituted a group of younger, more democratic
and liberal.ly inclined Centrists for the older more conservative members .38
As a result, the number of landed proprietors traditional.ly known for their

consel"lative aristocratic outlook.as drastically reduced from the sixteen
members of 1912 to t1ro meJlbers in the 1919 election.

The industrial. busi-

nessmen of the Rhineland district also received a reduction in their representatives.
faction

or

These two groups constituted a large part of the right-w1ng
centrist leadership prior to the revolution.

'the decrease in

their strength was indicative of the shifting to the left which was to be
37J(orsey, zentl"Ulll8~rtei 1911-1923, p. 1.56, has a more definitive occupational breakdOiii whIc aRiers slightly frail Table III. The IV, Februar,y 8,
1919, 1108, lists the delegates to the National. Assembly acoordIiig to
professions in a more definitive manner also but the listing is not complete
for the Centr1st delegates.
3 8At the local meeting of the Rhenish centrists in Cologne On Jamar,r 8,
1919, Brauns and Stegerwald demanded that the center nominate candidates who
would ind1oa"~ a "sharper separation" from the old right-w1nged elements in
the Party. "Allas, was in <ler Vergangenheit naoh rechts vorbelutet 1st,
muss herausl" Unpublished Papers or Bachem, as cited 10 Mprsey,
Zentrumspartei !911-19tJ, p.

mo.

TABl.E JY
CENTRISTS ELECTDD TO T;{E NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, 1919

De1egatea

Allekott.e, Joseph
Andre., Jaa.
Astor, Jakob
Becker, Johannaa
Josef
Bell, obiiiiies
Ber~ '1'heodor
Beyerle, Konrad
Blank, Lorenza
Blum, Johannes

BeckerS

l1oli, EUg8ii

BraUDa, Heinrich
von Brentano di
Tremeszo, otto
Bitta, Joseph
Burlaget Eduard

colihOrn, rterman6

='

Dies, carl
Dransteld, Hedlr1g
Erhardt, Frans

FOl"'JIIel"
Re1chstag
JLember Age

-

X
X
X

Sl

40

51
44
43

50

SO

ReUgion
Cath.

cath.
cat.h.

District
21. Koblens
31/32 wlJrttemberg
21. Koblenz

oath. lB.
cath. 19.

Arnaberg
Hesse

oath: 23. bllBiie1dOH'
oath. 23. nllsael.dorf

Occupation

Of't1c1a1. postal secretary
Labor secretary; newspaperman

lIel"chant
Labor union secretary. editor
Secre~ ot construction unionJ editor
iiiiiI8
lor ReiCh

-,6
61
X
31

cath.
oath.

Manufacturer
26.o,U,&U'nterf'ranken Universi.ty protes sor; historian
16. HpD9'er
Labor secretary
20. Koln
Farmer in Kreteld

~

bith. 31732 5'tteiiib8i=g

cath.

"
20. KOln

GOVernment Ofi'iClil

-

Cleric; director of ('ternan volksverein

63

oath.
Oath.

34.

llinisterial d1toectcr
Privy Councillor in Breslau
Council for ~ c~t of' Justice

-

X

I

45

;J4.

62
61

X

65
42

-

38

Jo~
gar,th1ii X
Fandck, Wilhelm
Fehrenbach, Konstantin I
Fleischer, paul
X
Frerker, Wilhelm
I

48

37

oath.

oath.

Hesse

10. Oppeln
15. Am-ich

tiith. rti. Hanover

taiid8d propr .

33. Baden
oath. 23. nG.ssel.dorr
oath. 10. Oppeln
Cath. 33. Baden

Farmer
Writer, Chair~ of Cat.h. Women's League
Trade union secretary
Labor association secre~
Stite secretaii'J iriiIS'E
commISsioner
Mayor in Aachen
J..a.1r1erJ councillor
Union secret.ary
Pensioneer, former master baker
~

Cath.

43

caE J17)2 'WiftIt.eiilb8rg

67

4,

Oath.
oath.

60

Oath.

"cath.

20. ~ln

33. Baden
1. East Berlin

17. Mllnster

...----------_.,
TABLE IV--Continued

Delegates

Former
Reichstag
Member Age

Gerstenberger,morius
Gasberts, Johann
GUsing, Anton
Gr8ber, Adolf
Grunau. August
H.gemann~ Joseph
Hebel, Benedik\
Hea, Georg
Herold, Karl
Herschel. Johannes

X
X
X
X

54
54

Religion

District

Cath. 26.0,M,&Unterfranken
Cath. 22. D~seldorf
Cath. 18. Arnsberg
Cath. .31/32 w«rttemberg
Cath.
9. Brealau
Cath. -- 15. Aurich
Cath. 24. Upper Bavaria
Cattl. 25. Lower Bavaria
Cath. 17. Mnnster tit Minden
Cath. 10. Oppeln
Catb.-2).Dnsselaoi"f'
Cat;h. 27. Pfalz
Cath. 16. Arnsberg
Cath. 24. Upper Bavaria
Cath. 24. Upper Bavaria

Occupation

Cleric; editor
Labor secretary
Labor secretary
4.3
State Secretary
6S
Trade-union secreta.rr
39
43
Labor secretary
5.3
Cleric; cathedral dean
X
53
Association director of Bavarian center
X
70
Count)" econOll1ic councillor
Lawyer
43
Hitie; Franz
- -X
67
Cleric;-uriiversity professor; labor laacer
High School teacher
Hofmann, Hermann
3B
Imbusch, Heinrich
40
Union official and editor
Irl, Martin
X
59
Master painter
Jaud..... Josef
40
Blacksmith
1Jo08-; JOS-8t- -uO- Cath.--~l.nDnsse1.dorr
AutliorandecB.t6r
Cleric; Professor in Trier
Kaas, Ludwig
37
Cattl. 21. Koblenz
Post office supervisor
Koch, Johann
45
Cath. 17. Mllnster
35
Cath. 21. Koblenz
Kossmann, Bartholomew X
Labor secretary
Kreutz .. Franz
49
C~~_. 17. M&1ster
Railroad conductor
ltubetzko~ Joeepti-----;;--Iili~-C.it.h.
10. Oppeln
Carpenter
Langwost, Heinricha
44 Luth. 16. Hanover
Editor
lsgendre, Peter
52
Cath. 21. Koblenz
Director of Association of Trier
lAsicht, Johann
X
So Cath. 26.0.M.&Unterfranken Cleric; cathedral dean
Farmer
Lens1llg.. Felix
- __._59 __ ~ath. __2.1. Ddsseldorf
Marx, Vlllhelil-- ----1 -- - 56 Cath.- 22.00sseldorf
Pri:vycouncillor- ot-TUstice
Mausbach, Josef
Cath. 17. M&ster
Cleric; cathedral prior; university professor
Cleric J School inspec tor
Maxen, Wilhelm
51
Cath. 16. Hanover
'0
Legal adviser
Mayer, Wilhelm
X
44 Cath. 24. Upper Bavaria
co

.sa

.~
TABlE IV--Cont.inued

Delegates

Former
Reichs'tag
Member Age
X
X

-X

-

X
X
X
X

67
58

64

46
39
43
)6

52

44

2
59
49

54

4
X

X

X

3

44

36
36
4
39
72
47

44

61
55

- re

Religion
Catha
Catha
Cath.
Cath.

Catha
Catha
Catha
Catha
Catha
Lutb.
Catha
Catha
Catha
Catha
Catha
Catha
Catha
Prot.
Cat.h.
Catha
ath.
Catha
Cat.h.
Cat.h.
Cat.h.
Catha
Catha
Catha
Catha
---~

District.

19.
20.
18.
21.
21.
11.
3.

Hesse-Nassau
loln
"
Amaberg
Koblenz
Koblenz
Leignitz
City of Berlin
9. Breslau
18. Arnsberg
27. Pfalz
• Posen
25. Lower Bavaria
17. Htlnat.er " Minden
25. Lower Bavaria
22. ntlsseldort
3 • Hessen
21. Koblenz
26.0,M,&Untertranken
2. West Prussia
19. Hesse
2. iper Bavaria
20. Koln and Aachen
25. Lower ~avaria
20. loln
"

Occupat.ion

Penaioneer and manufacturer
Merchant and mayor
\,lidow of county court official; social worker
Farmer
Editor . labor leader
Cleric; Count.y secretal'7 of Vollcsverein
Secret.ar,y-general ot Center Party
President of Labor Exchange
Rector; chairman of Catholic Teachers Union
Tax ins ctor
Trade-union secret.ary
Baker
Trade-union chairman
Labor"secretal'7; author
Associate director of Consumers Union
vy c\)uncillor; Dr. jure
High school t.eacher
County Court secretary
Labor secre'tal'7
Teacher--intermediate schools
La or-un on secretary
Prussian minister ot justice
Farmer
General secretal'7 of Christian Trade Union
Farmer
10. 0 In
10. Oppeln
Rector at Mys owitz; teacher atseminal'7
25. Lower Bavaria
Lawyer; councillor
Labor-union secret.ary
2g. loln
"
\()
2 .O,M,&Untertranken Labor assoc. secretary; union chairman; \()
longshoreman
-

.,
tABLE

Delegates

Former
Reichstag
Member Age

--

X
Tr1mborn, Karl
Ulitaka, Karl
Weber, Helene
Wieber, Franz
X
Wirth a Jos!Eh
Zawadzki, Konstantin
Zehnter, Johann
X
Zettler, Maria

-

~ember

64
4S
37

60

J9

32
67
33

ReI igion

IV--Con~inued

District
«

Cath.
Cath.
Cath.
Cath.
Cath.
Cath.

20.
10.
22.
23.
3J.

Ca~h.

33. Baden
24. Upper Bavaria

Cath.

Koln and Aachen
~peln

DUsseldorf
Dllsseldorf
Baden
1O.Oppeln

Occupation

Royal-Privy councillor
Cleric; pastor at Batisbom-Altendorf
High sChool teacher
Union chairman
Professor in Freiburs
Master carpenter
President of Court of Appeals
County secretary of Catholic Women's Union

..

of the German Hanoverian Party

~ember of the German Hanoverian Par~y; RHosp1tiBnt" of the Center

....

0
0
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an important faotor in subsequent Centrist po1ioies in the first year ot the
weimar period.

on the other hand, the threefold inorease in labor representation heralded
a stronger liberal trend within the Party leadership whioh likewise would have
its impact, espeoially on the PartY's deoision to enter into a ooalition with
the sooial1sts and the Demoorats.

AmOng the labor representatives were ener-

getio leaders who were not averse to oooperating with the Social Democrats.
During the last two years of the war, men like A. Or8ber, M. Erzberger, ..
Joseph Wirth,39 Wilhelm Karx, Johann Oiesberts,40 and Eugen Bo1z had indicated in the Reichstag their 1ert-wing tendencies and their acceptance ot
some of the milder social and liberal reforms of the )Iaj ority Social Democrats
and other democratio parties.41 Moreover, A. orSber, M. Erzberger, and K.
Trimborn as ministers in the cabinet ot the previous government of Prinoe Vax
39Joseph Wirth (1819-19$6) was eduoated at the University of Freiburg;
later in 1908 he returned to teaoh at the university. Wirth W88 elected to
the Reichstag in 1914 and to the National Assembly in 1919. He succeeded
M. Erzberger 88 minister of finance in )(arch 1920. Wirth also 88SUllOd leadership of the 1eft....tng faction of the Center atter Ersberger's death. In
May 1921 Wirth beoame chanoellor with an avowed policy of the fulfillment of
the obligations of the Versailles Treaty. Beoause of increased opposition
to the policy of f'ulfillment, he was forced to resign on October 22, 1921,
but resumed oftice four ~ later. Unable to oarry out the neoessary finanoial measures to stop the depreciat10n of the mark, Wirth resigned as chancellor in November 1922. From 1929-1930 he served as minister for the
provinces occupied by the Allies. In 1930 he beoame minister of the interior
but retired in October 1931. After Hitler CaD18 to power he went to Paris and
afterward to SWitserland.
40Johann Giesberts (1865-1938) was elected the first Centrist labor "p.
resentative in the Reichstag in 1905 • Fran 1892-1916 he also served 88 city
represctative in Mflnchen-G1adbach, and in the Prussian Lancitag from 1906-1918.
In 1919 he was elected to the National Assembly. He W88 appointed a Reich
minister in 1919 serving a8 under-secretary in the Economic Counoi1 until 1922.
USee the Introduction to this paper, pp. 23-24.
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had alreaqy demonstrated that collaboration with the Social Democrats and the
Democrats was possible.
For the most part, the Centrist delegates were comparatively young men
and women eager to employ their talents in reconstructing QermaD1'. While ages
among them ranged from thirty years (Christine Teusch) to seventy-two years
(Peter Spahn), over half the representatives were nevertheless under fifty
years 0.1' age.

Approximately sixteen per cent 0.1' the members were in their

thirties; thirty-three per cent were in their forties (mostly in the early
forties); thirty per cent in their fifties; eighteen per cent in their sixties.
Only two members were in their early seventies. 42 All Centrist delegates
whether entering the national political arena for the first tia or returning
as veteran parliamentarians displapd a sincere interest in and a uholy
enthusiasm" for their work in the "spirit of Windhorst. uLU
The party was fortunate in its retention of delegates who were experienced parliamentarians.

At l&ast thirty-seven members had previously served

in the Reichstag while thirty others had served in their state Landtag,

serving in both political bodies at the same time.
vigorous Centrist leaders were among this group:

Many

SCllle

of the old-time

M. Ersberger, K.

Fehren~ach,

Johann Giesberts, A. orSber, Karl Herold, Frans Hit .. , Richard Mfluer-Fulda,
Peter Spahn, and K. Trimbom.

others entering national politics for the first

time and soon to become leacl1ng figures in the Party were Karl Beyerle,
Heinrich Brauns, Joseph Ersing, Josef Joos, Ludwig Kaas, Josef Kausbacb, Aciaa
Stegerwald, and Karl utizka.

42See Table IV, pp. 98-101, for the various ages
JL60-.1

0.1' the delegates.

43nr. Wilhelm Jlaxen, "Enthusiasm for Work, It Gerrnania, February 6, 1919,
P.

2.

jP
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The Center faction in the National Assembly undoubtedly was, a hetero-.
geneous group, but hardly ineffectual because of a lack of hanogeneity. As the
subsequent events in the

Nat~onal

Assembly were soon to demonstrate, Centrists

motivated by their Christian Woltanschauung were not to shirk responsibility
in assuming some of the herculean tasks that were to confront the constituent
assembly.

In the arduous and lengthT debates and discussions facing the con-

stitutional committees and subcommittees the center would manifest its best
strength and energy.
Despite the increased liberal representation in the centrist National
A.ssemblJr delegation, the Party remained basically a middle clus party. This
was especiall.y apparent in the nUDlber of government officials, clerios, and
professional men and "<Den found among the Centrist deputies.

These along

with farmers, artisans, and self-employed businesslIBn favored a democratio
government which would protect their vested interests.

This middle 01u8

gl'Ol1p formed the backbone of the Party and acted u a moderating influenoe
on the extrel'/l8s within the Party.

Indeed one of the strengths of the Partyls

election program had been its traditional,bourgeois attitude toward the retention of' private property and the maintenance of an economic system based
on social justioe.

The moderatelJr oonservatiye group in its rs.nkB would con-

tinue to champion the Partyls fundamental principles conceming the maintenance of a Christian Weltanschauung, the safeguarding of marriage and the
fam1ly, the retention of Christian education in the public schools, and
confessional private schools.
Although the middle class, like the aristocratio landolmers and

wealt~

industrialists, .... re staunch supporters of the monarchy prior to the Revolu-

104
the "changed circumstances" and the advantage which such change would bring.
The labor leader stegerwald who was sympathetic to this middle clus political
mentality, typified about-face from monarchy to the acceptance of the republio
in a statement mde at the end of 1918:

"Today we

mow

that the old order

does not allow for the attainment of the proper welfare of all.

Therefore,

we determinedly oross the threshold and enter upon the new order ... 44
It had been difficult for all Centrists to accept the November Revolu-

tion. Like true realists, however, they had squarely faoed the tact that the
situation in Garmany at the end of World War I was grim and that there
easy or painless wtq out of it.

YfU

no

Order had to be restored and a new structure

for the state developed) peace terms had to be achieved and the nation'. eoon~

rebuilt.

As the Baden centrist spokesman Father Jo.er Sohofer indioated,

many Centrists oame to • ee their duty as:

"Rettung des Staatsordnung, Rettung

des Reiohes, Rettung des Volkes, Ablrehr dar Anarohia, .Abwehr des Burger"
krieges • ,,45 Cooperation with the government majority was deemed a, "historio
neoessity.tt46
But the middle ol88s Centrists were suspioious of the Social Democrats
and the direotion they might take in the new government.

Germania, reflecting

their concern, printed an article entitled, nThe M1ddle Class and the National
44nHeute wissen wir, <lass die alte ordnung una das wahre Vo1kswohl nioht
erreichen 11ess. Darwa treten wir entsch10ssen auf' dan Boden der neuen
Ordnung.tt Cited in 1)eutz, .Adam stegerwald, p. 75. The au-thor oalls Stegerwald a nReal-politikertt who was abii "to oast aside his emotional adherence
to the paet and mobilize every power in mastering the difficult times."
45J1it der alten Fahne, p. 120.
46suchheim, Geschichte der Christlichen Parteien, p. 327, conaidered the
Centrist decision a "progressive step."

~-------------------------------.
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Elections. u47

The article voiced a tear for the continued existence or the

middle class.

It pointed out that the Erf\1rt program of the Socialists called

for the el1m.1nation of the bourgeois gralp.

The Socialists had weloomed the

war beoause it supported their theory that war, coming as a result of the cap..

italistic d6'lelopnents, would cause the disappearance of the small industries.
NOW' it ..... teared that the Social1sta intended to utilise the economic unrest
after the war to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat.

It .... iJapera-

tive, therefore, in the opinion of GeI1l8ll1.&, that the Center Party 88&W1le ..
positive role in the new governJl8nt and strive to prevent such a catastrophe
from d6'leloptng.46
The po8aib1l1ty ot forming a ooalition government became obvious, when,
atter the publication

or

the eleotion results, the absence of a one-party

majority in the National As.embly became apparent.
had won a majority in

~

The Majority Socialists

a third of the thirty-seven districts; the b0ur-

geois parties or non-Soc 1alists had. control of two-thirds of the electoral districts. 49 The period of exclusive Socialist control of attaira came to •

end.

Quick to grasp at least some remnant of political existence the lIajority
Socialists then extended an invitation to the Independent Socialists to join
nth them in !ol1Ding a government on the oondition that they accept parl.1amentary democracy and renounce any attempt at a coup d'etat.
rejected by the Independent Soc1al1sts.

This ofter was

The llajority Socialists were, there-

47 January 21, 1919, #33.
46lbid.
49sachem, ZentrumsIJiLrtei, VIII, 272. The Social Democrats got 13, 779,0CJ0
vote. while the non:s6c£aIiS~s gained 16,465,000.
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fore, compelled to invite the center Party and the Democrats to join with them
in establishing a government for

Such

W88

Qe~.

the situation when the Centrist delegates 118t at Weimar in a

.Party caucus on Febru.ary 5 to formulate its program and elect officers to
carry on the business in the National. Assembl¥.

At Ermberger1s suggestion,

Adolf orSber, the previous chairman of the Reich's Centrist committee and
faction leader, was elected as the first chairman and director of the Center
Party.

Elected as vice-cbairt1en were Karl Tr1mbom of Oologne and Wilhelm

Mayer of Upper Bavaria. When A. Stegerwald, general.-secretar,y or the Christian
Trade Union, was snggested as a nominee for the post of third vice-chairman,
Ersberger vetoed him because of his wartime chauvinism and close association
with the industrialist Walter Rathenau.

Instead, Johannes Becker of Arnsberg

was elacted.50 All four chairmen had been previous members of the Reiohstag.
With the election of the labor :representative Johannes Becker Qermania saw
not only a continuation of the faction leadership as :regards the "OktoberPol1tik," but a strengthening also of the intention to advance resolutel¥ on
, "jenem. Wege. ,,51
At another Party cauous held on February 18, the board of directors of
the Oenter Party was extended further by including more or the lett-oriented,
social progressive wing into the Party leadership.
bel'S

not less than ten had

alre~

Of' the thirteen board _ -

belonged to the previOlls Reichstag, eight

or them were representatives or the Christian Trade Union, and two were
5Ofteport or the Center meeting or February 5, 1919, in Ersberger Papers,
cited in Epstein, Ersberger, p. 287.
5lpebruar;y 8, 1919,

#64.
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priests.

The new board members included: Joset Becker from Nassau, chairman ot

the Christian Workers Association Oarte1 of Greater Berlin, Father Brauns,
Erzberger, Giesberts, Father Ritze, Jfartin Irl, master painter trom Upper Bavaria, Karl Schirmer, author and labor secretary trom I,oIrer Bavaria, and Stegerwa1d.

Older Party leaders also on the board were Bell, Herold, JIarx, v:Iuer-

FUlda, and P. Spahn.52 The inclusion of several m_bers of the Bavarian
People' s Party53 among the Party chairmen and on the board ot directors indicated the reestablishment of rapprochement between the Center Party and Bvp.54
One

or

the most serious problems tacing the centrist delegates at the

first Party Caucus of February 5-6 was to decide whether or not they should
accept the invitation of the Social Democrats md enter into a coalition
governraent with them and the DaRoorats.

The Oentrists understood tully the

significance ot such a coalition and the 1m.portant respona ibil1ty which the
n_ government would have to assume both in foreign and domestic attain.
decision of entering into such a coalition with the Lett

W88

The

a weighty and

momentous one and was, theretore, carefully Yiewed from all angles by the
delegates.

On the one hand, it meant aligning themselves; w.lth their tradi-

tional enemies.

Not that this was iIlpossibleJ such a condition had alread7

existed since July, 1917.

But the election c_paign had stressed so torce-

!ully the difference between the Centrist Christian Weltanschauung and "athe-

istic" Jlarxist socialism ot the SPD that cooperation with them at this JaOment

52u, Februar;y 18, 1919, 11.38. No wallen delegates wre included in the
board ordirectora.
53wllhelm Mayer, Martin Irl, and Karl Schirmer.
5l&oerm.ania, February 8, 1919, #63, praised the reestabl.1.tsbment of an
"Einheitslron't."
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seemed illogical. and :impossible. For this reason,

S0JB8

of the representatives

of catholic 1I0rleers' Association favored a coalition' with the Right. 55

On

the

other hand, a majoritY' of delegates felt that in view of the seri0U8nes. ot
the t1m.es and especially ot the foreign situation, the PartY' could not afford
to be n.-d by emotional.1slD..
not a weale divided one.

The times demanded a strong united government,

A fairly workable govenaent could be achieved i t the

center joined with the 8P1) and the Democrats) a stronger majority could be
attained with such a coalition.

The decision 1..,. with the center.56

It took two <Js.ys of serious, soul-searching deliberation before the

Party could arrive at a decision, and then it

W88

not unan1mou8. 57

One

ot the

most energetic JD8mbera strongly in favor of a coalition with the Lett was
Enberger.

He felt that it was imperative for the Centrists to collaborate

with the 8P1), not thereby to assist them in carrying through their own wishes,
but rather to hinder them from striTing atter too extreme a program.58 He
hoped that the )(ajoritY' Socialists would be properly' t_d by the1r bourgeois
coalition partners, and so he resisted the new idea of forming an ant1Soc1al1st coalition extending from the Nationalists to the Democrats.

The

Center PartY' had more to gain by cooperating I'll th the government than by'
joining the opposi tion. 59 Ersberger's view was supported b7 IIJ8ll7 of the
55Josef Nausbach, Kulturfragen in der l)eutschen VerfsssUDg: E1ne
Erklarung wichtiger VerfusU1lgsartikil (Aladbach: volkivere1ii-verlag, 1920),
p. O.
56!!, February 6, 1919, #103.
57Germa.niat February 8, 1919, 163.
58snberger l s argument at the PartY' caucus, February 5-6, 1919, as cited
in Bachem, Zentrumspartei, VIII, 273) !!, February 8, 1919, 1108.
S9nachelD., Zentrumspartei, VIII, 274-275.

Later, Jlausbach pointed out that

~----------------~
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older JIl8IIlbere of the Party

88

well as the newl1'-e1eoted academioians. 60

Atter a "lengthy' d1soussion"61 the oauous voted sixt;y-four to five, over
the opposition of some Bavarians, to enter into the ooalition govel'mlllnt with
the I.ett.62 Cooperation with the new govemment

W88

looked upon as a "re-

sponsibllity to the tatherland" ("vaterllndisohe Pfl1oht M),6) as a "civic
duty.,,64 The decision

W88

not an easy one.

Nevertheless, the Oeqter had

agreed with "schweren Hersen.. 6,5 to place under "all circumstances and regardless

or its cost, the interest of the fatherland

above the interest

Part1'"66 and so, entered into the coalition government with the

8m

ot the
and the

Democrats.
As a waming, however, to his fellow Centrist deputies before the actual
oonvening ot the new ooalition govemment, Ersberger urged them all to be to
the center oou1d .erve its country more protitabl1' and best achieve the
PartY'. cultural and religious ideals by' joining the 'coalition gove:mnent. lV,
February 27, 1919, 116)J ll.arch 10, 191.9, 1193.
60nUnpublished Memoirs ot wilhelm
1917-1923, p. 168.

Marx,"

cited in Morsey, Zentrumspartei

61£rzberger, Erlebn1sse, p. )67.
62Ibid. Bachem, Zentrumspartei, VIII, 276, stated that nine-tenths ot t
Centrisi'i'Voted tor oollabOrat1Oii. The Bavarian extremist, Georg Heim, however, was adamant in his opposition.
63Albert tauscher, "Der Arbeit an der W'e1llarer vertassung," in Nationale
Arbe1t, p. 1,58.
6l4oermania, February 8, 1919, 1163.

6.5 Ibid.

-

66 JohannesBeU at the Rhenish Centrist "Parte1tag" Septellber lS, 1919,
Report, as cited in Morsey, Zentrtlll8partei 1917-1923, p. 169.
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in coalition bargaining.

They were to insist upon a program of three points:

tirst, the creation ot an &l"!Q' that could break any resistance that the
Soldiers' and Workers' Oouncils might otter to the Constituent Assembly;
second, a constitution under which the rights of the Catholic Church 1fOUl.d be
-"

safeguarded; and third, the preservation of the federal structure ot Germ&l17
:in opposition to the Soc1al18t and Democratic demand, headed by Preuss, tor

the unitar,y-centralized state. 67
Once the decision to enter a coalition government had bean reached,
Party leaders telt obliged to justif)" the Center's position to its supporters.
During the month ot Febl"'ll8l".Y, theretore, a series of articles appeared :in

Oemania, designed to accustom readers to the idea that, regardless of divergent phUosophies, cooperation between the Social De.ocrats and the Oenter was
necessar,y to obtain a workable govemment. 68 Oermania explained how the Centel
had worked with the Socialists during the war in seeking peace, but at the

SUM!

time had consistently and successtull1' avo1dad. siding with the Socialists in
anything that would have compromised basic party principles. 69 Admission and
defense of the great ideas of Christianity, Germania stated, had never yet
67Erzberger Papers, as cited in Epstein, ErzbeR' p. 287. Oemania
February 9, 1919, 1o;, referred to a tour-po1n~ pro
which the C8ntriit
offered as prerequisite for entering into the coalition goverpntl "protection of our cultural heritage" ("SchUtz unserer kultureUen outertf)J gua;rantaa
of private property; protection against radical socialism) and maintenance of
the tederal character ot the Reich.
66rebruary 8, 1919, 1/64, p. 2. Buchhe1m, Oeschichte der christlichen
Parteien, p. 324, noted that what the two parties when actIi'ii ilone had been
umrm1rig to concede to each other, they were now willing to caapromise. The
liberalism of the ".Paulskirche" beC8Jll8 prominent again :in the establishment
of the Yle1mar Coalition.

69oarmania, February 22, 1919, 168, p. 2.

III

shamed a party or a people despite the prejudice exerted against them, nor
in this coalition had the Center ever contemplated a denial at its principles.
It would seek as much as possible to take anything of value fran socialism
(certain social reforms); nevertheless, it lIOuld continue to fight the evils
of socialism.

The article concluded by pointing to the successful leadership

role taken by the Center Party and the Catholic press against the atheistic
policies at Hoffmann and Haenisch. 70
Perhaps the most accurate public stateJDBnt for the acceptance of the
Revolution as well as the Centrist collaboration with the parties at the Left
was voiced by the Party chairman on the fioor of the National. Assembly on
February 13, 1919. ar8ber, speald.ng for the center Party, stated that the
members of his Party could not recognize the Revolution

88

being either an

inner necessity or a boon to the developnent of political conditions in
GerJllallY.

He thought that the reforms ot Prince !laX in October, 1918, had

achieved all that was required, and that a republic was not essential for a
guarantee of democratic rights.

centrists, he said, would take their stand

on the basis of existing facts and recognize the full consequence of each
situation.

For the present, he conceded, the democratic republic was "the

only possible vehicle with Which to get out of the chaos ot the revolution."71
Cooperation among the majority parties was now the sole and necessary movement
to solve the difficult problems tacing Germ.a.ny.
Justification of these Centrist policies prompted Erzberger to write a
70Ibid., Feb~ar.r 23, 1919, 189, p. 2.

,
71Verhandlungen der Vertassunggebenden Deutschen NationalversammlU!!i.

una:

Stenograph1sche Ber1Chte (Berllii: Druck
verllij der Norad8utschen
DUChdl"Ucbrei una VerJOags-Anstalt, 1919), CCCXIVI, 53-54 (micro-card).
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lengthy' letter to his friend, Archbishop Paoelli, on February 24, 1919.

In

the letter Erzberger enumerated the reasons whioh impelled the Party to ohose
a position of partioipation in the new government rather than that of
opposition.
The Center is predes~1ned by its entire history to be a party
of positive work rather than negative opposition. It cannot refuse
to undertake responsible work for the Fatherland in the present
period of difficulty. The speoific reasons [diotating coalition
with the Socialists] were the following: foreign polioy oonsiderations require Center participation in the governing coalition. Its
_participation will impress all the enemy states with the stability
of the German goverrllllltnt, as it will be supported by more than 75
per cent of the National Assemly. Our enemies oannot impose new
burdens upon us on the plea that the German government is not
strong enough to guarantee the implementation of its pledges. I
have been informed by English sources that the entry of the center
into the government will have oonsiderable influence upon the
oourse of the peace negotiations. ,
To this must be added that t.he Center can do nothing to
champion the rights of the Holy See at the peace conferenoe i f it
is not a partioipant in the government.
The danestio reasons are the following I The Cabinet would
stand on very precarious foundations if the Center were in opposition. Partisan struggles would inorease in vigor, and the oountry
would not quiet down. • • • The National Msanbq would soon be
reduced to impotence and the nation would beoome viotim to anarchy.
The entry of the Center into the government has, on the other hand,
alreacV" yielded good results. 72
In conoluding his letter Erzberger pointed out that in its present position,

the Center oould Pl"event great harm to the Church and that the Party would
do its best "to oontinue to champion the rights of the Church and the

confessional schools in the coming constitutional debates. ft7J
Nevertheless, despite the efforts of the Center Party to justify its
72Erllberger to Pacelli, February 24, 1919, as cited in Epstein, Matthias
Erzberger, p. 288.
7JIbid., p. 289.
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decision to enter into the coalition government, the fact that the center,
traditional opponent of social1sm, should condescend to consort with the
Jlajority Socialists and liberal DelOOcrats in such a political union caused
surprise and alarm.

An article in a conservative catholic publication

referred to the Weimar Coalition as a npolitische Wischehe mit Hlresie. n74
yet the months to come would indeed reveal the wisdom of' such a step.

In the

policy-making decisions facing the new government, the Center leadership
would certainly eJatrt its innuence and fulfill its responsibility.

74Petrus Blltter, March 11, 1919,
Zentrumspartei 1911-1923, p. 172.

#24, p. 189, cited in Morse,y,

CHAPTER III

THE CENTER PARTY IN THE WEDIAR COALITION
PROBLEIf> OF THE F£ACE NEGOTIATIONS

February 6, 1919, was set as the date

r or the opening of the National

Assembly which was to meet not at Berlin but at Weimar.

The capital City,

disturbed by the unrest consequent upon Communist and Spartacist strikes
and street-fighting, was considered unsafe for the convention, and bourgeois
parties had demanded that it be held elsewhere. l

Berlin, moreover, was the

embodiment of Prussian hegemony which JDB.nY parts of' southern and western
Gerrna.ny had resisted when they sounded the cry-, "Los von Berl1n."2

choice of' Weimar from among such other possible locations as

The

~th,

Ntlmberg, and Jena, seemed altogether appropriate to those who felt that
the new republican Germany might take inspiration from this cultural center,
home of the classical tradition of Goethe and SchUler)
lThe Centrists made this one of the planks in their campaign program.
2Representatives from the governments of Bavaria, wUrttemberg, Baden,
and Hesse met at stuttgart on December 21-28 to demand that the National
Assembly convene at a place other than Bar lin. They' repeated this demand
again on January 9, 1919, see Ziegler, NationalversanmalW!i' p. 21.

3An article in the IV, January 22, 1919, #59, indicated that Weimar
was selected onl.¥ after a-rong verbal battle waged by the PrU8sian government. The paper noted jubilantly that the rejection of Berlin was a major
success in the Los von Berlin movement.
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At 3:15 on the appointed day, the newly elected Centrist delegates
assembled along with the other delegates in Weimar's National Theater amid
great pomp and ceremony.

The historic building itself was decorated in hol1datr

arrq. Within the assembly room, "fresh garlands of laurel and spruce interspersed with sprlq8 of carnations and 1111es of the valley added a festive
touch in keeping with the exultant mood of the auspicious occasion." 4
The Centrists listened with rapt attention as the lfajority SOCialist
Friedrich Ebert delivered the open1Dg speech.

.After first welcoming the

delegates to the constituent assembly, he set the tone tor the work of the
assembly by announcing:
We have done forever with the old kings and princes by the grace
ot God. (Lolld applause on the Lett; hisses on the Right; renewed
loud applause on the Left; cries from the Right, "Wait''') [sic]
We deny no one his sentimental memories, but as surely 88 tJiIi
National Assembly baa a great republican majority, so surely is
the old God-given dependence abolished forever. The German people
is free, remains free, am governs itself for all the future • • • •
We have lost the war; this is not the consequence ot the revolution • • • it was the Imperial government ot Prince )(aX of Baden
which began the armistice which made us deienseless. • • • The
revolution declines the responsibility tor the misery into which
the evils of the old autocracy, and the arrogance of the military
threw the German people.5
He went on to protest the "unheard. ot n and "ruthless" armistice terms.

His

denouncellElnt of the expulsion ot Germans from Alsace and of the 800,000
German prisoners

ot war still held in captivity won a "tumultUOUB" reaction

trom the Centrist section in the Assembly.

6 Ebert. s concluding advice that

5Verhandlungen, Februar,y 6, 1919, CCCXXVI, 1.
4Ibid., February 7, 1919, 11105.

6Ibid., p. 2.
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all move torward in the spirit

or the Weimar philosophers and poets toward

the erection of a government of justice and truth likBwise received a strong
affirmation from the Center. 7
Wilhelm Plannkuch, a Majority Socialist delegate, voiced the opinion ot
the delegates in praising the democratic sentiments expressed by Ebert.
National Assembly is not only a

~bol

"The

ot German democracy, it is the German

democracy itself, n said ptannkuch; and he added a ...arning:

"He who will not

recognize this, who seeles to belittle its zthority [the National Assembly J,
insults the majesty and the freedom ot the German people} he is an enemy ot
the German democracy, a counter-revolutionar,y.n8 To this statement not only
the Socialists, but also the Centrists gave a vehement hsehr richtigs,,9
After

simi) ar

patriotic expostulations by various members, the assembly

settled down to the business betore it-that

or erecting a provisional govern-

mant to stabilize the political, social, and economio conditione ot Germany.
The work

or the first few

dqs involved the business of e18cting the presiding

officers of the National Assembly.

Principal nominees for president ot the

National Assembly oftered by the major parties .... rea

Konetantin Fehrenbach by

the Center and Eduard David proposed by the Majority Socialists. lO When the
votes ...ere tallied the Majority Socialist Eduard David was elected with a vote
7Ib1cl., p. J.
8Ibid., p.

4.

9Ibid.
lOconrad Haussmann was nominated by the l)eJlX)(lrats and Herman A.
Dietrioh by the National people's Party.
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of 314 out of the 399 cast.

The other nominees were elected

&8

vice-presi-

dents b.Y acclamation vote upon the proposal of the centrist G~ber.ll
Next on the agenda were tho proposal and discussion on the provisional.
constitution which was to serve as the source of legal 8Ilthority pending construction and adoption of a new democratic constitution.

Accordingly, on

February 8, 1919, Hugo Preuss, an academic authority on constitutional law
and a member of the Democratic Party, presented a provisional draft for the
consideration of the National Assembly.

The plan called for a division ot

power among four departments of the Reich:

the constituent National Assembly,

a state Committee, the Reich's president, and the Reich's ministry.
was delegated specific duties.

To each

The National .Assembly was given the right to

draw up a permanent constitution and to vote for "other· urgent laws for the
Reich" with the consent of the state Committee.

The State Committee, made

up of a designated number of representatives from the individual German

states, was to administer justice and to collaborate with the National Aesembll'
in passing legislation. 12

To the president was'given the power to nominate

his chancellor who in tum 'Was to Iiloose a cabinet of ministers.

The entire

provisional program was to becOOle effective imDBd1ately upon its adoption.l.)
Preuss' provisional draft 'Was elaborately debated and amended in the
National Assembly during the next two sessions and formally adopted on

12trhis committee of states was similar

llIbid., FeblUar;y 1, 1919, CCCXXVI, 1-10.

in some respects to the old
Bundesrat, but differed fundamentally as to the matter of authority. See
Brunet, La Constitution .Allemande, p. $1.

l.3Verhandlungen, February 8, 1919, CCClXVI, 12-14.

~
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Febnary 10, 1919. 14 The ),fajority Socialists had intended a unified and oentralized Reich to include Austria; what was achieved was a deoentralised
federation of republics.

Particularism, strongly evident in the case of Bava-

ra,lS proved too deep~ ingrained, and the Gel"Jll8l'1 Reioh
vealed

88

11'&8

onoe again re-

a loose federation ot jealously individualistio states. Prussia

1"8-

tained its leadership in the States Committee with safeguards against domination, while Bavaria, Yrllrttemberg, and Baden reserved their special right by
deola ration. 16
The provisional. draft reoeived the support ot all msni:.lere ot the Center
Party except the Bavarian representatives.

Gr8ber as the Centrist faotion

leader tried to gloss over this disagreement in the Party's views by pointing
out to the delegates ot the National

Assemb~

on February 8, "For us the most

sign1tioant aotion at this lIOlD8nt is to eJCP8dite as quiokly as possible the
oonversion from a revolutionary, lawless state of affairs to an orderly, legal
situationrl1 But Germania, U8Ual~ rather moderate in its oritioism, was
oaustic in reprimanding the Bavarian People t s Party and asked i f they were
trying to be "more popish than the Pope" in wieting upon maintaining their
sptoial state privileges. 18 Thus, alre~ in the very beginning of the
14lbid., February 10, 1919, CCCXXVI, 20-3's.
l'sIbid., p. 21. George Heim as spokesman for the Bavarian People ' s
Party ('Ciiil:'r1&ts) declared against the oentralizing provisions in the draft
and demanded the retention of his state IS privileges.
16Ibid., p. 20. See Praeger's proposal on "Sonderreohte." Ebert tried
to impress upon all the "provisional character" ot the dratt in order to
obtain its speedy acceptance.
11~., p. 26.

lS,ebruary ll, 1919, 168; XV, February ll, 1919, Ill6, p. 2, criticized
this action on the part of the l'Jivarian Centrists and demanded an explanation
for their negative position.
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National Assembl1 friction was evident among the Centrist delegates--a
situation which waste be further accentuated as various issues were proposed.
Once

the provisional constitution was 1egalq adopted, Phil:i.pp Scheide-

mann as spokesman for the People' 8 Commissars turned the rudder o.r the ship of

state over to the constituent National AssemblY. 19 The new government had
taken its first major step out of the revolutionary chaos.

"We are no longer

a revolutionary goverment, but an orderlY, legal administration," Germania
commented. 20
In accordance with the provisional constitution, the National Assembly
elected Friedrioh Ebert president of the

new

government by a vote of 271 to

379. 21 His office as head of the cabinet was then left vacant and a new prima
minister
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to be named.

As ohancellor of the new government, Ebert chose

his right-hand man, A1ilipp Scheidemann, to form a ministry with representatives from the Center Party and the German Democratic Party.

Plans concerning the arrangeJl8nt of a cabinet had been discussed almost
immediately after the two bourgeois parties on February 5 agreed. to enter a
coalition with the Majority Socialists. 22

OriginallY, there were to have been

eight ministers taken fran the Majority Socialists and four members selected
from each of the two other parties. 23

But neither the Centrists nor the

l~ince the National Assembl1 is in session and the provisional oonstitution is adopted, the historic mission whioh had been entrusted to us as a previsional. govemment is terminated. We retum the powers which we have
received .from the Revolution into the hancl8 or the National Assembly,"
Verhandlungen, February 10, 1919, CCCXXVI, 36.

20february 11, 1919, 1/66.
21verhandlungen, February 11, 1919, CCCXIVI,

40.

. 22Centrist views concerning this decision were discussed in the previous
chapter.
23KV, February 11, 1919, 1/117.
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Democrats were in favor of allowing the Majority Socialists max:imum representation in the cabinet in addition to such key positions as president of the
Reich, chancellor, and president of the National Assembly.

The center Party.

espeCially, felt that it was being deprived of a fair share of the spoils ot
rlctor,y.24 F1nally, atter ttlengt~ discussions and vacillations" ("Schwanlen")
with the SPD, a compromise was reached whereby Dr. David's place as presiclalt
of the National_Assembly was vacated by offering him a post in the cabinet, 25
thus allowing for a re-election for the presidency of the National Assembly
and clearing the wSf for the eleotion of the Centrist nominee on February

14. 2~

The formation ot the government m1n1stry aroused much speoulation in the
daily press.

An unofficial m1n1sterial list circulated on February 8 carried

the names of four Oentr1sts-Erzberger, Richard Jdluer from Fulda. stegerwald,
and Bell--a.s possible m1n1stry heads. 27 Stegerwald' s name was listed at the
suggestion of the SPD.

But he refused to accept a position. 28

Later, it waa

reported that Karl Herold was asked to head the newly-oreated K1n1stry ot Foods
Johannes Becker of Amsberg to be undersecretary in the Labor Ministry, and
Johannes Herschel to be undersecretary in the Economic lI1n1stry. 29 Herold,
24Ibid.

S. also Scheidemann, MeJOOirs, II, 360.

2$KV, February 11, 1919, IU8} Germania, February 9, 1919, 16$, indicated
that, arthe time, the Centrists were hlddIiig tor either the presidency of the
National Assembly or the presidency of the government.
26rehrenbach was elected with 29$ of the 334 votes caSt.
Februar,y 14, 1919, CCCIXVI, 6$.

Verhandlungen,

27Germa.n1a, February 9, 1919, #6$.
28 Ib1d ., February 13, 1919, 1172. Stegerwald noted, "I was or1g1na1ly
named aB1'6'stmaster-General, later as IIin1ster of Foods, and finally as a
State Secretary for the Labor Ministry. But I refUsed. Adam stegerwald, A.us
Meinen Leben, p. 15, as cited in JIora.,., Zentrumspart,ei 1917-1923, p. 170.29Ibid., February 12, 1919, 169.
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however, alao refused the government post; this left the Party without a suitable nominee to head the Uinistry of Foods. JO The Oenter was compensated by
the promotion of Bell from a minor poet in the Colonial Office to the head of
that m1n1str,y.Jl
When the cabinet was

f1nal~

constituted it included three members of the!

Oenter out ot a total of sixteen ministers.

'!'he Center's representatives were

Matthias Erzberger as minister without portfolio, Johannes Bell as oolonial
Minister, and the trade-union leader, Johann Giesberts, as P08tmaster-GeneraJ.}
Despite denunciatory speeches from both Right and Left, the cabinet received
a vote of confidence. JJ
The center could find cause for genuine rejoicing when Scheid.emann

armounced the aims of the new coalition govemment, since the aims coincided
quite closely with those of the Center Party.

For example, the govem.ment

was determined to work for peace in accordance with Wilson's Fourteen Points.
It tavored the admission ot Germany to the League of Nations, and supported
such resolutions as the disarmament of all nations, compulsor,y arbitration of
international disputes.

It looked forward to the restoration of Germaqy's

colonial territories, and the immediate repatriation or German prisoners.
other goals which the new government hoped to achieve concerned a democratic
JOIbid.,. February 13, 1919, #72.
JlIbid.
32Besides the Oentrists, the coalition ministry consisted of eight
Majority Social ists, four Democrats, and Oount Brockdorfr-Rantzau, a man
Wi thout J,:arty afti1iations •
.3.3Verhandlungen, February 1.3, 1919, OOOXXVI, 42-43.
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collective bargaining, freedom of speech, press, religion, learning,

art, and educational opportunities for all Gemans. J4
The Centrists were pleased with the program and offered their wholehearted support. J5

As spokeSI:l8ll for the Center Party, orSber indicated this

in his speech aclmowledging the cooperation of the Party in the coalition

government. J6 He noted that the chief responsibility of parliament toward the
achievement of a regulated and productive state of affairs was the attainment
of "peace and order" ("Friede und Ordnung") and of "bread and work" (nBrot und
Arbeit tt ).

The Center favored the government's views on an immediate peace,

the retum of war prisoners, self-determination, Wilson's Fourteen PointsJ but
it denounced the armistice pr'ovisions conoerning French annexation of the Saar
region and the trial of war cr1minals.

Or8ber welcomed the idea of inoorpora-

ting "funclamBntal rights" into the constitution; nevertheless, he insisted
emphatically that regulation of Church-8tate affairs should be left to the
individual states.

He critioized severel1' revolutionary symptoms concerning

Church-8tate relationships and warned that they augured no good.J7
34Ibid., pp. 44-49.
35Germania, February 14, 1919, #74, pledged its support to Scheidemann's
program.
36 It is or8ber not Enberger, who emerges as the dominant figure of the
Center Party in the National Assembl1' and provides the principal leadership
for the Party's domestic policies. Erzberger at this period is preoccupied
wi th the negotiations and implementation of the sucoessive armistioe
agreements and devotes little time to the constitutional ~estions being
discU8sed at Weimar.
37Verhandlungnen, February 13, 1919, CCCXXVI, 49-51.
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In reference to the authority of the new government, the chairman of the

center noted that all authority, whether monarchial or republican, comes from
God.

The Party supported a del.llOcratic type of government such as was provided

by the october reforms of Prince Mex's government; the revolution had been unnecessary, bringing "no happiness to the Geman people."

A republic was not

essential for the guarantee of democratic rights, but the Center Party had
taken its stand on the basis of the existing facts and recognised the full
consequences of the situation.

or8ber alluded to the need of a federated

basis for the Reich and rejected "unhealthy unitarianism."
ear~

down

annexation of German-Austria to the Reich.

He anticipated an

In conclusion, he called

God's blessings and protection upon the new German government. 38
As the centrist leaders surveyed the work of the first days of the

National Assembly they had reason to look with satisfaction upon their
achieve_nte.

They had rejected their former pollcy of non-participation

entered into fruitful cooperation with the Socialists and Democrats.

am

More-

over, one of their own DII!III1bers, Konstantin Fehrenbach, had been duly elected
. president of the National ASsembly on February 14. 39 Fehrenbach had held the
office of president for a year in the previous Reichstag and was well qualified
for the new position, but in the opinion of the Party this was not as important as the fact that his elsction meant a major strengthening of the Party's
position and prestige. 40

38Ibid., pp. 51-54.

-

39Ibid~, February

14, 1919, CCClXVI, 65.

400erma.n1a, February lS, 1919, 1/75.
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Once launched, the new government braced itself for the months of hard
work ahead.

In subsequent sessions the National Assembly turned to the myriad

problems facing it.

The outlook was almost overwhelming.

social unrest and the economic situation was precarious.

There was mob
Because of the en8JQ"

blockade there was a perilous shortage of ever,y necessity.41
That the political parties were keenly aware ot these social and economic
problems is attested to by column upon column of speeches preserved for posterity in the account of the discussions of the. National Assembly.

Proposals

for solving the varied pressing problems of the day-obtaining sufficient
nourishment, ra1:sing the blockade, caring for the orphans and other needy,
the widows, the wounded war veterans-were proferred 1>7 _mbers of the
National Assembly.

In practically all of these proposals could be found

one or more Centrist signatures.

Alre~

on February B Or6ber protested

before the National Assembq agaill8t the unjust ·Allied retention ot GerJlBll
war prisoners. 42

Criticism. of the severe hunger blockade facing Gel"lDAnY'

W88

4lzeigler, OPe cit., p. SO, gives the following description of the plight
of the German people Immediately after the warl "Hardly a ton of' provisions
or a ton ot raw material was allowed the Germans; neither a package of
chocolate, a sack of flour, a can of lard, nor a bar of soap was permitted
them• • • • There was a shortage of potat.oes, bread, fat, sugar, and _at • • •
of all necessities of lite, clothes, shoes, stockings, coal, oU, benzene,
f1re-wood--everytbing neoded for daily living." See also Marion C. Siney, The
Allied Blockade of Ger~ (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Utlive1'8ity of Michigan Preu,
1951) J
sudi LOrena-sane and Ralph Haswell lJ;ltz, ed. The Blockade of' Ge1"lllanl
after the Armistice, 191B-l9l9: Selected DoclD.ents of the Supreme Econoidc
~ouncIl, li8riCarl Riner Adi1iii8tratlon (oaIDori'iii: stWora UnIversIty
Mss, 1942) XVI, 4}O::S1b.

ana

42Verhandlungen, Februar,y 8, 1919, CCCXlVI, 11. A fEffl dlqs later on
Karch 1, 1919, lrau Neuhaus _de a s1m1lar protest and asked for government
assistance for the families of war prisoners, ~., p. 410.
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offered b.Y a Centrist woman delegate, Hedwig Dransfeld, on Februar,y 13. 43
Maria Schmitz protested the plight of the Germans in Alsace and asked for
goverment assista.."lce. 44 Concem for widows and orphans was evidenced in a
speech by Frau Neuhaus in the Assembly on July 16. 45 Throughout the Weimar
period the Centrist delegates gave witness to their traditional concern for

Christian social Justice.
But the importance of these probleD18 was overshadowed by the
of the pending peace negotiations.

;I mm:l

nence

The Germans had hoped that tM change of

regime in their countr.y following upon their defeat would elicit from their
victorS a favorable attitude, and that their nation would be received as a
penitent member into the new world community.

But the unfriendly Entente

powers were made of sterner stuff, and the National Assembly, confronted with
the problem of Qbtaining acceptable peace terms, spent more than half' its
time on peace prel1m1.naries and discussions of the treaty terms.
The involvement of the Centrist Party in these peace negotiations was in
a sense unique'.

Their recent victor.y had given them partnership in the coali-

tion goverllll8nt, but besides this one of their own leaders, Matthias Erzberger,
had the distinction of being head of the armistice commission.

Both in nego-

tiating the armistice as well as in implementing successive armistice agree43Ibid., F'ebruary 13, 1919, 44.

Other Centrist proposals for the food

and nouri'ifiment for the need1' were made by Gr8ber on March 7, 1919, Ibid.,
p. 540; March 10, 1919, Ibid., 617; and by Peter Schlack on April 14;-I9l9,
~., CeCmII, 1024. -

44Ibid., February 27, 1919, CCClXVI, 410; on JLq 10, Fr81 Weber deplored
the pl1gJirof the people in Malmed1' and Eupen, ~., CCCnvII, UOS.
45Ibid., CCCXXVIII, 1601-1602.
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ments, Erzberger had worked ind.e:f'atigably'.

Among his Centrist colleagues,

even prior to the November Revolution, he had been pressuring for a peace
settlement based on the Fourteen POints.

As spokesman for the Centrist left-

wing, he had tried to convince dubious &Bsociates that such a peace would be t
the best interests of Germany.

He had appealed to President Wilson's idealism

as a counter-weight to the demands of Britain and France, and he had emphasized
the threat of Bolshevism to all of Europe if Germany were weakened by a vindi
tiva peace.

He had pointed out that the Germany of October 1918 was a new

Germany--democratic, peace-loving, and devoted to the idea

or

a league of

nations to which all the states of the world would belong. 46
Forzbarger's views, on the one hand, were instrumental in winning his
Party to support acceptance of peace terms (not without a struggle within the
ranks); the Party, on the other hand, was called upon to defend the actions
of this vigorous leader.

The extent, of its discomfiture over Erzberger can

be meas,ured by the violence of the Nationalists' attacks on him when the tull
effect of the armistioe terms was realised. What had been mereq deplored
by the general press as the harsh conditons to which he had agreed,47 beoame

after December 16, 1918, the basis for personal attaoks by the m1lit&1"7 and
the Right who went so far

88

to seek the removal' of Erzberger from the

armistice commission. 48
46,or Erzberger's activities prior to the Revolution, see Epstein,
Erzberger, Chapter XI.
47KV, November 11, 1918, #889; November 13, 1918, 1/897; Germania,
NoveDlberu, 1918, 1/528; November 12, 1918, 11530, p. 2. For an apology' of
Erzberger's role, see Ibid., November 17, 1918, #539.

-

4~'or Erzberger's own description, see Er1ebnisse, p. 340.
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Inseparable from the matter of peace negotiations was the testy business
of foreign policy.

In this area, too, the views of F..rzberger and those of his

Party coincidad-a circumstance due not so much to the fact that Erzberger
agreed with the Party as that he dominated and shaped its th1nldng decisively.
An artiole by Dr. r..o Sohwering published in Germania on February 7, 1919,

gives a run-down of the Center's policies on foreign affa1rs. 49

It; is

wortbT

of a sum.mary glance, sinoe it sets forth the very program for which Er:aberger

pleaded during the meetings with the Entente.
Sohwering begins by stating the importanoe of a party's role in defending foreign policy.

He proceeds to point out that a party as committed to the

interests of Germany as the Center cannot disregard its obligation nor withdraw in silenoe; it IlIl8t declare itself and stand by its principles.

He then

notes that the Center, in sanctioning Wilson's Fourteen Points, has made a
deoision whioh it must abide by-

Chauvinism and power politios must be re-

nounced in favor of the principle

or

self-determination for emerging peoples.

As for the colonies, the article continues, Germany must never let that "most
terrible peace" ("schlectester Frieda") rob her of them; they must continue to
be maintained as necessary assets to her economy and her position as a world
power.

It must remain a memorable tribute to the center that in these "dark

times" it has come forward with this demand.

SO

The Center Party enunoiated its foreign policy in the election program
of Deoember, 1918.

It; incorporated many of the ideas of Wilson's Fourteen

49nThe Center and Foreign Policy," February 7, 1919, #61, Supplement.

-

50Ibid.
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Points.

The Party wanted the "immediate conclusion of a preliminary peace and

an agreement and reconciliation of all people."

As a Cieterrentto future war,

it wanted "the establishll8nt of an international law based on Christian
principles."

Among other provisions it called for the return of the German

colonies and a union between Austria and Germany.51
Such were the principles on peace and foreign atfairs for which Erzbergar
fought as he confronted the Allied Powers in three special armistice conferences held at Trier in mid-December, January 15-16 and on February 14-15.
The conferences dealt with the inability of Germany to fulfill the armistice
terms on schedule, grievances over harsh Allied policies, the lifting ot the
blockade, and the establishment of a demarcation line between the Germans md
the Poles in the East.

The Allied Powers were, obviousl1', loath to compromise

on these stipulations, and the.y continued to"hold the upper hand b,y threatenjQg
Gel"lZl&IV" with the maintenance of the blockade, the retention of German

prisoners ot war, and the threat

o,t further occupation of German territory.52

To forestall a resumption of hostilities which Germaqy could ill afford,
Erzberger was forced to accept the terms of the Allied Powers. When, at the
National Assembl1' on February 11, 1919, he presented the final draft of the
armistice,S) both the document and his position as he,ad of the armistice were
51nr.,eitsltze, dar Deutschen Zentrumspartei vom,30 Dezember 1918," cited
in Ursachen und Folgen, III, 191-198.

5 2The best brief acCO'Wlt of the thr8e Trier conferences is in Erzberger,
Erlebnisse, Chapter XXIV. Epstein, Erzberger, p. 291, notes that the Allied
threat to march into unoccupied Germarl1' when·, Germany ..as in no condition to
resume hostilities hung like a sword of Damocles over Erzberger's head.
53KV, February 18, 1919, #136, reported Erzberger's speech u..l'lCler the
title, 1Itfer Eindruck inYleimar." The paper was not too pleased with the
terms of!:;he armistice and referred to ~"he Pl'8·'t~..OU3 dJq' s session in the
National Aasemb~ as a "sad DIq."
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bitterly attacked b,y the delegates on the Right in a formal interpellation.54
Albert V8g1er, an industrialist and member of the Qennan People's Party, denounced the armistice as heralding a violation of Wilson's Fourteen Points in
the coming peace treaty.

He censured Erzberger particularly, for the arrange-

ments affecting the steel industry and shipping, declaring that the Centrist
leader had negotiated in an autocratic manner without seeking the advice of experts.

VSgler ridiculed Erzberger' s plea that Ge nn~ could not secure better

terms because she was negotiating from a position of wealmess.

Quoting from

the influential Frankfurter Zeitung, v8gler stateds
Mr. Erzberger constantly seeks to prove that Gennany cannot secure

better tenlS. It is, of course, difficult to show ex post facto
that the presence of experts would have affected tho end
But Erzberger is responsible for the fact that the experts were
not even given a chance. Erzberger, with his habitual delusions
of gr~deur, believes he can do everything better than anybody
else.

rasun.

Erzberger defended himself against v8g1er's jibes with a length1' rebuttal
in which he reviewed the history of the armistice negotiations .56 Repeatedly
he denied the allegations which were distorting the true nature of the shipping
arrangement, and emphasized what seemed tOo have been nearly forgotten-that
these arrangements had originally been made to secure badly. needed food stutfs.
He attested further that he had done everything in his power to lessen the dema.nds on Germany and that he had achieved some amelioration.

He also stressed

that at every step of the negotiations, he had been supported by the government
54verhandlungen, February 17, 1919, CCCXXVI, 130.
A. Graefe, W8.8 most derogatory.

The Nationalist,

55~., February 18, 1919, CCCIXVI, ~J2-136, gives V!gler's attack.

56por Erzberger's lengthy defense, see ~., pp. 137...145.
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and the mUitary so that he had acted not as an individual or as an expert,
but merely as an agent of the government.
of failure to understand the difficulties
apparent throughout Vaglerls speech.

Erzberger accused his assailants

or

the situation.

"One thread was

He forgot the inconvenient fact that we

have unfortunately lost the war."S7
Despite his skillful arguments which, during the months ahead, aunrered
his opponents point by point in maDlY hours of debate, Enberger continued to
be blamed personally for the plight of Germany.

The attacks begun in the

National A.ssembly were taken up by the newspapers of the extreme Right and
Left. S8 Germania and the Center Party defended Erzberger, contending that
the major question stUl facing Genna1V' was whether it wanted lIllion or
Lenin.S9 Graber found the interpellation of the Right aimed at Erzberger's
labors a "groundless attack."

"It was," the chairman of the center announced,

Ita harsh attack of heavy industry-false in its point of departure, false in
its weapons, and false in its objective. • • • We are happy to have in our
midst one who with such extraordinary' ability and with such tremendous
diligence perfol'DlS for the Fatherland what no other is able to perform. n60
One

of the armistice terms deplored in the outraged

s~eches

voiced on

the noor of the National Assembly" concerned the 1088 of German colonies.
This 188ue presented a unique complication for the Center, since the V1n1atry

S7~., p. 144.
S~he Frankfurt Zeitung and the Berliner Tageblatt frequently" called for
Erzbergeris removii, see AliDa Luckau, The German Dilega'tion at the Peace Conerence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941), pp. 9&:lo2J 111-121.

S9February 19, 1919, H81J February 19, 1919, #82. p. 2.
6Overhandlungen, February 18, 1919, CCCIXVI, 148-149.
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of Colonial Aifairs in the government was occupied by a Centrist, Dr. Johannes
Bell.

In his ministerial capacity Bell had to denounce the surrender of Ger-

many' s colonies at the lIame time that his party colleague endorsed the propos-

al.

Bell solved his dilemma, howevar, and simultaneously defended Erzberger

by attributing the objectionable surrender to the Allies' greed. They were
nothing but thieves and robbers, he ins isted. 61
In a speech delivered at a Colonial Association meeting, Bell remarked,

''We must not allow this robbery to go unchallenged. • • • We must offer buming words of protest that we have merited them [the colonies] not only by' pro-

viding for, but also through establishing a respected culture in these
areas. n62 He expressed similar sentiments in the National Assembly on March 1
when he denounced the peace proceedings concerning the loss of colonies and
the economic hardship which such a loss would impose on Gel'll8.DY'.63

Dr. Bell

continued to wage an unremitting verbal battle both in the National Assembly
and out of it for retention ot the colonies, later adding to the economic
arguments the claim that the defense of national honor depended upon a colonial.
future. 64 At the Allies' suggestion that the colonies be relinquished as part

ot the pqment of the war indemnity, he told the Na.tional Assembly that GermSV'
would have to refuse such an offer since the two questions had nothing in
61Ibid.
62A report of this speech is given in Germania, February 20, 1919, #83.
63verhandlungen, ).{arch 1, 1919, CCCIXVI, 411-416.
64"Against the Robbery of OUr Colonies," article by Dr. Bell, Germa.'"1ia,
April 12, 1919, 1168, p. 4.
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"our

common.

colonies an part of our national honor, It he stated, "Which

cannot be sold nor estimated in money.,,65
Ersberger had also found Article 19 of the armistice terms mandating
German colonies to England and France "completely offensive and against German
principles.,,66

In a stirring speech delivered before the Prussian Herrenhaus

in Berlin on )larch 16, Erzberger spoke out against this and many of the other
"unjust" restrictions he had been forced to accept in the armistice terms.
He upheld the idea of a peace based on Wilson' 8 Fourteen Points, but acknowl-

edged that the President of the United states had faced difficulties in view
of the imperialism of the other strong powers.

He regretted that Wilson had

not favored Germany's entrance into the League of Nations.

He saw in the

expulsion of Germans from .Alsace and the sequestration of their property the
denial of their right of self-determination.

As for Poland's aspirations on

German territory, he rejected both that country's pretensions to Danzig and
its maneuvers to obtain a Polish corridor b,y annexation.
Germa~'s

moral obligation to

~

Although he admitted

for war damage to Belgium, he balked at the

idea of placing full responsibility for the war and its indemnities upon Germa.ny.

Germans, he felt, should refuse to allow themselves to be led into eco-

nomic and financial slavery.

He insisted that the return of German prisoners

of war was a sine <faa non condition in the peace proceedings.

In conclusion,

Erzberger appeale1 to the German people and the rest of the people of the
world not to perpetuate the estranged feelings brought about b,y the war, but
65See the article "The German Colonies and War Indemnity," ~.,
April 29, 1919, #192, p. 4.
66Ibid ., March 17, 1919, #122, p.

4.

1.3 .3
to attempt to build a European unity of understanding based upon cultural,
political, and economic cooperation.

He reminded the Allies of a statement

made by Wilson to the U. S. Congress in January, 1918:

"We do not wiBh to do

an injustice to Germany; we wish to give her an equal position within the

nations of the world. It What Qermans wanted, Erzberger affirmed, was n justice
and equality • • • no more, no less.,,67

The Polish-Qerman relationsldp touched upon earlier in Erzberger'.
speech was another of the very trying difficulties the German government had
to contend with and was discussed by the National Assemb~ on March 5, 1919. 68
Erzberger's views on Poland which were shared by his own Centrist colleagues
were reviewed by Qermania in an article entitled, "Erzberger on the Polish
Question. "69 The eagerness of the Poles to establish a Polish state

11'88

described by Erzberger as an attempt to "rush things," and the interests of
the Allies,

particular~

of France were motivated; according to Erzberger,

not by humanitarian reasons but by the desire to weaken Qel"l'lBll1' by strengthening Poland.

W11son'. demands regarding the establishment of a new Polish

Republic, Erzberger was willing to recognize, but he inveighed against
attempts to take from Germany territory which was rightfully hers.

"GsmJmy

Will not be robbed of its inalienable rights of national unity, n he said. 70
A peace providing for annexation of the

dense~

German-populated city of

Danzig, part of West Prussia, am a part of Upper S11es14 could not be
67The complete speech is reprinted in Germania, March 17, 1919, #122,
pp. 3-4.
6Bverhandlungen, March 5, 1919, CCCXXVI, 507-509.
69March

24,

1919, #134, pp. 2-.3.
70~. See also Erzberger, Erlebnisse, pp. 363-365.
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accepted by the Qennan people. 71
During the month of April the delegates at Weimar in vehement speeches

gave vent to their deep concern over the pending peace terms that were being
formulated by the Allied powers at the FariB Peace Conference.

The C8ntriBt

secretary-general, Ma:x::imilian Pfeiffer, in one of the more passionate speech..
delivered on the floor of the National Assembly on April 10, 1919 protested
against the "current of power politics" of the day.

Spurred on by the whole-

hearted encouragement of his colleagues, he continued:
The peace which is being concluded ought not to be filled with the
spirit of power, for i f it is fUled with this spirit of power,
it undeniably contains within itself the germ of a new war • • • •
Therefore, in thiB precise moment, we raise our voice in admonition, in this moment when fate compels us to decision. And I say
this in unison with the entire constituent National Assembly, that
that which we have proclaimed is the anguished cry of a people
tormented to the extreme. (Loud agreement) • • • • It peace is
given to us, then 118 demand that 118 be allowed to give our opinion
honorably, and, therefore, we offer three requests without which
there can be no agreement. The three requests we place before
the conscience of the world, before friends and foe, are: evacuation of occupied territory immediately at the conclusion of
peace. (Very rightl Bravol); second, the return 01' our captive
soldiers (lively agreement and applause); thirdlf, lifting the
blockade (renewed lively agree_nt and stormy applause) • • • •
In view of these convictions and opinions we look forward to the
peace discussions and its conclusion. I say emphatically-peace
discussionsl If this peace be not born of a spirit of justice and
reconciliation, then it will not fulfill its goal. I warn our
enemies in all earnestness in this decisive hour of our people:
the time can come when we will be forced to exclaim, Nol To a
peace of p<JI!8r and force we will not subscribe. (stOI'IIIY
applause. ) 72
This piece of oratory was typical of the sentiments expressed by other
members of the National Assemblf, and came as the climax of a
7loerm.ania, }.{arch 24, 1919, #134, p. 3
72Verhandlungen, April 10, 1919, CCCXXVII, 916-924.

~

of emotional
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speech-maldng.
One practical piece of business accomplished at this session (April 10)
was the passage of a bill requesting the formation of a Committee for Peace
Negotiations.

SUbmitted jointly by Adolf GrSber the Centrist and the Majority

socialist Paul t8be and representatives of other major parties the bill proposed that "The National Assembly should resolve to fom. a Committee for
Peace Negotiations and to delegate to it a president and twenty-eight
members." 1.3
On April 14, Konstantin Fehrenbach, the Centrist president of the
National Assembly, was named the cha1rm.an of the peace committee-an indicatio
of its importance.

The Center PartY's six members on the twenty-eight-man

committee included the Party chairman, Gr~berJ Franz Ehrhardt, a trade-union
secretary fran Upper Silesia; Georg Heim, spokesman for the Bavarian People's
Party; Wilhelm __er from Upper Bavaria; the veteran parliamentarian .Peter
Spahn; and the Rhenish leader, Karl Trimbom. 14
Jmch of the preliminary work for the Paris Peace Conference had been
prepared by Count Johann Bernstodt who headed a special section within the
Foreign atfice created for this purpose. With him, Erzberger collaborated
in friendly fashion until Mal' when a dispute on policy began to set the two

men at odds)5 Ersberger and Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, the foreign minister,
1.3Ibid., p. 961.
14Ibid., April 15, 1919, CCCIlVII, 10.30. other members on the committee
includea-II Majority Socialists, 5 Democrats, .3 Nationalists, 2 Independent
Socialists, and 1 from the German People t s Party.
15Erzberger describes this common work in Erlebnisse, pp • .366-.361.
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were also at variance, but this was due to a clash of persona1ities.76
The first session of the parl1amentar,y peace committee met at Weimar on
April lS, 1919, to prepare itself for the peace conference. 77

Count Brock-

dorff-Hantzan himself headed the German peace delegation which left for Paris
in the\1atter part of April to receive the terms worked out by the European
powers.

The delegation consisted of five members, one of whom was the

Cent~

Johann Giesberts. 78 Erzberger was not a member, since his controversial handling of the armistice negotiations had made it desirable to leave the delegation uncompromised by his membership.
In a brief cereJDOl1l' at Versailles on May 7, 19l9, the document of peace

was handed to the Germans.

In a letter to his wite, Walter Simons, the

comraissioner general of the delegation, described the shocked reaction of
each ot the members .of the Gennan delegation. 79 He depicted the Centrist
delegate, Giesberts, as staggering into a delegation conference on the
evening or

IIa\Y 7, yelling I

Gentlemen, I am drunk. That _y be proletarian, but with me
there was nothing else for it. This shameful treaty has broken
_, for I had believed in Wilson until today. When I talked
to him in America that Puritan said to me that the parochial
schools in America were the best. From that day I believed h1Jn
to be an honest man, and now that scoundrel Bent us Buch a treaty.
7f1For an explanation ot the difference in character and views of the two
men, see Epstein, Erzberger, pp. )00-)0).
77M1nutes of the meeting of April lS, 1919, as translated in Alma lJ1ckau,
The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York: Columbia
Uhiversity PreBS, 1946, pp. 182-188. For a description of the first session
of the peace committee see ~., 44-46.
78rhe German peace delegation included two Majority SOCialists, otto
Landsberg and Robert LeinartJ one Democrat" Carl MelchiorJ and Walter
schRcking ot the Peoplers Party.
79walter Simons to hiB wite, Kay 30, 1919, translated ~., 124-128.
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Right now i f I had those fellows sitting opposite me~ilson, Lloyd
George, and Clemenceau-they would hit the ceiling so hard that
theY'd stick to it. But I am telling you this, gentlemen • • •
i f t.'lose fellows think that the OerJllUl laborers are going to l'rOrk
hard for that capitalist gang, theY're wrong, and when they march
into the mining district, the few hand grenades that'll be needed
to nood eve ry mine, will be on hand,80
Such an outburst was not an untypical reaction.
was angered and surprised by the ftenns

Oennan public opinion

of the treaty. 81

President Ebert

proclaimed a week of mouming during which the state governments were asked
to suspend public amusements for a week. 82

On

~

8, Fehrenbach opened the session of the committee for peace ne-

gotiations with the words, "The incredible has happened; our enemies have
laid before us a treaty which surpasses by' far the fears of our greatest
pessimists."

The president went on to express consternation at the fact

that Wilson, who had promised the world a peace of justice and equity, could
have endured being present when this treaty was accepted.

Surely, the treaty

which meant enslavement of the German people was dictated by hate. Soheidemann, voicing the opinion of the oabinet, made a comparison between the Fourteen Points and those articles of the treaty which he considered
with President Wilson's peace program.

irreconci~

He closed the session with a unanimous

resolution to the effect that the conditions of peace were "unbearable and unfulfillable."

He recommended that the government endeavor to seoure genuine

negotiations, and he called for a plenary session of the National Assembly on

8oIbid., p. 124.
81Flags were flown half""'lllast in Cologne as a sign of mournirlg,
May 10, 1919,

#365.

82Pr1nted in oe~J J&ai' 9, 1919, 1208.

!!"
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May

12 in Berlin. 83
On ~

9, Dr. Pfeiffer published a declaration to the members or the

center Party in which he expressed his tear that the "hate-clenched tist" ot
a darkened peace would crush out all life.

"As pawns of humanity," the German

people were being abused by the Allied powers and condemned to a lasting servitude.

"OUr earnest desire for peace on the basis of reconciliation and

justice has been disregarded

am

trampled upon," he said. 84

In this hour of

need, he urged the Centrists to stand finn and. unite behind their leaders to
preserve peace and concord. 8S The next. day Pfeiffer explained h18 ideas of
the peace in an article entitled, "A Blow ("Faustschlag") in the r'ace of Mankind," in which he noted:

"It is apparent that our enemies hate us and wish

to see us crushed politically and economically. We w11l not accept such disgrace impassively.n86 He criticized the complacent attitude of France and
England in regard to GorDlBllY"s economic plight, waming that they would feel

the repercussions, for they "have ldlled tho hen that lays the golden egg. H87
Everywhere voices were raised in bitter disappointment at having been
denied a treaty based on Ylilson's Fourteen Points.

In a message to all the

electors ot the Center Party, the Party's board of directors described the
83,A t-eport of the co.u.ttee waa printed in Gormania, Ma1 9, 1919, #208,
p. 3; also in!!, ~ 10, 1919, #363.
84oermania, ibid. In the same issue, oermania carried an editorial highl;p
critical ot thft treaty. It felt that the Whole proceedings ot the Peace Conference depicted a complete bankruptcy of Wilson's peace offerings, see. p. 1.

-

-

8SIbid.; also KV,
86oerman1a,
87 Ibid.

JIay

JIay ll,

1919, 11366.

10, 1919, 11209, p. 2.
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peace terms as "unbearable, unfulfillable, and insincere" ("unertragl1ch,
"
h

unertullbar, und unaufrichtig").

Such a peace meant impoverishment, servitude

and national dismemberment, for the financial stipulations were "unfulfill-

able," and the territorial demands were "unbearable."

Insisting that the

Allied powers had broken their word about a just peace, the Center demanded
new peace terma-a peaoe of "reconcU1ation and justice. n88
The Qeman National .Assembly met on May 12 in special session at Berlin
to discuss the terms of the treaty.

The Chancellor opened the -proceedings

with a savage attack on the treaty, using the terms that had been on the
tongues of Germana ever since its publication.

It was a "terrible and mrder-

ous 'Hexenhammer t ."; no honorable man would accept these "unbearable, unfultUl
able, and unacceptable" terms.

He W'amed that "the hand should wither which

signed a treaty plaoing Germany in such intolerable fettellt,,89 For five hours
speakers from all parties orit1cized the treaty severely.

GrSber, speaking

for the Center, expressed simiJar sentiments against "forced peace" but was
careful to avoid using the term "unacceptable,,,90 sinoe Erzberger had
impressed upon hill the importance of avoiding the lIOrd. 91
During this session of the National Assembly, two other Centrists de-

nounced the harsh terms of the treaty in the name of the people of the enemyoccupied territories.

Joseph Bitta

It'88

delegated to speak for the people of

88hAn die Zentrumswahler," ~., May ll, 1919, #211.
89verhandlungen, MaiY 12, 1919, cCcmII, 1082-1084.

Erzberger and

German1'& criticized Scheidemann' s eJOOtional rejection of the treaty as "unaccePEaba n as leading the nation into a position from which it would find it
difficult to retreat. See Erlebnisse, p. 368; Germania, May 13, 1919, #21.3.

9OIbid., pp. 1087-1089.
9lErzberger, ~lebnisse, p. 369.
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upper SUssia and Helene Weber for those in Eupen and Malmedy.92 Atter
I

similar protests from delegates speaking in the name of inhabitants of ather
territories lost to Germany, President Fehrenbaoh olosed the d,y's disoussion
with a fiery extemporaneous speech. 93

He deolared that the power and una-

n1m1ty of the delegates' demonstrations against the treaty was "a great oonsolation."

He summed up the sessj.on' s proceedings in the following words I

The course of to~, s proceedings is a great oomfort in these
tr,ying times. It is a powerful, united, solid demonstration
of the entire representation of the German people against the
violent peact treaty that they [Allies] wish to diotate to us.
one can hardly speak of different shades, of different moods;
no, the mood of all the &peakers was equally ardent, This
peaoe 1RI oannot accept. 9
Fehrenbach expressed the hope that the German people in their parliament as
well as in spontaneous mass meetings throughout Germany might convinoe the
Allied and Associated powers of the neoessity of a thoroughgoing revision
of the tems of peace.

He thanked all those in neutral countries who had

raised their voices on behalf of Germany.

But, asa devout Catholio, he

said, he felt surprise that not a single bishop or clergyman in the world
had oond8Dl1ed this treaty

aB,

"haVing no part in

8i

Christian era. n9S

In h1a

final sentenoe, Fehrenbaoh addressed the Allies and urged them to think of

-

92Ibid., pp. 1094-1095; l1OS.
930ustavstresemann praised the speech as being the greatest of t be dq
in sinoerity and effect. See Oustav Stresemann, Von dar Revolution bis zum
Frieden von Versailles: Reden und Autsltze. (BerlIn: Staatspoliflischer
Verag, 1919), pp. 110:171.
94Verhandlungen, Mq 12, 1919, CCCXXVII, lllq-llll.
95Cardinal Hartmann, Archbishop of Cologne, later requested Pope ~8nedict
XV to intervene on behalf of Germany in order to save her from the complete
foreign breakdown which menaced her. He also addressed the Catholics of the
world for help, understanding, and justice. See "The Qerman Catholics to the
Catholics of the World,tt Germania, __ lS, 1919, #217, p. 3.
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their own children and grandchildren, for the concanitant hardships of this
treaty would create a generation in German;y in whan "the

will

to break the

chain of slavery would be implanted fran chUdhood on ... 96 The dramatic
session was brooght to a close with all the members rising and singing:
"Deutschland nber alles'" 97
The iJDmed1ate response to the

DB.

n1fold appeals for protest demonstra-

tions ....8.8 nationwide; it wa-s expressed by means of mass meetings and vindictive
newspaper articles.

The Catholic social unions and associations in Berlin

and other clities of Germany whose leaders were Centrist delegates staged mass
demonstrations.

Criticism centered generally on the economic restrictions

placed on Germany and the blockade which

11'88

still in foroe.

new peace baaed on "justice and reconcUiation."98

All demanded a

On.., 11 fifteen prominent

politiCians, parliamantarians, and representatives of various Catholic sooial
unions and associations met in Berlin to protest in the name "of justioe, of
Christian morality, and of oulture" against the "foroed peace.,,99

On the same dq, Johannes Bell, the Centrist minister of colonies, addressed a large assembly in Berlin on the subject of Gezmany's foreign colonies.

In a stirring speech he reiterated mmy of his previous arguments for

retention of the German colonies.
scientific

He stressed the humanistic, cultural,

al

d

advantages that had come to the oolonies as a result of Germany's

96verhandlungen, ~ 12, 1919, CCCIXVII,·llll.
97Ib1d.
98oermania, IIay' 13, 1919, #213, Supplement: May
~ 20, 1919, #225.

1919, 121(;

14,

1919, #215; May

99Ib.1d., MB¥ 13, 1919, #213, oontained a manifesto drawn up by this
group. '.l'fiiY also published a second manifesto ~., )fq lS, 1919, #217.

lS,

efforts in the colonial world. 1OO The loss of Qeraan colonies was a cause of
great concern to German Catholic Missionary Societies. 10l The Catholic Church
feared for the fate of the Catholic missions in the German colonies .102
The last hopes of the Oeman delegation l.q in a caref'ully prepared,
comprehensive study of the treaty. While this work was being compiled,
members of the delegation and the government cabinet met on

~

18 and

M~

22

at Spa in Belgium to arrive at a concensU8 of opinion on the policy to be
pursued.

Erzberger had arranged the meetings after unsuccessfully attempting

to 1ntluence the course of negotiations

at Versailles through hi. Party

colleague, Giesberts.10)
Between the two meetings Enberger ex:perimen ted in a characteristic
piece of amateur diplomacy and attempted to negotiate with President Wilson
without the knowledge of Rantsau and the German peace delegation. 104 Ersberger's offer secured no repq from President Wilson

mo

engaging in negotiations behind the back of the Allies.

probabq disdained
Though keenly dia-

appointed at the total failure of his diplomatic efforts Ersberger, nevertheless, clung to his fundamental conviction that the treaty IIIIl8t be signed. 105
lOOaerman1a, May 16, 1919, ,219.
101See the editorial in Oermania,
Erlebn1sse, p. 368.

)lay

20, 1919,

11225.. Erzberger,

102Rome hoped to be able to preserve the Catholic German missions and
sent a papal nuncio to Versailles to intercede in behalf of the Qerman
missions. See!!, June 10, 1919, #447.
10JEnberger, Erlebn1sse, pp. 371-375.
lD4Foran account of the Conger mission, see Frits T. Epstein, "Zwiachen
Compiegne und Versailles," Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgesohiohte, III
(stuttgart, 19$5), pp. 4l2-42i5.
10$Ibid., 443-416. Ersberger was later oritioised severely for negotiating wi~ Allies behind the baok of Rantaau. By posing as the leader of

p

At the second conference between the cabinet members and the members ot
the peace delegation held at Spa on lIq 22, Erzberger's proposal that the
acceptance of the disarmaJll8nt of Gezma.ny
armament was rejected by Rantzau.

~

made contingent on gene;ral dis-

other elements of disagreement were also

evident; nevertheless, many of Ersbergerts proposals won the ~.106 The
final. drafting of Germany's counterproposals, however, was left to the
plenipotentiaries at Versailles. 107
The German delegation's last appeal., considered by the Allies between
May 29 and June 2, was not without effect, so that for a time it appeared

that an equitable settlement might ultimately be reached.

However, the reply

of the President of the Paris Peace Conference delivered at VersaUles on
June 16 together with the revised treaty soon dispelled this hope.108
Erzherger, nonetheless, fearing that Rantzau. and his delegation would
recOJlUll8nd rejection of the treaty after their return to

Ge~,

determined

that the final decision would be undertaken by the cabinet made without the
pressure of a time limit set by t he Allies.

Therefore, on JUne .3 and 4, while

the Geman delegation was still exchanging notes with the Allies at Versailles,
he forced a cabinet discussion of the question, "to sign or not to sign."

The

the group for acceptance of the treaty, he exposed the internal dissention of
the German cabinet. For a valiant defense of Erzberger's actions, see naus
Epstein, Erzberger, pp. 309-313.
l06stresemann, in reference to the decisive treatment of the peace terms
noted that i f the history of that period were ever written, it should rightly
be cal.led "the Erzbergor era." See stresemam, Von der Revolution, pp. 17217.5.
107Erzberger, Erlebn1Bse, pp. 369-370.
l08Luckau, German Del6!rition, p. 89. The revised treaty was a copy of the
draft of IfIO" 7 1ri ifiich c.. ges had been made with red ink.

basis of these discussions was a written memorandum of his own vi81f8 made at
the request of Scheidemann.

It the treaty were signed, Erzberger's notation

advised, heav,y burdens would be Placed upon

Germa~.

Taxes, for example,

would be crushing but business would be opened. 109 other advantages would
be gained:

pr1eone1'8 of war would retum.

terminate its aggressive designs.

Poland 'WOuld be forced to

The unity of Germany would be preserved. It,

however, the treaty were not signed, the rejection would result in three major
catastrophesJ
1.

The dissolution of national unity and the establishment of
several German states. The hatred of the various states
against Prussia, which is widely blamed for the present
catastrophic situation, would make the separation a permanent one.
2. Peace eventually would have to be made, but it would be
signed by the several diff'erent states separately. They
would be obligated under imposed terms to pledge themselves not to enter into any- future German national state.
Such a peace would be stillworee than that now proposed.
). The overthrow of the govemment and its replacement by
Independent Sooialists and Communists, dissolution of the
arrq, and anarchy throughout the entire country .llO
The majority of the cabinet members on June .3-4 were sharply opposed to
acceptance of the treaty_

Neither were Erzberger's opinions shared by his

Centrist colleague, Giesberts, in the peace delegation.

Nevertheless, the

adamant leader insisted that there was no alternative to acceptance short of
a renewal of hostilities and an enem,y invasion in the Southnst. l l l

To his

opponent's arguments that the treaty would be dishonorable, Erzberger replied
that:
109Erzberger, Erlebnisse, pp. )71-372.
110Ibid., pp. 372-37).
lllIb1d.

There was no dishonor if we signed under olear duress, provided
we announce the fact that we were signing under duress. Suppose
someone tied my arms and placed a loaded pistol against my chest,
and asked me to sign a paper obligating me to olimb to the moon
within forty-eight hours. .As a thinking man I would sign to save
my lite, but would at the same time say openly that the demand
simply oould not be fulfilled. The moral situation presented by
the Entente demand to sign the treaty was exaotly of the same
kind. ll2
But this argument did not prevail with the cabinet; only three members, namely
the Majority Sooialists Eduard David, Wolfgang Heiner, and Gustav Noske, agreed.
with Erzberger.
oation.

The Democrat ministers were in vehement opposition to ratifi-

Erzberger'8 party colleagues, Giesberts and Bell, also opposed. 113

With the ooalition cabinet divided over the issue, the position to be
taken by the center Party assumed great importance.

As so otten before in

German history, the center Party's decision would prove to be the act whioh
would shift the parl1am&ntary balance.

A Socialist-center coalition oould

obtain a majority tor ratifioation, while an anti-treaty majority ooalition
could reach trom the Center to the Nationalists.

Erzberger worked untiringly

at a series ot Party meetings at Weimar beginning on June 13, to rally the
center faction to the CAuse for ratification.

Erzberger repeated his argument

that there was no alternative to acceptance short ot a renewal of hostilities
and an enemy invasion in the Southwest.
some

or

This was instrumental in winning over

his colleagues, espeoially those who oame from areas whioh wruld sutf'al"

most from a resumption of hostilities.114 Nearly all agreed that renewed
112Ibid., p. 314.
113The cabinet sessions Qf June 3-4 are described in Ibid. ~ pp. 312-375 J
Scheidemannj }lemoires II, 36tl-312j stresemann, Von dar ReVtJ1'trt,l.on, pp. 112115.
.
114Erzberger, Erlebnisse, p. 315.
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militar,y resistance was unthinkable, but many of the Centrists felt that they
could not bring themselves to vote for a treaty which included the dishonorable
Articles 227 and 231.11.5

On June

14 a "well-known representative" of the

Party refused to accept the treaty because he felt acceptance would shame the
honor of the nation for "all eternity.n1l6 GrBber, however, supported
Erzberger's views on acceptance and declared, "Hay the Party perish, i f it
does not support the Reich.,,117
On

June 16, 1919, the Entente presented Germany with a seven-da."r ultima-

tum either to accept the treaty or to face invasion.

Humiliated and embittel1t<i.

the German delegation lett Versailles determined to rejec.t the treaty.

But

the grim defiance of the delegation was no longer representative of the German
people.

The Allied blockade had been exacting its toll, and the possibility

of renewed hostilities hung heavily over the German nation.

The people were

disgruntled with the prolonged peace parleys and were interested only in their
termination.

Under the influence of this change in the popular attitude, gov-

ernment proceedings were taking a turn. U8 Erzberger's strenuous efforts to
organize a majority in favor of acceptance were bearing fruit.

The cabinet

meeting of June 18 indicated the gains he had made among his colleagues.
11.5Ibid.
ll6aermania, June 1.5, 1919, #267, the article reporting the Party caucus
on June 14 did not name the ~ll-known representative."
117Erzberger, Erlebnisse, p. 375. Erzberger does not name GrBber as the
one who made the statemlht;, but Uors8Y, Zentrumspartei 1917-1923, p. 18.5,
cites statements from seven Centrists who verified that the statement was
made by:Gr~ber.
llBaichard iuenzer, "Die Aussenpolitik des Zentrums," in National. Arbeit,
p. 86. The author was a prominent Centrist and a contemporary or the period.

...
117
Whereas the vote in early June had been 10 to
7 to 7.

4

against ratification, 'it was na

Two Centrists, Bell and Gieaberts, and one additional Socialist now

converted to Erzberger's views.

The cause tor ratification was further strength

ened by the virtually unanimous support ot the premiers ot the various German
states, especially those fram the South who feared the French invasion. 1l9
By June 19 Erzberger was able to muster tour-titths

ot the Centrists to

tavor acceptance it the Articles 221 and 231 were expunged from the treatyJ 120
but sixteen ot their number opposed this compromise despite Erzberger's assurance that the Allies would not insist upon the retention ot the "points ot
honor. "121
Since the Center leadership was mot able to rally their entire membership
it was decided that in view ot the grave responsibility, the Party would not
require the customary vote en bloc, but would allow each member to vote on the
treaty and be answerable only "before God, his conscience, and the Gennan
people. "122
As a result ot the vote in the various party caususes, Scheidemann resigned as chancellor.

Centrists and the Majority Socialists agreed

the treaty provided Articles 221 and 231 were withdrawn.
adamant in their complete rejection.

1;0

accept

The Democrats were

This inability to come to tenDs brought

119Erzberger, Erlebnisse, pp. 376-378.
l20ae rm&nia, June 20, 1919,

1215.

~emorandUJll ot Wilhelm Mayer and Johann Bell, as cited in A.lma Lackau,
"Unconditional Acceptance ot the Treaty ot Versailles by the German Government,
June 22-28, 1919," Journal ot Modern History, VII (September, 1945), pp.218-215
122Erzberger, Erlebnisse, p. 315. also Report ot the Meet1ff' June 19,
1919, a8 c1ted in Kuenzer, "A.ussenpo11t1k des !entrums," p. 86.
, June 21,
1919, #419.
--

p
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the short-lived Weimar coalition to an abrupt end. 12J A new government amenable to a conditional acceptance of the Versailles Treaty had to be arranged.
11

In the Center faction meeting held on June 21, Grober emphasized the urgent
need for the Centrists to cooperate immediately with the Majority Socialists
in forming such a government:

"We have a moral duty, a responsibility before

God and the German people, for whose destiny we are responsible • • • to save
what can be saved.

Therefore, we must seek to form a government with the

Majority Socialist alone if others refuse. u124
The Centrists thought that Scheidemann's successor would be the SPI>
chairman lIermann Mllner and that perhaps Giesberts would not be able to return

as minister in the new cabinet. 125 But once organized the new government established on June 21, 1919, with the SPD Gustav Bauer as chancellor included
four Centrists in the cabinet.
well as Minister of Finance.

Erzberger was appointed Vice-chancellor as
Since the Democrats were against acceptance,

the ministry was composed onl1' of Centrists am Majority SOCialists. 126 The
other Centrists were Giesberts as Jl1n1ster for Postal Affairs, Bell as )(inistel
12JSee Eugen Schiffer's speech in the National Assembly, Verhandlungen,
June 22, 1919, CCCmII, 1118-1120; Enberger, Erlebnisse, pp. 3/9-380;
Germania, June 22, 1919, #218; also editorial nflaa nun?1i in KV, June 20, 1919,

#47$.

-

l24Report of the meeting, June 21, 1919, as cited in Kuenzer, uAussenpolitik des Zentrums," p. 89.
125Germania, June 20, 1919, #215.
l26rhe Democrats resented the role taken by the Centrists and were extremely oritical. Germania defended the Centrist position and stressed that
the Center voted for acceptance only under protest. The new organ felt confident that if despite the heavy difficulties facing Ge~, the people united
behind the concerted efforts of the government, they wOllld find a wq to
surmount all obstaoles. See the editorial in June 21, 1919, #216.
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'for colonial Affairs, and Wilhelm

~r-Kaufbeuren

as Minister of Treasury.

Erzberger 'WOuld have liked to include individual Democrats in the ministry not
as delegates of their party, but as private individuals; however, his plana di

not materialize.

He had also hoped to head a new ministry of transportation

in order to effect the great work of railroad nationalization contemplated b.Y
the National Assembly.127

In this, too, he was disappointed.

His position as

head of the finance ministry he accepted with reluctance knowing how di.:Cficult
a post it would be.l28
The goverrment :1.mmediately set to the task of persuading the National.
Assembly to ratifY the Versailles Treaty.

On June 22, just twenty-four hours

before the expiration of the Allied deadline, Bauer called upon the delegates
of the National Assembly to rise above party politics in their action on the
treaty and support; the new gOV81"D1l8Ilt .129 "The government of the German
Republic is ready to sign the peace treaty," Bauer announced, "but without
aclmowledg1ng thereby that the German people are the responsible authors of the
World War, and without accepting Art;icles 227 and 231 ...130

In the ensuing

parl1amentar,y debate the centrists and the Majority Socialists stressed the
necessity for responsible leadership in the period of crisis.

The treaty was

to be accepted cOnditionally only in order to prevent continued suffering and
to preserve the unity of the nation. 131 The Right reiterated its refueal.
l27Erlebnisse, p. 378.
12~Ibid., pp. 318-379.

-

129verhandlungen, June 22, 1919, CCCINII, lll3-1l.l.5.
l.30Ibid., p.

1115.

131~., pp. lllS-1l22. G~ber spoke for the center and Paul r,gbe spoke
for theJliJority Socialists. The Independents consistently supported
acceptance, see Erlebnisse, pp. 319-380; Germania, June 22, 1919, #278.
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When the question was put to a vote, 237 deputies voted for the acceptance and 1)8 opposed it.
abstaining, 2; absent, 2.

The Center's vote was:

acceptance, 78; refusal, 9;

Most of those who opposed conditional acceptance

were from eastern districts which were to become Polish or which would border
poland.

Those Centrists who refused acceptance included Karl Ollmert, an

editor from Saarbrtlcken; Maria Schmitz, a school teacher from the Rhineland;
Wilhea Schllimaer, a labor secretary from Danzig; Thomas Szczeponik, a school
official from Posen; Joseph Bitta, a jurist fram BreslauJ

B~holom8W

Koss-

marm, a labor secretary from Coblenz; Johannes Herschel, a lawyer from BreslaUl
Alexander Schneider, a government official from Bavaria; and Herman Colshorn,
a large landowner and "Hospitant" of the Center Party. 132
Despite the hopeful expectations of the new coalition government, the
Allies rejected

Qe~'s

conditional acceptance and demanded unconditional

acceptance within twenty-four hours.

The ultimatum was received at 9 P.M. on

June 22; the deadline for acceptance was set for 7 P.M. on June 23, 1919. 133
)(any deputies had already left Weimar convinced that the conditionalterDlll!l
would be accepted.

At 11 P.M., leaders of the Weimar Coalition, including the

Democratic Party's leaders, met in President Ebert's rooms to discuss the tum
of events.

As the evening wore on, other leaders joined the gathering.

By

1 A.M. of June 23, the two Centrist leaders Trimborn and GrBber, who had rus
back to Weimar, joined the meeting.

At 8 A.M. a cabinet meeting was held.

GU8tav Noske, Minister of Defense, and General Uaercker informed the members
that in case of rejection the

a~

was too small to maintain order.

132Verhandlungen, June 22, 1919, CCCXXVII, 1136-1138.
133&rlebnisse, p. 380.
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Aoceptance might bring a military coup or a mass resignation of

~

offioers.

The leaders retired to hold party caucuses.134
Erzberger and his Centrist colleagues were shaken by the Entente's reply
and by rumors of an officers' revolt should Germany sign the treat.y.

A Center

meeting held on the mOrning of June 23 reversed the centrist. previous stand
and declared, by an overwhelming majority (against

o~

fourteen votes), that

the treaty must be rejected in view of the Allied intransigence. 1 35

The

Bavarians Georg Heim and Alexander Schneider left the Party as a protest
against even considering acceptance .136 Erzberger

11'88

forced to acquiesce in

a decision he felt. powerless t.o ohange. 137
A dilemma was created for the government b.Y the Center's new position,
for the Center's vote provided a theoretical majority opposed to the rat1fication of the Versailles terms.

The coalition government formed for the purpose

of accepting the treaty was alread,y dissolving, and an altemat.e govemm.ent
11'&8

unavailable since both the Center and the Democrats were umrilling to form

a coalition with the Nationalists against the Socialists. 138 The Allies were
to march into Germany in the early evening if the treaty
ally ratified by that time.

11'&8

not uncondition-

A conferenoe of party leaders met at noon with

134l4eIllOrandum, as cited in Luckau, "Unconditional Acceptance, lip. 218.
13.5KV, June 23, 1919, #4B4; Germania, June 23, 1919, #279; June 24, 1919,
#281. 136oermania, June 23, 1919, #279.

A few dq's later Schneider retum.d.

137Er1ebnisse, p. 380; the best account of the center's meeting is in the
Memorandum. prepared by __er and Bell, cited in Luckau, "Uncondi. tional. Acceptance,ii p. 218. Later Ersberger remarked, "It seemed to be Germany's fatal
hour: anarchy by rat.ification, anarctv by rejection." Er1ebnisse, p. 381.
138lbid., p. 381-383; Payer, Von Revolution, p. 300.
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President Ebert to resolve the issue.

Erzberger asked the opponents of rat1fi

cation if they were willing to form a new government that would face renewed
hostilities.

The Democrats, the German People's Part;y, and the German

National People's Party all replied in the negat1ve. 139
Conditions seemed to have reached an impasse when a decision in favor
of unconditional ratification was promoted by two unexpected developments.
General Groaner of the Supreme Oommand when asked by Ebert whether the treaty
should be ratified, replied that he recommended acceptance not as an officer,
but as a German.

He

assured Ebert that the officers would remain at their

post even if the treaty were accepted. l4O Groaner's assurance

W88

inatru-

mental in calming one of the two apprehensions that had influenoed the
Center's cauous vote against unconditional acceptance. 141
The other difficulty concerning the points of honor was solved for the
Centrists by a proposal

Dade by. Karl

Heinze, leader of the People's Party.

He

suggested a parliamentary maneuver whereby the authorization given to the
government the previous dq to sign the treaty conditionalq would' be enlarged
to convey an authorization to sign unconditionally as well.

Heinze also sug-

gested that the parties opposing ratification agree to make deolarations in
which they would affirm their faith in the national loyalty of the deputies
who voted for acceptance even though their own parties would reject the
treaty.l42
139 Erzberger, Erlebnisse, p. 383; ~er, Von Revolution, 301-304.
140 Telegram of Groener to the Reich President Ebert, June 23, 1919, cited
in Ursachen und Folgen, III, 386.

141 Erlebnisse,

l42

-

p. 381.

Ibid., pp. 382-383.
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The plenar,y session of the National Assembly was opened in the afternoon
of the same
protest:

~

(June 23) b,y Bauer.

The chancellor raised his voice in a

f~

"At the hour of life and death, under the menace of invasions, for

the last time I raise in free Germany a protest against this mockery of seltdetermination, this enslavement of the German people, this new menace to the
peace of the world under the mask of a treaty of peace. "143 Bauer, nevertheless, realized that protesting was useless since Germany's power of resistance
was broken and they had no means of averting the treaty.

The only gleam of

hope was "the handle" given b.r the treaty, namely, the Entente's solemn
praaise of June 16, 1919, that the treaty could be revised from time to time
and adapted

to new conditions.

This was one of the few terms in the treaty

"breathing the real spirit of peace. "l44
Chancellor Bauer's reading of Clemenceau's rejection of

Ge~'s

ditional acceptance provoked oonaiderable reaction in the assembly.

con-

Fehren-

bach's firm leadership kept the Gerft\Bl\ Nationalists from obstructing action by
demaIliing a new vote. 145 The Demoorats and the German People's Party cooperated to avoid a new vote and, as agreed, publicly reiterated their confidence
in the patriotism of the government plrties.

smoothly.

ar8'ber spoke a

ffJ'll

Ever,yth1ng was carried off

words pointing out that his Party accepted the

treaty because tea new war above all JDlSt be avoided."

The Party still asserted

that the proposals were "unbearable" and "unfulfillable," but they had no othel
l43verhandlungen, June 23, 1919, CCCIXVII, 1139.
144Ibid.
145Ibid., p. 1141.
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alternative.
In view

The Party placed the welfare of the natiOl'l, above Party interests.

ot the circumstances, acceptance was an "absolute necessity." There

would, at least, be some benefits, for the treaty would bring back a hundred
thousand war prisoners.

"Millions of our relatives wait with eagemess for the

moment their fathers, husbands, and brothers will again be in their midsts. ,,146
Fehrenbach rose to the occasion with a brief but noble declaration made all the
more effective by his emotional delivery.

In the throes of deep emotion, he

closed the session with a prayer which recommended "our unfortunate Fatherland
to the protection of the meroifUl Ood."147
The Centrist Dr. Bell and Dr. MIDer, a Majority Social Democrat, undertook the fateful mission to Versailles. 148
1919.

~

The treaty waa signed on June 28,

July 8, 1919, it was ratified despite the bitter denunciations ot

the delegates trom the extreme Right. 149 Spahn speaking far the Center noted
that his Party accepted only as a last resort to aave Oel'llUlllY from complete
chaos and destruction.l'O
The reaction ot the Centrist news organa, Oermania and the K8lni8che
Volkaseitunl, was moderate cOIlpared to the Rightist newspapers.
146Ibid •
147 .

-

1!?!2..,

The Centrist

pp. 1139-1140.

148Bell was reluctant to become a signer because of a conflict of conSCience, and accepted the odious assignment only after repeated supplications
by Ebert and his cabinet. See Bell's Memorandum, cited in Luckau, "Unoonditional Acoeptance," p. 219.
149verhandlungen, July 9, 1919, CCCIXVII, 1421-1423. The Center Party
cast 6$ votes tor acceptance, 10 for refusal. Hone abstained in this vote, but
there were 13 absent and 3 listed as ill.
150Ibid., p. 1409; Germania, June 2$, #282.
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press counseled sober acceptance of the hard realities, a slow process of
regeneration for Germany, and international understanding.

The KV wrote:

We stand t~ upon the threshold of an historic and signifioant
event. It matters little when and where the treaty is signed,
or who plaoes his signature to it. . •• We tinally have received
a peace for which we have waited since November 11 • • • one for
which we have waited so long, so painfully as no other people on
earth, for never has an armistice of such diffioul ty and such
duration ever been inflicted before.15l
Qermania considered the event a black period of history, but it stressed that
it was not the time to waste on useless vindictiveness.
opened before the Gennan people.
obstacles ahead.

A new period had

They must work untiringly to surmount the

Germany was now free to take stock of the future and begin

to look ahead to a period of reconstruction and hard work.152
The deep nationalist resentment over the treaty discussion, however,
left a profound mark on the Qennan mentality.

The varr not to torget was re-

iterated on all sides.153 The acceptance of the Versailles Treaty spared
Germany a further Allied invasion, but it brought upon the accepting parties
the opprobrium of the nationalists.

The center Party had accepted the harsh

terms of the treaty only after serious and responsible consideration of the
desperate alternative confronting Qermany.154 Erzberger defended the view of
the parlianentary majority in the National Assembly by stating:

"The peace

l51June 24, 1919, #485.
l5 2 July 9, 1919, #307.
lSJVerhandlungen, ~ 9, 1919, CCCIXVII, 1408-1409.
154centr1st delegates were inspired by "the honorable conviction" that
they were fultilling their dut;y b;y acceptance. See Braun's speech in the
National Assembly ibid., ~ 2S, 1919, CCCIXVIII, 1892.

-
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had to be concluded in order to save the unity of' the Reich. "lSS But neither
Erzberger nor his supporting colleagues had any way of' knowing at the time
that the consequences of acceptance would be so catastrophic for Germany. The
conscientious Centrists who had placed love for the Fatherland higher than

Party interests and personal concern and signed the treaty were now grouped
with the "November criminals," and placed high on the German Nationalists I
"black list" as "traitors of the Fatherland. n lS6

1.5SIbid., p. 1942.
1.56Lutz, Demokratie 1m Z1I'ielicht, p. 7S.

CHAPTER IV
DELIBERATIONS ON THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTION
CENTRIST

Vlm~S

ON POLITICAL

ASP~TS

While the peace negotiations were being carried on at Versailles, the
National Allambly gathered at Weimar was engaged in another project of major
significance, namely, the work of drawing up a constitution for the new republic of Germany.

Begun in January, deliberations on this 1Ilportant document

were destined to drag on over a period of nea rl,. seven months.

Before the

final acceptance of the constitution by the Constituent Assembly on July 31,
1919, there would be endlels proposals and counter-proposals as well as rejections and compromises, in all of which the Center Party would be uniquely
mvolved.

On February 24, 1919, a draft constitution vas presented to the ASlembly
by Dr. Hugo PreuII, a diltinguished jurist and mellber

ot the Democratic Part,..l

In eKplaining his propoled document, Preusl touched upon two baSic theoretical

queltiona of particular concern to the Centristl. the degree of centrali,ation
Ipreuss' Qnicle, "Volk.ltaat oder verkehrter Obrigkeitsstaat," in the
Berliner Tageblatt, November 14, 1919, 11583, proposed plans for a democratic
constitution to be drawn up by a univerlally elected National Alsembl,.. The
article. attracted IlUCh attention. Ql November lS Ebert entrusted Preuss vi th
the tasle of formulating such a prelim1riary constitution. This draft vas then
subdtted to a oonterence ot States' representatives appointed by Ebert which
met trom January 26 to February 21, 1919, and made several adjustments. See
Konrad Beyerle, Zehn Jahre Reich8Verfas~J (M6nchenl Verlag Max Hueber,
1919), pp. 17-18.
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1$8
in the new goyernment structure, and the plan for the dismemberaent of Pruasia.

2

Much of the deliberations in Weimar in the next .onths concerning the political
aspects of the constitution would revolve around these two questions.

The Cen-

ter would be called upon to choose between a republic or IIOnarchy for Ge1'llUlny,
to select a new

nag or retain

the old, to support a federal or unitary govern-

ment, to divide Prussia or to continue Pruss1an hegeaony over Gel'll8n affairs,
to support or to check the separatist lIoveaents in Prussia.

These and other

poll tical issues which Preuss formulated in his original constitutional draft
were laid before the 'ss.bly.
Following the first reading of the draft conati tution, there began on
February 28 a long session of speech-uking which continued on through March 3
and

4, as spoke.en for the various parties expres.ed their views

liberal, d eaocratic docUllent.

on the

Speaking for the Center, Dr. Peter Spahn acI'

cepted the idea of a republic tor the Reich and told of his Party's desire to
work for a new order that would be "honorablv deaocratic" and "reasonably
SOCial, II an order with "a Christian character for all Germans.,,3

He spoke of

the state as an "ethical organi_" which emanated froll the nature of"volunt&ry
authority."
ment.

Thts volunta17 authority was the "state power."

It was the goverft .

Therefore, he challenged Preuss' state.ent that "Die Steatagewalt. liegt

baill Volk•• ..4

Parroting much of the tradit.ion party line 1n his speech, Spahn

noted that as traditional advocates of a Bundes.taat, the Center Part,- could
not accept Preuss' proposal tor an Einheitastaat.

The Party would tavor

2verhandlungen, February 24, 1919, CCCXIVI, 284-294.
3Ibid ., February
4Ibid •

~~, 1919,

CCCnVI, 379.

3
159
strengthening the Reich's central authority in sOlIe areas, but it insisted that
control over relig1oua, educational, and cultural affairs should be retained bT
the States. 5
Because of the conflicting views on the consU tutional draft expressed in
the National Assembl7, it was deemed necessary to establish a constitutional
cOJllllittee drawn trOll members of the Assembly to consider the draft point by
point.

The cOJlllll1tWe was expected to resolve party dilterences on ..jor pro-

visions before returning the document to the National Assembly tor a second and
third reading. 6 It cClllprised twenty-eight members selected trOll the live leading parties in the National Assembly.

Six were Centrists,7 ot whoa tour held

permanent assignaenw: Graber, Spahn, Tr1Jaborn, and a newcomer to parliaaenta17'
11te, Konrad Beyerle. 8 These tour Centrists played prC81nent roles in tONu-

--

lating difterent sections of the constitution, each man serving as a Berichterstatter for his respective sectiona Spahn on legislation, Gr&ber on Church and
school affairS, Tn.bom on administration of justice and division on the
Linder, and Beyerle on the section on "Fundamental Rights."

The other two

'rbid., pp. 376-383.

6~D!!, March 5, 1919, #10.$.
7Besides these _bers, there were twelve Socialists, five German Demcrats, three aeman Nationalists, and two _embers of the People's Party. For
an assessment ot the coapetency of these ...bers, see Beyerle, Reicbavertassuns
pp. 11-1.$, Ziegler, Nationalvers8lllll.ung, pp. lll-1l2J Bachem, !!ntruupartei,
VIII, 288-289.
8Konrad Beyerle (1872-1933) studied at. the univereities ilt Munich ar..d
Heidelberg, receiving his Doctor ot Law degree in 189,3. He taught at the Univerai \y of O&t.tingen in 1906, the Universi t.,. of Bonn in 1917, and was protfessor ot history at the universities of heiburg, a8ttingen, Bonn, and Munich.
He served as vice-president ot the G3rres-Oesellscbatt tor a number of years
and edited ita SUpplement tor Law and Social Science.
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appointments were held interchangeably by other prominent Centrist delegates-the three clerics: Franz Hiue, Heinrich Braune, and Joseph MaU8bach,9 a school
director, Anton Rheinllnder. a social worker, Frau NeuhausJ and the labor
leader, Adam. Stegerwald.

These members, paired as teau, worked on the sec-

tions in which they were most experienced I Rheiclnder and Mauabach in the area

ot religion and Christian education; Father Brauns and Frau Neuhaus on the
social aspecta ot the constitution; and Hitse and Stegerwald on the social10
economic sections ot the constitution.
Deliberations b7 the constitutional camaittee began immediately on
March

4. Proceeding systematically yet not without

an occasional digression,

the coaittee considered the paragraphs and articles ot Preuss' constitution
in the order of sequence.l l The tirst ot the sections considered had to do
with the relationship between the Reich and its _ber states ("Das Reich unci
seine Gl1edstaaten") .12 Since this was a problem ot long-standing in Gel'll8B
9Joseph Mausbach (1861-1931) studied at the universities ot Mllilster and
E1chstltt. From 168h-1889 he served as chaplain in Cologne and teacher of
religion. In 1889 he bee. .e protessor at the University ot Milnster and an
active leader ot the aSrres-Gesellschatt. In 1916 he was appointed chairman
ot a labor cOlllllittee in M-Gnster. His many literary works demonstrate h18 precision and discernment ot the cultural problema ot the Weimar Constitution.
See Konrad Beyerle, "Mausbach in Weillar," Hochland, 28/11 (1931), pp. 93-97.
lOaachem, Zentruraspartei, VIII, 289-290; Beyerle, ReichsvertasslJ!ll,
pp. 13-lh.
11

-

The section OIl "Fundaaental Rights" vas set aside tor later deliberation. The debate on the Reich's tlag vas deterred until the second reading.
See Zeigler, ope Cit., tor a coverage on the work ot the constitutional CORmittee. (Since the wri tar ot this paper did not have access to the Protocol
of the constitutional Committee, the following were used as sources ot lDiormationa Reports ot the work of the cOlllDittee published in Germania and KV;
Be)"8rle, ReiChsvertas" Albert Lauscher, "Die Arbeit an der Webarervertassung" Iii Naflonale 1 eitl Ziegler, Nat10nalversamlungJ Morsey, Zentrwup!rtei 1917-i92J.
l2}pol'" .ll"'t.ie1•• 1-17 in Preuss' orirlnal 4ratt. see Urs8chen und Fo12en.
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history, it was not to be resolved without much ettort and controversy.

13

Article 2, of Section I concerned the principle of a democratic republi~
Little time was needed to deliberate on this provision, for the January electio ~
had been certain proof that the overwhelming majority of people favored a republic.

The Center Party in voting for the acceptance or this provision vas

simply taking its cue trOll Graber's speech in the Ha tional Aasembly on February 13.

In depicting the Party'a desires for the new government, Graber had

pointed out that under the circUJll8tancea the republic waa the "beat vehicle
with which to get out ot the chaos of the revolution ••15
Not that all the Centrist parliamentarians were contirmed republicans; aa
a matter of fact, they were only realists who accepted the election results aa
a mandate tor the establishment of a republican lona ot government. 16 Never
did the m.aoers 01 the Center Party betra¥ More than a aild enthusiasm lor the
republic, yet neither did they in future co_ittee discussions or on the floor

ot the National Assembly take an oflicial position for or against the monarchy.17 On the other hand, Centrist delegates did giTe full support to the
III, 429, in the final constitution they are Article. 1-18, ~., pp. 464-468.
13C01l8idered one of the aost f'undaaental probleu by the c~ttee, it
was likewise one of the most t1me-eonsuaing, involving not less than seventeen
days of deliberation. Ziegler, Ope Cit., p. 112, Beyerle, ReichsverfassPEl,
p. 19.
l4In the tinal docU1l\8nt the provision was embodied in Article 1.
15verhandlUnsen, February 13, 1919, CCCXlVI, 54.
16r.auschexo, o~. cit., p. 159, notes that "undoubtedly there were many in
the Center Party an even if.& its parliamentary representation who were lundamentally and theoretically monarchists," but they refrained trOll expressing
their views publicly at this time. (Lauscher was a pr<lll1inent member of the
Rhenish Center and a c ont_ponry of these events.)

UAn opportunity to do so presented iwelt when on

"
July 2 Hans Delbruck,
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republican idea once it had been accepted by the National Asseably.

The alter-

native discussed by the committee during the first weeks, theretore, was not
whether the German govermuent should be monarchical or republican, but whether
the new republic of Geraany should be socialistic or dElllocra tic. 18 The Centrists along vi th the coalition parties in the National Assembly supported
Preuss' provision for a deaocratic, parl.iallenu17 republiC, as Dr. Spahn indicated when he spoke for a new order that would be "honorab17 deaocratic.,,19
The Center Party contiraed its accepUnce of a democratic republic by
voting in favor ot the second sentence of Article 1 which states: "Political
authority . .nates troa the people.,,20

lest its pOSition be IIdsunderstood,

however, the Party hastened to point out that sovereignty exercised by the
people vas not the SUle as an absolute popular sovereipty.21

In an earlier

session ot the National AS88ab17, Gr8ber had noted that all authority, 'Whether
exercised by

8

JIlonarch7 or

8

danocratic republic, derived its power trom God.

22

DNVP, declared emphatically that he and his colleaguee preferred a constitutional, parliamentary monarchy to a republic govermumtJ eee his speech in
Verhandlunlen, July 2, 1919, CCCXXVI, 1242.
18The Independent Socialists strove to establish a dictatorship of the
proletariat, but thie Ilet with extr8lll8 opposition trom the bourgeois parties a8
well as the Majority Socialists both in the constitutional cOJllBittee and later
in the National Ass_bly. See the . .echee on July 21, 1919, ibid., CCCXXVIII,
1750-1786.
-

-

19Ib1d ., February 2), 1919, CeenVI, )79.
20nD1e Deutsche Re1chsvertassl.Ulg vom 11. August 1919," Article 1, "Di.e
Staatlgewalt geht vom Volke aus." Ursachen und Follen, III, 464.
21
Joseph Mausbach, Kulturfrasen in der Deutachen Vertassung: Eine Erkllrung wichtiger VerfassUnlsariliel (M-Oladbach: Volksvsreinsver1ag, 19~O),
pp. 23-26. see a180 Spahn' &I speech, Verhandlunlen, February 28, 1919, CceXXVI,
397.
22Ibid ., February 13, 1919, cccnvr, 54.
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Article 1, the Centrists emphasized, was not to be construed

8S

Rousseau's idea

of absolute popular sovereignt.y.23 Both in the constitutional cClIIDlittee and on
the f1o~r of the National A8Sembly,24 the Centrists made special efforts to
clarify their Party' s position on this point.

Despi te precaut.ions, the ques-

tion of sovereignty would be sadly JI11sconat.rued in Can'tr1at circles and among
the Catholic hierarchy after the adopt.ion of the We1mar Constitution.
Once it had been established that t.he Reich would have a republican
government, thw question arose about the position of the monarchy in the indi.
vidual states.
the Center,

~len

If the Reich was to have a republican const.itut.ion, reasoned
aut the constituent states follow that pattern of govel'J11l\ent?

This question was discussed in t.he second reading ot the cons" tution on Jul.y 2.
One of the Center's delegates, Joseph Andre, t.old the Asseab17 that it vas "unthinkable" to "have a republic in th~Reich and allow the :1ndiTidual states to
provide for a constitutional JIlonareh7.,,2S At. hiB proposal, Article 17 in
Section I (Reich and States) which states I "Each state aust. Daye a republican
CODSt.itution,,,26 was inserted into the const.itut.ion and adopted by the
A8S8Jllbly.27
In keeping wi th the country, B "conYeraion" frail monarchy to a democratic

23
Mausbach, Kulturt'raaen, p. 26.

24see Spahn's speech, Verhandlungen, February 26, 1919, cccnvr, 279.
2S

Ibid., July 3, 1919, CCCIXVIl, 1161.

-

j

26Cited in Uraachen und Folgen, Ill, 464. All further art.icles of the
'Weimar Constitution are cited frail this source.
27Verhandlungen, July 3, 1919, CCCnVII, 1261.
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republic, Preuss proposed a new flag for

Gel'lll8Iq. 26

He did not include this in

his original draft but suggested it in his speech to the National A.sembly on
February 24. 29 Pointing to the parallel between the 1846 and the present
National As.embly, Preus. proposed reYiving the flag of
liberal and democratic spirit of the "new times."

1848 to symbolize the

Acknowledging that it might

be difficult for sCIIle to abandon the old national colors, he argued the necessity of having a symbolic banner to signify the establishment of a new repub!ican government.

He also emphasised the fact that black, red, and gold were

the colon ot the Orossdeutschlan!. JIOV8l1lent and, therefore, would appeal to the
Austrians who favored a union with Germany.30
His suggestion for a black, red, and gold flag aerely evoked a je8ting
cODlllent trOll Spahn who preferred to retain the present nag for the German
Reich. 31 But the debate in the A8sembly aroused by the proposition was very
serious and veheaent, for the delegate8 felt strongly about changing the colors
of the national nag.

When the topic was discussed in the National Assembly

in July, there ensued a lively dispute arousing deep-seated national feelings. 32
Three alternative nag choices had been set down by the constitutional
28Ibid ., February 24, 191i, cccmI, 285.
29
Ibid., p. 281. Preuss proposed that the prov1aions be 1naerted in
Article T;'Dut in the final dratt of the We1M.r ConsU tution a separate article
(.~ rUcle 3) prOYided tor the new flag.
30Ibid.

-

31Sp&hn 8aid the colora reminded hill of a ditty he learnt in childhood:
~Schwarz i8t das Pulver, rot das Blut, golden flackert die F1a... ~"~., p.3B3.

-

32Ibid ., July 2-3, 1919, CCCXZVII, l224-123S. 1244-124S.
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cClllDdttee on June 3 atter it had been unsuccessful in solving the flag question, and these vere now eubmitted to the National ASleably for consideration.
The choice ot the Independent Socialists was a red flag.

The Majority Sooi-

alists and Democrats wanted a revival of the black, red, and gold colors as a
"symbolic expression" of the desire "to complete the unfinished work of the
Frankfurt Assembly of 1848. n33

The Centrists were in favor ot retaining the

old black, white, and red flag ot the Bismarckian Reich, tor as Gr~ber pointed
out there was no purpose in changing flags at a t1me when occupied German territory vas under an alien flag.

France had retained her flag, he argued,

despite her change of governments; Germany should not be too hasty now. 34 In
their desire to retain the old tlag the Centrists aidecl w1ththe Right.
The selection of flags by the Party did not necessarily represent unanim1ty of choice.

Among the Centrists,

tor

~stance,

ber who preferred the tag of olt'!Ck, red, and gold.

there was a goodly numOthers, furtheNore,

though agreeing with the Right tor the retention of the old flag, had not remained insensible to the remarks ot the Austrian representative to the National
Assembly, Ludo Moritz Hartmann, who had pointed out that the old black, white,
and red tlag was viewed by Auatr1all8 as an historic symbol

land.

a

ot a lUeiDdeuMCh-

The proposed black, red, and gold flag, he had suggested, vas more ac-

ceptable to the Genaan Austrians and its adoption would make it easier for
Austria to join the German ReiCh)5 Liberal Centrists who had faYOred the
33pz.otoc#., cited in Lauscher, ~. cit., p. 1.61J Ziegler, Ope cit.,
,June 4, 1919, l::"32. ~ee also Preuss' speech in th'! National
Assembly, Verh8nd1unlen, Februar;r 24, 1919, CCCA-XVI, 287.
pp. 1h5-lli6;

34Ziegler, OPe cit., p. 146; !!, June 4, 1919, 1432.
35
Cited in ~uscher, o~. Cit., p. 162; Ziegler, Ope cit., p.

147.
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black, red, and gold flag trom the start were confirmed in their choice by
Hartmann's remarks. 36 lupporters ot Gr5ber' 8 views gave the matter second
thought so that between June 3 and July 2-3 when the three flag proposals were
presented to the National Assembly for consideration, nearly two-thirds of the
center had been won oyer to the Left's viewpoint

wh~e

one-third of the Party still sided with the Right.

only slightly lIOre \haD

37

All parties except the Center delivered nlaerous speeches ot patriotic

tervor both for and against the three flag proposals during the sessions of the
National Assembly on July 2 and the day following~.38

The proposal for the red

nsg was rejected by an overvhela1ng aajorU;y.39 The black, white, and red
flag also failed to receive a sufficient _3or1ty.40

The acceptance, t1nall7,

ot the black, red, and gold flag was due to a propoeal sublllltted jointly 01'
Gr8ber and Majority Socialist Max Quark who suggested that black, red, and gole
be adopted as the national colors, but that the .erchant flag continue as
36LaUSCher, Ope cit., p. 162; Ziegler, 21>. Cit., p. 147. 1'bis was a
strong argmaent for the C81ter Party since a union with Aua'trla had al_18
been a Centrist desire. Religious ties with Catholic Auatr1a were a deter.
m1rd.ng factor in the Centrist progrUl. During the early veeks ot the Weimar
coalition the Centrists worked assiduously toward this union. Shortl,. after
the opening ot the Na tional Assembly, Pfeitfer, secretar,.-general of the Canta
vas sent by the gOYer.mt1ent to Vienna to discuss the poe.lbUities of such a
union. Germania, Februa17 11, 1919, #69, February 13, 1919, 1173J Februa1'711,
1919, #19 carried special Suppleaente with articles' listing historiC, re1lgiou
and econClll1c reasons for this union. The Part,. vas keenly disappointed later
when the union was forbidden by the ter.as ot the Versailles Treaty.
31Oe:rmania, Jul7 9, 1919, #301.

38yerhandl~en,

-

Jul,. 2-3, 1919,

cccnm,

1224-124,.

39Ibld., July 3, 1919, CCClXVII, 124S.
40Ibid •

The vote was 110 for and 190 againat with one abstaining.
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black, white, and red with a display of the national colors in the upper lefthand corner. 4l

On the strength of this ccmprOIlliae about one-fifth of the Cen-

trists who had voted prniously for the black, white, and red flag, now gave
their consent to the change.

42

Of all the proposals submitted to the National Assembly,during the decisive month of July, this one concerning the change of national colors provides
the most interesting study of the conn1cting torces within the Center Party.
From the "ry beginning, the Party was divided on the issue--iilie liberal faction favoring the change, the conservative clinging to the old.

The Austrian

views on this matter induced some of the more realistic Centrists to drop their
allegiance to the old flag as a matter

or expediency, while the compromise pro-

posal enabled others to relinquish their allegiance.

Nevertheless, the Party

had not succeeded in the final show-down to rally its entire membership to the
acceptance of the new banner.

As Table V indicates, the Centrist vote on the

c01llpromise proposal was sixty-four in favor, tive against,43 and one abstaining. 44 More re.ealing still is the record of absence.

Twenty-tvo delegates,

representing one-fifth of the Party's membership, failed to appear.

Three of

these were ill, two were excused, the other seventeen were simply unaccounted
for. 4S

-

41Ibid.
42 Ibid •
abstaining.

The vote on this proposal was 211 for and 89 against with one

43Josef Becker tran Hesse; the cleric, Lud"~g Kaasl the leader of the
Bavarian People's Party, Georg Heila; the trade union secretary frOlI Posen,
Robert Sagawe J and Herman Colshom, the Hosp~~ of the Center trom the German
Hanoverian Party.
44Heinrich Langworst of tbe German Hanoverian Party.
45See Table V for the vote on the flag. The information in Table V is
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Although Oermania published a lengthy article on the change ot the flag,
it made no comment on the final vote.

It observed that it vas difficult for

patriotic Centrists to give up the old flag, but it agreed that the new colors
were more symbolic of the change in government.

It was highly critical, how-

ever, of the adamant poai tion of the A:ight and their press, ac cusing them ot
chauvinistic efforts to arouse patriotic sentiments against the flag coapromise
In order to erect an enduring and stable constitution, Germania stated, it was

necessary for the majority parties to compromise on some isaues. 46
But the choice of national colors, while it evoked sentiments of patriotism and stirred the emotions of loyal Germans, was not as significant in its
consequences as some of the other hard-core decisions facing the National Assembly.

Chief 8JI10ng these was the "vielleicht schwierigst.e Verfassungs-

problea,n 47 that most difficult problem of deciding whether the new republic of
Germany should have a federal or unitary system of government.

Should the con-

stitution, in other words, abolish the special priTUeges of the individual
states and centralize power in one unitary type of government similar to that
of France; or should it retain the federated characteristics of the German
States as they had existed unaer tha old Bismarckian constitution of 1871?

The

Center Party had noted with apprehension that centrali,ation was becoming increasingly stronger as the forces of liberalism and democracy which had traditionally espoused strong unitary tendencies became Tictorious over the forces
taken from the Verhandlunge.!!, July 3, 1919, CCCXXVII, 1244-1245.

46 July 9, 1919, 1307J Mausbach, Kulturfragen, p. 30, alao noted the difficulty with which the "greater majorityn of the "Center acquiesced to the
change.

47

Lauscher. 21>___ cit •• p. 162.

TABLE V
VOTE ON THE NEW FLAG, JULY 3, 1919
Delegates

,

Allekotte, Joseph
Andre, Joseph
Astor, Jakob
Becker, Johannes
Becker, Josef
Bell, Johannes
Bergmann, Theodore
Beyerle, Konrad
Sitts, Joseph
Blank, Lorenz
Blum, Johannes
Bolz, Eugen
Brauns, Heinrich
von Brentano di
Tremezzo, Otto
Burla ge, F.c:iuard
Colshorn, Herman
Diez, Carl
Dransfeld,Hedwig
Erhardt, Franz
Ersing, Joseph
Erzberger, Matthias
Farwick , Wilhelm
Fehrenbach, Konstantin
Fleischer, Paul
Frerker, Wilhelm
Gerstenberger,L1bor1.us
Giesberts, Johann
Gilsing, Anton
Grober,
Adolf
"
Grunau, August
Hagemann, Joseph
Hebel, Benedikt
Heim, Georg
Herold, Karl
Herschel, Johannes
Hitze , Franz
Hofmann, Hermann
Imbusch, Heinrich
Irl, Martin
Jaud , Josef
Joos, Josef
Kaas, Ludwig
Koch, Johann
Kossmann, Bartholomew
Kreutz, Franz

District

Vote

KRblenz
Wurttemberg
Koblenz
Arnsberg
Nassau
Dusseldorf
"
Thisseldorf
Franken
Oppeln
Hanover
Kgln
Wllrttemberg
K8ln

Yes
Yes
Yes
III
No
Yes
Absent
Yes
Absent
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Nassau
Aurich
Hanover
Baden
ntlsseldorf
Oppeln
Baden
II
Wurttemberg

Absent
Yes
No
Yes
Excused
Yes
Yes - . "
5Yes
,
Yes
Yes
Excused
Yes
res
Yes
Yes
Yes
Absent
Absent
Yes
No
Yes
Absent
Yes
Absent
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Absent
Yes

KSln
Baden
East
Berlin.
II
Munster
fl"arucen

DHssel dorf
Arnsberg
\-Jurt
" temberg
Breslau
Aurich
Bavaria
Bavaria
Mllnster
Oppeln
Dllsseldor f
Pfalz
Arnsberg
Bavaria
Bavaria
DUsseldor f
Koblenz
M.flnster
Koblenz
Munster
"

Delegates

I.

I

Kubetzko, Joseph
Langwost, Heinrich
Legendre, Peter
Leicht, Johann
Lensing, Felix
Marx, Wilhelm
Mausbach, Josef
Maxen, Wilhelm
Mayer,
Wilhelm
n
Miiller, Richard
Nacken, Josef
Neuhaus, Agnes
Neyses, Matthias
Ollmert, Karl
Otte, Waldemar
Pfeiffer, Maximilian
Puschmann, Alois
RheinlHnder, Anton
Richter, Johann
Sagawe, Robert
Schefbeck, Josef
t
"
Schiffer, Mattias
..
Schirmer, Karl
... ,
Schlack, Peter
Schmitt, Adam J .
Schmitz , Maria
oc~eider , Alexander
Schummer , Wi lhelm
Schwarz, Jean Albert
Schwarzer, Rudolf
Spahn, Peter
Stapfer, Michael
Stegerwald, Adam
Strzoda, Franz
Szczeponik , Thomas
Tauscher , Eugen
Teusch, Christine
Tremmel, Pet er
Trimborn, Karl
Ulit zka , Karl
Weber, Helene
Wieber, FranzWirth, Joseph
Zawadzki , Konstantin
Zehnter, Johann
Zettler, Maria
\.

District

Vote

Oppeln
Hanover
Koblenz
Franken
It
Wsseldorf
DUsseldorf
Mllnster
Hanover
Bavaria
Fulda
K8ln
Arnsberg
Koblenz
Koblenz
Leignitz
Berlin
Breslau
Arnsberg
Pfalz
Posen
Bavaria
MUnster
Bavaria
Dusseldorf
"
Hessen
Koblenz
Franken
Prussi a
Nassau
Bavaria
K3ln
Bavaria
K8ln
Oppeln
Oppeln
Bavaria
K8ln

Yes
Abstained
Yes
Yes
Absent
Absent
Yes
Yes
Yes
III
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Absent
Yes
Yes
Yes
Absent
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Absent
Yes
Yes
! bsent
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Absent
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
r'·
Yes
Absent
Absent
Yes
III
Yes

Franken

K8ln
O~peln

DUsseldorf
D3.sseldorf
Baden
Oppeln
Baden
Bavaria
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at militarism and autocracy at the end at 1918. 48 Now it viewed with alara the
revival in 1919 ot the centuries-old problem of Bundesstaat versus

E1nhei~

staat. h9
Pruess, as a firm adherent of a centralised and unified state, attellpted
to embody these unitarian provisions in the constitution. SO Within the ,constitutional cOlllittee itself tbere existed a strong tendenc1 '\ovard an Einheitsstaat which the six Centrist JI8Dlbers tried to check.

They were assisted by the

strong opposition stemming tram the representatives of the South German States
in the States' Committee.

Bavaria, especially, had no intention of surrender-

ing rights and privileges which sbe had enjoyed for so long.51

Traditionally, the Center Party was federalist, 52 preferring a Bundessta!i..!- type of government that emphasized states' rights.

Accordingq, Centrists

had campaigned in the Januar;y election on a plat.tora advocating tta stronger
Reich" but one with a "bundessteatlichen Aufbau."

Later, on the tloor of the

National Ass_b11 this same idea was reiterated by one at the Partytl1leJlben. 53
48See Richard Fischer's speech in V8rhandl~8n, Februar;y 28, 1919,
CCCnVI, 342, "Away with particulari.. and 8s't8buah an 'Einheit.ataat tor
Germanyl"
49See the e di torial, "Bundessteat oder Mnzelsteat," Germania, March
1919, 1105.

5,

50verhandl~en, February 24, 1919, CCCIXVI, 28h-286. In Preuss' orig1na
dratt the uni tartan prOVisions were embodied in Section I (Reich and the Stete..
51
Lauscher, 21'. cit., pp. 167-168.
52The term "tederalist" does not have the same meaning in Germany as it
has in the U. S. Our word, "tederalist, tt @TJl)lies to advocates ot a atrong
tederal government, whereas the German term "FSderalisttl was used tor one who
opposed all but the weakeat federal government in tavor ot State independence.
See .Amold Brecht, 'ederali.. and Regionalill1ll in Germanz:: The Division at
Prussia (New York. Mord University Press, 1945), p. 4.
.
~3se. Beyerle l s speech, Verhandlungen, March 3, 1919, CCCUVI, h64-467.
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By

maintaining this traditional position, the Center Party repudiated any moves

on the part ot its coalition partners toward a tully unitary state. But here
again unaniJdty ot Party policies among the Centrists in the Assembly vas not
apparent. Within the Center's ranks

8

strong tendency toward centralization

was evident in a minority taction comprising some ot the newly elected labor
and trade unionists trom southwestern Germany who rallied around Erllberger's

banner. 54

Though this minority group was unable to influence the view ot the

majority taction, especially the members ot the BayariJn People's Party who
clung tenaciously to the tederaliBt principle,;; it remained nonetheless a
divisive tactor in Party deliberations. 56
'WhUe the Party otticiall7 maintained its devotion to tederali8ll, it did
not repudiate the idea ot strengthening the power ot the Reich in certain areas
This it de_ad opportune in order to place the Reich in a poei tion where it
would be able to . .et the ditficult reparations and war indemnities, and to
prevent the centrifugal torces "which are necessarily present in every tederal
system" trom becoming overwhelming.;7 St.egerwald pointed this out to the Assembly on February 21 when he told the delegates that the industrial power

ot western German terri tory was necessary to the general weltare ot the whole

;4See

Morsey, !!!!.,.truuJ!!rtei 1917-1923, p. 200.

S;schwend, Balem, pp. 88, 102-103.

;6F,rzberger' s

duties as Armistice Ca.issioner hindered hilft trOll taking
an active part in the making ot the constitution. Nevertheless, he did advocate a vigorous policy ot centralization within the National Assembly and as a
member ot the ministry. 'lbe nationalization ot the GC!,rman railroad system and
the complete reorganiza tion ot Germany' 8 tileal system on a centralised basis
were largely Enberger' 8 achievements. See Epstein, Erzberger, pp. )27-329.
;7 Lauscher,

Ope cit., p. 167.
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Reich and that, therefore, every atteapt to weaken the Reich's power in the
West must be hindered. 58 A few days later on February 28, Spahn indicated the
necessity of a "strong central power in the Reich, It requesting that control
over the armed forces, cOJ!ll1llunications, and foreign affairs be placed in the
hands of the Reich. 59 Again on March 7, Spahn declared that "an important
task of the Reich's ada1nlstrative ofticials" was to keep "guard over the
Reich's unity.n 6O
1I0twi ttlstanding the increase in power which the Centrists were willing

to concede to the Reich, they refused 'to acknowledge the Reich's power oyer
certain questions, especially those conceming the privileged position granted
by the individual states to the Church and Christian education
in Article 10.

March

14, 15,

8S

proT1ded for

The proposal debated in the constitutional ccmm1ttee on
and 16, granting the Reich jurisdiction Over the regulation

ot

rel1gioUII associationa and OYer a unitol'll educational system, brought the
advocates of unitari_ and federali_ to loggerheads.

The Centrists, in

particular, were adamant in their resistance.

Beyerle, supported by Qr8ber,

called for a cancellation of the provisions.

The tvo Centrists were not alone

in their objection, however; the Baden Minister, Dr. Dietrich, protested in
the names of both the Baden and w~ttemberg lorer.nments. 61 In the heat of the
debate OYer this controversial issue, Gr8ber remonstrated,

It • • •

as a Catho1.1c

58verhandlungen, February 21, 1919, CCCxx.VI, 264.

-

59Ibid ., February 28, 1919, CCCXXVI, 379.
60
Protocol, cited in Morsey, Zentrumspartei 1917-1923, p. 200.

6lProtocol, cited in Ziegler, .2£.

ill.,

p. 117.
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I cannot concede competency to the National Assembly to discuss reUgious
questions. "62
The Bavarian People's Party, reflecting the age-old particularism of
ita native state, we8 much more conservative in its view of federalism than
the rest of the Center Party.

Dr. Georg Be1m, director of the Bavarian People's

Part;y, exemplified this a tti tude in an address d slivered before the National
Assembly on July 3 after the const! tution had been returned to the Assembly
for its second and third reading.

Contesting the growth of the paver of the

Reich at the cost of the states

provided in Section I of the constitution,

8S

especially Article 7, Be1m noted that:

Bavarians have always striven "pre-

eminently" against centralisation for it is an "extraordinarily dangerous
thing."

Destroy federaUn in Gel'Wlll7 and you destroy the unique cultural

particularism for which ael'll8ny is universally known.

If government power

over finance, communications, agriculture, religion, and culture be centralized,
what autonomy, asked the Bavarian Centrists, will reuin to the constituent
states?

"We don't fear unity itself," he said, "we fear the unity of Berlin

domination."

This all-toe-vast centralization which the Democrat.e and the

lMajority Socialists advocate will bV its very nature lead to the destruction
of the "Reichsgedankes~ (the idea of the Reich as a federal structure).

It is

a "dangerous game," he warned, "to assault" the constituent states, for the
federal principle will survive.

"The stronger you promote centralization in

the Reich, the stronger will be the federalist echo. ,,63
62lbid. The problem of Church-State relations and education will be
next chapter.
.

~ea ted

rn-the

63verhandlungen, July 3, ·1919, CCCXXVII, 1240-1243. Beyerle and FAuard
Burlage also spoke against the strong centralizing power given to the Reich in
Section I. See ibid., 12$1-12$4, 1270.

-
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Closely allied with the strengthening of the power of the Reich was the
struggle over Preuss' provision for a rearrangement of the German states, the
.rJ:nder. 64

It was not surprising that the Center Party agreed to Preuss' pro-

posal calling for the amalgamation of smaller German principalities into

la~r

Beyerle suggested in the constitutional camdttee that the disappear-

'W11ts.

ence of the dynasties presented an opportunity to do away wi th many of the
smaller states. 65 But later Beyerle was not supported by his Bavarian colleagues who considered any tendency toward amalgamation as dangerous to federalism. 66
Deliberations on this point of division of linder provoked varying views
from all parties, to the point of shattering party fronts.

Three days' debate

in the constitutional cODlJllittee (March 17-19) brought no real solution to the
problem, for any rearrangement of states necessarily involved a partitioning
of Prussia.

Preuss favored the suppression of Prussian domination either by

voluntary or enfol'ced partition. 67 He argued that Prussia was not a nation,
but an artificial formation resulting fro. political intrigues, purchases,
marriages, and conquests. 66

The Rhenish Centrist leader, Tr1mborn, used this

same argument in the constitutional committee on March 18.
plained, was merely "an editice ot fortune."

Prussia, he ex-

Only by suppression of Prussia

64Articles 1-17 t
6Sa.port of the constitutional comaittee lV, March 11, 1919, #213;
p. 165.
Germani8, March 20, 1919, 1127J .Lauscher, .2£.

ill.,

66see Heim's address of July 3, 1919, Verhandlunlen, CCCXXVI1~1240-1243.
67See Preuss' speech in the Hational Assembly on February 24, 1919,
Verhandlungen, CCCXXVI, 284-294.
68Protocol, cited in Ziegler, .2f.

!!!.,

pp. 118-120.
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would the people ot the Prussian provinces be able to s.cure equali V. 69
Sentiment against Prussian hegemony was especially strong in the West
where the cry "Los von Serlin" had been heard atter the Nov_ber ReTolution. 70
while the western Centrists had repudiated earlier attempts to establish a
separate Republic ot the ibine, they did not support in the tirst halt ot 1919
a moveaent tor the tormation ot a West German Free State within the unity ot
the German Reich. 7l Hence, tor the Rbineland Centrist, the probleJi ot the partition of Prussia was closely linked with the move..nt tor a West Oerman
Republic as a member state in the tederation ot the R.ioh.
When the question ot Prussian hegeaony was discussed at a joint meeting

ot the constitutional colmlittee and the States Cc;aaittee on March 18, Trimborn
spoke out emphatically in taTor ot greater
inces. 72

auton~

tor the Prusaian prov-

Reterring to Pruasia control in Germany, he remarked, "The present

state ot Prussia gains the greatest profit from Prussian unity• • • • But today
tthe intereat ot the Reich and that ot a true, healthy organi_ require its
~-

69Ibid., cited in Morsel", Zentrumapartei 1917-l92J, p. 201, also in
iLauscher-;op. cit., p. 168.
70The Democrat Walter SChlcking declared to his tellow delegates in the
National Assembly: "UP to 1867 Prussia was against the Reich, tro. 1867 to 1918
~L!fia was aboTe the Reich; the Reich must hereafter be above Prussia."
Verhandlungen, March 4, 1919, ceCIIn, 324.

-

7lxv, February 2, 1919, #91 J Februa17 3, 1919, 1195.
72The Centrists in the Pruaaian provinces telt keenly the di8proportionate representation they would receive it Prussia would be given a repre8entation in the Reichsrat siJlilar to what she had under the old con8titution. On
~rch 26, TriJlborn told the constitutional comrltteeJ "It i8 unbearable tor us
Ito be torced to see tbat s ..ll states have influence on legislation trca which
Ive larger Pruasian province8 are excluded) thia position will becoae even more
junbearable it the competence ot the Reich is enlarged without tolerating our
~nteresta. " Protocol, c1 ted in Morsey, Zentrwupartei 1917-1923, p. 205.
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[Prussia's] alteration.,,7)

Trimbom's proposal to establish the westem pr01lf~

ince as a separate republic within the Reich brought a stinging retort. trom
Prussian Minister of Justice, Wolfgang Heine, who "with veh_nee, with witticism, and with sarca8tic antagonism,n74 accused all Rhinelanders, but. especially the Centri8ts, of disloyalty and of deserting the Reich in its hour of
need: "Nov the rats are beginning to desert. the sinking ship.
longer eontribate

to the coat of these poor land8

The)" will no

Prussia's eastern prav-

inees , but vill retain all profit for thamaelves.,,1S
Tr1llborn replied that the arguments ot Prussia were invalid; separation
of the Rhineland trOll PrUS8ia did not entail separation from the Reich.

On

the contrary, Rhineland would be more 801ldl)" and intimatel)" welded to the
Reich if it belonged to it direetl;y rather than a8 a part of Prus8ia.

Nor

would Trimborn and hi8 Centri8t eolleague8 accept the argument that Rhineland
8hould belong to Prussia to supplement economicall;y the relativel)" poor ea.tem
Prussian prav1nce8.

"The old cr:r of the poor East and the rich West i8 dead

tada)"," he insisted, pOinting out that war and revolution had done more duage
to the industrial Rhineland than to the rural ea.tem provinc e8.

\'Ihile he ad-

mitted that the creation ot a new state in German)" might cause 80M di8turbance
for a brief time, he a8sured the a888Mbl)" that the confusion would be less
7)Protocol, cited in Ziegler, Ope Cit., p. 120.
74
Ziegler, Ope ci~., p. 119.

~ Ibid., pp. ll9-120J also Cited in Lau8cher, OPe cit., p. 170. GrOber
"
'Was so incen8ed by Heine' 8 invectives that he 8houtedout, ' "Don't you poi80n
this situation an)" further. "--a remark, Ziegler noted, "that had no parallel
in the Protocol of the colllldttee." ~., p. 120.
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harmful than the pem-anent source of trouble which would result from indifference to the Rhineland situation. 76
The debate over the issue caused conSiderable conflict among the parties
and at one point even erupted in a personal encounter between the German
Nationalist delegate Gottfried Traub and the Centrist cleric Ludwig Kaas when
Traub accused the Centrists of disloyal t:'i to the Reich and termed the movement
in the West a "Zentrumamacht. ft77

Emotional involvement over the problem of an

arrangement of the IJInder and the partitioning of Prussia went completely out
-~-

of hand, splitting not only the Center, but also the parties along regional
rather than party lines both in the National .Assembly and in the constitutional
committee. With the groups so divided among themselves it was difficult to
arrive at any decision. 78
A compromise proposed by Trimborn was finally placed before the committee
on June 4. According to ita prOVision a territorial adjustment could be made
by a simple law i t the people in the area concerned voted in tavor of the

change.

The compromise stipulated, however, that no territorial changes could

be made until a two-year period had elapsed a!'ter the formal adoption ot the
Constitution. 79 On July 22 the National Assembly included this compromise in
Article 18. 80
76,or a report of 'lr1mborn's speech in the constitutional coDBittee, se
Gemani!l, March· 20, 1919, 1127; !!" March 20, 1919, #2'22.
77Protocol, cited in Morsey, Zentrumspartei 1917-192}, p. 204.
78See committee reports in KY, March 25, 1919, #236; June 4, 1919, #432,
German.!!, June 2, 1919, #245.
79!!, June 4, 1919, #432; Germania, June 4, 1919, #250.
8OVernandlungen, July 22, 1919, CCCXXVIII, 1840-1642.
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The latter provision of Trimborn's compromise was aimed at the unrest in
;.he Rhineland.

It was deCided, on the one hand, that the Rhineland need a

period of tranquillity to resolve its problems J on the other hand, it was argued
that the period of Allied occupation was not a feasible time for making terri81
torial adjustments.
Thus, in the late spring of 1919 Allied pressure for a
82
separate Rhine Republic had inadvertently contributed to the unity at Prussia.
Pledging their loyalty to the Reich, the Centrist delegates from the West had
with the other delegates in protesting against Allied designs in the
83
Rhineland area.
Now, following the lead of the Party's directors at Berlin,
84
the Rhenish Centrists gave full support to Trimborn's compromise.
~ted

The Centrist involvement in the whole problem of the dismemberment of
tprussia was quite complex.

In the first place, opinions within the Center

Party were divided over these issues.
~t

In the eyes of the Centrist leadership

Berlin a division of Prussia posed the danger of greatly weakening the

Party's strength.

!from

The Party recruited about eighty per cent of its electorate

the Prussian provinces. A division of Prussia into difterent states could

prove detrimental if by such a division the Center should "sink to the status
pf a regional party," too small in some areas to be effective. 8, Besides this
81
See editorial on Martin Fassbender's pamphlet, "Los von Berlin?" in
~ermania, April 20, 1919, 11179, Supplement; May 27,1919, #237.
82lbid., May 29, 1919, #241; June 2, 1919, #24,.

This issue called the

~stablishii1eiit of a separate Rhine Republic a "pol:4.tical swindle" (lflochstapelel.").

83See editorial, "Pratestbewegung," signed by the Centrist faction in
!Y, June 4, 1919, #432.

~ermania, June 3, 1919, #248; June 4, 1919, #249;

84The leaders of the Center Party pleaded with all Centrists to maintain
Party unity in "this hour ot danger." Anyone persisting in entertaining motives
pf separation would be expelled from the Party. Germania, June 3, 1919, #248.

8,Germania, AprU 20, 1919, 1/179; Morsey, Zentrums;eartei 1917-1923, p.201.

p
179
political problem, there existed a religious danger to Catholicism in the
"Diaspora," for the privileges enjoyed by the Church under Prussia could well
be ignored in an area of great Protestant domination once the provinces were
separated tro. Berlin. 86 Concern for its Catholic interests had always been
one of the strengths ot the Center Party and one which it had no intentions

ot neglecting in this perilous time.
CD the other hand, the Party could not remain inditterent to the wishes

ot its local tactions in the Prussian provinces who were agitating tor more
autonomY' or tor cOlllplete separation trom Prussia.

In Preuss' constitutional

proviSion tor a new territorial arrangement ot the Reich the Pruss1an provinces
saw an opportunity to curtail or eYen to crush entirely Pru8san hegemony_
The cry; "Los van Berlir.;" was echoed not only in the Rhineland-Westphalian area,
but a180 in Hanover and in Upper 5iles18.

In each ot these provinces the

Center Party had the backing ot a large percentage ot the electorate, and it
was therefore obliged to assume the dominant role in separatist movements.
Hence, the Centrists ot the Pruss1an provinces tound common interests both in
the cOJIIIIlittee and in the National Assembly in agitating for a division ot

Prussia"
There seeu to have been no detini te directive from the Center's headquarters in Berlin concerning an official policy
~le
~n

or

the Party on this

que~tion.

defining the Party's views on the direction ot the new government Or!ber

his address to the National Assembly on February 1), avoided taking a deti-

pi te stand on the issue.

8~orsey, zentrumat:etei 1917-192}, p. 201J !!, June 28, 1919, #498, took
with those who cle
d a separation of Prussian provinces would be harmto the Party. It telt such views were "groundless."

~sEue

~ul

Vaguely he reterred to the cry, "1oa von Berlin,"

160
linich seemed to be leading to "unhealthy unitarism lt and "overwhel.ll1ng centralization"--goals which the Center Par\y rejected. 67 While recognizing the need
tor the "StAmme" to develop independent.ly their own cultural characteristics,

.

Grober stressed the need to subject all development to the weltare ot the
88
whole Reich.
The cry ot "Los von Berlin" vas inopportune because ot the
danger ot ene~ occupation--_ danger especially evident in borderland areas. 89
Advocates ot separatism were told to recognize the evil designs ot

Fra~ce

who

would benetit tram the abeence ot a strong Prussia on her eastern border. 90
The provincials, in anawer, claimed the t they did recognize the danger

or

enemy encroachments upon their territory, but that more autClllallY in their own
attairs would enable th. to meet the outside danger. 91 The apparent sUence

ot the Center Party's leadership in Berlin on the impor\ant issue involved in
IArticle 18 vas interpreted by Prussia I s provincial Centrist factions as the
!signal to move ahead in their efforts to win a separate status wi thin the Reich
67Verhandlunsep, February I), 1919, CCCXIVI,

IP.

54-55.

88Protocol, March 17, 1919, as cited in Horsey, Zentrumspartei 1917-1923,
202.

-

69Ibid •
~III,

90Joaeph Kuckhott, "~ die westdeutsche Republik,· Allegem~ine Rundschau,
(February, 1919), p. 10).
'

91Rbinelanders telt that an independent Rhineland would obtain milder
peace terms for the entire German nation. For a thorough study ot the Centrist
role in the Rhineland movement, see Morsey, Zentrumsp8rtei 19l7-19i' chap. iY.
~orse7 challenges statements made by Peter Klein, SeparatIsten an
ein und
R~rl Die konterrevolutionire separatistische Beweguns der deutschen Bour~eoiae
in derHheinprov1nz und in Westfalen November 1916 bts Jill 1919 J.L!..ll_Berlli:
Riftten and Loaning, 19(1). Horsey maintains that Klein's work is based on talsified statements of Adam Dorten vhich ~icate Adenauer in the separatist
movement frail the Reich. While Adenauer favored separation frail Prussia, he
never supported an independent movement frOll the Reich.
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or, faUing that, to strive for greater autonomy trom Prussia ln regulating
thelr aftairs.
In Upper SUesia the Oentrist movement against Pruaslan domlnation was

led by Father Carll. Ulitzka, a pastor at Ratisborn.

92

The political situation

following the war had placed the cl Usens of Upper S11esia in a precarious sl tuat1on, for the Entente powers wanted to annex part ot this area to Poland.
Under the leadership ot the Center Party the people of Upper S11esla were
9.3
fighting to remain in the Reich.
Al though there was a movement to establish
Upper SUesla as a separate state in the Reich,94 Ul1tska and the Centrists
were sat1sfled to agitate tor more local autonomy wlth1n PrusS1a,95 Ulitska
pointed to the danger ot Polish encroachJlent if the territory vould be glven an
independent status.

In the National As._bly, Ulltaka and the Centrist dele-

gates tram Upper S11es18 joined wi. th the other Prusslan Centrists in supporting
Traborn's compromise allcw!.r:g fer mon local

~utonomy

both within Prussia and

the Reich. 96
The autonOlllous moftDlent in Upper Siles1a was merely a local Centrist

92Carl Ulltzks (187.3) attended the Unlverai V of Breslau betore be~
coming chaplain at Kreuzburg in 1897. He was pastor tirst at Breslau trom
1901-1910 and then was appointed pastor at Rat1sborn. In 1918 he was director
of the Cathollc People's Party in Upper S11esla. He served in the National
Assembly and the Relchetag.
93Carl Ulltska, WOer deutache Osten und die Zentruaapartei," in Nationale
Arbeit, pp. 141-14.3.
94~., p. 14.3.
95
Ibid., p. 144.

-

96Ibld., pp. 145-147. See Ulitzka's speech on Article 18 ln the National
AII8embly on July .31, 1919, Verhandl¥en, cccnvnI, 2142. See a180 the editorial, "Eindruck aua Cberachlesien;tiermanla, May .31, 1919, 1244. The artia.E
praises the efforts of the Center in fighting to keep Upper SUesia loyal.

p
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projectJ 97 the separatist movements in the West were far more extensive and
involved.

The agitation in the Rhineland, for e:napl., was neither cOIIlpletely

Centrist-inspired nor Centrist-led, especially the movement in the spring ot
1919 for the establialunent of a West German Republic wi thin the Reich. In this
98
movement both Democrats and Majority Socialists were implicated.
Nevertheless, the strong baclcing received fran. the local Centrist factiona, the leadership of prominent Centrist politicians, and the enthusd.asltd..c support ot the
electorate (the

~jority

of whoa belonged to the Center Party) tended to give

the lIhole mov_ant a definite Centrist character.

!n the constitutional

COJl-

m1ttee and in the National Ass_q the separatist movement was looked upon as
a Centrist "power move, .. 99 and it called forth taunta about the Center Part,.' s
"disloyalt,." to the Reich tran. the Gerun Nationalists. 1OO
As was noted above, the Rhenish Centrists designs regarding separation
from Prussia were not given any official sanction frOll the leadership in Berlin.

The local Centrists preferred to disassociate thauelves from the Part,.

in this political movement and to keep it a regional matter.

On February 11,

1919, the secretary-general of the Rhineland Center Part,., Josef J3rg, repudiated an,. "official" connection with the Rhenish separatist lIlO'ftIment.
97Ulitska,

2P.

Reterrlng

cit., p. 147.

98In the "KasinoveraaJlUllung" at Cologne on March 10, a number ot representatives tr<Xll the Center, Jlajorit,. SOCialist, and the Democratic parties assembled to pressure lor a West German Republic as a "Friedenrepublik." The
group published a manifesto signed b,. representatives ot the K8lnische Volk!lIeitunJj. Cologne CentriSts, and members of the other parties.-W;r.rch 11,
1:919, 97. A similar resolution had been passed b,. the Centriits in Orsabr{kk
on March 7, demandir..g ttu, £stablishment ot a "West State with fl 1'lrm anchorage
in the unit,. of the Reich." This was published in the same issue of !!.
99Protocol, cited in Korse,., Zentrllll!partei 19l7-l92l, p. 204.
lOOIbide; tauscher,

Ope

cit., p. 170; Ziegler, 91>_. cit., pp. 119-120.

>

to one of the first "los von Berlin" proclamations made by the editors of the
K8lnischa Volkszeitung at a large Center Party convention held in Cologne on
December 4, 1918, J8rg remarked, "I know full vell that this action, particularly the assembly of December 4, has ruined us among other parties. nlOl

In

his article, "Zur Fraga der Wastdeutschen Republ1k," another leading Centrist,
Joseph Hess, stated, "Never at any time or under any circumstances has the discussion over the West German Republic been used by us as a Party interest."102
He insisted that the whole issue was ". fateful one concerning all Germans"
and had nothing to do with Party interests. 103

()l

another occasion, Tr1JRborn

explicitly pointed out that he did not represent any political party when he
spoke about plans for the establisbment ot • West German Republic.
In their separatiat

140V9'...n~

104

I'ram PrusSia, the Rhenish Centrista loyall,-

maintained their allegiance to the Reich.

At no tiae did they support the

simultaneous movement instigated by the French and led by the Wiesbaden otticial, Hans Ada. Dorten, 1.0 establish an .independent Rhine Republic separated
from the Reich. 105 Dortents abortive attempt to establish an independent Rhine
10llederal Archives ot Coloe!, as cited in Morsel', Zentrusmp!rtei 19171923, p. 251.

l03 Ibid •

102 KV , February 19, 1919, #136.
A pre'rlous ar1.icle by Leo Schwering entitled: "Zentrwa und
ReichseinJiiri," sought to prove that the separatist Iloyements had no otficial
Party backing, see ibid., February 16, 1919, 1131.

04

-

.

1 At a public 8ssembly of representatives tram the Center, Majority
SOCialist, and Democratic parties held at Cologne on February 1, 1919. Federal
Archives ot, Colope, 88 cited in Morsey, Zentrwupartei 1917-192;, p. 252.
lOSSee Morseyts coverage of the Centrist activities on this issue,
2entrumspartei 1917-1923, pp. 246-265.
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Republic on June 1, 1919, aroused bitter criticism trOl'll the Rhenish Centrists
as vell as trOll the whole Centrist Party.l06 When the Rhenish question ceased
101
to be a regional issue and became one ot national concern,
the Center Party
came out with an otficial announcement. 108

It called upon all Party members to

unite_.against the traitorous separatist mov81Ilents in the west. 109 All Center
tactions-the Berlin taction as well as all :beal Rhenish Center organi.ationa-united in their protestations ot loyalty to the Reich and repudiated their
torm.r design ot establishing a West German Republic vithin the Reich. 110
Despite the bitter struggle exerted b;y the Rhenish Centrist ft..ction tor a
division ot PrUSSia, the state emerged trom the constitutional contl1ct with
her territory undiminished.

Yet, the Centrists telt that the outcome of their

struggle vas valuable on at least three counts. lll Firat of all, their efforts
had provided not only a legal bea1s tor obtaining greater provincial autonc::D.7
trom PrUSSia,112 but according to a concession won thrcugh Triaborn's ettorts

.l06See editorial, "Hochstapelei," Oermania, June 2, 1919, #24$, June 3,
1919, #248.
101Mora ey , Zentrwup!rtei 1911-192l, p. 260.
1080ermania, June 3, 1919, #248; June

4,

1919, #249.

l09 Ibid ., June 4, 1919, 1/2$0.
110Ibid • See the speeches of Brauns and Hitze in the constitutional committee on June S, 1919, Protocol, as cited in Moraey, p. 260; Hess' speech on
June 21, 1919, in the Pruss1&n landversammlung, Session Report as cited in
Morsey, Zentrumap!rte1 1911-1923, p. 260.

l~a 1s the opinion of a Centrist representative trOll Bonn, Professor
Albert Lauscher, vho had been an act1Ye vorker in the Rhineland movement. See
his ''WeiJnarer Verfassung, n p. 110.
112See Article :1.8 of the Weimar ConsU tution.
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and embodied in Article 6), the Prussian provinces had been given a more direct
voice in the ReiCh~113

Secondly, by advOcating the establishment of the West

German Republic within the Reich, the Centrist had "crippled" the ef'forts of
the "traitorous" separate independence movement instigated by the French, and
having rallied the citizenry under the Centrist's banner of' loyalty, had preserved intact the unity of' the Reich.
18 proposing

Thirdly, the hard struggle over A.rticle

the dismemberment of' Prussia provided a danger signal to that

State, warning her not to ·overstrain" her centralizing efforts in regard to
the provinces but to allow them "freer elbow ros" than they had enjoyed

pre~

viously in developing their individual cultural achievements .114
Throughout the 8eemingly endle8s debates in the constitutional COIIIIII1i ttae
and in the plenar,y ses8ions of' the lia ti onal Assembly, the delega tes of the
Center Party had labored assiduously to establish a democratic republic ba8ed
on a federal structure in accord with the pramises made in their Party prograa
of' December 30, 1918.115 It was not always possible to attain these goa18, for
the Party had much oppoei tion to contend within preserving for its constituents those principles for which it stood.

There were times, in tact, when,

for the maintenance ot prinCiples 80 vi tal to its Christian Weltanschauung, the
Center Party was forced to vote against policies advocated by its more liberal
coali tion partners.

Ckl the other hand, the Center could not always assume the

ll3A-rUcle 63 provided that the Pru88un provinces be given halt ot the
Prussian votes in the Reichsrat. "The States will be represented in thfc Reich..
rat by members ot their cabinets. Half ot the Prussian votes, however, will be
at the disposal of the Prusaian provincial administrations in accordance with
a State law."
114LaUBCher, Ope cit., pp. 179-173; Morsey, Zentrumspartei 1917-192;3, p.~
115"Leitsltze der Deutschen Zentrumsparte1," Ursachen und Folgen,

III,~
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attitude of an obstructionist, and, theretore, when issues of lesser importanc
allowed for compromise, the Party acquiesced in order to achieve some principle more important and more vital to the interests ot the Party.
In lesser matters the Party offered noticeable resistance only to those

articles which accorded increased power to the Reich at the expense of the
States.

The Bavarian People's Party spokesman, Heim, indicated such reaistanc

when the articles dealing with the Reichsrat were read in the Assembly.

He

opposed the decreased power allotted to the Reichsrat by Artic.s 60 to 67.

116

At the time of the final reading ot the constitution in the National Assembly,
Beyerle protested against the stipulation in Article 49 granting the exerei.e

ot the right of pardon to the President of the Reich. U7 Bavaria, he stated,
did not wish to concede this right to the ReiCh. 118 In some areas Centrist
intervention was BUccessful in gaining certain desired results.

Graber, for

instance, scored a victory on Article 23 by opposing in the constitutional
committee the five-year term allotted to the Reichetag and succeeded in having
the term shortened by a ,..ar. ll9 At the suggestion of Beyerle, furtheNore,
it was agreed that a religious aff::i.rmation could be added to the preSidential
oath. 120 All other political provisions passed the second and third reading
without too much comment trOll the Center t'arty.
116Sectlon IV of the first division of the Weimar Constitution.
117See Ursachen und &olgen,
10'
Ill, 473.
118See Beyerle's speech of July

5, 1919, Verhandlungen CCClXVII, 1328.

119Gr3ber in the conlltitutional cOlll1littee on April 5, Frotceol, as cited
in Morsey, zentrUllSPjrtei 19l7-19!1' p. 231. See also Beyerle's support of
this article in the ssembiy on J y 4, Vemendl!!!e!, CCCIXVII, 1281.
120Article 42.

See Beyerle's comment on July

-

5, 1919, ibid, p. 1318.
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The area in which the Center Party offered the greatest opp08i tion in
dealing with the political aspects of the Weimar Constitution concerned the relation between the Reich and its member States.

The Democrats and the Majority

Socialists both favored an F..1nheitsstaat.

But Preuss' constitutional draft

providing for a unitary type of government

WAS

Party, which had always advocated a

vehemently opposed by the Center

~sstaat

type of gOYernment.

Although

the Center was successful in hindering the establishment of a unitary government, it was not able to check the centralizing tendency.

Not without an inch-

by-inch struggle, however, had it conceded to the Reich an increase of the
power at the expense of the member States.

121

But once the question of the

power of the Reich versus states' rights had been determined, the Center displayed

~

a minor interest in the formation of other provisions involving

such regulations as executive or presidential power, ministerial responsibilit,;
and the legislative powers of the Reichstag.
In summing up, therefore, the Center Party can be said to have acquiesced
in the JIUljor political proTision. of the constitution in all but two important
areas.

Its opposition to the establishment of a unitary state involved its

traditional cOlllllittment to protect the religious and cultural rights of its
constituents; hence, its resistance on this point remained adamant.
question of Prussia, the

Pa~tyts

On the

obligation to stand by its provinCial Prussian

membership lett no alternative but to press for the curtailment of excessive
power.
121_-

"he Center eventually gave in on this issue atter receiving instructions from the Reich's ministers, Erzberger and Bell, who promised the Party
would elildnate all hindrance to the cansti tutional draft. See "Session ot thE
Reich's Ministry, July 10, 1919," in State Archives, as cited in Morsey,
Zentrumapartei 1917-1923, p. 234.

>

CHAPTER V

DELIBERATIONS ON THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTION
CENTRIST VIEVIS ON CIVIC, RELIGIOUS
AND CULTURAL ASPl!X:TS

In its completed fora the Weillar Cansti tution was divided into two ..in

divisions, one dealing with political aspects of the Reich, the other defining
the "Fundamental Rights and Duties of a German. It

The formation of the latter

involved much concentrated effort on the part of the constitutional commi t.t.ee
and was the product of many pai.nf'ul.. compromises.

Originally, Preuss had not

planned a separate section defining German rights, but at the instigation of
the govemment.--in fact, at a personal request trOll1 Friederich Ebert-he had
included in his working draft a short list of traditional axiOll1s. 1

It was this

list which the constitutional committee, regarding very seriously, had judged
inadequate and had replaced by the introduction of new provisions which would
include within the constitution those guarantees which each politioal party
considered essential. 2
luraachen und Folgen, III, 433-434. During the deliberations with the
Committee on February 8, Preuss told the state representat.ives that he
~referred not to include a section on "Fundamental Rights" because he feared
ithat an expanded and detailed consideration of the axioms would only delay work
~n the constitution and he hoped "to avoid the mistake of 1848." See also
~ocol, as cited in Ziegler, Nationalversammlpng, pp. 136-137.
~tate

2Ibid ., p. 130.

Four drafts were submittea on March 31, 1919.
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The Center Party's particular concerna included the areas ot Church-5tate
re~tions,

marriage, the family, confessional schools, and the teaching of

religion.

Provisions for these matters, embodied in a draft of rights pre-

sented by Gr&ber to the constitutional committee on March 31, 19l9,3 were subsequentl;r rejected by the comaittee in favor ot the draft presented by the
Democrat Friedrich Newunn.
Atter much deliberation on Neumann's draft. the constitutional committee
indicated what it. considered the essential rights to be included in the constitution.

These rights were further defined by a subcommittee consisting of

nine members chosen trom. the constitutional ccaaittee.

Three prominent Cen-

trists, Graber, Beyerle, and Mausbach, were part of this subcOllUllittee. 4
Although no ofticial record was kept of the subcommittee's deliberations,
their finished docUlllent evidenced the intensive etfort exerted by the meabers
during their seversllleet.ings.5

In the opinion of the historian Wilhelm.

Ziegler, none worked more diligently than Konrad Beyerle who is oredited with
"having saved NeUlll8nn's rather obscure draft ot tundamental rights trOll the
wastebasket" by fOl"lllulating an acceptable draft ot this second major division
ot the constitution. 6 Ziegler describes Beyerle as laboring "quietly and
3Johannes Linneborn, "Die Kirchenpolitik des Zentruma," in Nationals
~rbeit. p. 198. Lausoher, Ope cit., p. 175; Mauabach, Kulturtragen, p. 38.

40tber members included the two Social Democrats s. Katzenstein and Frau
PtiUtJ the two Democrats D. Ablas. and E. Koch; P. Heinse of the German Peoplets
Party; and A. Duringer of the German National People's Party. Beyerle, Reiohs~ertassunl, PP. 11-13, Ziegler, OPe cit., PP. 138-140.
~ember8 _9f the subcommittee met on May 2, 3,
...~
___
• _c...;;i.....
t., p. 130.
.
6Nationalversaal'U!i, p. 190.

5, 6,

and 28.

See Ziegler,

p:z
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unobtrullively~'

at the task of completing the final copy by applying, as he says

the Itugnifying glass of the lawyer and the pen of the framing and scrutiniz inS
editor" to the sketchy original text. 7 Thus, by the end of the subcommittee's
deliberations, the twelve original provisions on rights emerged as sixty
art.icles, fOl"llling the consti tut.ion' 19 Part. II on "Fundamental Rights and Duties

at a German." When presented to the full constitutional committee on May 26,
1919, this schema of Grundrechte was an impressive piece of work subdivided
into five major areas dealing with t.he rights of individuals, community life,
6
religion and religious societies, education and schools, and economic life.
Discussion of the Grundrecht.e began immediately upon its presentation
to the constitutional cOllUllit.tee (May 26).

Beyerle, report.ing for the sub-

«omm1t.tee, explained t.hat the absence of a declaration of fundamental rights
had been a major deficiency in t.he Bismarckian Const.itution of 1671 and that an
enumeration of certain rights was mandatory for the new constitutIon. 9

Karl

Heinze of the German People's Part.yopposed Beyerle and called for a drast.ic
reduction of the articles anumerated in Part. II of the constit.ution.

Heinze

even suggested the total e11lllination of this second ujor division since he

7Ibid • ZIegler praises the selt-sacrificing labors or Beyerle in the
subcOlllllI'ttie. Seldom in the lime-light., he was the "energet.ic spirit." behind
the constitutional committee; "his scholarliness, thoroughness, and the objectivity of his civic office proved useful to him in his parliamentary function."
Ibid. Adelbert. Diringer (DNVP) paid a public tribute to the "excellent ser~n rendered by Beyerle in the subc~it.tee. See D:lringer's speech in t.he
National Assembly on July 11, 1919, Verhandlungen, CCCXXVIII, 1495.
6 HZwei tar Haupt8il: Grundrechte und Grundpflicht.en der Deutschen," in
Ursachen und Folgen, III, 482... 493. All further citations from the constitution
are taken frOIl this edition.
9Protocol, as cited in Ziegler, OPe cit., p. 141.
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saw in it only a collection of "declarations and declamations" supplemented
10
In the midst of the heated
by legal maxims already present in other laws.
debate, Preuss intervened to remind the cOJ1lmittee members how imperative it was
that the government "bring the constitution under roof as soon as possible"
even at tithe cost of the integrity of the Grundrechte. ll en June 2, after .four
days of further deliberations, it was decided that the Grundrechte should be
retained.

Thereupon the constitutional camnittee began its second reading and
12
subsequent discussion of the entire constitutional draft.
Chief among controversial issues studied in the forthcoming sessions were the question of the

Reich's colors, the Church-5tate issue, and the confessional school problem-the two latter questions of great significance to the Center Party.13
Though the constitutional coounittee was able to bring its deliberations
to a conclusion on June 18, work on the constitution was stalled for the next
~o

weeks because of the crisis in the government concerning the acceptance of

!the Versailles Treaty.

Consequently, it was not until July 2 that the plenary

session of the National Assembly began its deliberations on the second reading
of the constitutional draft. By July ll, the Assembly was ready to consider
Part II on "Fundamental Rights and Duties. n Once again this second division
10Ibid.
11Ibid •
12 Ibid., pp. 142-143. The second reading in the constitutional camnittee
:overed seven days, June 2, 3, 4, 5, 16, 11, and 18.
13Ibid., pp. 144-146; Germenia, June 18, 1919, #212; June 19, 1919, #213;

~, June2O'; 1919, #415; Mausbach, Kulturfragen, pp. 86-88.
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was

severe~

Erich Koch!

criticized as impractical b.Y the DNVP Heinze and the Demoorat

14 But Beyerle's lucid explanation of the subcommittee's arguments

for retention overcame the opposition and Part II ot the oonstitutional dratt

was acoepted,lS
A oloser sorutiny of the Center's involvment with the Grundrechte reveals
the extent ot the proteotion demanded for the safeguard of personal liberty as
as the labor and anxiety attendant upon the struggle tor each ot the five

~ell

~as

included in the Constitution's Part II.
Section I, "The Individual, tt enumerated a list of individual liberties

~hich inoluded such matters as civil equality,16 the right to settle in any
part ot the Reich or to emigrate to a foreign oountry,11 and guarantees against.
~rbitrary

arrests, imprisonments, and other penalties.

18

.
Rights to the invio-

p.abilit.y of the h01ll8,19 to secrecy in mail, telephone, and telegraph coJlllllWlica..ions,20 as well as the right to freely express opinions through all media including motion picture tilms 21 were also guaranteed.
This whole section on "The Individual" was accepted wi thOllt too much
~ebate

once the constit.utional committee had agreed to retain Part. II on

14verhandlungen, ~ 11, 1919, CCCXAYIII,
1.5
~.J p. 1.503.
·16
Articlll 109.

17

Article 111 and Article 112.

l8Article 114.
19Articlll 11.5 •
20Article 117.
21
Article 118.
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"Fundamental Rights. tt22

Nevertheless, Beyerle did suggest a minor change on

July 11 when he introduced the revised part to the National Assembly.

He ob-

jected to the statement in the first article which read that this section was
to act "as a guiding principle and a check on legislation, governmental power,
and the judicial administrat1on. t123

Beyerle thought thatth1s article was

-.orthless and should be deleted. n24 At the next session of the National Assembly, Graber also proposed eliminating the "useless n article. 25 When the
majority of the delegates indicated by a standing vote their disapproval ot
Article 107, it was deleted from the constitutional draft.

26

Only two articles in this section received further attention in the
National

Assemb~.

27
Article 109 providing for Civil equality and the aboli-

tion of titles ot nobility had alreaqy engendered 80me discussion in the constitutional committee on June 2,
of the

Assemb~

on July

15

28

but it was not until it reached the tloor

that a lively discussion developed.

Referring to

the provision for civil equality of men and women, Christine Teusch, a Centrist
delegate, praiaed the article as a progressive and democratic step in the new
29
Her defense of civil equality won the support of the whole
RePublic.

22

Germania, June 19, 1919, #272;

!!,

June 20, 1919, #475.

23Article 107 of the constitutional draft. Since this article was later
~eleted, it should not be contused with Article 107 in the official ConstitutiOn.

2~erhandl~n,

July 11, 1919, CCCXXVIII, 1503.

25Ibid., July 15, 1919, CCCXXVIII, 1557.

26Ibid., p. 1560.

-

27 This article was referred to as Article 108 in the constitutional dra.t't.
28Ziegler, ope cit., p. 142.
29verb"wut,

Julv

1~

J.4embers of the !tight did not favor tts art:i:le.

1919

r.r.r.:uv

1~60
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Assembly.

The second provision of Article 109 concerning the abolition ot

titles of nobility was championed by the Social Democrats.

Surprisingly', this

statement found a sympathetic supporter. in the Bavarian People's Party spokesman, Heim.

Commonly knOlal as an arch-conservative, Heim amused his fellow

Centrists and other delegates ot the National Assembly by his vehement speech
in favor of the proposal made by the Social Democrats. 30
The other article ot Section I which brought a response f'rom the Center
was Article 11431 which states:

"Personal liberty is inviolable.

Curtailment

or deprivation of' personal liberty by a public authority is permissible only
by authority ot law. tt32

In the National A8stlllbly' on July 15 the Independent

Socialists proposed that an exception be made in the case of prostitution to
guarantee that under certain conditions it would not be curt&Ued by law. 33
This proposal was challenged by the Centrist delegate Agnes Neuhaus, who held
that the Constitution ~as not the place to legalize prostitution.1I 34 Frau
Neuhaus was supported in her opinion by the majority of' the Assembly and the
proposal was dropped. 35
In Section II ot the Orundrechte the constitutional cClQl11ittee dealt with
30Ibid., p. 1567. Heill's comment, "On this question [abolition of titles
of nobility] I am more radical than the most radical among yoU," evoked loud
laughter tram the Social DeJIlOCrats. Ibid.

31aeferred to as Article 113 in the constitutional draft.
32Article 114.
33verhandlungen, July 15, 1919, CCCXXVIII, 1574.
34Ibid., p. 1575.
35Ibid •

>

,I,
II'
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matters social.

Properly designated "Canmuni ty Life," this section outlined

the rights and duties or those groups and canmunities which played a particular
role in society--the family, associations, municipalities, and civil service. 36
Keenly interested in all of these areas, the Center Party evidenced particular
concern for the institution of marriage and the family.

Since constitutional

guarantees in this matter were as vi tal to the common good as the safeguards
to education and religion, the Center was not remiss in bringing its influence
to bear upon this area of the Kulturfragen.

Earlier, in its December election

program, the Party had advocated "the protection and strengthening or the
religious character of marriage and the family.,,37
sition,,38 from the

sm

Despite "difficult oppo-

in the committee, the Centrists had again striven to

secure "cansti tutional protection for monogamous marriage in the Christian
sense.,,39 When at length, the B,rticle on marriage was ready for discussion
at the May 28 meeting or the constitutional committee, its Centrist overtones
were unmistakable.

"Marriage," it read, "as the foundation of family life and

of the maintenance and increase of the nation, 1s under the special protection
of the Constitution.

The maintenance of the purity, the health, and the social

advancement of the family is the task of the state and of the municipalities.
Families with numerous children have a claim to equalizing assistance. ltuO
36section II, Article 119-1.34.

37"Leits~tze vom Dezember 1918." cr. above, pp. 69-72.
38Lauscher, .2£.

ill.,

p. 177.

39Mausbach, Kulturfragen, pp. 38-39. en January 1, 1919, Dr. Sonnenschair
had told the Berlin Centrists: "The question of divorce should not be one of
indifference. The marriage bond must be respected." Germania, January 1,
1919, #2.
uOArticle 119.
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Credit for the acceptance of this marriage article by the oonstitutional
committee was due in particular to the Centrist women delegates 41 who, exerting
every effort, had eventually forced the committee to recognize marriage and the
fami~

as the basis on 'Which nsocial lile reposes" and. as the ttprimary source

from which German customs and culture develop.n 42

Th1a was not aooeptable to

the SPD who claimed th18 article discrilll1nated aga1nat un.wed mothers and illegitimate ohildren. 4J
The denunciation of the &rtiole 44 by r.he Sooial Democrats did not effect
its deletion .from the draft, nevertheless, the artiole came under tire again
when it was read in the National Assembly on Jul¥ 16.
Independents

"'0 opposed it. 45

This time it was the

The Centrist view, however, was ably defended

by Frau Neuha).ts and Eduard Burlage.

Not only did the)" answer the criticism

levelled at them by the SPD, but the)" also proposed enlarging the article to
include other guarantees for the faBily.46

Particular areas treated were the

needs of arge families, protection of motherhood, and the care of illegitimate

offspring.

In keeping with their traditional concern for human rightd, the

Center agitated for a constitutional guarantee of state assistance for large
4l)lausbach, Kulturfragen, p. 39. Frau Neuhaus represented the Center as
one of its members on the constitutional committee when the Kulturfragen were
~der discussion.

42 Ibid •
43

Protocol, as cited in tauscher,

OPe

oit., p. 176.

44Article 113 in the cGnstituticnal draft.
45

See their speeches in the National Assembly, Verhandlungen, July 16,

~919, CCCIXVIII, 1$98-1600.

46Ibid., pp. 1601-1603; 1608-1609.
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families. 47

Through the efforts of Frau Neuhaus and Herr Burlage, the proposal

"Motherhood has a claim to the protection and care of the state." was affixed
to Article 119. 48
Closely related to the privileges granted to motherhood and family was
the prescription of Article 120, stating that "the physical, mental, and moral
education of their offspring is the highest duty and the natural right of
parents."49 In his report to the National Assembly on J~ 16 Beyerle acknowl50
edged Graber as the author of the proposal made in Article 120.
Centrist
inspired, it, too, was challenged by the SPD who considered education the task
of society or the State and not primarily of the parents. 51 Fearing the effect on Christian education which could result in areas dominated by the
Socialists i f the state should gain complete control of the education of children, the Centrists appealed to the delegates to retain Article 120.52 The
success of their plea was seen on the following day when Article 120 received

~ favorable vote in the National Assemb~.53
The quostioI! of the status of illegitimate children was also brought up
in the discussion of Articles 119 and 120.54 However, the problem

was

too

41Helene Weber, "Kulturpolitik," in Nationale Arbeit, pp. 231-239.
48
Verhandlungen, J~ 17, 1919, CCCL~III, 1620.
49Article 120.
50see Beyerle's speech, Verhandlungen, July 16, 1919, CCCIXVIII, 1597.
51 Ibid.
52See Burlage's speech, ~., 1608-1609.
53Ibid., J~ 17, CCCXXVIII, 1627; tauscher, Ope cit., p. 178.
IIhe artirn-in!!, July 11, ·1919, #552.
54
.
Verhandlungen, ~ 16 and 11, 1919, CCCIXVIII, 1608-1621.

See

also
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heavily fraught with questions of private rights to allow for an easy solution;
hence the Assembly decided to transfer legislation to a later date. 55 For the
present, it established a guiding principle that illegitimate children would be
~rovided

....ith the same opportunities for their physical, mental, and moral

~elopment

as legitimate

children,"$~

a stipulation accepted by the

centrist~

Section III and IV conceming the topics, "Religion and Religious
~ocieties"
~han

and

ItEducat~on

and Schools," involved more controversial discussion

any othar section in the Gruncirechte.

In preparing these articles, the

ielegates t::> the Weimar Assembly refused to l1m1t themselves to any traditional
ieclaration of rights containing general principles relative to religious
iberty and the free exercise of belief.

The question of Church and St.ate

Pormed an essential part of the program of both the Center and the Social
Jemocrats, and neither group was

w1l1~;

to rush to easy solutions while basic

iifferences remained to be satisfactorily resolved.
Adhering to the Erfurt Program of 1891, the Social nEtDlOcrats continued
~o

press for a complete separation of Church and State in the n... German

epubl1c.

The Social Democrat,. whose anti-clerical program during the past

ovembar and December had aroused alarm among both Catholics and Protestants
~ike,

considered religion a private matter and, therefore, not the concern of

tate. 58

-.

5Ssee the proposal of Frau BrSnner (SPD) in the National Assembly, ibid.,
uly 17, 1919, CCCIXVIII, 1620.
56Article 121.
57see r'rau Neuhaus t speech on Article 121,

~., pp. 1626-1627.

5~or a description of and reaction to the anti-clerical program of the
IOcia1ists regime, cf. above pp. 77-80.

199

em. this issue the Social DeIlocrats stood di.ametrioally opposed to the
Centrists who considered religion a vital part of German culture
safeguarded by the State.

~ich

must be

From the time of its inception, the Center Party

had been the chief exponent of religious .treedOlI in GermanY'.

Already in Novem-

ber 1918, the PartY' had indicated ita intention to retain this role. 59

In ita

political program' of Dec_ber 30, 1918, the Center had stressed among other
proposals of dcaestic policies, lithe maintenance and strengthening of the
cultural and educational ideals in the minds of the people," treedOlll of conscience and of religious exercises with cooperation between Church and State,
the maintenance of "the confessional public schools," and "sufficient religious instructions in all achools."60

In ita election campaign the Center

Party, supported by the Protestants, championed the rights ot religion. 61 Upholding the federal character ot the ReiCh, the Center had proposed that certain powers, especially those concerning Church and school, be reserved to the
Bundeestaaten. 62 In so doing, the Party had hoped to secure the privileged
63
position granted the Church under the old regtme.
Fearing the "unhealthy
59 In the Center's manifesto on November 20, 1918, the Party promised to
maintain ita traditional stand on Cburoh-5tate relations. See Germania,
November 20, 1918, 154h; !!, November 22, 1918, 11919.

60 ttLeits itme der Deutschen Zentrumapartei vom 30, Demember 1918, cf.
pp. 69-72.
61On January 7, 1919, a manitesto issued by the Evangelical Churches
called on all \.hristialUl to join with the Center in ita attacks on the antireligious policies of the Social D_ocr!ta. Cited i~ Johannes Linneborn, "Die
Kirchenpolitik des Zentrums," in Nationale Ar~~!, p. 198. Written by a contemporary, this article gives the Centrist views on Church poliCies in the
Weimar discussions.
62w1lhelll Marx stressed this at the Centrist d81ll0nstration at Cologne on
December 4, 1918. See!!, December 5, 1918, #957.
63Unneborn. ope cit. t p. 198; also Mausbach, Kulturfrajlen, p. $9.
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mitary element" which vas 1I8.nifesting its "devastating action" in all cultural
64
lreas, it demanded that these affairs be lett in the hands of the Linder.
)n

February 28, 1918, Spahn as Centrist spolcesman repeated this same idea in

the National Assembly, adding that every religious society should be allowed
to manage its affairs autoncaously as had been the case under the Prussian

~onstitution of 1850. 65
When

~e

question of the Reich's caapetency over religious affairs came

~tore the constitutional committee on March 14, 15, and 16, Graber advised

against "hasty changes" in the traditional policies and warned that granting
such jurisdiction to the Reich would bring unrest. 66 Controversy swelled over
the wording of Article 10 which tended to give the Reich jurisdiction over
1UIlY' areas formerly superYised by the individual states.
~i0U8
~ere

Regulation of reli,..-

affairs and the establishment of a uniform educational syatem in Germany
attempts to turther centralize authority in the Reich, and as such were

ontr&ry to the Center's federalist policies.
Doth Beyerle and Gr8ber called for a cancellation of these provisions.
~As

a Catholic," Graber remonstrated, "I cannot concede competency to the

~atianal Assembly to discuss religious questions. n67 But the Centrists were
~ot

able to check this centralizing torce in the constitutional COlUlitwe, for

640r8ber in the National Assembly, Verhandlungen, February 13, 1919,

pccnVI, 54.

65Ibid., February 28, 1919, CCCUVl, 319.
66

Ki.,cMarch, 1919, #214.

~. cit.-;-p. 191.

61

See also Ziegler,

Protocol, cited in Ziegler,

OPe

OPe

Cit., p. ll1.

cit., p. ll7; Linneborn,
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the majority of the mabers had decided that the Reich could "prescribe by law
fundamental principles concerning the rights and duties of religious a8sociat1 on8. • • "68
March 1, the co_ittee turned its attention to a consideration of
69
religious treedOll as propo8ed in Preuss' dratt.
This article, the only one
On

in which Preuss dealt wi t.h religious atfairs, prO't'ided for freedom

science and the tree exercise of onels religious duties.

ot con-

It abolished the

special privileged posi tion of the Church in the State, guaranteeing religious
societies the tree exercise ot their atfairs, but subjecting the. to the gen70
eral law ot the land.
In the ensuing debate over this article, Dr. Mauabach warned the Social
Democrats that attempts to s eperate Church and State would arouse the otagOniD of both Catholics and Protestants alike,

He referred to the turor that

had erupted in Christian circles in reaction to the Independent Socialist
Hoffmann's anti-religious policies of Nove.ber and December, 1918.

The Center

had always been a champion of states' rights and protector ot religious treedem, he told the Social Democrats, and he insisted that in the new German constitution, guarantees be made to protect liberty ot conscience.

To cloud the

issue with the slogan, "Religion is a private thing, and therefore, no concern
of the State," was to court trouble, Mausbach declared.

To a certain extent,

he admitted, religion was a private matter, but not entirely, since it was
68Article 10: "Das Reich kann ill Wege del' Gesetzgebung GrtmdsAtse aatstallen tDr die Rechte und Ptlichten dar Religionagesellschatten."
69Qriginally Article 19 in Preuss' constitutional dratt, cited in
Ursachen und Folgen, III, 433.

-

70Ibid •
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also a powerful factor of public life and could not be divorced trom it.

Dr.

Mausbach, moreover, advocated State encouragement of "the development ot
Christianity in the service ot the weltare ot all; a tree world endeavor of
all religious, educational, and social realities."11
But the Center's position was becoming precarious.

It was while the

commi ttee was discussing Article 3012 during the latter part of March that
they began to.question the advisability of adhering to their traditional federalist view on religious aftairs.

Since the revolutionary governments in

some ot the Linder, especially in PrusSia, Munich, Brunswick, and Gotha, had
assumed an anti-religious attitude, the Center Party decided that perhaps it
would be more desirable to choOle a positive approach in order to be able to
prepare an "acceptable course" regarding Chureh-State relations.

The Party

reasoned that since the Daloerats and the partiea of the Right had guaranteed
religious tolerance and protection ot Church interests in their election campaign, the Social Democrats would be unable to Muster a majon ty in the
National Assembly tor their kulturkampferische goals. 13 Hence, the Center
Party revereed its previous negative attitude toward jurisdiction of the Reich
1l;-or a report of the cOllUllittee meeting, see Germania, March 16, 1919,
#121. Mauabach had expressed a s1lllUar view in the National Assembly on
March 11, when he told the delegates", !fAs history has sholm and the culture ot
the German people has daonstrated, religion is also a powerful element in
public lite and it does not proceecl trOll economic necessity, but rather frOll.
the depths of mankind's inner soul. and his natural propensity toward God and
eternity." Verhandlungen, March ll, 1919, CCClIVII, 619.
12This article was addod to Preuss' draft to cover the Church-5tate relations. The subcClllUlittee expanded into several articles by combining the various proposals ot the constitutional committee until it became Section III,
"Religion and Religious Societies," in the Grundrechte.
7)1auscher,

OPe

cit~, p. 119.
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..n religious utters, and along with the other bourgeois parties sought to nan~hor"

more specifically in the constitution a basic policy ot religious free-

dome

This reversal ot the Centrist position was first revealed by Beyerle on
~arch

29 when he told the constitutionsl cOllllittee that the Center Party had

accepted the initial provision of Article 10 granting the Reich competency over
religious affairs and education. 74 Determined as they were not to "sacrifice"
their religious goals,75 the six Centrists on the collDlittee16 assisted by
rlihel.lll Kahl fram the German People' s Party had, however, tormulated their own
article a8 a counter-proposal to Preuss' article on religion. 11

To the bocial

Democrats' proposal, ''separation of Church and State," 18 tor example, Gr3ber had
retaliated with a series ot supplementar" proposals.
Breedes ot associations in religious societies is guaranteed.
Every religious society regulates and manages its aftairs treely
and independently and sppoints its officials without State assistance. Religious societies and spiritual societies obtain legal
rights after the BGr,erliches Geset~buch.
Religious societies
are entitled to the possession of their cultural institutions
and endowaente as well as their right of taxation. Religious instruction is a school subject under the uswsal direction of re~9gious societies. The theological faculties will be continued.
14protocol, cited in Ziegler, Ope cit., p. 172J Linneborn, Ope cit.,p. 201
15For the Centrist views on the Church-5tate question, see Alexander von
Staat und Kirche. Zur Trennungstrage in Preussen (Flugschrift8n der
Peutschen Zentrumspartei, Berlin: December, 1918).
~randt,

16The Centrists 'Working on this section were Graber, Beyerle, Mausbach,
Spahn, and Trimbom--pro.11inent parliamentarians on the question
pf Kulturpoliti!. See Linnebom, 2E.!_cit., p. 200.

~heinl1lnder,

17Called Article 30 on "State and Religion" in the constitutional draft.
78Protocol, as cited in Ziegler, Ope cit., p. 124;
Germanr~, April 4, 1919, #153.

!!,

19Protocol, as cited in Ziegler, OPe cit., pp. 124-125.

April 3, 1919,

pa
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The Social Democrats resisted Gr8ber t s proposals as contrary to their
cOJlmlitments and insisted upon a complete separation of Church and State which
they considered the ncore question. nBO

The Centrists, for their part, reasoned

that cODlplete separation of Church and State would involve a decrease in
econOlldc protection and support given to the churches by the State and to this
Bl
they would not consent.
Because neither side would compromise, the situstionmet a hopeless impasse.
A few daya later on April

1.4, Majority Socialist Johannes Meerfeld, oall-

ing Grabert s proposals "cODlpletely unacceptable, II stated, nevertheless, that
the ,members of his party wanted tlno KulturkaJllpf. II

Indicating a change in the

militant anti-religious socialist attitude, Meerfeld conceded, "My party knows
from experience that one cannot tight against religion and expect 8uccess. n82
The Socialists, he said, were willing to "recogni.e for the present the imp ortance and the influence of religion • • • as an inner need for numerous .en,
and one must allow for thifi situation. 1I83 Separation of Church and State, he
pointed out, could be accomplished in an "amicable fashion" and without hara
to the respective Churches as had already been proved by many governaents.
"Separation is possible if it is accomplished with the good will of all concerned.,,84 The Majority SOCialists, he announced, hid, therefore, reconsidered

80
Linnebom, 2P. cit., p. 200.

81

-

ltV, April

8, 1919, #276.

82

Protocol, as cited in Linneborn, Ope cit., p. 201.

83Protocol, as cited in Ziegler, Ope Cit., p. 12,.
B4Ibid .; also cited in Linneborn, 2P. cit., p. 201.

...
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the religious question and were willing to comprOlllise with the Centrists and
the parties of the Right. 85
In lieu ot the change of attitude or the Majority Socialists, Mausbach
announced, "I think that the opposition between our point of view and that ot
the Social DElloerate is not incompatible in all parta as (lIle might expect at
first glance.

The idea of a separation ot Church and State ia,

has already indicated, many-sided.

8S

J:m". Kehl

86

My Party is now w1lling to go halt-wa,... n

Seizing upon these initial conceasions, the two Centrist clerics Keas
and Mausbach worked with Meerteld in forming a compromise on the religious issue.

In place ot Meerfeld's propo8al, "There is separation or Church and State]

Mausbach proposed the negative statement, "There i8 no State Church. n87

Having

granted this much to the Social Democrats, the Center and the parties ot the
Right were now in a position to secure favorable concessions regarding religion
and religious societies.

Out ot this spirit ot coaproaise evolved the solu-

tion that there would not be complete separation ot "hurch and State, but
nei ther would there be a close union between them.

The Churches would be
88
emancipated trOll the State, but they would enjoy certain privileges.
"\..-'

To this end, the principle of liberty ot beliet and conscience and the
free exercise ot religion were immediately given constitutional guarantees.
Ever since 1905 the Centri8ts had attempted, albeit unauccesstully, to get the
5>Protocol, cited in Ziegler, ~2t cit., p. 125.

86

Protocol, cited in Linneborn, 02. cit., p. 201.

87Mausbach, Kulturtrage!,l;, pp. 59-60. also cited in Linneborn,
p. 202.
88aermania, April 14, 1919,

1170;

!!,

April

14,

1919,

1295.

OPe

cit.,
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Reichstag to pass a toleration act tor the protection ot minority groups.
They now saw the fulfillaent of their desires in Articles 135 and 136.

The

first article stated: "All inhabitants • • • enjoy complete liberty of beliet
89
and conscience. The free eDreise of religion is assured. • • ."
In the
second article, the political status of citizens vas protected regardless ot
religious aftiliation.

Article 136 readl "Civil and political rights are

neither conditioned nor limited by the exerciae ot religious liberty.

The

enjoyment of civil and political rights as well as eligibility to public otfice
is independent ot religious beliet. • • • ,,90
Determined to insure religious associations and societies the right to
administer their own atfairs independently of the State, Gr8ber proposed:
"Each religious society regulates and administers its atfairs freely and inde}fmdently; espeCially in regard to the appointment of its officials, it is
~n

organisation free to act without interterence freD the State or civic

~ommunitiesJ

the right of private patronage remains undisturbed."

(Jede

Relig10nsgesellschaft ordnet und verwaltet !hre Angelegenheiten frei und selbstandig, insbe.ondere verleiht sie !hre Kmter ohne Mitwirkung des Steates oder

~er bDrgerlichen

Gemeinde; die Rechte aus dem Privatpatronat bleiben unbertlhrJ'

~o the Sooial Democrats and Democrats, this proviaion appeared entirely too

iberal.
~intain

Some 11lllitation or State superviaion, they felt, was necessary to
public order and safety.

Dr. Kahl then suggested adding to "freely

89Article 135.
90Article 136.
91
Cited in Linneborn,

OPe

cit., p. 205.
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and independently" (frei und 8elbst~ndig) the words: "but is subjected to general legislation" (bleibt aber den allgemeinen ~taatsgesetzen unterworfen).92
Meerteld insisted upon the phrase "innerhalb der Schranken des Gesetzen." 93
The Center, realizing how dangerous a restricting phrase might be in the hands
or an anti-clerical government, preterred no such limitation, but once again
the Party was forced to compromise.

Grober,
therefore, recommended adding
"

tlwi thin the limits of a general law" (innerhalb der Schranken des

rllr alle

geltenden Gesetzes).94 The recommendation was accepted by the committee in
Aprll. 95 The provision, later to be incorporated in Article 137, read, "Every
religious society regulates and administers its artairs independently within
the limits of the general law.

It appoints its officers without interference

by the State or the civil municipality. ,,96
A further development of this prOVision gave recognition to the social
force and importance of Churches in public life and accorded to them pri vileges similar to those extended to public corporations.

Grober,
Spahn , and
"

Mausbach who were active in obtaining these concessions 97 not only secured for
religious societies the privilege of being accorded the rights ot public corporations,98 but also won the constitutional guarantee of "property and other

----_.---------------------------------------------------------------------

95 Ibid ., pp. 20"'206. The article, ItRalgion and the Church in the Constitutional Committee," in !I, April 17, 1919, #302, described the struggle.
96Article 137, par. 3.
p. 206.
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rights ot religious bodies and associations tor the maintenance of their cultural, educational, and charitable institutions, their foundations and other
possessions." 99 Nor did the question of taxation escape the Center's notice.
Under German law public corporations enjoyed both the legal standing that
private law aftorded and the special protection ot the State.

Theirorganiza-

tions were regarded indirectly as public agencies and had,therefore, the right
to levY taxes.
of taxation.

Spahn desired to set constitutional guarantees on this right
He told the const.itutional co_ittee when it was debating the

issue of separation ot Church and State that many individual States such as
Saxony, Oldenburg, Saxony-Altenburg, Bavaria, and Baden, had already passed
legislation in this regard. 1OO Gr8ber also emphasised this point 1Ihil~ at the
same time streSSing the social .function ot religious societies.

101

.As a resul"

of the support the Center received frail the other bourgeois parties, the constitutional committee accepted in its last reading in June the proposal that
" ••• religious societies which are recognized by law as corporate bodies are
entitled on the basis of the civil taxrolls to raise taes according to the
provisions of the laws of the respective States. nl02
As a consequence of separation of Church and State, the parties of the
Left insisted that the obligation of the State, stemming from the days ot
secularization, to participate financially in the expenses of the Churches no
99Article 1)8, par. 2.
lOOThe Social Democrats wanted to prohibit this right, but Spahn was able
to overcome their opposition when the provision was receiving its second reading in the constitutional comm1.ttee. See Linnebom, OPe ci~., p. 206.

-

l°1rbid.J KV, June 2, 1919, #426.

-

102
Article 137, par. 6.
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longer existed.

The Democrat Naumann declared, "We rio longer wish the State

to support the Churches finanCially.

The Churches must nov say, 'We will pay

our own expenses. I ,,10) Since the Social De.ocra ta were of the same opinion,
Meerfeld and Naumann made a joint proposal to the constitutional committee
which sought the "redemption of State payments" (Ab18sung der Staatsleistungen)
while guaranteeing at the .ame time the property of the Church. 104 The Center
Party and the German National People's Party were fearful of the implications
and complications such. propoeal could have.

Sp~hn

argued that due to the

post-war economic instability it was not a feaaible time for redemption of
St.a te payments. 10,

Keas demanded more def1n1 te terms from the government be-

fore expecting the Churches to relinquish their legal titles and contracts. 106
107 It was agreed
In the end the committee comprc::m1sed on this pOint.
that payments due from the State to the Churches because of same law or legal
title must be commuted by State legislation on bases fixed by the Reich.10B
Until then, these payments were to continue. 109
10)Cited in Linn.born, Ope ci~.~ p. 207.
104
Ibid

_.

10'Ibid.

106

Ibid., p. 208.
107
!!,
2, 1919, #426.
June

10B"State contributions to religious societies authorized by law, contr~
or any special grant, will be co-.uted by State legisle tion. • • • tf Article
l3B, par. 1.
109
"Until the adoption of a national law according to Article l3B, the
existing state contributions to the religious societies, whether authorized
by law, con\ract or special grant, will be continued." Article 174.

p:z
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other religious concessions were also incorporated into the constitution
through the indefatigable ettorts ot the Centrist committee meabers and the
110
DVP Kahl.
Sunday, along with legal holidays, was set aside as "a day of
rest and spiritual edification_ nlll Theological faculties were to be aain112
tained in the German universities.
Government approval ot chaplains "tor
religious services and spiritual care in hospitals, prisons, and other public
institutions" was also given a constitutional guarantee. 113
The success of the Center Party in maintaining i ts traditional religious
goals despite the strong opposition of the Socialists was highly commended.
A special vote of thanks was given by the Jerman bishops in recognition of the
"unforgettable, great service" the Centrist had rendered the Church. 114
Germania considered the conclusion of the "penetrating deliberatinns" over
the question ot Church and State a "principal achievement ot the new government" allowing all "to work toward a harmonious whole. 1I

It praised "the spirit

of freedom, conciliation, and understanding" in recognizing the important cultural significance of religion in all states ot lite, and was confident that
110
For a commentary ot the Centrist work in the conlti tutional c ODDi 1',t.e
see Mausbach and Graber's speeches in the National Assembly at the time of th~l
second reading of the constitutional dratt. Verhandlungen, July 17 1919
CCClXVIII, 1661-1662.
'
,
III
Article 139.
112
Article 149, par.

3.

113

Article 141. For a cOllUll8ntary on these articles, see Mauabaoh, Kultux '"
tragen, Pp. $1-$9; Bachem, Zentrwypartei. VIII, 29$-300.

114

Cited in Bachem, ZentrUJUpartei. VIII, 303-30$.
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u,

the final proposal of separation of "'hurch and State would resolve itself without causing financial difficulties to religious communi ties.

The nati va ease with which the Centriata were able to achieve their
historic policy of religious toleration allowed them to believe that they would
meet with siJl1lar success concerning religious education and t.he retention of
confessional schools in Germany.

However, they underestimated the opposition

of their liberal-minded coalition partners.

Perhaps nowhere in the proceedings

of Weimar was a divergence of opinion so evident as when the members of the
National Assembly discussed the constitutional basis for a national educa.
tional system in the new republic.

It was the earnest endeavor of Jlost of the

delegates to establish a liberal democratic system of education--one that
would lead to physical, mental, and social fitness in the new order.

To achUt..

this they reali.ed that some marked educational changes vere necessary.
In the first place, the old educational systeJll was considered undemocrat.ic.

Although under the Eapire education had been regulated independently

by the various States, a COlllDlon feature in all States had been ita "two-class"
syst... 1l6 There had been no common elementary school system as a basis for
higher education and adTanced studies.

Children of wealthier parents began

ll'Germania, July 4, 1919, #298. A few years later at the Second Reich,@parteital, January 11, 1922, Wilhelm Marx noted, "In the beginning of 1919 • • •
no one in our group had thought it possible to have achiaTed the rights and
freedOll of the (,;hurch in such large Jleasure." Ofticia~ Report, as cited in
Morsey, Zentrumapartei 1911-1923, p. 220.
U6The objective of education was to produce on the one hand a body of
intelligent and highly-trained experts, leaders, and officers; and on the other
hand a vast army of capable, obedient, and well-disciplined followera. See
John'l'. Cramer and George S. BrOJlIle, Contemporarz Educations A c~rative
Study of National Systems (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Worla,9~6), p. 434.
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their schooling in the Vorschule, a private preparatory school fraa which they
could transfer to a higher level of education and eventually qualify for admittance into the university.

Children of the lower classes while receiving

a sound education in the Volksschule, had no opportunity of continuing into
the university or protessional studies.

Denominational schools under clerical

supervision were organised under the same system.

117

Attempts to break the "two-class" system ot education had been made prior
to World War I, but they were unsuccesstul.

118

The November Revolutioo with

1 ts overthrow of the old empire and the establisMent of a new republic had

set the stage for reforms toward a Jrlore democratic system of education.

Under

the influence ot Socialism the new government 80ught not only to control the
educational system and centralize it, but also to oust denominationali8ll.

In

the National Assembly the Democrats also tavored a unitora elementary school
system devoid of denominationali8Jll.

Nevertheless, they wished to retain

religious instructions but under State, not clerical supervision.

This attempt

to divorce public education from Church control aroused the antagoni8ll

Church authorities and religious-minded Germana .119

or all

The Center Party as well

as the German People's Party and the National People' s iarty had struck out
against these s eculeristic tendencies.
117Ibid ., PP.

The publication of the Prussian Edicts

434-436.

l18elera Strateme18r, S~rv1sion in German Elementary Education, 1918~ (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers eollege, liolombia Universt ty
~9jff, pp. 24-28.
'
119
.
Mausbach, speaking in the Assembly on March 11, 1919, declaredr "These
ttempts • • • met with strong opposition from the Pruasian bishops the Evanelical Churches, and t~e mass of Christians." See his speech in the National
sseably, Verhandlungen, March 11, 1919, CCClXVl, 677.
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of Education of November 27-29 had brought furious repercU8sions.

120

In the

election campaign, the Centrists had made these anti-religioU8 reforms the
target of their Party's criticism.
~hortly

after the convening of the National Assembly, the contrOTersial

subject of education and religioU8 instruct.ions in public schools had been
brought. up.

On February 24, 1919, an interpellation submitted by the German

121
challenging the legality of new Ichool
122
laWi eltablished by the revolutionary governments in saae of the Linder.
National People's Party vas

read~

The docUlllent vas an attempt to initiate a debate on the school question in the
National AI9emblyJ however, the interpellation was not discussed lD'ltil March ll.
When the debate actually got under way it quickly beeDe evident that the
various parties aligned themselves into two opposing camps: those who favored
secular public schools and thole who demanded the retention of confessional
public Ichools as well as private scheols.
Pr'.or to the revolution, the educational system of Germany had been regulated by the individual States.

Because of their traditional states' rights,

the Centrists would have preferred to keep this arrangeraent.

However, as in-

dicated in the Church-5tate questiOn, the secularistic attitude exemplified by
l20Cf • issues of Germania, on November 28, 1918, #556; January 3, 1919,
#4; January 4, 1919, #6; January 7, 1919, 110; January 15, 1919, #23; January
18, 1919, #30; KV, December 17, 1918, 1988; December 27, 1918, 11013; January
4, 1919, Ill; January 13, 1919, 134, January 14, 1919, 137.
l21Arnstadt and Genossen interpellation, Verhal'ldlungen, February 24,· 1919,
CCCXXVI, 293.
l22nContrary to justice and law many individual LInder, such as Saxony,
Hamburg, and Brunswick have denied the right of religious instruction or will
do so in the beginning of the new school term after the Easter recess. Does
the government intend to take a position on the legality of the existing school
laws to protest such UlJurpation by individual gOTemments?" Ibid.

-

jiiii'"
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sau of the revolutionary state governments impelled the Center Party to rever.
its stand and call for the Reich's protection of public confessional schools
123
and the retention of private schools.
Already in the National Assembly's deliberations on March 11, suggestions
for three types of educational structures emerged.

One was the Socialist pro-

posal for a secular school where no religion was taught.

The spokesman for the

Social Democrats, C. August Hellmann, defended the revolutionary secular edueational system in Saxony claiming that it was not entirely irreligious.
merel,

8

It was

reform of the old system which had been under clerical control.

The

teaching of religion, he noted, had degenerated to rote recitatton, was therefore impractical, and should be el1m1nated. 124
The second proposal, supported by the Center Party and the parti.s of the
Right, favored a conf.ssional or d .nominational system of education whereby
the public school would be supervised by religious denominations.
very ably defended the Center's views in the debate of March ll.

Dr. Mausbach

In a length7

address he emphasised the iaportance of the religious issue involved in the
recent school reforms ot some LInder.

B,y way of example, he noted how in

Bavaria by a "simple stroke ot the pen," without consulting the Churohes,
clerical supervision ot schools had been revoked and this in direct violation

ot a governmental guarantee given the various religious groups. While admitting difterences between the Weltanschauung ot the Center Party and the parties
of the Right, Dr. Mausbach pointed out that they all agreed on the retention
of conr'8ssional and denominational schools.
l23ziegler,

Ope

cit., p. 150; Lauscher,

124verhandlunie~, Ma~ch

He detended the idea afmain taining

Ope

Cit., p. 179.

11, 1919, CCCIXVI, 673-677.
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religious instructions as a cOillpulsory part. of the public school cirriculum and
insisted that the Catholic and hvange1ical instruct.ions must. logically be under
f"

the supervision of the respect.ive "'hurch communit.y.

125

He noted further how t.he Center Part.y had placed Christian schools and
educational ideals at the head of its domestic program.

Next to personal lib-

erty of conscience, the Party supported "freedom for religious organisations
in the education of children ...126

Dr. Mausbach was highly cri tical of the at-

titude of the new revolutionary governments whose (;hurch and school policies
followed the pat.tern of Hoftmann' s Prussian reforms.

He c orusldered these at-

tacks on libert.y ot conscience as more insidious than t.he assaults ot the old
Bismarckian Kulturkampf because while the lat.ter were done in the name of power
and Rea1poli t~k.t the former were performed in the name of "freedom" and the
127
"Free People's Republic."
Further on in his speech Dr. Mausbach pointed out.
that the Catholics Who comprised the majority of the citizens along the westerq
southern, and ,eastern frontiers of Germany had always maintained a line ot defense for the country and. were willing to do the same tor the new Republic of
Germany.

But, he reiterated, assurance of contessional schools and religious

peace was a valuable proviso for the support of those inhabitants.

In conc1ud-

ing his statements, Mausbach advocated a harmonious bridging of the gap forming
between the Church and State, and proposed that the State encourage the develop
128
ment ot Christianity in the service of the general public.

-

125Ibid ., p. 677.
126
~., p. 678.
1271bid •

-

128Ibid ., pp. 678-680.
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A proposal for a third type of school structure was offered the National
Assembly on March 11 by Dr. Konrad Weiss, spokesman for the German Democrats.
Agreeing with Mausbach that the relations between Ghurch and State should be
founded on the basis of friendly religious understanding, Dr. Weiss, nonetheless, rejected the "untenable poBi_tionn of the SPD in proposing that the new
government of the Reich be built solely on economic, political, SOCial, and
cultural ideals which would neglect the
tion.

tr~

significance of religious educa-

Complete development of the whole personality, he said, rsquired reli-

gious education, and, therefore, the role that the Church plays in the formati
of the moral character of the citizen should be recognized.

Even trOll a soci

viewpoint, he argued, religious instruction has an essential place in the
school.

However, the Democrats were not so much concerned with religious in, ..

struction being a special responsibility of the Church, as theY' were in the c
plete omission of it in the elementary schools.

He even agreed with Dr. Maus-

bach that no university should be without a theological faculty taught bY' the
clergy.

His Party favored the retention of religious instruction as a part of

the school program on all levels, but most especially on the elementary level.
Nevertheless, he pointed out that the Democrats wished the schools to be emancipated fran Church control, to be secular.

He proposed an undenominational

0

mixed school, the S1lnu.l tanschule in which supervisi on of the schools and the
regulation of religious instruction would be the task of the individual Statea,
not of any particular Church.

He advocated sweeping "reforms in the teaching

0

religion, greater efficiency and effectiveness, and a dovetailing of the old
wi th the new thoughts of pedagogy.

Once these reforms would be achieved, Weis

saw no reason whY' religion as a moral guidance COUl'se could not be considered
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an essential part of tne school curriculum.
Like other

c~ntroyft'8w.

129

issues, the school question posed too manY' dUfi

culties to allow for quick solution.

It was handed over, instead, to the con-

stitutional cOJlUl'littee whose diverse membership gave no hope for an early settleMnt. Late in March the discussion in the constitutional cOllDli ttee got under
way_

RepresentatiTes of the Center supported bY' the delegates from the German

People's PartY' and the German Nationalists demanded a constitutional guarantee
for denominpt.ional or confessional schools while the Sooial Demoorats and the
Democrats held to their idea of the secular and unifonR SChools. 130 After
serious deliberations, it appeared that a solution was forthcoming when the
parties agreed that a uniform school syBtem, Grundschule, be established as tne
basis for elementary education.131 But on April 2, tensions were increased as
Gr8ber insisted that religion be considered an "ordentliches Lehrfach" under
religious auspices and that private schools be allowed to exist alongside the
public cammon SChools. 132
The question of private schools caused some concern for the Centrists.
In Protestant areas where Catholics were a minority, private schools allowed
for the proper Catholic religious instruction.
right of establishment of such schools.

The Center wished to retain the

The Social Democrats, on the other

hand, demanded the abolition of all private schools.

On this issue, the

129Ibid., pp. 681-684.

130~, March 31, 1919, 1254; Mausbach, Kulturfralen, p. 51.
1)1
tauscher, ope cit., p. 183.
1)2
Germania, April 2, 1919, #152J KV, April 4, 1919, #266; Lauscher, ,ope
~., p. 18); Ziegler, OPe cit., p. 127;!Mausbach, Kulturfragen, p. 51.
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Democrats were willing to concede the right to establish private schools provided they conformed to the same educational standards as the public schools
133
and were under state supervision.
This question found no satistactor,y solution in the constitutional committee since the Centrists and Social Democrats
could reach no agreement nor would the Centrist.s agree to the Democrats' proposal of state supervision.

134 In the end the Centrists were forced to lessen

their demands regax:ding private schools in order to secure the retention ot religious instructions in the public schools .13$ The solution to the private
schools issue was to be finally settled in the canpromise on contessional
SChools.
Maintaining contessional public schools in the German educational system
was ot paramount importance to the Center Part.y and the DNiP.

Together they
worked to gain a constitutional guarantee as proposed by Gr8ber. 136 But the .
Lett refused to accept his proposals, pressing its demand tor Ichools divorced
from religious elements.
bend.

For a time it seemed as it neither adversary would

Four more days of deliberation over the Kulturpolitik ensued.

Then a

compromise was proposed by the Democrat Neum3nn which was accepted b¥ both Centrists and the SPD. 137 According to Neumann's proposal to the constitutional
133Lauscher, Ope cit., p. 182; Mausbach, Kulturfragen, pp. 111-112.
134LaUBcher, loc. cit.; Mausbach, Kulturfragen, p. 112. The Social Democrats spokesman, Quarck, insisted his party woUld never accept a provision tor
the retention ot private schools. Ziegler, Ope cit., p. 1$0.
13$
Lauscher, Ope ci~., Mausbach, Kult.urfragen, p. 112.

136Ziegler, Ope

cit., p. 128J Mausbach, Kulturtrasen, pp. 116-117.

137
Germania, April 10, 1919, #l64J Lauscher, 22. cit., p. 181J Ziegler,
cit., p. 128. KV, April 9, 1919, #281, noted that in the heat of the dete Rheinlinder .XCIaimed, "Das deutsche Volk wird ein religiSs gerichtetes
Volk sein. odBr 9S wird kel.n Kulturvolk sein."

hi.

p
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~ammittee

on April

h,

the teaching of religion either as an "allgemeinen Moral-

unterricht" or "religionsgeschichtlichen Unterricht" was to be included in the
curriculum of all schools except those which were completely secular. 138

To

this proposal of Neumann's, Graber added that in keeping with freedom of conSCience, each teacher be permitted to decide whether or not he wished to teach
religion so that no teacher would be obliged to do so against his will.

This

concession found a favorable acceptance with the SPD. 1 39 Satisfied with retaining religious instructions in the public schools, the Center thought it
wiser to retrain fran pressuring for any further constitutional guarantees for
confessional schools and private schools, confident that in the second reading
of the school articles it could achieve better terma. 140
WhUe the school question was being d1ecuased at Weimar, the Catholic
electorate was staging deaonstration rallies all over the country to back the
Centrist efforts.

Aroused by the prospect of losing confessional or denomina-

tional schools, Catholics of Germany protested in speech and press.

Schools,

they said, were second hOJl8s and must, therefore, be institutions capable of
developing the spiritual as well as the mental capacities of youth.

Religious

education was a necessary element in the ccaplete development of the child, the
Centrist speaker Father Lichtenberg told an assembly of Catholics in Berlin. l41
An,.ar,t1,cle in Germania told the German Catholics that the choice of the type
of education was a parental right, not a state right.

To allow the state a

l38aermania, April 10, 1919, #161J !!, April 9, 1919, #281.
139
Germania, loc. cit.J !!, loc. ci~.J 21egler, Ope cit., p. 128.
14°Lauacher, Ope cit., p. 184; Mauabach, Kulturfragen, p. 86.
14laermama, April 10, 1919, #164.
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monopoly over the school system would be to abrogate the parents' rights to
choose between confessional or denominational and the secular schools.

Not

142

only that; the very establishlnent of private SChools would be made impossible.
143
Lest the,. should seem iJIlpervious to the demand of' the electorate,
Centrist delega tes Mausbach, Rheinllnder, Marx, and others publisbed articles

on the school question, reassuring Catholics that the Part,. would seek to obtain constitutional protection of confessional schools and the teaching of
religion in the common public schools.144

en

June 16 at the second reading of the school articles,145 the Centrists

attempted to make good their promises.

Gr8ber told the cOll\ll\ittee that the Cen-

ter wanted the assurance that religious instructions would be given to Children
146
To achieve thiS, he argued, it was
b,. teachers of their respective faith.
necessary to retain confessional SChoo1s. 147 His arguments gained nothing; the
142
~.,

April 13, 1919, #169.

143Anton RheinJJnder, Zentrum unci Schulpo1itik seit Weimar (F1ugschriften
der Deutschen Zentrumapartei, Berlin: 1924), pp. 8-~, claimed it was not "lIBrell'
the dut,. concerning its program b)lt the driving f'orce of' its responsibilit,.
to the electorate" which goaded the Centrists on to demand confessional schools.
144
.
See article of Mausbach in Germania, March 16, 1919, #121; Dr. Sonnenschien, ~., March 22, 1919, #131; liChtenberg, April 10, 1919, #164; April
13, 1919, #169; June 18, 1919, #273; !I, March 15, 1919, 1210; W. Marx, March 11,
1919, #214; March 31, 1919, #254; Rheinllnder, April 6, 1919, #281; April 17,
1919, #302; April 19, 1919, #310; Ma,. 24, 1919, 1404.
14SAf'ter the committee's deliberation of the various school proposals
during March and April, the subcommittee fOl'llu1ated them into several articles
comprising Section IV of' the Grundrechte. This took place during the month of'
Ma,.. On Ma,. 28 the constitutional commIttee began its deliberations on the
first reading of the newl,.-formulated Grundrechte. Much of the four-da,. discussion concerned other sections of the Grundrec6te. The discussion on the
school issue came onl,. in the second reading.
146Protocol, as cited in Ziegler,
147Ibid .; see also Lauacher,

Ope Cit., p. 149.

Ope cit., 184-165.
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SPD remained ad. . nt in their demands for secular schools devoid of religious
instructions,148 while the Democrats clamored for mixed or undenOJlinational
sohools with the teaching of religion under State supervision. 149
Atter three days ot heated debate, the problem seemed no nearer a solu-

tion than betore.
~enter's

ISO Dr. Mausbach offered various arguments supporting the

pOSition, but to no avail.

Neither the reterence to the "historic

right" of denominational schools, nor the argument ot religious freedom and
parental rigbte, nor even the threat ot a loss ot the Catholic support in the
[border regions of the Reich seemed to lIave the Lett in their position against
contessional schools. lSI It beealle apparent to the Centrists that they would
~ave

to compromise in order to win at least some concessions for contessional

schools. 152 The Democrats ottered a proposal whereby the public schools would
[be undenominational or mixed; that is, the same religious instructions would be
given to all the students regardless ot their religious atfiliation.

But con-

~essional or denominational schools would not be entirely excluded, for the
~ould

law

allow for the erection of such SChools "upon the wish of the parents ot

those entitled to education."lS)
~onfessional

Unable to obtain a definite "anchorage" ot

schools in the constitution, the Centrists "reluctantly" accepted

148mey wanted "Ausschaltung des religi8s-konfessionellen Elements in den
~ffentlichen Schulen." See tauscher, ope c!..t., p. 181,
lh9aermania, June 19, 1919, 1/27),

ISOZiegler,

Ope

AI, June 20, 1919, 1147,;Ziegler,

OPe

cit.

cit., p. 149.

1,lProtocol, as cited in Ziegler,

OPe

cit., pp. 149-1,1.

l5~aU8b8ch told the Centrists to cOlllprOl1l1se on "social matters" to prelPare a favorable climate for acceptance of confessional schools. See Rhein~Bnder,"Zentrum, p. 10.
l53 Protocol, as cited in Ziegler,

OPe

cit., p. 151.
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this coapromise.

154

By June 18 the constitutional cORllllittee had coapleted its

debate on the second reading of the constitutional draft and it was ready to be
sent back to the Na tional Assembly .155
The acceptance of this "totally unsatisfactory compr01lise nl56 by the Centrists Ulustrated the frustrating battle it was waging in the cOJlDlittee.

The

parties were so divided an all questions, especially religious ones that the
five Democrats held a pon tion which far exceeded their numerical strength in
the constitutional cOllJllittee.

Without difficulty they could control the balance

of any legislation by playing one party against another.

Thus, tor instance,

by voting with the Socialists, they could negate the proposals of the Centrists
Under these circumstances, the Center's ettorts to achieve a constitutional
guarantee tor conlessional schools were tutile and wasted.

151

Nevertheless,

just when the situation laoked the darkest for the Center Party, just when hope
for its educational demands was about to vanish, a new si ttl8til')n arose which
proved advantageoua
On

t~

tho Center.

June 20 the Democrats withdrew frca the government to demonstrate

their opposition to the Versailles Treaty. This circumstance presented a "coml58
pletely new situation" for the Center.
007 the Spn and the Center tomed
the new coalition government.
154Lauscher,

OPe

The politt.1cal climate, nov so tavorable to the

cit., p. 185.

155nue to the crisis over the acce9t~nce ~f the Versailles Treaty the
conclusion ot the constitutional committee's work received little publicity in
the newspapers.
l56aerman ia, June 18, 1919, #272J

!!,

157BaChem, Zentrumapartie, VlII, 289.

June 20, 1919, #475.

p
223
Center Party, was "greatly utilized" by it in the matter of the Kulturpolitik.:'
There was much to be accomplished.

The SPD needed the help of the Center to

achieve a majority for the acceptance of the treaty and the Center wanted a
change in the constitutional articles on education.

At the suggestion

or

Or8ber, the SPD agreed to cooperate with the Center on the school issue if the
Center Party would cooperate with the SPD on foreign policy.

Although the fun-

damental vieva of the Center and SPD were "diametrically opposed, It the two parties agreed to compromise on the school issue.
During the first two weeks of July, the Center and the SPD held interparty caucuses to formulate a new school proposal.

To secure a constitutional

guarantee for confessional SChools, the Center wished to change the Democrats'
proposal accepted by the constitutional committee at its last meeting.

The

Centrists Graber, Hitse, Mausbach, RheinlMnder, and Burlage collaborated with
the SPD to achieve a new school comprollliee acceptable to the Center Party.160
After "lengthy discussions" which involved consideration of at least sixteen
different proposals,161 the two parties reached an agreement on July 15 which
was referred to as the "first Weimar school compromise."

According to this

agreement, the consti tut1an would allow for the erection of three types of
schools: secular, denominational or confessional, and undenominational or mixed
All schools had to confol"lll to the scholastic standards set by the State, but
159MaUSbach, Kulturfragen, p. 88.
16Ooermania, July 8, 1919, #304.
161
Later Mausbach in KV, April 28, 1924, #318, described the difficulties
met with in attempting to reach an lIacceptable ll cCll1promise. The discussion
covered Articles 146, 147, and 149. A partial coverage of the discussions between the SPD and the C.ntri~ts was printed in Germania, July 11, 1919, #311.
This article indicated that a final compromise was rmmInent.
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parents were free to make their own choice in regard to their children' 8 scHoale
As a concession to the SPD, the Center agreed that private preparatory schools
were to be abolished.

Private schools as a substitute for public schools would

require State approval and were to be subject to State supervision. 162
The "first Weimar school canpromise" was presented to the National Assem163
b1y on July 18.
Graber, as spokesman for the Center, noted that the Center
164
faction had declared "unanimously" in favor of the compromise.
He described
how the Center had expanded the constitutional section on

'~Education

and

Schools" to include both a "pedagogical and social view." He admitted that the
165
Party was not c~pletely satisfied with Article 147
which placed limitations
on private schools requiring State approval and State supervision, but he felt
it was balanced by the "victory" of the Center in obtaining a constitutional
guarantee for the erection of confessional schools in Germany.166
The general reaction ot the Center to the first Weimar school compromise
167
The proposal was looked upon as a "noteworthy success
was one of great jo,y.
and "in view of the circumstances, the beat which could have been achieved. ,;1.&
Mausbach felt that the "durchaus ertrBg1iche Regelung" was "one of the best
162Germania, July 15, 1919, #318, gives a r~port of the discussion.
163
Verhand1unsen, July 18, 1919, CCCXXVIII, 1678.
164
Ibid., p. 1683J KV, July 19, 1919, #559.
6
1 5/1rtic1e 147. "Pri vate Schulen a1s Ersatz tQr 8ffent1ich Schulen bedtlrfen dar Genehmigung des Staates und unterstehen den Landeagesetzen. • • ."

-

-

166. ~!nd1unsen, July 18, 1919, CCCXXVIII, 1683-1685.
167KV , July 17, 1919, #552; Germania, July 19, 1919, #324.
168
Lauscher in a Party caucus, Janu~ry 16, 1921, as cited in Bachem,
Z.ntltUJUpartei, VIII, 321.

22,
formulas" the Center could have won.

169

But despite elation over its success,

the plenar,y session of the National Assembly on July 18 indicated that the
other parties,

esp~cially

the Democrats, did not share the Centrists'

enthusia.~

As spokesman for the Daocrats, Dr. Weiss indicated his PartY's disapproval of the comprcmise.

SGIe States, he pointed out, had already introduced

undenominational schools as their co_on schools and would have to rearrange
their systeJu to Met the new demands for the three types provided in the caaprOlllise.

He expressed d1aappointment that the SPD had reneged on ita original

demands for a uniform secular system. 170 The Majority SOCialist Heinrich
Schulz called the section on education "a step in progress," but noted that it
did not accomplish what the Socialists had aspired to.

Even though the 500ial-

ista would support the Center with a favorable vote, said Schulz, the ccapromise would continue to be entirely unsatisfactory to them.

171 The Independent

Socialist Fr1 tz Kunert lashed out against the whole section on education.
Party stood for "Einheitlichkeit, Unentgeltlichkeit, und Weltlichkeit."

Hill

In

their rejection of the complete school lIection, the Independents emphasized the
opposition to the private contessional schools, especially convent SChools. 172
Kunert·s critici_ of the Centrists and Majority Socialists was matched bT the
Democrat Richard Seyfert who voiced his disapproval of the cOilprom1se and accused the Majority Socialists of deserting the Democrat. on the issue of secularization of schools. 17 )

169!!, JulT 17, 1919,
170

The whole temper of the day's discussion indicated
~~
#~~2.

Verhandlungen, July 18, 1919, CCCllVIII, 167)-1678.

171Ibid., pp. 1679-168).
172..,~., pp. 1627-1700.
1 {5J;OJ.U.. jf. 170'9 ~ Dr. Ka tzens tein

,,8m J

1.\.

reo11ed that thJi

....

...

I JAmn~ra t.~

F
226
the tenuous position of the school comprollise.
Although it received a majority of votes in the second reading on July 1&
the compromise passed by a very narrow margin.114 The Centrists realised that
i t they wanted the constitutional guarantee ot denominational schools, they

would have to achieve a rapprochement with the Democrats before the third redding of the school section in the National ASSeJIlbly.11S This gaTe the advantage
to the Democrats who "utili.ed" their unique position to change the first Wei116
mar school compromise to their liking.
The greater part ot the controversy unleashed in the last week ot July
mainly concemed the wording ot Article lh6.

The firat paragraph, establish-

ing a common school 8ystem for all, remained unchanged.

The constitutional

cOJUdttee had agreed already in the beginning of June that:
The public school system shall be systematically organised.
Upon a foundation ot cOllDlon elementary schools the system of secondary and higher education is erected. The development of secondary
and higher education shall be determined in accordance with the needs
ot all kinds of occupations, and the acceptance of a child in a partieular school shall depend upon his qualifications and inclinations, nO!11
upon the economic and social position or the religion of his parents.
had no cause for complaint since in the "Fatherland' 8 darkest hour, n the Democrats had deserted the Majority Socialists by retusing to accept the peace
te!'lll8. Ibid.
1140ermania, July 19, 1919, #324J Lauscher, 9P. cit., p. 18S, noted that
this was due to the absenteeism ot the Democrats at this session. By a stroke
of fortune, many of the Democrats had left for Halle to attend 8 Reichspartei~ for their party, and hence were absent for the vote on the second reading
ol'the Constitution.
11SRhe inlinder, Zentrum, p. 14.
116Ibid •
111Article lh6, par. 1.

227
By this provil!lion all parties agreed to break the tvo-class system

ot education

existent under the old government.
It vas the second paragraph ot this article which the Democrats contested
so vehemently.

This paragraph, containing the so-called "tirst Weimar school

compromise," provided tor the erection ot the three types ot schools mentioned
above.

The D_ocrate argued that this would iIlpoae a heavy financial responsi-

bility upon the government which the government could 111 afford.

Besides,

those States which had recentlJ' established school systems with 1I11xed or undenominational schools vould be forced to overhaul their educational systells to
me~t the demand tor the three types of SChools. l78
The Social Democrats, dissatistied with the first school compromise,
sided with the Democrats against the Centrists.

It was not until the evening

ot the last da,. before the N,tional Ass_bl,. was to vote on the Constitution
that the three parties reached a compromise.

The so-called "second Weimar

school cOIlpromise" was toraulated by representatives ot the three parties, the
Centrist Graber, Majority Socialist Paul

L8be,

and the Democrat Rugen Schiffer.
179
According to the "second Weimar school comprCDise"
the unden01llination-

al or mixed SChools vere to' be the nora tor all States.

Rellgioua instructions

would be given not by the clergy but by the regular school teachers according

to the various denominational instructions issued by the govern.ent and approved by the clergy ot each denardnation.

Separate denominational or contes-

sional schools and secular schools could be erected as an exception upon the
l78Lauacher, OPe cit., p. 185.
1790ermania , July 30, 19l9, #344. The proposal ot ar8ber-L!be-Schitrer
was referred to as the "second Weimar school compromise" to distinguish it
tram the previous compromise presented to the Assembly on July 18.

r
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request of parents in a particular locality, but these schools had to conform
to the regular school standards. 180 Paragraph two of Article 146 containing
the "second Weimar compromise" read as follows:
Nevertheless, within the municipalities, upon the petition of
those entitled to instruction cOlllJlon schools shall be established
of their taith or ethical system, in so tar 8S this does not interfere wi th a system of school administration wi thin the . .anmg of
paragraph 1. The wishes of those entitled to instruction shall be
considered as much as possible. Details will be regulated by State
lawsl~ accordance with prinCiples to be prescribed by a national
law.
Article 149, which was included in the compromise, provided tor the inplusion of religious instruction in all schools except in secular onesl
Religious instruction is included in the regular school curriCulum, except in the nonsectarian (secular) 8chools. The imparting of religious instruction is regulated by the school laws. Religious instruction is imparted in accordance with the principle of
the religious society concerned, without prejudice to the right of
supervision ot the State.
The imparting of religious instruction and the use of
ecclesiastical ceremonies is optional with the teachers,and the
participation of the pupils in religious studies and in ecclesillstical ceremonies and festivities is left to the decision ot those 182
who have the right to control the religious education of the child.

em
~e

July 31, the proposal

National .Assembly.

onsideratian.

news.
~oal

ot Gr8ber, L3be, and Schiffer was presented to

The change in the school articles was given another

Various spokesmen tor the different parties presented their

Heinrich Schulz, speaking for the Majority SOCialists, noted that the

of his party had not been attained.

'chool system.

Nonetheless, in view of the opposition

l8°.Article 146, par. 2.
l81Ibid •

-

They preferred a uniform secular

182
Article 149.

at

lOme parties, the

f
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Majority Socialists deemed it advisable to compromise on the school issue and,
therefore, the present proposal was acceptable to their party.183

Hermann

Hofmann spoke in the name ot those Centrist delegates who were educators, and
expressed their displeasure at the "second Weimar school c OIIlprOlllise. "

"Now,

as formerl;y, we consider confessional schools as the most ideal form tor an
educational system," he told the Assembl;y.

Due to the moral diSintegration
I

concomitant upon four years of warfare, it was imperative that the German
nation have a sound moral basis for its educational system.

This he and his

fellow Centrist teachers felt, co~ be; ~tta1ned only through confessional
184
SChools.
The DNVP's Dr. Mu.m said his party, atter examining the "various
aspects tor and against," would accept the (:omprOlllise.

But Ferdinand Runkel,

spokesman tor the German People's Party, expressed his party's dissatistaction
wi th the provisions and their retusal to accept the agreement.

Likewise, the

Independent Socialist Kunert also rejected the sehool articles as completely
18S
contrary to the socialist goal ot unitorm secular schools.
Graber, otficial spokesman tor the Center, was the last to speak on the
school section.

Emphasizing that Hofmann had expressed an individual opinion

" noted
which did not represent the final conclusion of the Center Party, Grober
.

that the Center was disappointed that the "rirst Weimar school compromise" vas
supplanted by a new one.

Al though the new agreement required a "weakening" of

their demands, at least confeSSional schools were still given a constitutional
183verhand1unsen, July 31, 1919, CCCIXVIII, 2161-2163.
164
~., p. 2163.
18SIbid., pp. 2154- 21S6J 2166-2111.

I

I
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guarantee.

Therefore the Center Party, to avoid further conflict, accepted

the school articles a8 agreed upon in the second compromise. 186 Gro"ber's
speech brought the discussion of the school section to an end.

The section,

article by article, was submitted to vote and accepted by the majority of the
Assembly. 187
The Center Party came under sharp criticiam outside of the A8sembly because of its acceptance of the "second Weimar school compr(ltlise. ,,188

The

critics were dissatisfied with it; they went 80 far as to ask why the Centrists
had not fought to retain the first compromise at the price of a rupture in the
189
government coalition.
Mausbach in the name of the Centrist delegates replied by pointing to the fact that at least in a liJIlited sense they bad at190
tRine<! a constitutional guarantee for confessional SChools.
Germania, on
the other hand, complimented the Center Party on its efforts to win coneeesions for confessional schoo18.

Considering the opposition of the liberal

partie8 and the SPD, thi8 news organ felt that the Centri.sts had contributed
toward the a ttainment of a "peaceful. solution to the school problem. ,,191

186Ibid ., pp. 2171-2172.
187
Ibid., pp. 2174-217S.

-

188 KV , August S, 1919, #60S.
18~

Ibid. Later Lauscher in the Prussian Landtag assembly on December 3,
1919, expIiIiied that such a rupture W8s"justwhat the Center wanted to avoid.
SessioD Report VI, as cited in Morse,., Zentrumsp!rtei 1917-1923, p. 21S.
j

19~aU8bach in the !I, August 6, 1919, #608. For a defense of the Centrist p08 iti on regarding the school compromi8e, 8ee J08eph Mausbach, Religionsunterricht und Kirche: J.us den Beratungen des Weimarer Verfassungsausschusses
(Freiburg-im-Breisgau: Herder and Co., 1922).
191 .
August 1, 1919, #34S.
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CHAPl'ER VI
DELmER.ll.TIONS ON THE llEIUAR CONSTITUTION
CENTRIST VTh"WS ON ECONOMIC A..')ffiCTS

centrist interests in the Grundrechte extended beyond civic, religious,
and cultural rights to include social and economic aspects of life as well.
This was evident in their active participation in the formation of Section V

on "Economic Lite," which represented a compromise between socialist principles, to which the .Majority Socialists continued to pay liP-service, and the
bourgeois ideology of the Centrists and the Democrats.
GerJll&1'l1 had neither political nor economic autonomy.

Prior to the Revolut:kn
The upheaval of 1918 had

resulted in the establishment of a political democracy.

But the German people,

war-wearied, jobless, hungry, and discontented, awaited not only political reforms, but the rectifying of economic and 80cial abuses as well.

l

As the i)raditional champions of Social Catholicism, the Center had prom-

ised in its December election cmnpaign to strive for "the development of the
national

econ~

in the service of social justice."

2

AccordinglY, the Party

promised to strive toward the attainment of an agricultural policy benefiting
the public welfare.
duct10n."

It proposed a "systematic promotion of agricultural pro-

As a further incentive to the farmer, the Center favored the

lLauacher, "Weimarer Verfassung," p. 116.
2nLe1tsitse vom Dezember 1918," as cited in Ursachen und Folgen, III, 197.
231

232
"requisition of community lands and partitioning of landed estates, but with
compensation."

It l1kew1se promised "sweeping housing reforms," and coloniz-

ing of interior areas, the protection of "individual professional organizatio
as necessary members of a healthy economic
middle class."

bo~,

especially of an energetio

Reflecting its bourgeois mentality, the center Party upheld

the right of private property and proposed to further a social pollcy for all
with a strong emphasis upon the individual and the recognition of the human
dignity.

It would work toward a continuation of the "administration of juatic

in the lense of increased social justioe and increased eoonomio proteotion

ag.tnat profiteering, unfair competition, cheating, and exploitation of all
kinds."

The Party dananded lithe effective care of all the d1sabled and

wounded war veterans and their fam1l.1es."

Regarding financial atfain the

Party sought to win the suwort ot the bourgeoia group by c1rcuaventing the
tlight of oapital abroad, by preventing depreoiation in the value of war loans,
and by advocating that taxes be apportioned acoording to each citisen's
ability to pay.3

Like the Social Democrat. the Center tought againat the evils

or

capi-

tali8I\J 4 unl1lce them, the Centrists rejected Marx1st .ocialism aa a solution

to the social and economic evils ot the dq. TheT supported 1Dstead a tom or
'Chriatian Socialism" or "Chr1st1u Solidar1s." as advocated by the Je.uit
Father He1nr1ch Pesch.

His economic and social phUosophy' waa published in a

Flugschritten issued by the Centrist .ecntariat in Berlin as campaign
31bid.

4During the election campaign, the Center daanded a critical revi_ ot
the leading capitalist spirit of materialism. see QerEna, January 7, 1919,
(l0.

~----------------------------~
2.3.3

mater1al..'

The solution to the social problems of the dq, Pesch stated, ....

to be found. in a new approach to the socio-economic lite.

H18 program at

"Christian Solidar1sa" .... an alternative to both capitalism and. socialism.
SOCiety aust be reorganized in such a wq that its institutions rill foster
1nd.1v1dual liberty while securing the common good.

The principles ..hich would

secure such a result II118t govern social th1nlc1ng if' the world was to be restored to order and peace.

Solidarism disavowed absolute freedom in the

economic spirit just as it rejected. a COllpnlaor;y planned econOJl,1.

Unl1lI1ted.,

unrestrained. freedom could. be seriously harmf'uJ. to the attainment of the goal
of econolD1'.

At the same time, Pesch recogn118d. in freedom "a major, atimula-

ting moti...e 81haating the developllent of abilities. thus it demanda and protects every freedo.nich is in harmol11' 'With the cCllBllOn weltare and. which can
turther the moat favorable possible attainment ot the goal ot econcnv .,,6
Nevertheless, he warned, freedom DWlt postulate justice.
While recogn1sing the right ot private ownership, he opposed the abaolutAt,
irresponsible concept of private ownership, just as he rejeoted the soc1al1at1c
concept ot state ownership of all property.

Pesch's central notion

was that nthe gooda of the earth must serve all mankind."
mising the distribution

or

prope

He advocated. maxi-

ot private property, postulating that the State

had

the right and the duty to a ee that the property ..as used for the benefit ot
the common welfare.

As a key to industrial har.mony, he proposed the idea of

codaterm1nation (f'litbest1mmungsrecht") and or cooperatives, not strictly
limited to economic and business associatiOns, but applicable to all phases at

mus'

'Heinrich Pesch, Nicht kommun1stiacher, sondern christl1cher Soz1al1s(Flugschr1f'ten dar Zentrum&J'.6rtel ,4, Bernnl DizeiDber 2), 1918}.
6Ibid., pp. 1-6.
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public lire-lito the relation of one citizen to another and to the state, the
relation of professional. associations in the state, of international &8soo1&tions of peoples in a world cOl!Ullllllity embracilll the whole famiq of God."

He

alao favored proflt-sharing schemes based upon distributing stock among the
workers, and collective fara:1ng as a stimulus to the agrarian economy. 7
At the big centriBt electlon rally held in Berlin on January 1, 1919,
Dr. Anton Hafle, director of the 'rechn1ci81'llJ t Union, dlrelt at
SOllll

of"

Doo- __

L

-~...

SODle

length on

H3tle expressed the need of a modern "Sozialpolitik"

ttle for "mutual cooperation" between emplo;yer and employee,
\lies for laborers to allow for decent living standards. u8

Its of sociali. .,

he spoke in favor of an "equitable distri-

\ He accepted the fact of personal ownership of property and
iPrivate initiative should be encouraged, but he denounced
, which he declared IIIWIt be replaced by "cOJllJll.UUll. adm1n1as-

1

\'iT was

not a ll8Wooaer to the socio-economic field.

It had

' interest in social legialation and fiBcal policies by at, an equitalale balance be1rteen the interests ot industry
\ ,I
,. the ;years the Party had developed a sound and coherent
I

...........&.1.

phil080phT which its delegates at the National A8sembl;y hoped to embody

in the Weimar Constltution.
7~., pp.

The center was "especialq well prepared" to

7-23.

s'or the text. of this speech,

-

9Ibid.

S88

German1a, January 2, 1919, 112.

f

'I,

23.5
oppose the economic liberalism ot the day and to tight the cause ot social
justice.10 Among its outstanding parliamentarians were HitH, Tr1lllbom, and
Qiesberts, all experienced 80cial politicians well versed in labor relations.
other8, newcaaers to the parliamentary scene, 11ke BraWlS and stegerwald, also
had 8pecial protessional experience a8 labor epoke8J118n.

These Centri8t8 in the National Assembly provided the moderating torce
neceBeary in checld.ng the more radical requests of the Social Democrats who
d.anded a complete overhauling of the Qerman economic Ufe.

The Socia.li"ts

as the traditional champion8 ot the worldng man scomed the socio-economic
proposals ot the Centrists as mere "curative8 tor the
and economic evil8 ot 8ociety ...11 Socialism

W&II

aymptOD18

or

the social

the Social Democrats. answer

to these problems of the day. They postulated the aboUt ion of private property and the confiscation by the state of all _ans ot capitalist production.12

AlreadT on November 15, 1918, the Socialist government established
Revolution introduced labor reforma.

by the

ItArbeitsgemeinschattenlt or labor boards

were set up by a joint agl"Hll8nt between labor unions and emp1078r&' associ&!tiona whereby the two groups proDliBed to work together for the solution

or

all

economic and social questions involving industry and labor.l)
But these refol"ll8 were cons1dered .erely transitional.
l0Lauscher,

OR.

Not Batistied

cit., p. 187.

Ulbid., p. 186.
12see Ebert's speech ot Dec_ber 1, 1918, as cited in Ursachen und Fo;tgen,
III, 15.5-156.
l)1tvereinbarung fftr die &bergangsw1rtschaf't !t1fischen Arbeitgeberbinden
und Qewerkschatten voa 15. November 1918," as cited ibid., pp. 14-15.
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with recognition of workers I organisations and collective bargaining, the
Social Democrats attempted to establish an economic democracy which would
secure for the working class the constitutional right of participating active'll
in the regulation of all economic questions.

However, the Socialists differed

among themselves as to how this was to be atta.ined.

The Majority Socialists

favored the evolutionary socialization of Germany, whereas the Independent
Socialists demanded the immediate establishJllent of the "dictatorship of the
proletariat. n14
The attempts of the

~ocial

Democr§ts to establish a socialist society in

Germany met with opposition from the Centrist and other bourgeois delegates at
Weimar.

On February 21, 1919, Adam Stegerwald, speaking in the National Assem-

bq for the center Party, denounced Marxist Socialism as detrimental to the
human dignity of man and to the right of private property.

Contrasting JIarx-

1st Socialism with Christian Socialism, which he advocated, Stegenrald pointed
out that the former operated on the principle ''What's yours is mine"; whereas
the latter supported the notion "what's mine is yours."

Secondly, he noted,

Marxist Socialism held a "perverted notion of the omnipotent power of the State
over economic life"; but Christian Social1nt advocated a "healthy national
power" in the sense of cooperative efforts in business and labor.

'l.'h1rdly,

Christian Socialism tlencouraged and assisted individual initiative"; whereas
the other form inhibited it.

To convert to a state of Socialism as envisioned

by the Social Democrats would be harmful to the whole German economic struc-

ture. lS

l~uscher,

OPe

Cit., pp. 186-181.

lSVerhandlungen, l<'ebruary 21, 1919, COOmI, 269.
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Later on in his speech, stegerwald indicated that he disagreed with
Gr8ber who sai,d that the November Revolution was unnecessary.

Stegerwald per-

sanally felt that it was inevitable due to the deplorable conditions at the end
of october and the beginning of November.

Hence, he emphasized, it wu impera-

tive that the government prepare definite economic and social reforms to remedy

As economic goals he proposed that the government build

these conditions.

better homes, provide for larger families, have more adequate child and mother
care, social security for the s10k and the aged, care for the war veterans and
war widows, higher wages for teachers, favorable labor laws and better conditions for the farmers.

With the right legislation Germany would be able to

check the economic evils of

the~.

He suggested that the government utilize

t.he "Arbeitsgemeinschart" as a model for the further betterlll!lnt of the economic
life.

"We have agricultural boards, trade boards, commercial and labor &8soci-

i8tions for employers and employees in industry, business, and agriculture," he
[told the Assembly.

"These associations can offer worthwhile preparation for

proper social legislation.,,16
Mindful, therefore, of its heterogeneous electorate, the Center Party

proposed new forms of economic l1te that would "serve the general welfare" as
~ather

Pesch had advocated.

ithe post-war period.
talism and socialism.
over Germany.

It could not remain oblivious to the unrest of

The Revolution had intenSified the conflict between capiFrom January through April, strikes are reported all

In February a delegation of miners from the Ruhr area came to

~e1mar to protest against the economic conditions. 11
l6 Ibid •

17Germania

and KV carried numerous accounts of these strikes, especially

11I

2,38

On March 7, 1919, the government had hastily introduced two pieces of
legislation to the National Assembly--one on general socialization of key industries and another on the regulation of the coal industry.

The government I s

spokesman, Majority Socialist Rudolf Wissel, in a scathing denunciation of
capitalism, demanded immediate socialization of Germany.

He rejected the right

of private property as detrimental to the economic betterment of Germany and
insisted upon nationalization of all German industries.

The German workers,

Wissel noted, would not be satisfied until they had a voice in the arrangement
of affairs.

Therefore, he proposed the establishment of workers' councils to

suparv1Be production, distribution, and the econOJllic lite of the nation, to
sooialise enterprises, and to contribute towards bringing about nationaliza18
tion.
By attempting sooialization experiments the government at Weimar hoped

to "reviVe the sick economy.,,19 Since the socialisation legislation pused by
the National Assembly was to be used by the constitutional oanm1ttee

&8

the

basis for the eoonomio section in the Gru.ndreohte, a study of the Centrist
views will be helpful in determining the influenoe they 'exerted on the formulation of the subsequent articles in Section V of the Grundreohte.
The discussion on sooiali.zation carried on by the National Assembly during the month of March indicated the delegates' awareness

ot the magnitude of

during the months of March flnd April, when both papers carried dajJ.y commentaries on strikes and "bloody street-fighting" in Berlin, Halle, r!8seldorf,
Lichtenberg, Middle Gel'mCll\Y, stuttgart, r'r'ankturt, V#O&temberg, Brunswick,
Saxor.y, Upper ~ilesia, Munich, Hamburg, and practically every industrial area
in Germany.
18
Verhancilungen, March'7, 1919, CCCIXVI, 541.
19!y, Uarch

7, 1919, #187.

I
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Germany's post-war problems.

Brauns

intim~ted

on March 7 that the Revolution

would be incomplete without specific social and economic reforms.
been exploited by industry.

Workers had

The masses wanted not only increased wages, but

also to be recognized as human beings endowed with human dignity.

They were

entitled to certain rights which could not be denied; they sought such guarantees as individual Uberty to engage in work, cOlllJDltrce, and industry as well
as the right of private property. 20 Brauns said he could not accept the wholesale socialisation and nationaliBation of all industries advocated by the
Social Democrats.

Moreover, he warned against extreme forms ot s ocialiBation.

"There are other ways of correoting the economic and social evils, tt he told
the National Assembly.

"We must leave the door open tor various forms of

socialization and avoid a one-sided program.,,21
S1m1lar views expressed by Heinrich Imbusoh, another Centrist labor
leader addressing the National Assembly on the following

d~

(March 8),

indicated that he abhorred the evils ot capitalism as much as the Social Democrats.

As director of the Catholic Miners t Association, he demanded that the

govemment rectify earlier mistakes regarding their lack of re,ponsibilitY' to
the miners.

Too often, Imbusch said, had the worker been thought of merely for

what he could produce and not tor what he was.
treated as a commodity.
exploited.

Labor should no longer be

Human dignity must be respected; laborars must not be

The "unjust and unearned surplus revenue" gained by capitalist pro-

duction must be abolished.

Nationalisation of the coal industry would secure

20verhandlungen, March

21Ib~d., p. $$3.

7, 1919, CCCIXVI, $$1-$$2.

certain protection for the minensJtherefore, he favored it.

Nevertheless, he

was not out for c;omplete nationaliaation of all indu.stries. 22
Giesberts, speaking on the same da1', also emphuized his dissatisfaction
with the economic oonditions existent under the empire and spoke in favor of
ref'onu.

"If' the existing econollG" had been satisf'acto!7, then the desires for

change would not have been

80

strong. n2.3 Moreover, he pointed out, "the

changes of the Herrenatandpunkts in industry were too late in coming • • • and
we nOlf tace a fait accompli, that the temper and demands of the I18Bses DI18t be
met.,,24 Nonetheless, l1lce the other Centrist. aiesberts rejected the proposals
of the Socialists tor a complete state-controlled economy-.

He agreed to sup-

port a general plan for nationalization ot key industrie. but cautioned that it
DlWSt be done slowly and that each case JllU8t be sorutinized very carefully before a decision'A8 reached.

He stressed the rules involved in such new social-

istic experiments and for the time being saw no

~d.1ate

neoessity for

further national1sation. 2$
Throughout the discussion ot the socialization and national1zation laws
the Centrists upheld the notion of human dignity and the liberty of the 1nd122Ibid., j4arcll.8, 1919, CCCIDI, 583-584.

2$Ibid., p. 591. Erzberger differed frQll hisi'ellow Centrists on this
2.3roid., p. 591.

24Ibid ., p. 592.

point. -mradvocated a hasty nationalization of all public facil1ties. In the
cabinet session ot March 19, 1919, Ersberger advised that the gas, waterworks,
electricity, and street cars be nationalized "as soon as possible." Charles
Burdick and Ralph H. Lutz, ed. The Political Institutions ot the German
Revolution, 1918-1919 (New Yorks FredirIck A. Fraeger, PUblishens, 1966),
p. 266.

viduaJ., and wanted no limitations placed upon this PrinciPle. 26 But the
Majority Socialist W1asell rejected this notion; individuals had no rights except that of serving the 5tate. 21 A coalition of all the representatives ot
the bourgeois parties organised against the Socialist proposal and introduced

a provision conceming the principle of Uberty of employment which

incor-

W&8

pon.ted. into the socialization law passed on March 23, 1919. 26 These provisions read a
Every German has without prejudice to his personal. liberty the
moral duty so to use his intellectual and physical powers as is
demanded by the welfare of the community.
The labor torce as the highest economic good deserves the
special protection of the government. Every German shall have the
opportunity to earn his Uving by' economic labor. So long as suitable employment can oot be procured for h1m., his aa1ntenanoe will
be provided for. Details will be regulated by special national
laws • • • • 29
Where a need existed to banetit the general ecooo.., ot the nation, the
Center Party took a realistic view as in the case at the legislation tor
national regulation of the coal industry.

Because the mining industry was the

backbone of German econom;y, it was necessary that the government

"C01l8

to the

aid of the miners" to relieve their pUght. 30 Hence, the Party supported the
Social Democrats in nationalization ot the coal industry.

But even while it

2~'or an appraisal of the Center's vi. . , see ltV, March 1, 1919, #181;
also March 8, 1919, #190.
21Verhandlungen, Ilarch 1, 1919, CCCXlVI,

S41.

28!!, March 10, 1919, #193.
29c1ted in Ursachen und Folen, . III, 261-268. Articles 151 and 163 ot
the Weimar consti'£ution were to:rmed trOll these provisions.
JOsurlage'in the National Assembly, JlarCh 12, 1919, Verhandl5en,
CCCXlVI, 713.

r
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did so, the Center explicitly stated that it did not favor State ownership of
medium and small businesses.

31

The socialization law of Karch 23 and the law for the nationalization of
the coal industry passed on the same day were utilized by the constitutional
committee as the basis of discussion on the economic section when the committe
began its work on it at the end of March.

Spahn and GrBber were apprehensive

about the strong socialization tendencies exhibited by the Social Democrats an
wished to oheck an)" further efforts towards sooialization or nationalization
industries.

0

The Centrists told the members of the committee that the laws of

March 23 had sufficient provisions to satisfy the needs of social and economio
reform.

l.'he Centrists also insisted that the regulation of eoonomio life must

be compatible with the prinoiples of justioe in order to provide deoent living
32
.
oondi tions for all.
They teared the movement toward SOCialism would become
too extreme and attempted to moderate the demands ot the Socialists. 33
With the laws of Maroh 23 as their guide, therefore, the constitutional
oommittee began formulating the articles for the economio section.

Article 15

provided & "The regulation of economic lite must conform to the prinoiples of
justioe, with the aim of attaining humane conditions of existence tor all."
The Center cooperated with the Social Democrats in checking the evils ot eco3lsee Martin Irl's interpellation in the National Assembl)" on March 27,
1919, ibid., p. 794.

-

32Protocol, as oited in Korsey, Zentrumsparte1, 1917-1923, p. 22, •
.33See lDrenz Zach, 0 Jahre Zentrum: Wirtsohatts-und-50zial olitik iDl
Reicheta" 1871-1920 (Ber1 : Germania, 192 , p. 2 0 for an eva uation of the
Centrists' efforts in the oonstitutional committee. See also, Germania,
"Social Democrats and SOCialism," May 21, 1919, #228, p. 2.

nomic liberalism by guaranteeing "decent living conditions for all.-34 In ita
eftorts to safeguard the right of private peoperty, however, the Centrists
clashed with the Social Democrats over Article 153.

Ritze insisted upon re-

taining the provision in Preuss' original constitutional draft which said:
"The right of private property is guaranteed."35

The Social Democrats, none-

theless, placed limitations upon it by adding, "its nature and limits are
defined by law."36 They also added a paragraph to this article allowing for
expropriation of property for "the benefit of the community."

Hit.. counter-

balanced this by stipulating that it must be done "b,y due process ot

law."

....ith just compensation," and -only in case ot extreme necessity.n37
U a result of this conflict, the constitutional committee formulated

several articles involving property rights.

In the beginning of June atter

the subcommittee had presented the completed Grundrechte to the constitutional
committee for approval, Articlea 153, 154, and 156 indicated the cOllProm1ae
f1nall1' arrived at by the I18mbers.
The right of' private property ia guarM,teed by the Constitution.
Its nature and l1m1ts are defined by law.
Expropriation ot property lIllY take place • • • by due prooeas of
law. There 8hall be just compensation. • •• The property -of the
States, municipalities, and &88ociations of public utility -.y be
taken by the Reich onlY upon p~nt of oompensation.
Property rights 1m.t>11' property duties.,38Exeroue thereof shall
at the same time serve the general weLtare_
Article lS6 culled almost completel1' from the aocializationla included
34Lausoher,

Ope

oit., p. 189.

35See Preuss' original draft as cited in Unachen und rolgen, III,

433-434.
)6Protocol, as cited in Lausoher,

31 Ibid.
38-

op_

cit., p. 190.

,I
I

JIitze 1 S proposal "in case of extreme necessity":
'!'he Reicb ~ by law, without impairment of the right to compensation, and with a proper application of the regulations relating to
expropriation, transfer to public ownership private business enterprises adapted for socialization. The Reich itself, the states, or
the municipalities may take part in the management of business enterprises and associations, or secure a dominating influence tberein in
~ other~.

Furthermore, in case of extreme necessity the Reich, i f it is
in the interest of collectivism, IIB1' combine by 1_ business enterprises and associations on the basis of administrative autonom.y, in
order to insure the cooperation of all producing ele_nts of the
people, to give to eJJployers and employees a share in the manag8Mllt,
and to regulate the production, preparation, distribution, utilisation and pecuniary valuation, as well as the iaport and export, of
economic goods upon collectivistic principles • • • • 39
.
one of the biggest problema confronting the constitutional co-.1ttee was
the question of the ctouncil system.

Long before the November Revolution, the

Social Democrats had advocated the establ1shlllent within factories of councilJs

representing the workers and sharing with the employers the power to determine
working conditions.

The idea ot a system of councils acquired a runrd.mpetus

shortly atter the establishment ot the republ1c. 40 But it encountered the opoposition ot the trade union executives, especially the Christian Trade Unionists, who teared that the strong position which was theirs as a Nsult of the
capital-labor accord of November· lS, 1918, might be jeopardised.41
Nevertheless, the labor strike crisis in )(arCh convinced the government
that it must take steps to satisfy the discontented workers.

Accordingly, on

April 6, 1919, the govemment proposed that a specially constructed cOlllllittee
of economics be appointed to prepare a syatem of labor law based on tbe
39Article

lS6.

4Q.rhe Reich economic minister Rudolf Wissel suggested it ·to t be National
A.8sembq on Ma.rch 7, 1919, cf., p. 238.

-

4lProtocol, Ziegler, ope cit., pp.

,7-58.

principles of sooial (iemoorao:r_

The coDmittee was to ooncern itself' nth a

number of matters _ These included the crea,tion of workers' oouncils in the
faotories, the establishments of labor oourts, and the formulation of colleoBut before the speoial comittee got under wJq, the

tive bargaining contraots.

oonstitutional oommitteo took matters into its own hands and outlined provisions embcxtring the gover11lll8nt.s proposals of .April 6 as the basis for Artiole

16$.42
While the constitutional comittee was deliberating on the councils'
system, a change became evident in the view of the Christian Trade Unionists.
Although the:r teared a dictatorship of the counoils, some ot the more realistio
members agreed that there was

II omething

just and legitimate in suoh theories

and indioated their willingness to consider the possibil1 ties 6f the oounoils'
system.

Qiesberts, who held an important position in the Christian Trades

Union, wrote near the end

or

AprU,

We have not sufticiently appreoiated and, above all, we have realized
too late the degree ot sO'lUld truth in the idea ot the counoils. The
reason for this is that this idea has oome to us from Russia as a
politioalconoeption, and also because it arrived accompanied b:r aU
the tragio manitestations ot the Russian Revolution. It the system
of councils assures to the workers the right to participate more
completely in the organization and developDlmt of economic lite, then
it cannot help but contribute, i t this is done in a reasonable
manner, to the reawakening of the love ot work and the establishment
ot a close community ot interests between employers and employees.4.3
The first big struggle over the councils' system came on June 2 after the
subcommittee had returned the Orundrechte to the oonstitutional committee tor
its second and third readings.
42Ibid.,
OPe

The Independent Socialist HUgo Haas argued tor

l42.

LUDeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, April 29, 1919, as oited in Brunet,
cit., p. 243.
-
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the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and rejected the notion of the councils'
systea as not going far enough on the road to the establishment of a social:1at
republic.

He preferred substituting the soviet s;yatem tor the councUa'

system,1.a4 The Jlajorit)" Socialist Hugo Sinzheimar, on the other hand, dismissing the idea

at party or class dictatorship as too impractical tor the moment,

pointed to the limitations of democratic forma ot govemment and to the grave
danger ot tension between the political qstem and the social oonditions.

He

strongly advocated the sTste. of councils as a traditional stage to the attaino
ment ot a complete socialist state.

He argued that political democrac;y re-

quired complementary social and economic institutions with the Reichatag as
the organ ot political democracy and the councils as the agencies ot economic
democracy.4S
Article 16$ as outlined by the committee provided both tor an Economic
Council which was to be the sUP]!"e_ organ ot the whole Qerman collective economy, and tor Work CouncUa which were to allow workers the right to partioi-

pate in the shaping and determining ot conditions ot labor.

Hit.., Brauns,

and stegerwald who represented the Center Party on economic aftairs in the
constitutional committee ottered to accept the councils B,Yatem
in Article 16$ on condition the s)"stem did nothing

proved.

&8

provided tor

ot which the unions di8ap-

The)" wanted the assurance that the Work Councils would not replace

the trade unions and labor aesocis.tions.

Ritza proposed that "the district

economic councils and the National Economic Council shall be so constituted
that all substantial vocational groups are represented therein according to
1.a4Protocol, as cited in Ziegler, Ope cit., p.

45 Ibid.

l42.
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their economic and social importance. n46 In this way the centrists gained for
the trade unionists a constitutional guarantee that they would be given legal
recognition as the voice of the workers.

The cozapleted fona of Artiole 165

reads as followsl
Workers and employees shall be called upon to cooperate with
employers, and on an equal footing, in the regulation of wages and
world.ng conditions, as well as in the entire field of the economic
development of the forces of production. • • •
Workers and employees shall, for t,he purpose of looking atter
their economic and social interests, be given legal representation
in factory workers' oouncils, as well as in dietrict workers' councils
• • • and in a Workers' Council of t he Reich.
The d1atrict workers t . councils and the Reich Workers' Council
meet together with the representatives of the employers and with
other interested classes of people in district economic counci18
and in a National Economic Council for the purpose of performing
joint economic tas1cB and cooperating in the e:xacution of the law8 of
socialization. The district economic councils and the Economic
Council of the Reich shall be 80 constituted that all substantial
vocational groups are represented therein according to their econoldc and social importance.
The national m1n1stI7 shall, before proposing drafts of
polit1co-soctal and politioo-economic bills of iundaMntal importance, submit them to the Economic Council of the Reich. The Econoriri.c
Council of the Reich shall itself have the right to initiate drafts
of such bUls. U the national m1nistr,y fails to aBsent, it shall
nevertheless present the4ratt to the Reichstag accozapan1ed by m
expression of its views.
The complete Section V of the Orundrechte was accepted without .change by
the majority- parties in the National Assembly when it was presented for deliberation on

~

21, 1919. The Independent Socialists and the conservative

parties rejected it, but for different reasons.

Th~

Right feared the gains

made in socialisation, while the Independent Socialists felt socialization had

not gone far enough. 48 The Centrist Trade Unionists expressed their 8at1sfac-

4~tocol, as cited in tauscher,
47Article

OPe

cit., p. 190.

165.

48Verhandlungen, ~ 21, 1919, CCCXllVIII, 1155-1757.
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tion with the provisions because they guaranteed the working class better
conditions of labor. 49 Brauns praised the effort. of the constitutional
committee in preparing articles which allowed for social and economic changes
without violating the rights of private peoperty.

In the name of the centristl

he told of his PartY's acceptance of the section as a "tremendous progressive

step" in labor legislation which would work toward reconstructing the econOJDic
and social order in Gel'lll&D1".$O

Like many of the other sections in the Weimar Constitution, the economic
section reflected the compromise made between the coalition parties.

A number

of prov1BioJUI contained the more moderate views of the centrists and the
Democrats.

Economic liberty of the individual was expl1citq assured. 51 Pri-

vate property and the right of ~ritance were guaranteed,52 expropriation
was to be permiasible onlT i t it redounded to the public gooda

"The right of

private property is guaranteed by the Constitution • • • • Expropriation of
property may take place • • • by due process of law. • •

f3

Nevertheless, a number of prov1sioJUI in Section V reflected the doctrinaire radicalism of the country t s strongest party.
rights, it was stipulated, must be at the

S81118

The exercise of property

time serving the public good.$4

4988e the speeches of Ehrhardt and Brauns, ~., pp. 1784-1789; 179$.
$OIbid. J p. 1795
$lA.rt1cle 151.
$2Article 1$4.
$3Article 1$.3.

-

S4Ibid.
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The distribution and use ot the soil were to be controlled by" the state in
such a way as "to prevent abuse and to promote the object of usuring to every

,I

I

German a healthful habitation • • • • nS5

The country's natural resources and

"all economically uaetul forces ot nature n were to be placed under the super-

vision ot the state. 56 The Reich wu authorised to tranSfer to public ownership ·private economic enterprises suitable tor socialization.-'7

It was also

empowered to combine them "in the interests ot collectivism. 1t58 Every German
wu to be accorded an opportunity to earn a livelihood "by" productive work.-59
The national government was to exert itself in behalf ot the international
regulation of labor's legal status "to the end that the entire working claes

ot the world may enjoy a universal minimum of social rights en60
Notwithstanding the strong etforts of the Social Democrats to give Germany a socialist republic, the Centrists and the Democrats had managed to

check any extreme inroads ot SOCialism.

)(any

ot the Centrist promises made in

the Januar;y election campaign were fulfilled in the economic section of the
Qrundrechta.. Later, Father }lite, surveying the accomplishments of the National .Assembly, referred to the cooperative idea expressed in the constitution u

the "final tulfillment" of a long-standing desire of the Center' 8 socio-econ-

55Article 155.
56Ibid •

-

57Article 156.

58Ibid.

-

59Article 163.
60Article 162.

2$0
omic program. 61
After months of tedious discussion, debate, and struggle the Weimar Constitution had

gradual~

emerged in its completed form.

It was a document of

compromises which indicated gains and losses sustained by each party. 62

On

J~ 31, 1919, it received the final vote of the National A.ssembly.63 The
final vote for acceptance was far from unanimous.
present was 338.

The number of members

Of their votes, 262 were in tavor, 7$ were opposed, and 1

(centrist Johann Richter's) withheld. 64 The centrist vote was almost unanimows.

Table VI shan that of the 90 Centrists liste~$ 79 cut their vote tor

acceptance, 7 members were absent (1 because ot illness), 1 was excused, 8ld 1
abstained.
lie ill.

The onq dissenting vote was that of the Bavarian extrem1at, Georg

The other Bavarians, while not too enthusiutic about the centralizing

tendencies evident in the constitution, voted along with their tellow Centrists
for acceptance in order not to break the united Party front. 66
In reporting the results

or

the vote and summarizing the achievements ot

61!!, Januar,y 8, 1920, #19.
62At the Parte1t5 of the Rhenish Centrists in Cologne on September 16,
1919, Joseph Hess announced, "Die Signatur der neuen Zeit ist nun e1nmal daB
Kompromiss, die Komprom1sspo11t1k gro8sen st1ls." Report, as cited in Korse;y,
Zentrumsparte1 1917-1923, p. 230.
63verhandlungen,

Julf

31, 1919, CCCXXVIII, 2197-2199.

64Ibid• The German Jlational People I 15 Party, the German People I 15 Party,

and the'""'l'fRlependent Social1sts-the extreme Right and the extreme .Lett-voted
aga1n&t the Weimar constit1ltion.

6$ Josef ICubet.ka was not on the official llst, although he 'Wu listed
when votes were taken a f." day's previows to Jul.y 31.
66schwend, Bayem, pp. 103-104.

TABLE VI
CENTER VOTE ON THE CONSTITUTIOO, JULY 31, 1919
Delegates
Allekotte, Joseph
Andre, Joseph
As tor, Jakob
Becker, Johannes
Becker, Josef
Bell, Johannes
Bergmann, Theodore
Beyerle, Konrad
Bitta, Joseph
Blank, Lorenz
Blum, Johannes
Bolz, Eugen
Brauns, Heinrich
von Brentano di
Tremezzo, Otto
Burlage, Eduar d
Colshorn, Herman
Diez, Carl
Dransfeld, Hedwig
Erhardt, Franz
Ersing~ Joseph
Erzberger, Matthias
Farwick, Wilhelm Fehrenbach, KonstBntin
Fleischer, Paul
Frerker, Wilhelm
Gerstenberger, Liborius
Giesberts, Johann ·
Gilsing,
Anton
II
Grober, Adolf
Grunau, Augus t
Hagemann, Joseph
Hebel, Benedikt
Heim, Georg
Herold, Karl
Herschel, Johannes
Hitze, Franz
Hofmann, Hennann
Imbusch, Heinrich
Irl, Martin
Jaud, Josef
Joos, Josef
Kaas, Ludwig
Koch, Johann
Kossmann, Bartholomew
Kreutz, Franz

Distr ict

Vote

Koblenz
Wllrttemberg
Koblenz
Arnsberg
Nassau
Dlli3seldorf
rhlsseldorf
Franken
Oppeln
Hanover
K8ln
WHrttemberg
K8ln

Yes
Yes
Yes

Nassau
Aurich
Hanover
Baden
DUsseldorf
Oppeln
Baden
wBrttemberg
K8ln
Baden
East Berlin
MUnster
F);anken
Dusseldorf
Arnsberg
\Ol{h-ttemberg
Breslau
Aurich
Bavaria
Bavar ia
MUnster

~ln
D
seldorf
Pfalz
Arnsberg
Bavaria
Bavaria
II
Dusseldorf
Koblenz
MUnster
Koblenz
MHnster

Delegates

III

Absent
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
i'':--~'
,
.
Yes
Absent
Yes
.

"

Excused

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Absent
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Absent
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

)

.~

District

Langwost, Heinrich
Hanover
Legendre, Peter
Koblenz
Leicht, Johann
Franken
Lensing, Felix
Dnsseldorf
Marx, Wilhelm
ntlsseldorf
Mausbach, Josef
M-8nster
Haxen, Wilhelm
Hanover
Mayer, Wilhelm
Bavaria
. Mllner, Richard
Fulda
Nacken, Josef
K~hn
Neuhaus , Agnes
Arnsber g
Neyses, }01atthias
Koblenz
Ollmert, Karl
Koblenz
Leignitz
Otte, Wal demar
Pfeiffer, Maximilian
Berlin
Puschmann, Alois
Breslau
RheinlHnder, Anton
Arnsberg
Richter, Johann
Pfalz
Sagawe, Robert
Posen
Schefbeck, Josef
Bavaria
Schiffer, Ma ttias
MUnster
.;
Schirmer, Karl
Bavaria
Schlack, Peter
;.'> . Dlisseldorf
Hessen
Schmitt, Adam J. oJ'.,;
SclUJr1tz, Karia
Koblenz
Franken
Schneider, Alexander
SchUmmer, Wilhelm - - Prussia
Schwarz , Jean Albert
Nassau
Schwarzer, Rudolf
Bavar ia
Kgln
Spahn, Peter
Stapfer, Michael
Bavaria
Stegerwald, Adam
Klhn
Strzoda, Franz
Oppeln
Oppeln
S~cze p onik, Thomas
Tauscher, Eugen
Bavari a
Kgln
Teusch, Christine
Tremmel, Peter
Franken
Tr1mborn, Karl
K8ln
Ulltzka, Karl
0f.peln .
Weber, Helene
Dllsseldorf
Wieber, Franz
nU.sseldorf
Wirth, Joseph
Baden
Zawadzki, Konstantin
Oppeln
Zehnter, Johann
Baden
Zettler, Maria
Bavaria
~

Vote
Yes
Yes
Yes
Absent
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Abstained
Yes
Yes
Absent
Yes
Yes
III

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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the National A88embly, Germania expre88ed some concern about the tuture of

Germany under the new cOl18titution.

It wondered whether the majority parties

would be influential enough to induce the 1$ opponents to 'the constitution to
accept or at least to acquie8ce in the future legiBlation needed to supplement
the basic law ot the" land.61

The Center Party pledged its wholehearted support

to 8tand by its coalition partners in upholding the Weimar Constitution; tor,
&II

Oermania pointed out, the Center had always been a constitutional. partT and

intended to remain one. 68
The Center Party had achieved e8sent1al:q what it had 8et out to do at
the beginning ot the year.
ship

&II

It had 8ustained t.he los8 ot so_ ot its .mber-

a result of its realistic attitude t.owarda the Versailles Treat.y. and

some ot its conservative _bers. disgusted with the more liberal tendencies

ot the delegates at Weimar, began leaving the PartT- Moreover, in late ](ay
and ear:q June there appeared a rift in relationa between the Protestant and

Catholic members ot t he center Party.

The German Nat.ional .People t s PartT

capitalized upon this rift and began luring the discontented element to their
ranks.

Many

ot the prominent Protestant members who had joined the Center

after the Revolution, deserted to the DNVP.

For example, the Prote8tant

pastor ot Berlin. Theodor Haecker, was quoted
the "ChriBt.liche VollaJparte1"

&II

&II

referring to hi8 support of

a m1stake. 69 Germania felt compelled to warn

its readers to be on their guard against the concerted ettorts ot the DNVP to

61August 2, 1919, #346.
68 Ibid •

69!!, June 29, 1919, #$$0.

2$.3
win recruits from the Centrist camp.

For all serioua-minded Christiana there

was onlJr one truly Christian Party based on sound principles and that was the
oenter Party which oould never "aooept the clear slogans of chauvinistio extravagance and unchristian revengefulness" of the DNVp.70
True to it. traditions, the Center had striven to inoorporate its Ohriatlan Weltanschauung into the deliberations at Weimar.

The delegates had oause

for satisfaction "for they had fulfilled completely their dut.ies and obliga.tions." 71 Tokens of gratitude and appreciation were onered the Center Party
for its role in the Weimar deliberations.

At the first Provinsialtag of the

Berlin Center Part,.. on Sept-ember 21, 1919, Frhr. von Rechenberg gawe a publio
tribute of "thanks and aoknorlledgement tt to the delegates for their oooperation
in the oonstitutional work, and approved the PartY's position on "the questions of constitutional and oultural policies. n72

The bishops of German;r,

gathered at Fulda on August. 20, 1919, for a Ohurch oonferenoe, issued a publio
declaration thanld.ng the Oentrist delegates for their arduous work in defending
Church principles despite strong opposition.

Although the bishops spoke

against a few specifio articles ooncerning Ohurch affairs and education whiob
they did not favor,7.3 thq nevertheless acknowledged that through the sole
efforts of tba Centrist delegates, the original draft of the oonstitution regarding religious questions had been "improved and supplemented. n 74

70~ 4, 1919, #298.

7laermania, September 22, 1919, #434.

-

72Ibid.
7.3Articles 10/1J 137) l.38) 143-149.
74eeB1shops' Declaration ot August 20, 1919, n as cited in Bachem, Zentrwuf!!tei, VIII, 30.3-304.
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Later, Kausbach at the first Reichsparteit!l of the Center Party on
January 22, 1920, referred to a statement he had received froll fta high ChUrch
digni'tary" which thanked the Centrist delegates of the cOJllJtitutional committee in the nama of the Church "for their earnest and honorable labor.,,75Tbe
Centrist delegates themselves spoke with satisfaction of their wcrk. Wllhelll
Marx in an article describing the

cluded it with the stateDWmt.

Cen~er's

position on the Kulturfragen con-

"The Center can in truth and

consci~ntioU8

con-

viction s8l' of itself that it has perf'orEd its entire duty and obligation
(Pf'llcht unci Schuld.1gkeit)."76

75Re~rt, January 22, 1920, as cited in ~., p. 304.
76nHat die Zentrumspartei in Kultur~ragen veraagt?" Westdeutsche Arbeitterzei
J Ma.Y 29, 1920, 622, as cited in Mora.,., Zentrumspartel1911-192j,

/

CHAPl'ER VII
CONCLUSION
The Center' a record. of political achieveDltnt during the relatively'
ahort period from November 1918 to August 1919 is an impressive one.

In the

face of difficulties and obatacles, the Party labored to aecure for its
electorate guarantees for the adequate protection of civil and religious
rights.

Under it left-oriented leadership, it had adjusted realisticalq to

the chaotic conditions of the

~diate

poat-war period in Germany'.

Prior to the Revolution, cOl18ervatism had alwqs been a basic characteristic of' the Center.

Ita leadership, consisting of bureaucrats, landowners,

clergymen, and profeasional men, had supplied the political ideas for the
Party.

But a lert-oriented faction within the Party, more cloaely attuned to

the demands or the masses, gradually began to exert its influence.

Assisted

by the growing discontent, war-weariness, and demoralizing conditions in
Germany in

Matthias

the last Tears of the war, this group under the leadership of'

}<~zberger

was able to veer the Party toward a coalition with the

parties of the Left in July 1917.

Conservative, ariatocratic Centrist

leadera, however, suspicious of' the restless proletarian ele.-nt and fearful
of the outcome of democratic ideals, disapproved of parliamentary ref01'll8 and
continued to support the monarcy and the parties of the Right.
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Later, in
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October 1918, nevertheless, the lett...-ing faction of the Center Party succeeded in obtaining, albeit

reluctant~,

the Center Party's cooperation tor con-

stitutional refoms which converted Germal\Y to a constitutional monarchy.
Unfortunately, these politioal reforms were too late in cCllldng.

Disor-

ganized and demoralized, succumbing to riots and radioal agitation, the imperial regime in Germany gave way.

within a few.eks the age-old thrones and

dynasties oams toppling down, and overnight, so to speak, GerJl18l11' witnessed
the establishment of a soc1al1st republio with workers' and soldiers'
councils in ascendenc,y.
Most ot the conservative leaders of the Centrist Reioh's committee were
unprepared for these revolutionary events of early November 1918.

Up to the

very da1' of the Kaiser·.8 abdication, they had stolidly supported the monarchy.
Unable to reconoile themselves to the new German Republic this oonservative
"old-guard" withdrew from Berlin disillusioned and retired to their home
states.

They were no match tor the type of leadership demanded by the

perilous times.
In the midst ot this crisis, the democratically oriented faotion ot the

Center came to the fore, assumed the challenging position of leadership in the
Party, and prepared for the cOming election of a National Assembly whioh was
to decide the politioal tate ot Germany.

To provide greater cohesiveness for

the various factions within the Party, a reorganisation of the Center's
national structure

W88

arranged by establishing a general-seoretariat in

Berlin. Following this, the Centrist leadership prepared to .et the demands
of the "new times," proposing a reexamination of the Party's fundamental principles.

Alread1' by the m1ddle of November, several plans for a new party pro-

gram had been submitted to the Cent-ut

'RA,..11n

1...... _............

'fn,.. nnNlitiA'NI+.inn

.....
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Divergent shades of conservatism, l1beralum, and radicaiL social reform were
evidenced in the proposals.

The left-oriented Cologne Plan called for a com-

pletely new organization of the Center's program; the more moderate Berlin
Plan suggested a readjustment of party principles to cope with the changing
times.

Both programs offered similar plans for a democratic :tntercontessional

party structure.

A further suggestion that the Party's name be changed to

signify its intention to "come out of its tower," met with conflicting opinions within each group.
Internal tensions already apparent prior to 1918 were accentuated by the
Revolution. tllls making party solidarity and unanimity d1t'ficult to maintain.
Due

to its heterogeneous composition, the Center Party had to cope with prob-

le.118 in reconc111ng all its socio-economic interests into a single acceptable
party program.

The majority found it hard to relinquish allegiance to the old

monarchy and accept a republican structure for Germany, but expediency necessitated submersion of emotional. attachment to the old state stru.cture.

In

order to save the Reich's unity and. overcome the radical disruptive foroes
rampant in Germany-, it

11'88

necessary to recognize the Republic as "the onq

possible vehicle to get out of the chaos of revoiution." After a month's
deliberation" a national Centrist committee drew up a list of "guiding principles" which

11'88

to serve as the Center's political program in the election

campaign for the National Assembly.

These Leitslt_ of Dec8Jllber 1918 revolu-

tionized the PartY-'s political theories while retaining the basic principles
of the old SOest Program.

Assuming a realistic vin of the ravolutionar,y

events of November, the Center Party abandoned its traditional allegiance to
the monarchy.

NOW' called the "Christlicbe Volkspartei," the Party- accepted the

2$8

Revolution

a fait accompli, and entered the election campaign

811

88

a

supporter of a democratic republic.
A. deciding factor in facilitating unanimity among the divergent interests of the Center was the radical anti-religious actions ot the revolutionar,y
government.

The appointment of the Independent Socialist A.dolf Hoffmann as

Kiniater of CUlt-tire brought a stream of protest from the catholic electorate.
The center

811

traditional champion of religious rights

11'811

forced to submerge

its various social, pOlitical, and economic differences to _et the challenge
ot Hottmann's new Kulturkampt.

Capitalising upon the religious issue, the

Party had managed to torget local differences and to present a united tront.
But the 1aage
exist.

or

sol1darit)"

11'88

deceiving; Party unaniaity did not actuall)"

The right-wing conservatives, content for the time being to remain in

the background, awaited post-election development••
The result. of the National Assembly election were gratifying to the
Center Party,

Despite the recent loss of Gel'll&llY's densely populated Catholic

frontier area, the "Chrutliched VolkBpartei" emerged from the tirst national
election ordeal of the new democratic state

88

an important political tactor.

Receiving the second highest number of votes, the Party obtained ninety-one
seats in the National A.8se1libly.

As in previous election returns, the delegates

represented a cross-section ot the varied socio-econoJDic composition ot the
Party.

Yet, there was a arked difference in the strength

groups represented.

or

SOl8

or

the

Conspicuous for its abseJlce was the usual representation

of the conservative wing.
represmtation from labor.

On

the other band,

cl

definite gain was noted in the

Nevertheless, despite an increase in liberal repre-

sentation in the Centrist delegates to the Assembly, the Party remained basi-
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call7 a middle class party with a slight. leaning toward the lett in its sooioeconoll1c viaws.
It the Party membership displayed little enthusiasm for the republic, it

was almost with replgn&nOe that it vi81l'8d acceptance of an invitation from. the

sm who, falling a majority of the election returns, were forced to

uk the

Centrists and DeDlDCrats to join with them. in a coalition gover11lll8nt.

The ele

tion campaign had stressed so forceful.l¥ the dirferenee between the Centrist
Christian Weltanschauung and JIar.x1Bt Soo1al1s. of the SPD that cooperation
wi th them seemed Ulogical. But the Centrist delegates could not remain
imperrious to the seriousness of the times which deanded a strong stable
governu.nt for GerMlV".

Since this could be achieved only through a coalition

of the three major parties, practical-aa1nded st&tes.n of the Center Party
advocated that civio responsibility and concern for the ... elfare or Geran7 be
set above party interests, and that the delegates, despite their repugnance,
take steps to join the coalition.

The decision ...as not an easy one, nor· d.1d

it win full acceptance; the vote ot the reactiona::y Bavarian partioularist remained negative even when the _jority of delegates agreed to collaborate
with their eretwhUe enemies.
A.a an active _m.ber of the first Weimar Coalition, the Cen.t4.'r .Part;y .....

faoed ...ith the responsibility of obtaining favorable peace telW tor GermBD1'a moat difficult task in view of the truculent attitude of the victora.
though the PartY"s reaction to the harsh peace teras of the Allies .....

Al88

ve-

hement as that of the JJlD8t avid Nationalist, the realistic appraisal given b7
the cctr1sts to the altematives confronting defeated oerm&lV, compel.l8d the
Party to side ld. th the SPD and vote for acceptance of the Versailles Treaty.
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accepting the peace te:rJD8, the center holding a pivotal parl1am..nt817 position
brought about the .nd of the futU. stalest. and saved their countl')'lll8n the
horrors of further Allied occupation and the hardships of a continued

bloo~

Another major responsibility assumed by the Centrist delegatea ...as the
task of cooperating in formulating a democratic constitution for

Ge~~

The

Weimar Constitution, adopted on July .31, 1919, and promulgated on AUguBt ll,
1919, was a un.1que document 1n many respects.

Although the form of gov.rnaent

was a republic, it was deSignated as the German Reich with all its imperial
associations.

Oonflicting 1nterests represented in the National Ass ••bly ....re

evident 1n the number of compromis.s upon ...hich the Constitution ...as bas.d.
One of the issues was that of the centralized state v.rsus the federal state.
In the end the centrist f.derative prinCiple was retained.

However, exponents

of a unitary solution did not .merge empty-handed for the national gOV8rIB8nt
gained more power than held by its imperial predecessor.

Legislative authoritr'

vest.d exclusively 1n the Reich was enormous, embracing such things as foreign
relatiOns, national defense, tariff and moneta1")" polici.s, o1tisenship, md
coaaun1cation.

Koreov.r, the Reich was given unlimited power to deal with a

great many other matt-.rs, such as civil and -criminal law, judicial proc.dure,
poor relief, tne press, the protection of mothers and children, public health,
labor, expropriations and 8ocialisatiol1ll, cOllll8rce, banking, industry, railways
and 1nternal navigation, and theaters.

It could lay down "fundamental princi-

ples" in regard to education, the right ot religious bodies, lllld distribution,
housing, and the taxing of the tJlnder.
EDcutive power was vested 1n the president of the Reich who was to be
.l.cted directly by the people for a term of' seven y.ars with the possibility

...
i
'I
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ot re-election. Arr1' German at least thirty-five years of age was eligible tor
the office.

The eDcuti"

W8.8

given power to make treaties and alliances,

appoint and remove the chancellor and other _bers of the national goyernaent,
given supreme command of the armed forces, could dissolve the Reichstag, and
subject &IV' law enacted by parliament to a popular referendUJI.
was given broad emergency powers under Article 46.

Aboye all, he

"In the event that the

public order and security are seriously disturbed or endangered, the Reich
President DUQ" take the measures necess&r.y tor their restoration, intervening,
i t neces8&ry', with the aid ot the armed forces."l

For thie purpoae he could

abrogate temporarily, whollr, or in part, the fundamental rights laid down in
the Constitution.
Legislative power wu vested in a bicsneral body.

..bers

or

the lower

house, the Reichstag, were to be elected for a lIUlX1mum of four years by secret,
universal suftrage and according to proportional representation. '!'he Reichatag was the supreme expression of the popular will and the sOTereign legislative power.

It initiated and enacted lan subject to a suspensive veto.

The

cabinet was responsible to the Reichstag.
The Reichsrat, the upper house, represented the German states (LInder).
Each state was to haV'fP at leut one member in the Reichsrat.

The memor,r ot

pre....ar Pl'Ussian control of the Bun<iesrat had led to a stipulation that no one
state could control more than two-f1£tha of the councU-a prav1sion fully
supported by the Center Party.
gether with the cabinet.

The Reicharat could initiate legislation to-

It it disapproved a _asure passed by the Reichstag,

it could return the b1ll to that
lArticle 46.

~J

the latter could override the veto, by

i
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a two-thirds vote.

The Reichsrat was to enjoy less power than it had in the

Bismarckian Reich.
The moat un1que feature of the Weimar Constitution and one on Which the
center eDrted much effort and influence was the second _jor division-the
Grundrechte.

Look1ng back to the days of 1848, the makers

ot the conetitution

incorporated into their document the treedoms that had been sought in that
revolutionary year.

All Germans were declared equal before the law.

were free to travel or to emigrate from Germany-.
anteed and there would be no censorship.
guaranteed as sacred.

They

Freedom or speech wa guar-

Communications and the home were

The constitution went into detail not only' on the crit

cal question or civil rights but also on economic, social, and religious matters.

Practioa.J.ly' every facet of German life was treated in the constitution.

A letter-perfect dOCUJDent, the Weiaar Constitution was too \UDl'1eldl;r to be

practical.
Unable to achieTe its goals in all afrairs, the centrists compromised on
lesser issues in order to gain concessione which the Party oonsidered essential
to its Christian WeltanschaulUlg-avo1d.ance ot a complete separation of Church
and state, protection

or the Church privileges, a constitutional guarantee or

cQnfessional schools, and other :fundamental rights which the Party sought over
the oppoaition or its IIIOre liberal coalition partners.

1I1ch of the Il1ccess or

the center Party during the nine months under diecussion was due to t he capable
leadership of 8uch men as,

Gr8ber, Ersberger, Trimborn, Fehrenbach, Jlausbaoh,

Brauns, Spahn, Hit .., and Marx.

Though representing dirferant shades ot

political thought, these men generally united in a positive policy for the
Party.

Skilled in group diplomacy, ocoasionalq ruthless, zd always nexible,
litical realists who never

26)

t.he price.
Despit.e
att.ained.

~ic

leadership, unanimity within the Party was never tull,..

The discont.ented conservative monarchists within the Party subjectad.

t.he leadership t.o sharp criticism, especially after the accept.ance of the
Versailles Treaty.2 With the adoption of the Weiar COD8tit.ution on August l.l,

1919, the stom of criticism broke wit.h sudden fury.

In Catholic circles, in

the Party itselt, everywhere, conflicting views on the Constitution were being
aired.) A new struggle had emerged, a VertusUDgaatreit, not unlike the
Zentrwnast.reit of a few )"eara previous.

The published document of the Conati-

tution was aubjected to cloa8 scrut.iny', and ever)" new discovery of compromise
was greeted with the atinging lash of criticism. 4
staunch lIlonarchiat.s found it. dll!icult to :reconoile their fOl"lMr views
on monarclrlcal power to the new d_oor&tic ideals. The center'. acceptance of
the compromiae oonceming the national oolors

11'88

versy for disappointed monarchist... reproaohes.

t.he focal point of centroTheae aeoret supporters of tbt

1Il0n8rcby a .... t.he last symbol of the old atolid mona.rdW:al regim.e-"tbe proud

old German flag under which millions of our beat people have gone to nctal)'"
2,. W. Hopmann, "Das Zentrum von haute," Historisoh-ellt1aohe Blltter
fur daa kathol1ache Deutsohland, CLXIII (1919), pp. 232-243. See ilso Dii
Zentrum ad :rrrwegen1 AUCh eIiie Kriegsbilans von einelll rheinisohen ZentrU'msmann {E!'aen: V01.k8ver1.ag, 1.91.9,). Both art1o.L8S .D'( the aane author are
cEllcal of the Center'a role in the peaoe negottatioll8.
Jrerdinand Frhr. von r«rstenberg, a contemporar;y and aevere oritio of
the Center's policiea of 1918-1919, wrote reoentq of t.he difficult,.. COD8ervative Catholios had. in 1918 in accepting the "complete policy of reversal from
conservative to liberal atand" taken by the centrist leadership in 1918.
Letter from Ferdinand Frhr. von FUrstenberg to the author, November 10, 1966.
4Hermann von IJlningk, "~ zentrum am Scheideweg," re}rint from.
Historisoh-politisohe Blatter fur daa katholisohe Ileutscbland, CLXV (Januar;y,

1920), 9-17.
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and to deathll-replaced by' the "flag of the revolution."S The acceptance of
the n_ flag sign1.t1ed far these conservative critics

or the centrists a re-

jection of the traditional fundamental principles of the Old center Party as
exempl1!1ed in the Soest Program of 1871. 6
A still more important area of the Constitution whioh oame under heav,y
criticism was the compromise on the school question.

Despite the tremendous

odds against the Center and their efforts to secure constitutional recognition
of confessional schools, the critics of the Party felt that the Centrist delegates had reneged on their principles. 7 Because of the large number of centrist delegates on the oonstitutional committee (six out of twenty-eight), the
catholics in GerIlaDT and the member. of the center Party in particular overestimated the delegates' strength and expected that they should have been able
to introduce their political program with ease, espeoially in regard to

religious and school affairs. 8
Aocording to Hermann. Freiherr von Illninok, grandson of Hel"ll8lln von
Mallinckrodt one of the Original founders and leaders ot the Cmter Party, the

24.
6see Hermarm von 1Jn1nck, Katholiache Politik (K81na Verlag des st.

SIbid. , p.

Josephs-Vereina, 1921), pp. 3-9.
7r.!n1nck, "Lentl"Wll am scheid.eweg," pp. 2-9. Jlausbach, especially is
criticised for "falling to take a definite stand in the constitutional
committee for Christian ideals and principles •••• • Ibid., pp. 6-7.

---

Ssee Bach., Zentrumapartei, VIII, 289. )(ausbach, Re~ionsunterricht
und K1rche, p. 26, wrote that those who raised critioia ag Mt the We1iiir
constitUEIon for its irreligiOUS aspects would find it difficult to na. a
single IIOdsm constitution in the world which oontained &8 many significant
sta.tements on religion as those found in the Weimar Constitution.
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conservative element 'Wi thin the Party diaapprOYed of the le:tt-oriented Cent
leaderabip diaplqed at Weimar because of what they considered to be its betrqal of the Christian Weltanschauung.9

In their scrutin;y of the Weimar

Constitution, the critics singled out Article 1, which stated "political
authority emanates from the people," as an example of the rejection of
Christian prinCiples and the acceptance of secularistic vi_s on govem.ment.lO
Criticism of the Center Party in its 'Work at We1mar culminated in the
assertion that the Centrist leaders had neither identified nor supported the
catholic principles of the Party in a satisfactory manner. ll The prospect of
taking the oath to support the Weimar Constitution caused such concem for th
traditionalists that Mausbach sought to allay their fears by publishing two
articles in the K8ln1sche Volksseitung in which he showed there was no "moral
hindrance prohibiting anyone from taking the oath ...l2
The Verfass'!18sstreit which

1fU

tearing the Center Party appeared to

have been instigated by the d1V81"8ity of opinion on the Weimar Constitution.
This, however, was not the case. A cleavage ldthin the Party had already
been Ilowly deYeloping since 1912 when the more liberally inclined left 'Wing
began its ascendancy to Part;y leaderahip.

Unable to reconcile their national

1st views to the new leadership of the Part;y after 1918, manT ot the traditional cQD8ervatives telt compelled to "tum their back- on the Center Party
9Lnmnck, Kathollsche Po1itik, ;vp. 4-8. rllninck recentq reaffirmed
~ttW trom Hirmann von LUn1nck to the author, September 3, 1966.

this vi_.

l0tGninck, "Zentrum am Scheideweg,. pp. 9-17. Hopmann, "Das zentrum von
heute," PP. 28$-292.
ll.I!Un1nck,

OPe

cit., p. 2.

l2October 20, 1919, #824. November 2$, 1919, #923.

266
and to seek refuge with the Right. lJ

In January 1920, the Bavarian particu-

larists complAttely dissatisfied with the centralizing tendencies of the new
govern.nt, broke with the center Party over Ersberger's national finance progr_ cd went their am

wa:r.

it. strength.

real1stic _l1bers of the Party, on the other hand,

The

lDDl"8

This

W811

a great blow to the Party and weakened .

recognized that the Weimar delAtgates had remained true to the Party'. basic
pr1nciplu.14
Unfortunately for the future of the center Party the d1nam1c leadership
of 1918-1919 was short-lived. Within a fflf( year. lIalllY of the indetatigable
Centrist delegates of the National Assembly had withdr8ltl1 from political life
or died. lS The fflf( .eillar leaders who remained ....re unable to cope with the
strong conservative element which was again colling to the fore.

Since a

majority of the Center Party had never been tully comm:Ltted to the Weimar Constitution and the Republic, the Galter Party slipped back into its cOll8ervati'n
and ccmplacent roles once its energetic leadership had passed from the scene.
l.3tf1n1nck, OPe cit., p. 12, "It 18 now necessary to demand that the Center Party openlY recognise the superiority of the monarchical system and declare itseU for restoration of the monarclV" as soon 88 political circumstances are favorable. It this 18 not done, then all those who Br8nfor monarclV" are free to tum their backs on the Center. n Agreeing wi tb Liininck was
the anonymous author of ttber die politische und parteipolit18che SteUung der
lcathol1schen Deutaohen von e1ri8i iOlchen (Bresau: 'erag von It'Uri I'riCise,
n. d.), p. 1, who sud, ",or Chr18tliii-conservative Catholic there 18 no
opportunity nor possibility to participate politically in the Center."
l4see Giesberts' speech at a Center assembly in nLseldorf on JUl..y 27,
1919, Germania, Jul¥ 30, 1919, #341.
15J1aWJbach retumed to his duties of teaghing atter the completion of the
work of the National. Assembly in Hay 1920; Or8ber died in November 1919)
Trimborn in July 1921J Enberger was assassinated in August 1921. Hit.. and
Burlage l1kewise died in 1921. By 1925 Spahn, Fehrenbach, Gerstenberger, and
~er had also died.
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Lacldng the realistic v1Enrpoint of an Erzberger, GrBber, or Tr1mborn,

the new leadership was doa.d to failure.

Quic~

it abandoned ita prom1aing

inter-coni'essional party basis and began to narrow its interest to strictly
Catholic demands,
tion.

espec1a~

concerning the partiall1 unsolved school ques-

A,nti-democratic foroes again asserted themselves as the Party veered

more to the Right, gay from the Centrist's former liberal-democratic
position.16

It was this alignment with the Right which eventually unde:na1ned

the canter Part.r. 11
The Centrist leadership in 1918-1919 had made a positive contribution
toward pacifying and stabilizing the revolutionary elements of the poat-war
Germany.

That the Weimar Republic succumbed after fifteen years of existence

was not so muoh the result of failure on the part of the center or the other
bourgeois parties as it was the aocumulation of extenuating circumstances
during the post-war period.

It is a moot question what might have happened

i f the Genter had continued to be led by leaders of the same caliber ..

Erzberger, Gr8ber, or Tr1mborn.

1~r8ey, Zentrumapartei 1911-1923, pp. 601-619, Attributes the waning of
the centrist vlt&llty &lter 192) to fis loss ot adequate leadership and its
abandoning of its intercontession.al basis. Korstty repeats this same idea in
his article, "Das Zentl'Wll zwischen den Fronten," in Der Weg in die D1ktatur
1916 bis 1933 (Mltnchen: R. Piper & Co., 1963), pp. 95-120: See ilso bita,
Dimoki'atie Ii Zwielicht, pp. 61-11, who holds a sim.1lar view but place. more
stre8s on ti11ure to retain the Party's tntereonte8sional basis.
17Edgar Alexander, "Church and Society," in Church and SocietT, pp. 469414, claims that the election of the cleric Luciwig kiii as l'iiP;y c'fia.1.ntan in
1928 deteated the Party's trend ot a realistic intercontossional Center policy
on a broad tront and steered the Party toward a "clear-cut coalition" with the
Right. See also Joseph Rovan, 'tAt cathol1cisme Politique en Allemagne," in
H1stoire de la Demooratie chretienne, II (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1956),
p. 114, Who compares the reilIitic attitude ot the center in 1918 with its
complacent rightist attitude in 1933 and accuses the center of dealing the
death blow to political Catholicism by voting tor the Enabling Act which
delivered Germany to Hitler's terror.
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From November 1918 to AugWlt 1919, the Center Party under able leadership played a prominent role in the development of the democratic government.
True to its traditional position in German parliamentary life it exerted a
moderating influence on the political extremes and strove throughout the
period to uphold the Center's old slogan of "Truth, Justice, and Freedom'"
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